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PART XVII.

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FURTHER · CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

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January to March 1909.

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125	" ..	319	23,	Indian oil guard. Refers to No. 361, Part XVI. Transmits letter from Lieutenant Wilson, giving his views as to ..	68
126	" ..	321	28,	Seistan muleteers and Afghan horsemen. His Highness Ala-es-Sultaneh has complained of incident between. Has made inquiries of His Majesty's Consul in Seistan. Scene of incident is in debatable territory. Has communicated result to Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	70
127	" ..	322	28,	Zil-es-Sultan. Reports that in view of proposed communication by two Ambassadors, Zil has telegraphed to the Shah and to Naib-es-Sultaneh, his brother, expressing his surprise at representations of two Ambassadors ..	71
128	" ..	323	29,	Seizure by Ain-ed-Dowleh of Imperial Bank's money. As his representations had no result, has presented a bond for whole amount for signature of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Fears that penniless condition of Government gives little hope of repayment ..	71
129	" ..	324	29,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 120. Joint representations with regard to new Council. Saad-ed-Dowleh and the Shah. Former has been deputed to ask whether advance of 400,000L. could be made in return for granting of Constitution. Bast at Turkish Legation. Shah's written promise to publish electoral law: not fulfilled. Situation in Tehran ..	72
130	" ..	325	31,	Monthly summary of events in Persia. Transmits, for December 1908, drawn up by Mr. Churchill and Major Stokes ..	75
131	" ..	326	30,	Bushire customs receipts. Gives extract of Persian Government's reply to his request concerning, and discusses ..	81
132	" ..	327	30,	Situation in Azerbaijan. Transmits three Reports from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez. Nationalists have maintained comparative order of late in and around Tabreez. Ain-ed-Dowleh has been active ..	82
133	" ..	330	31,	Persian financial position. It appears from No. 400, Part XVI. that M. de Hartwig fears that unless Shah is supplied with money by two Powers he will turn to Germany. Doubts this, and considers that Persian Concessions would not find a ready sale in Germany ..	86
134	Sir A. Nicolson ..	12	Jan. 5, 1909	German officers as instructors for Persian army. M. Isvolsky said he had no news on the subject, but Persian Envoy was now in Berlin ..	87
135	" ..	23	11,	Situation at Tabreez and at Ispahan. Reports interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs on subject of serious state of anarchy in Persia, and has pressed M. Isvolsky to let him have Russian Government's Memorandum on the subject as soon as possible ..	87

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
136	Sir A. Hardinge ..	7 Confidential	Jan. 15, 1909	Ala-ed-Dowleh. Reports interview with. Has been asked to return to Persia by the Shah. His views on the situation ..	88
137	Sir G. Barclay ..	47 Tel.	18,	Karun irrigation. Minister for Foreign Affairs admits that option for two years for Concession has been granted to late Dutch Minister in Tehran. M. Sabline knew nothing of it. Will defer reminding Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sir C. Spring-Rice's note to Persian Government (see No. 234, Part VIII) until Minister for Foreign Affairs has submitted copy of document supplied to M. de Sturler ..	89
138	Sir F. Bertie ..	34	17,	Zil-es-Sultan. Zil has inquired whether it would be better that his box should be brought by Mr. Churchill or sent, insured ..	89
139	India Office ..	..	18,	Transfer of Imperial Bank's lien from receipts of Kermanshah to those of Bushire. In reply to No. 106, concurs in terms of proposed telegram to Sir G. Barclay ..	90
140	Sir G. Barclay ..	48 Tel.	19,	Situation at Ispahan. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that Bakhtiaris have arrested official delegated by Persian Government to collect taxes. 1,500 Bakhtiaris in Ispahan ..	90
141	" ..	49 Tel.	19,	Situation at Tehran. Interview with member of late Parliament, who explained views of Nationalists. Latter afraid of control by British and Russian Governments, and only desire intervention to bring about re-establishment of constitutional régime ..	90
142	" ..	50 Tel.	19,	Karun irrigation. Has received copy of document mentioned in No. 137. Terms vague, but mention made of two years' option ..	91
143	To India Office ..	..	19,	Second wire from Tehran to Shahrud. In reply to No. 110, deprecates suggestion to ask Russian Government if they have any objection. Proposes to send copies of correspondence to Sir A. Nicolson with instructions to explain situation to M. Isvolsky ..	91
144	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	54 Tel.	20,	Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia. Refers to No. 117. Transmits draft of proposed communiqué to press on subject of. To be submitted to M. Isvolsky ..	91
145	To Sir G. Barclay ..	26 Tel.	20,	Financial advance to Persia. Refers to No. 229, Part XVI. His Majesty's Government cannot consider question till M. Bizot's report is received. Inquires when report will be ready ..	92
146	" ..	27 Tel.	20,	Transfer of lien of Imperial Bank from Kermanshah to Bushire customs. Refers to No. 96. His Majesty's Government regard proposal as provisional ..	92
147	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	22	20,	Tabreez Nationalists' threat to cut wires of Indo-European Telegraph Company. Transmits copy of telegram from Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran handed by Count Benckendorff to Sir C. Hardinge relative to. His Majesty's Government have not considered the contingency ..	92



No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
148	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	23	Jan. 20, 1909	M. de Hartwig's return to Tehran. Russian Ambassador is convinced that M. de Hartwig will not be allowed to return, but has written to M. Isvolsky. Better to await developments .. ..	93
149	" " ..	24	20,	Affairs in Ispahan. Transmits copies of telegrams communicated by Russian Ambassador. His Majesty's Government of opinion that it would be better to await developments .. ..	93
150	" " ..	28	20,	Wire from Tehran to Shahrud on Tehran-Meshed line. Transmits Nos. 110 and 143. To explain situation to M. Isvolsky, and to intimate to him that His Majesty's Government wish to arrive at settlement of other questions pending, especially those referred to in No. 101 .. ..	95
151	To Sir G. Barclay ..	9	20,	Communication between Dizful and Western and Northern Persia. Refers to Nos. 405 and 579, Part XV, and No. 233, Part XVI. His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be premature to embark on any extensive project of such a kind. To discuss question with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire .. ..	95
152	To Mr. W. D'Arcy ..	..	20,	Indian guard near Ahwaz. Refers to Nos. 108 and 109. His Majesty's Government cannot undertake cost of guard any longer. Government of India concur in this, and cost will be debited to Syndicate from 17th instant, unless it is desired that guard be withdrawn .. ..	95
153	Sir F. Bertie ..	37	20,	Zil-es-Sultan. Transmits copy of letter from, thanking His Majesty's Government for protection of his family in Ispahan, and requesting that it be extended to certain of his servants .. ..	96
154	Lord Acton ..	7 Commercial	20,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 141, Part X. Gives details from Dutch press concerning reported Concession for .. ..	96
155	Sir G. Barclay ..	51 Tel.	21,	Situation in Azerbaijan. His Majesty's Consul-General reports severe weather. Sattar Khan has suspended hostilities .. ..	97
156	" " ..	52 Tel.	21,	Anglo-Russian negotiations with regard to Persia. Impression in Tehran that Anglo-Russian control about to be imposed on Persia .. ..	97
157	" " ..	53 Tel.	21,	Persian finances. Refers to No. 145. Financial Adviser hopes to be able to present report to Shah in about three weeks. Russian Financial Agent in favour of conversion and unification of debt .. ..	98
158	To Sir G. Barclay ..	28 Tel.	21,	Karun Irrigation Concession. In reply to Nos. 137 and 142, instructs him to inform Persian Government that His Majesty's Government reserve their right to object in view of Sir C. Spring-Rice's warning given to Ales-Sultaneh on 2nd October, 1906, which has been disregarded .. ..	98
159	Sir A. Nicolson ..	38	17,	Situation in Persia. Transmits Memorandum from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning measures which might be taken by two Governments in view of deplorable situation. Loan, &c. .. ..	98

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
160	Sir A. Nicolson ..	39	Jan. 17, 1909	Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia. M. Isvolsky complained of false reports in press concerning, and suggested a communiqué to the press .. ..	102
161	India Office ..	..	20,	Erection of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud on Tehran-Meshed line. In reply to No. 143, concurs in instructions contained in proposed despatch to His Majesty's Representative at St. Petersburg .. ..	102
162	" " ..	..	21,	Oxide Concessions. Refers to No. 26. Lord Morley agrees that Strick has no claim to be regarded as holder of Concession on Sirri. Situation remains same as in October 1908. No objection now to Strick competing with Moin. Concession on Little Tamb .. ..	103
163	Sir A. Nicolson ..	24 Tel.	22,	Communiqué to press respecting Anglo-Russian negotiations relative to Persia. Has given draft communicated in No. 144 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Transmits draft which latter would substitute for it. Asks views of His Majesty's Government .. ..	103
164	To Sir G. Barclay ..	29 Tel.	22,	Tabreez Nationalists. Quotes communication from Russian Ambassador respecting demand of Nationalists that customs be paid to Anjuman .. ..	104
165	To India Office ..	..	22,	Russian Consulate at Bunder Abbas. In reply to No. 59, deprecates mention of matter to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs till M. de Hartwig has left St. Petersburg and new Russian Minister is installed at Tehran .. ..	104
166	Sir F. Bertie ..	17 Tel.	23,	Zil-es-Sultan. Anjuman of Ispahan has demanded payment of taxes from Zil. Payment would offend Persian Government; refusal would offend Nationalists. He asks for immediate advice .. ..	104
167	Sir G. Barclay ..	54 Tel.	23,	Situation at Ispahan. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that Iqbal-ed-Dowleh proposes to start for Tehran on 24th January. Mr. Grahame requests leave to accompany him one stage, but this has been refused. Iqbal is most unpopular .. ..	104
168	" " ..	55 Tel.	23,	Azerbaijan customs receipts. Refers to No. 164. Chief Manager of Imperial Bank says that as yet no receipts from Tabreez customs have been paid into their branch. Local Manager has been instructed not to receive and disburse them locally if requested to do so .. ..	105
169	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	60 Tel.	23,	Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia: press communiqué. In reply to No. 163, instructs him to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government accepts his text, which will be published on 25th instant .. ..	105



No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
170	To Sir G. Barclay ..	30 Tel.	Jan. 23, 1909	Oxide Concessions. Refers to No. 414, Part XVI. In view of A. Weir's three years' contract for Hormuz, so much caution is no longer necessary in regard to Sirri. Refers to No. 133. In view of assurances given to Messrs. Hadji Ali Akbar, two applications must be supported concurrently, though His Majesty's Government would prefer Messrs. Strick to be given preference .. .. .	105
171	Sir F. Bertie ..	42	23,	Zil-es-Sultan's taxes. Transmits copy of letter from Zil respecting Anjuman of Ispahan's demand for payment of .. .. .	105
172	Mr. W. K. D'Arcy ..	..	23,	Indian guard at Ahwaz. In reply to No. 152, have decided to defray cost of, till further notice .. .. .	106
173	Sir G. Barclay ..	56 Tel.	25,	Provincial Nationalist movement. Russian Legation have heard from Astarabad that movement in Mazanderan very active, and may be joined by Turkomans. Russian Consul has been sounded by Governor as to how coalition of provinces on Caspian littoral would be regarded by Russia. Governor rebuked for suggestion .. .. .	107
174	" "	57 Tel.	25,	Azerbaijan customs receipts. Refers to No. 164. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that customs receipts were to remain in a bank at disposal of customs, and not to be sent to Tehran. No question of their being handed over to local Assembly. Entire receipts absorbed by Russian debt .. .. .	107
175	" "	58 Tel.	25,	Persian finances. French Financial Adviser has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs of his views (see No. 157). Minister for Foreign Affairs has arranged with M. Bizot for appointment of Frenchmen to the two posts. Latter has written to French Minister of Finance .. .. .	107
176	" "	59 Tel.	25,	Situation at Ispahan. Refers to No. 167. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that late Governor refuses to leave without guarantee from Mr. Grahame. Unwilling to give Governor protection outside Consulate .. .. .	107
177	To Sir G. Barclay ..	31 Tel.	25,	British Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari. Refers to No. 157, Part XIV. Would be a needless extravagance. Captain Keyes suggests native agency. Could agency be intrusted to Indo-European Department's official or to officer of Levant service? .. .. .	108
178	Sir A. Nicolson ..	32 Tel.	26,	Persian telegraphs. Has communicated Memorandum to Minister for Foreign Affairs giving substance of Nos. 101 and 150. Russian Government concurs in proposals, but would wish Russian signallers to be allowed to be employed on Arabistan lines .. .. .	108
179	" "	34 Tel.	26,	Persian finances. Appointment of French Treasurer-General and Financial Inspector. M. Isvolsky sees no objection to these appointments, but is awaiting opinion of His Majesty's Government. He regards these two officials as mere assistants to M. Bizot .. .. .	108

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
180	Sir G. Barclay ..	60 Tel.	Jan. 26, 1909	Nationalists in Azerbaijan. Consul-General at Tabreez reports that local Assembly has addressed letter to Consuls to effect that nation will accept no responsibility for any loan not approved by Parliament..	109
181	" "	61 Tel.	26,	Arabistan telegraphs. Refers to No. 330, Part XVI. Agreement arrived at verbally on subject of, by Minister of Telegraphs, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Indo-European Telegraph Department. Agreement now to be submitted in writing to Shah for his consent .. .. .	109
182	To Sir G. Barclay ..	33 Tel.	26,	Zil-es-Sultan. Instructs him to ascertain whether facts reported in No. 166 are accurate, and, if so, to suggest that His Majesty's Consul at Ispahan should try to induce Anjuman to suspend demand by exerting influence unofficially on Ilkhani .. .. .	109
183	" "	34 Tel.	26,	Late Governor-General of Ispahan. Agrees with opinion expressed in No. 176 that it is unnecessary to protect Governor-General outside His Majesty's Consulate-General .. .. .	109
184	India Office ..	..	26,	Visit to Robat of Russian Military Attaché in Seistan. Transmits copy of inclosures in letter to Government of India relative to .. .. .	110
185	" "	..	27,	Karun irrigation. Transmits copy of telegram from Viceroy, dated 26th January, reporting that Sheikh of Mohammerah has been informed that no further developments have occurred with regard to .. .. .	110
186	Sir G. Barclay ..	62 Tel.	27,	Karun irrigation. Refers to Nos. 185 and 158. Persian Government admit that His Majesty's Government will have the right to object to anything contrary to their interests. Advisable to control at The Hague assurance of Persian Minister .. .. .	111
187	" "	63 Tel.	27,	Situation in Ispahan. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that Iqbal-ed-Dowleh, escorted by three Bakhtiari Khans and number of horsemen, has left Consulate-General for Kashan .. .. .	111
188	To Sir G. Barclay ..	36 Tel.	27,	Arabistan telegraph. In reply to No. 181, informs of arrangement agreed upon by British and Russian Governments, on lines of which His Majesty's Government would like Agreement to be concluded .. .. .	111
189	To Count Benckendorff ..	..	27,	Tabreez Nationalists and local customs. Sir G. Barclay reports that no Tabreez duties have yet been paid into bank. Local Manager would refuse, if called upon to do so, to disburse them locally. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports that there is no question of receipts being paid to Anjuman .. .. .	112
190	To Sir F. Bertie ..	42	27,	Zil-es-Sultan. In reply to No. 153, instructs him to inform Zil that His Majesty's Government cannot further extend protection given to him and his family .. .. .	112
191	To Messrs. Strick and Co.	Confidential	27,	Oxide Concessions. Acknowledges No. 111. His Majesty's Government do not object to their making application for Sirri Concession, but cannot favour their demand at expense of other applicant. Sir G. Barclay will be instructed to support both equally .. .. .	112

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
192	Sir G. Barclay ..	64 Tel.	Jan. 28, 1909	Bank and Bushire customs. Refers to No. 146. Has received note from Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that interest on bank's advances to Persian Government is to be paid from Bushire customs in monthly instalments from 21st March .. ..	113
193	" ..	65 Tel.	28,	Sirri oxide. Inquires whether Strick negotiating through Persian Legation. If Strick has agent in Tehran, might see him and decide how assistance might best be given him .. ..	113
194	" ..	66 Tel.	28,	Insecurity on trade routes. Refers to No. 346, Part XVI. Reports increase of. Chief Manager of bank says business becoming impossible owing to danger involved in remitting money .. ..	113
195	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	95 Tel.	28,	French Financial Inspector and Treasurer-General in Persia. His Majesty's Government have no objection to appointment of Frenchmen, provided they are subordinate to Financial Adviser (see No. 183). Appointment had better be delayed until the meeting of a Parliament .. ..	113
196	To Sir G. Barclay ..	39 Tel.	28,	Oil guard near Ahwaz. Refers to No. 41. From 18th January Syndicate will bear cost of .. ..	114
197	Sir F. Bertie ..	47	28,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 190. Interview with Akbar Mirza, Zil's son, who submitted telegram from another of Zil's sons in Persia urging return. Insurance of Zil's box. Has informed Akbar Mirza of instructions contained in No. 182 .. ..	114
198	Messrs. F. Strick and Co.	..	28,	Sirri Oxide Concession. Acknowledges No. 191. Have reason to believe that other firm applying is a private company. Hope to obtain Concession on reasonable terms .. ..	114
198*	To Sir G. Barclay ..	40 Tel.	29,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 67. Zil asserts he has instructed Imperial Bank to pay 2000, for purposes of insurance. Value of contents. If risk is too great, Mr. Churchill need not bring the box .. ..	114*
199	To India Office ..	..	29,	Persian telegraphs. Transmits Nos. 181, 187, and 188. No objection to Russian signalers being employed on Arabistan line in contingency named. Further agreement with Russia for transfer of British rights over Tehran-Khanikin line to Russia .. ..	115
200	To Messrs. Ellinger and Co.	..	29,	Oxide Concessions. Refers to No. 306, Part XVI. His Majesty's Government have always contended that Persian Government cannot dispose of Sirri. Transmits copy of Moh's Firman, in which no mention is made of Sirri. Sir E. Grey cannot accede to request that His Majesty's Government should oppose applications by other parties .. ..	115
201	To Messrs. F. Strick and Co.	Confidential	29,	Oxide Concessions. Refers to No. 191. Informs of No. 193. Asks for information .. ..	115
202	Messrs. F. Strick and Co.	Confidential	29,	Sirri oxide. Refers to No. 201. Transmits copy of letter to Mirza Mehdi Khan of 27th October, 1908, regarding concessions on islands in the Gulf. Nothing has come of it. Have no agent in Tehran. Agents at Bushire have been instructed to try to obtain Concession .. ..	116

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
203	Sir G. Barclay ..	67 Tel.	Jan. 30, 1909	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 198*. Inquires whether His Imperial Highness has insured his box, as instructed by Imperial Bank. Pending reply, will detain Churchill at Resht .. ..	116
204	" ..	68 Tel.	30,	His Majesty's Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari. Is awaiting receipt of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Meshed before replying to No. 177 .. ..	117
205	" ..	69 Tel.	30,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 203. Can effect insurance in Tehran. No action needed in London, as His Imperial Highness being communicated with through Embassy in Paris .. ..	117
206	To Sir G. Barclay ..	41 Tel.	30,	Oxide Concessions. In reply to No. 193. Messrs. Strick approached Persian Chargé d'Affaires in his private capacity and requested his help, but with no result. Instructs him to assist Messrs. Strick as far as possible .. ..	117
207	Memorandum communicated to M. Cambon	..	30,	French Treasurer-General and Financial Inspector. His Majesty's Government would not object provided two officials are subordinate to Financial Adviser, but suggest postponing appointment till meeting of an Assembly capable of approving them .. ..	117
208	To Sir F. Bertie ..	49	30,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to Nos. 138 and 197. His Majesty's Government's responsibility for safe transit of the box, and conveyance of box to Europe .. ..	118
209	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	43	30,	Mr. Simpson's commercial projects. Instructs him to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of .. ..	118
210	To India Office ..	..	30,	Persian telegraphs. Acknowledges No. 61. Financial aspect of the arrangement. In view of No. 178, recommendations of the Director-in-chief of the Department may be adopted .. ..	118
211	Sir G. Barclay ..	70 Tel.	31,	Persian finances. Refers to Nos. 179 and 195. Agrees with M. Bizot that a Treasurer-General without executive powers would be useless. Suggestions as to best chance of effective reform. Gives programme of Treasurer-General's work sketched by M. Bizot .. ..	119
211*	" ..	71 Tel.	31,	Situation at Ispahan. Prince Farman Farma is trying to avoid going to Ispahan. 300 to 500 men left Tehran on the 29th January .. ..	120*
212	" ..	72 Tel.	31,	Taxation of Zil-es-Sultan's property in Ispahan. Refers to No. 33. His Majesty's Consul - General reports that Anjuman refuse to waive their claim to Zil's taxes .. ..	120
212*	" ..	73 Tel.	31,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Persian Government have offered to take over debts of 2,000,000 tomans to Russian Bank and 500,000 to Imperial Bank on certain conditions. The two banks seem to favour the scheme. Objections to it .. ..	120*



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213	Sir A. Nicolson ..	57	Jan. 24, 1909	Russian policy in Persia. Announces that official communiqué has appeared on subject of Russian Government's deliberations concerning. Denying rumours of their intention to intervene in Persia ..	120
214	" " ..	60	26,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to Nos. 101 and 150. Transmits copy of <i>aide-memoire</i> communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting. Russian Government concur in proposals, but wish Russian signallers to be appointed on Arabistan lines. M. Tcharykoff thinks negotiations for exchange of lines between Tehran and Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad should be kept separate ..	120
215	" " ..	64	26,	Persian finances. M. Isvolsky sees no objection to appointment of French Treasurer-General and Financial Inspector, and thinks they would be merely assistants of M. Bizot. Is awaiting opinion of His Majesty's Government ..	122
216	India Office ..	..	30,	Karun irrigation. Lord Morley would be glad to hear views of Sir E. Grey as to attitude that should be taken by Major Cox in discussion of subject with the Sheikh of Mohammerah. In view of intimation to Netherland Chargé d'Affaires indicated in Nos. 32 and 34. Part X, Lord Morley hopes Concession may be cancelled or modified so as to suit the Sheikh ..	122
217	Sir F. Bertie ..	49	31,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 208. Transmits copy of letter to, informing him that His Majesty's Government could not accept responsibility for safe transit and delivery of the box. Insurance of box (see No. 203) ..	123
218	" " ..	50	31,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 197. Demands of Anjuman for payment of taxes by. Transmits letter from Akbar Mirza informing of ..	123
219	" " ..	22 Tel.	Feb. 1,	Zil-es-Sultan. Has informed Sir G. Barclay that Zil insists on insurance of his box at any rate, and has sent 2000 ..	124
220	Sir G. Barclay ..	74 Tel.	1,	Persian finances. Refers to No. 157. M. Bizot's report is retarded by Muharram celebrations ..	124
221	To Treasury ..	..	1,	Indian guard near Ahwaz. Refers to No. 351, Part XII. Informs of arrangement with Oil Syndicate that they shall bear cost of maintenance from 18th January, 1909. Hopes that Lords Commissioners will sanction charge to Imperial funds of half cost from 17th June, 1908 ..	124
222	India Office ..	..	1,	Karun irrigation. Transmits copy of telegram to Viceroy promising to consider, with Foreign Office, suggestions contained in No. 185. Gives substance of No. 158 ..	125
223	Sir A. Nicolson ..	45 Tel.	2,	Russian Memorandum. M. Isvolsky has inquired whether reply to has been received ..	126
224	To Sir G. Barclay ..	42 Tel.	2,	Payment of taxes by Zil-es-Sultan to Ispahan Anjuman. Refers to No. 212. Agrees that if excuses are required His Imperial Highness should himself make them ..	126

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225	To Sir G. Barclay ..	44 Tel.	Feb. 2, 1909	Treasurer-General for Persia. Agrees that appointment should be settled under present régime (see No. 211). His Majesty's Government will raise no objection if Shah decides on immediate appointment ..	126
226	" " ..	45 Tel.	2,	Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia. Refers to Nos. 116 and 211. Gives summary of proposed reply to Russian Memorandum and proposals ..	126
227	To India Office ..	..	2,	Transfer of lien of Imperial Bank from Kermanshah to Bushire customs. Refers to No. 106. Transmits copy of telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran respecting assignment of part of Bushire receipts to interest on advances of Imperial Bank. Question of service of Anglo-Indian loan. Asks views on question of demanding resumption of payment ..	127
228	Sir A. Nicolson ..	71	Jan. 30,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 214. Transmits <i>aide-memoire</i> received from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated 16th (29th) January, relative to. Russian Government prepared to proceed to exchange on basis laid down in <i>aide-memoire</i> of 20th September (3rd October), 1908 ..	127
229	Messrs. Ellinger and Co. ..	..	Feb. 1,	Sirri oxide. Acknowledges No. 200. Will inform Moin that His Majesty's Government refuse to oppose other applications for Mining Concessions on island ..	129
230	Messrs. F. Strick and Co. ..	Confidential	2,	Sirri oxide. Refers to Nos. 198 and 202. Transmits copies of telegrams to and from Bushire agents, dated 30th January, giving them authority to prospect Sirri ..	129
231	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	46	3,	Persian situation: Russian Memorandum. Refers to No. 159. Transmits reply drawn up by His Majesty's Government ..	1
232	To Board of Trade ..	..	3,	Oxide Concessions. Refers to No. 335, Part XV. Transmits No. 198 respecting status of firm of Messrs. Hadji Ali Akbar and Co. Proposes to reply that His Majesty's Government believe the firm to be British; that they cannot discriminate between British firms, but they will assist Messrs. Strick as far as possible ..	131
233	Sir F. Bertie ..	54	3,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 171. Transmits copy of further letter from Zil, dated 1st February, respecting enforced payment of taxes to Ispahan Anjuman. Interview with Akbar Mirza. Zil anxious not to prolong indefinitely his absence from Persia ..	131
234	Imperial Bank of Persia ..	..	3,	Transfer of lien of Imperial Bank from Kermanshah to Bushire customs. Transmits telegram dispatched to Chief Manager of bank in Tehran approving arrangement if better terms not available ..	132
235	Sir G. Barclay ..	75 Tel.	4,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to Nos. 116 and 226. Observations on Russian Memorandum and proposed reply of His Majesty's Government ..	133
236	" " ..	76 Tel.	4,	Karun Irrigation Concession. Refers to No. 186. Interview of His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah with Sheikh, who prefers that scheme should not be taken up ..	134



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236*	Sir G. Barclay ..	77 Tel.	Feb. 4, 1909	Turco-Persian frontier. Persian Government have approached Turkish Government with proposal for dissolution of present Commission, and for negotiations to be resumed at Tehran or Constantinople .. .. .	134
237	" ..	78 Tel.	5,	Sirri oxide. Refers to No. 206. Malcolm has taken no action himself. Reported deposits are scanty. If Strick had an agent in Tehran, he might be afforded help indirectly .. .. .	134
238	" ..	79 Tel.	5,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Persian Government has made another proposal which managers of two banks are anxious to accept. Details of proposal .. .. .	135
238*	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	139 Tel.	5,	Afghan refugees. Views of India Office on proposal in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 53 are being ascertained .. .. .	135*
239	To Mr. W. K. D'Arcy ..	..	5,	Indian guard at Ahwaz. Acknowledges No. 172. Explains that, if retention of guard beyond a certain period became necessary, dispatch of reliefs would involve additional expense .. .. .	135
240	Board of Trade ..	Confidential	5,	Anglo - Russian Bank in Persia. Transmits copy of a Memorandum respecting M. Notovitch's proposals prepared in Board of Trade Department .. .. .	135
241	Sir G. Barclay ..	80 Tel.	6,	Situation in Azerbaijan. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports that Ain-ed-Dowleh expressed desire to negotiate. Anjuman refused to send delegates, but offered to receive them, and suggested presence of a Consul at discussion .. .. .	137
242	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	148 Tel.	6,	Reply to Russian Memorandum. Refers to No. 231. Insertions to be made in paragraphs 8, 9, and 11. The two Representatives might explain that Shah would lose all sympathy of the two Powers .. .. .	137
243	" ..	150 Tel.	6,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Refers to Nos. 212* and 238. His Majesty's Government will use all their influence to induce Imperial Bank to abstain, provided Russian Bank decide to do so. To ascertain views of Russian Government .. .. .	138
244	Sir G. Barclay ..	81 Tel.	8,	Turco-Persian frontier. Mr. Wratishaw reports rumour of Turkish advance, in small bodies, in Salmas district and elsewhere. Turkish Chargé d'Affaires' explanation .. .. .	138
245	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	153 Tel.	8,	Situation in Persia: Russian Memorandum. His Majesty's Government will not go farther at present than paragraph 12, point 3. Desirable to obtain approval of an Assembly before making any advance .. .. .	138
246	" ..	157 Tel.	8,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Refers to No. 243. Imperial Bank will accept new proposal made by Shah for taking over. His Majesty's Government cannot prevent their acceptance, though regretting it .. .. .	139
247	To Sir G. Barclay ..	46 Tel.	8,	Russian Memorandum. Refers to No. 235. His Majesty's Government have incorporated suggestions in reply to Russian Government .. .. .	139

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249	Sir G. Barclay ..	82 Tel.	9,	Disorders at Resht. M. Sabline has heard that Governor's house has been attacked. Governor apparently killed and troops took refuge in Russian Consulate .. .. .	139
250	" ..	83 Tel.	9,	Situation at Yezd. His Majesty's Vice-Consul reports disorders due to a <i>soi-disant</i> Nationalist movement. Bakhtiari of Ispahan are believed to be extending their field of action to Yezd .. .. .	140
251	India Office ..	..	9,	Sirri oxide. Transmits copy of telegram from Viceroy dated 8th February. Resident in Gulf reports amount of oxide small .. .. .	140
252	Sir G. Barclay ..	84 Tel.	10,	Disorders at Resht. Refers to No. 249. M. Sabline has heard that town is in hands of revolutionaries. Foreigners at present in no danger, and provisional Government established .. .. .	140
253	India Office ..	..	10,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 199. Transmits Memorandum by Mr. Kirk dated 4th February. Agrees with Sir E. Grey that secret agreement might be made with Russian Government as to employment of Russian signallers on Arabistan lines. Agrees that further agreement as to Tehran-Khanikin line should be deferred (see No. 267, Part XIII) .. .. .	140
254	" ..	..	10,	Bahrein. Lord Morley concurs in proposal of Sir E. Grey to approve action of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in returning Mushir-ed-Dowleh's note of 9th April, 1908 .. .. .	142
255	Board of Trade ..	..	10,	Sirri oxide. Refers to No. 232. Board concur in proposed communication to Messrs. Strick .. .. .	142
256	Sir F. Bertie ..	28 Tel.	11,	Requests for letters of protection by His Majesty's Government. Refers to No. 345, Part XIV, and No. 27, Part XV. Has received from Dr. Ismail Khan and Mostepha Gholi Khan .. .. .	142
257	Sir G. Barclay ..	85 Tel.	11,	Situation in Azerbaijan. Ain-ed-Dowleh has again invited Tabreez Nationalists to negotiate. Position of Nationalists in town is precarious, as all roads are held .. .. .	143
258	" ..	86 Tel.	11,	Turkish guards for Consulates at Khoi and Urumia. Refers to No. 244. Persian Government in their reply to Turkish Chargé d'Affaires object to dispatch of .. .. .	143
259	" ..	87 Tel.	11,	Situation at Yezd. Refers to No. 250. Some Parsees have taken refuge with Acting Vice-Consul. Reports harrying of neighbourhood by inhabitants of Taft .. .. .	143
260	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	175 Tel.	11,	Amin-es-Zarb. Refers to No. 246. Imperial Bank have authorized Tehran manager to accept Shah's last proposal .. .. .	143

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262	To Sir F. Bertie ..	76	11,	Zil-es-Sultan's taxes. Has received No. 233. Instructs him to inform Zil that His Majesty's Government can give no assurances at present, but that they will consult with Russian Government as to possible date of his return on establishment of constitutional Government ..	144
263	To India Office ..	Confidential	11,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 216. Transmits copy of telegram from His Majesty's Representative at Tehran respecting scheme. Proposes to await reply of Netherland Government to proposed note to them .. ..	144
264	Mr. Lynch to Mr. Syngé ..	..	9,	Persian Committee and policy of His Majesty's Government in Persia. Is desirous of framing Parliamentary question, answer to which might show harmony between Committee and Foreign Office. Transmits further short confidential Memorandum ..	144
265	Sir G. Barclay ..	88 Tel.	12,	Ispahan situation. Conditions made by Farman Farma before going to Ispahan. Deprecates transfer of Amin-es-Zarb's debts .. ..	146
266	" ..	89 Tel.	12,	Sardar Assad. Is reported to have left Paris for Ahwaz; would like confirmation or denial of His Majesty's Embassy ..	146
267	" ..	90 Tel.	12,	Declaration purporting to come from Tehran Nationalists. Reports receipt of, stating that no loan or Concessions will be recognized unless approved by Assembly ..	146
268	To Sir G. Barclay ..	51 Tel.	12,	Dr. Ismail Khan and Mostepha Gholi. Asks opinion on request of (see No. 256). To report what was protection promised by His Majesty's Legation .. ..	147
269	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	185 Tel.	13,	Loans to Persia. Refers to No. 267. Loans made to Shah contrary to provisions of Constitution might be called in question. Doubtful whether it would be possible to uphold validity of loans contemplated by the two banks except against Shah's personal property .. ..	147
270	Sir G. Barclay ..	91 Tel.	14,	Constitution. Reports receipt of telegram from local Assembly at Ispahan, asking him to inform proper quarter that old Constitution must not be altered ..	147
271	" ..	92 Tel.	14,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Refers to Nos. 265 and 267. Proposed arrangement will exasperate Nationalists and would be repudiated by an Assembly. Could Imperial Bank be induced to change their attitude? ..	147
272	" ..	93 Tel.	14,	Situation in Tehran. Most of bazaars closed, as Nationalist demonstration .. ..	147
273	" ..	94 Tel.	14,	Protection of Dr. Ismail and Mustapha Kuli Khan. Refers to No. 268. Can find no record of assurances given, and deprecates giving any .. ..	148

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275	" ..	5	18,	Transfer of lien of Imperial Bank from Kermanshah to Bushire customs. Refers to No. 84. Transmits copy of note addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting. Has not mentioned provisional character of arrangement to Persian Government, but will do so when they have accepted it .. ..	149
276	" ..	6	20,	Appointment of Saad-ed-Dowleh as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Refers to No. 42. Gives sketch of career of Saad-ed-Dowleh. Stronger man, though perhaps not so reliable as his predecessor .. ..	150
277	" ..	7	20,	Persian finances. Interview with M. Bizot. Necessity of European Treasurer-General and Inspector of Finances. Policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to advance. Interview with M. Ostrogradsky on his scheme for unification and conversion of the debt .. ..	150
278	" ..	8	22,	Seizure by France of port of Kung. French Consular Agent at Lingah has reported. Rumour unfounded, and French colleague has recommended dismissal of Consular Agent and suppression of Agency ..	151
279	" ..	9	22,	M. de Sturler and Ahwaz Concession. Refers to Nos. 137 and 142. Transmits copy of document furnished by Minister for Foreign Affairs to, granting two years' option from 10th January. Also copy of note addressed to Saad-ed-Dowleh under instructions contained in your telegram No. 28, stating that His Majesty's Government reserved right to oppose Concession, with reply .. ..	152
280	" ..	10	22,	Bahrein. Refers to No. 123. Transmits amended note which Persian Government would send instead of note rejected in No. 35A, Part XIV, if this rejection withdrawn ..	153
281	" ..	11	25,	Attempt on life of Sheikh Fazlullah. Arrest of Abdul Kerim and Hussein Khan. Sheikh Hassan, brother of latter, finding that he, too, would be arrested, sought protection of His Majesty's Legation, which was accorded to him. Both brothers now handed over to Saad-ed-Dowleh, and trial being watched by Mr. Smart on behalf of His Majesty's Government .. ..	154
282	" ..	12	26,	British loan, 1903-4. Transmits copy of note addressed to Persian Government with regard to further pledging of resources of Persia (see No. 57) .. ..	155
283	" ..	14	26,	Situation at Ispahan. Reports troubles due to oppressive administration of Iqbal-ed-Dowleh, Governor-General, and opposition from Zargham-es-Sultaneh. Joint representation to Shah to urge him to appoint Samsam Governor. Appointment of Farman Farma .. ..	155



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285	" ..	16	27,	Boycott of Messrs. Lynch's steamers on the Karun. Has heard that Hajji Rais, agent of Moin-ut-Tujjar at Mohammerah, has instigated. Has protested. Moin denies charge, and declares readiness to come to arrangement with Lynch. Has arranged interview between Moin and Malleson ..	157
286	" ..	17	27,	Nationalists at Tabreez. Refers to No. 132. Reports relaxation of hostilities. Demand of local Assembly that receipts for local traffic on line of Indo-European Telegraph Company should be handed over to them. Demand of Nationalists with regard to customs receipts (see No. 174) ..	158
287	" ..	18	27,	Nationalist movement in Persia. Refers to No. 52. Gives detailed account of growth and spread of. Necessity of satisfaction being given to the Nationalists, and financial needs of the Government ..	158
288	" ..	19	28,	Seizure of bank's money by Ain-ed-Dowleh. Refers to No. 59. Total sum will probably amount to 100,000 tomans. More than half the stolen money has now been recovered .. .. .	160
289	" ..	20	28,	Events in Persia. Transmits monthly summary of, drawn up by Mr. Churchill and Major Stokes. Ministerial changes ..	160
290	Sir A. Nicolson ..	90	Feb. 7,	Reply to Russian Memorandum. Refers to No. 231. M. Isvolsky anxious that financial aid should be given to Persian Government as soon as possible, if only a moderate advance pending fulfilment of Shah's promises .. .. .	163
291	" ..	97	10,	Reply to Russian Memorandum. Refers to No. 231. Has handed Memorandum to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Reports interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs, when latter made some preliminary observations on it. Fears that if present situation allowed to continue resulting anarchy must necessitate intervention. Constitution would not be immediate and infallible remedy .. .. .	164
292	Sir F. Bertie ..	29 Tel.	13,	Sirdar Assad. Refers to No. 266. Sirdar Assad is identical with Chief interview with whom was reported in No. 107. Is staying at Hotel Astoria .. .. .	165
293	Sir A. Nicolson ..	73 Tel.	15,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Russian Minister of Finance is instructing Russian Bank not to accept proposal .. .. .	165
294	Sir G. Barclay ..	95 Tel.	15,	Russian Consulate-General at Tabreez. M. Miller will replace M. Pokhitonow, who is going on leave .. .. .	165
295	" ..	96 Tel.	15,	Tabreez. Refers to No. 257. His Majesty's Consul thinks grain reserves will suffice for two months longer .. .. .	165

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297	To Sir F. Bertie ..	119 Tel.	15,	Ismail Khan and Mustapha Gholi. Impossible for His Majesty's Government to give letters of protection to, in view of circumstances described in No. 273 ..	166
298	To Sir G. Barclay ..	54 Tel.	15,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Refers to No. 271. His Majesty's Government intend to inform bank that, if prospective Assembly were to repudiate arrangement, claim against personal property of the Shah would be only method of obtaining repayment which they could support ..	166
299	Imperial Bank of Persia ..	..	15,	Nationalist declaration against advances to Shah's Government. Refers to No. 267. Transmits copy of telegram to Mr. Wood, instructing him to suspend all proposed arrangements in view of .. .. .	166
300	Sir G. Barclay ..	98 Tel.	16,	Turbat-i-Haidari Consulate. Suggests that suppression of provides good opportunity for asking for abolition or reduction of Russian Consulate in Seistan .. .. .	167
301	" ..	99 Tel.	16,	General situation. Gravity of increases with delay of instructions. Minister for Foreign Affairs urges joint representations to Shah as soon as possible .. .. .	167
302	" ..	100 Tel.	16,	General situation. Gives text of telegram sent by Russian colleague to his Government. Concurs in sense of telegram ..	167
303	Sir G. Barclay ..	101 Tel.	16,	Situation at Resht. People have elected Sipahdar as Governor. Should prove excellent Governor. Had been, in conjunction with Russian Representative, pressing Shah to appoint him .. .. .	168
304	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	194 Tel.	16,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Refers to No. 293. Imperial Bank have telegraphed to Manager in Tehran instructing him to suspend arrangements and await events ..	168
305	Sir A. Nicolson ..	79 Tel.	17,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to Nos. 301 and 302. Has urged M. Isvolsky to agree to steps proposed. Latter is still awaiting M. Sabline's telegram on the subject ..	168
306	Sir G. Barclay ..	102 Tel.	17,	Guarantees for Shah. Refers to No. 104. Was approached by Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom same reply was given as before. Shah is genuinely afraid of consequences to himself of a Constitution ..	168
307	" ..	103 Tel.	17,	Arabistan telegraphs. Refers to No. 188. Persian Government have informed him that Minister of Telegraphs has been instructed to make necessary arrangements with Indo-European Telegraph Department for repair of .. .. .	169
308	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	196 Tel.	17,	Situation in Persia. Refers to No. 301. Gives opinion of His Majesty's Government that Shah will best be impressed by a threat that he will receive no financial or military support. His Majesty's Government will act entirely in concert with Russia in Persia .. .. .	169



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310	Sir A. Nicolson ..	107	13,	Shah and Constitution. Interview with Persian Minister. Considers financial aid essential. His Majesty's Government will not make advance until constitutional régime re-established ..	170
311	" ..	83 Tel.	18,	British and Russian action in Persia. Refers to No. 302. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says the two Representatives must clearly be furnished with instructions without delay. Minister for Foreign Affairs promises to submit points on which two Governments might be found to be in agreement ..	170
312	Sir G. Barclay ..	104 Tel.	18,	Persian finances. Refers to No. 220. M. Bizot promised his report in a fortnight at latest ..	171
312*	" ..	105 Tel.	18,	Alleged loan negotiations between Bakhtiari and Messrs. Lynch. Has received information from a Bakhtiari Chief concerning ..	171*
313	" ..	106 Tel.	18,	Situation at Resht. Sipahdar has asked British and Russian Representatives to communicate telegrams to Shah urging latter to send no troops to Resht. Representatives have declined to act as intermediaries. If troops which have already left for Resht get beyond Kasvin, note might be addressed in terms of No. 77 ..	171
314	To Sir G. Barclay ..	59 Tel.	18,	Assurances to Shah. Approves reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in No. 306. His Majesty's Government cannot go farther than verbal assurances reported in No. 412, Part XVI ..	171
315	" ..	61 Tel.	18,	Russian representations at the Porte. Russian Government have requested support of on two points: neutral Turco-Persian frontier district and "bastis" at Turkish Legation. Asks instructions also with regard to dispatch of Turkish guards to Urumia and Khoi ..	171
316	India Office ..	..	17,	Anglo-Indian Loan of 290,000/. Refers to No. 227. Concurs in view of Sir E. Grey that it would be inopportune at present to take any steps with a view to collection by or on behalf of His Majesty's Government of Gulf customs, which demand for repayment would probably entail. Better to await establishment of constitutional régime. Transmits note by Mr. Kirk ..	172
317	" ..	..	17,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 263. Lord Morley concurs in proposed note to Netherland Government. Agrees that no further communication need be made to Sheikh of Mohammurah pending their reply ..	173

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319	Sir A. Nicolson ..	87 Tel.	19,	Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on method of dealing with Persian situation. Gives substance of. Minister for Foreign Affairs will submit them to the Cabinet, and hopes they may form basis for agreement between the two Governments ..	174
320	Sir G. Barclay ..	107 Tel.	19,	Situation at Tabreez. Gives text of telegram No. 15 to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez ..	174
321	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	207 Tel.	19,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 228. To communicate view of His Majesty's Government as to order in which questions should be considered ..	174
322	Sir G. Barclay ..	108 Tel.	20,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 315. Has warned Turkish Chargé d'Affaires to prevent Turkish Embassy being used as a centre of political agitation. Russian Chargé d'Affaires has informed him of establishment of a Turkish custom-house at Jebel Kend ..	175
323	" ..	109 Tel.	20,	Arabistan telegraphs. If there is no change in Government, hopes to obtain satisfactory arrangement shortly. Communication on lines of No. 188 impressed Minister of Telegraphs very favourably ..	175
324	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	216 Tel.	20,	Shah and Constitution. To ask Minister for Foreign Affairs to await opinion of His Majesty's Government of proposals in No. 319. There are objections which may prove insuperable to point 7. Meanwhile, no reason why Shah should not proclaim amnesty and Constitution ..	175
325	To India Office ..	..	20,	Reduction of expenditure on Consular establishments in Persia. States opinion of Sir E. Grey. Suggestions for reducing costs of certain stations. Details ..	176
326	Sir G. Barclay ..	110 Tel.	21,	Situation at Tabreez. Refers to No. 320. Consul-General cannot tell what Ain-ed-Dowleh intends to do, nor whether town could be taken by assault. Consul-General has been instructed to warn Ain-ed-Dowleh to respect His Majesty's Consulate-General ..	177
327	" ..	111 Tel.	21,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 319. Comments on Russian proposal ..	178
328	Sir A. Nicolson ..	94 Tel.	22,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 324. Minister for Foreign Affairs will take no action until he has received observations of His Majesty's Government. Discussion of point 7 with Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	179
329	Sir G. Barclay ..	112 Tel.	22,	Imperial Bank of Persia at Tabreez. Has advised General Manager, who is desirous of sending money to Tabreez, not to do so, and is holding Government responsible ..	179

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331	India Office ..	..	20,	Extension of telegraphic communication in Persian Gulf. Transmits copy of inclosures in a letter to Government of India, dated 21st January, relative to .. ..	180
332	Messrs. Bose and Moore ..	..	22,	Proposed loan to Persian Government. Have heard of, and, as representing considerable number of Stock Exchange members who have sustained loss through action of Persian Government, enter caveat in connection with such loan .. ..	181
333	Mr. J. Preece ..	..	23,	Abadan Island. Oil Syndicate request support of His Majesty's Government in acquiring site on. Telegram to Consul-General instructing him to assist Reynolds .. ..	182
334	To Sir G. Barclay ..	69 Tel.	23,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 261. His Majesty's Government are addressing note to Dutch Legation inquiring nature and extent of negotiations, and reminding them that no scheme prejudicial to interests of His Majesty's Government can receive their support .. ..	183
334A	Sir A. Nicolson ..	112	16,	Amin-es-Zarb's debts. Refers to No. 293. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs says Minister of Finance has decided not to permit Russian Bank to accept arrangement proposed by Persian Government .. ..	183*
334B	" " ..	116	17,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 305. Reports interview with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom he read No. 301. Minister for Foreign Affairs still of opinion that Constitution alone can do no good .. ..	183*
335	" " ..	124	20,	English and Russian action at Tehran. Refers to No. 319. Transmits copy of letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs inclosing note respecting crisis in Persia. ..	183
336	" " ..	96 Tel.	24,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 321. Russian Government will probably object to British signallers on Sharud and Meshed lines, as these are in Russian zone. Suggests proposing to Russian Government that transfer of control over Khaf-Seistan and Tehran-Meshed lines should be dealt with at the earliest opportunity .. ..	184
337	Sir G. Barclay ..	115 Tel.	24,	Situation at Tabreez. Consul reports that Nationalist expedition reported in No. 330 left on 22nd without having accomplished its object .. ..	184
338	" " ..	116 Tel.	24,	Oxide. Refers to No. 309. Suggests that Lynch's agent should act for Strick. Moin's hostility might, however, be increased thereby .. ..	185
339	" " ..	117 Tel.	24,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 328. Maintains his view as to proposed loan. Suggests that two Representatives should be able to stop supplies if loan is made .. ..	185
340	" " ..	118 Tel.	24,	Execution of former basti in His Majesty's Legation. Reports protest against. Possible reason for outrage. Town still under martial law .. ..	185

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341	To Baron Gericke ..	..	Feb. 24, 1909	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 34, Part X. His Majesty's Government can support no scheme which is not favourably viewed by Sheikh of Mohammerah, or is in any way prejudicial to their interests. Enquires nature and scope of negotiations now proceeding .. ..	185
342	Sir G. Barclay ..	119 Tel.	25,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 339. Proposal for appropriation of advance .. ..	186
343	" " ..	120 Tel.	25,	Tabreez. Mr. Wratishaw reports that Karadaghli have occupied Sofian, and that Tabreez could hold out for a month unless taken by assault .. ..	186
344	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	247 Tel.	25,	Russian proposals. Refers to No. 319. Gives modifications with which they could be accepted by His Majesty's Government .. ..	186
345	To Sir G. Barclay ..	71 Tel.	25,	Agent for Messrs. Strick at Tehran. Inquires whether any one else could be proposed, as unlikely that Lynch will approve suggestion in No. 338. .. ..	187
346	" " ..	23	25,	Persian finances. Refers to No. 277. Approves language to M. Bizot. Consideration of loans and conversion schemes (see last paragraph, No. 277) must wait till financial administration reformed under constitutional Government .. ..	187
347	Sir G. Barclay ..	121 Tel.	26,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 334. Sheikh of Mohammerah again wishes to telegraph to Persian Government in sense previously suggested (see No. 236). Has told Sheikh that communication appears unnecessary. ..	187
348	" " ..	122 Tel.	26,	Situation in Azerbaijan: Tabreez. Determined assault on Tabreez by Maraga forces, and Basminch force repulsed .. ..	188
349	Consul McDouall ..	1 Commercial	6,	Sheikh of Mohammerah's property on the Karun. Sheikh would be ready to give lease of thirty to fifty years to any British Company. If Persian Government hear of this before lease is signed they would probably try to prevent it .. ..	188
350	Sir G. Barclay ..	123 Tel.	27,	Situation at Tabreez. Governor of Julfa declares ten Cossacks have crossed into Persia. Russian Chargé d'Affaires doubts truth .. ..	188
351	" " ..	124 Tel.	28,	Oxide. Refers to No. 345. Mr. Brown would be best agent for Messrs. Strick .. ..	188
352	Sir A. Nicolson ..	126	23,	Russian proposals. Refers to No. 328. Interview with M. Isvolsky. Latter hopes that His Majesty's Government's observations on will soon be received. Discussion of probable objection to point 7 .. ..	189
353	Sir G. Barclay ..	126 Tel.	Mar. 1,	Imperial Bank money for Tabreez. Refers to No. 329. Persian Government offer escort, thus evading responsibility. Requests instructions .. ..	190
354	" " ..	127 Tel.	1,	Situation at Resht. Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated telegram addressed by Council of Ministers to Notables of Resht. Sense of telegram .. ..	190



No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
355	India Office ..	..	Mar. 1, 1909	Persian telegraph. Transmits copy of note on subject by the Director of Indo-European Telegraph Department. Lord Morley agrees that it would be inadvisable to raise question of employment of British signallers on Shahrud and Meshed lines. Question of Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Seistan lines. Sir A. Nicolson might be authorized to give explanations in No. 321 ..	191
356	To Mr. F. Strick ..	..	2,	Sirri oxide. Refers to No. 230. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran suggests Brown of Imperial Bank as agent. Inquires whether Department may enter into negotiations with bank on the subject ..	191
357	Sir A. Nicolson ..	113 Tel.	3,	Russo-British co-operation in Persia. M. Isvolsky thinks financial assistance indispensable, and is distressed that His Majesty's Government did not give way on point 7. Dispatch of Russian troops to Baku, Julfa, and Resht ..	192
358	Sir G. Barclay ..	128 Tel.	3,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 279. Has received from Minister for Foreign Affairs draft of Concession desired by M. de Sturler. M. de Sturler complains that Persian Government's option is useless ..	192
359	" ..	129 Tel.	3,	Concession for Kuh Malek Siah-Nasratabad road. M. Edward Kitabji is seeking concession. He says he is about to become a British subject, and will form an English Company to work Concession. Is consulting His Majesty's Consul in Seistan ..	192
360	India Office ..	..	3,	Works at Bassidu. Refers to No. 21, Part VI, of "Persia and Arabia." Transmits copy of letter from Viceroy suggesting the undertaking of ..	192
361	Imperial Bank of Persia ..	..	3,	Dispatch of specie to Tabreez. Transfer of coin is essential, but, in view of information contained in No. 353, do not feel justified in incurring risk ..	197
362	Mr. F. Strick ..	..	3,	Sirri oxide. Refers to No. 356. Requests His Majesty's Government to communicate with Imperial Bank of Persia with a view to arranging for Mr. Brown to act as his agent ..	198
363	Sir A. Nicolson ..	118 Tel.	4,	Samsam's order for guns and ammunition. Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed of ..	198
364	" ..	119 Tel.	4,	Dispatch of Russian troops to Resht. Minister for Foreign Affairs has announced. Detachment will also probably be sent to Julfa ..	198
365	Sir G. Barclay ..	130 Tel.	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 244. Persian Government complain of dispatch of Turkish gendarmes to Miadek ..	199
366	To Sir G. Barclay ..	77 Tel.	4,	Transfer of bank's specie to Tabreez. Refers to No. 353. In view of risk, bank do not feel justified in effecting transfer. Inquires whether possible to obtain promise from Persian Government to give mortgage for reimbursement on one of the southern ports in event of robbery ..	199

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368	Sir G. Barclay ..	131 Tel.	5,	Situation in Azerbaijan. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports cutting of Tabreez-Julfa Indo-European telegraph line. Distress is increasing in town ..	199
369	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	274 Tel.	5,	Dispatch of Russian troops to Resht. Refers to No. 334. Would be regrettable if they were involved in any kind of intervention. Desirable to have some precise explanation in case of questions being asked in England ..	200
370	" ..	277 Tel.	5,	Persian telegraphs. In event of Russia pressing the point of method of procedure with regard to exchange of Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Seistan lines, to be guided by No. 321. Refers to No. 336. No need to raise question ..	200
371	To Sir G. Barclay ..	80 Tel.	5,	Situation at Tabreez. Persian Government must be told that they will be held responsible if damage done to His Majesty's Consulate at Tabreez ..	200
371*	Sir G. Barclay ..	Tel. Private	5,	Tabreez. Refers to No. 366. Should he ask for promise indicated in above? Dispatch of 280,000 would enable Aim-ed-Dowleh to proceed against Tabreez. Persian Government should give assurance of his dismissal if he takes any of it ..	200*
372	" ..	132 Tel.	6,	Russian troops for Resht. Refers to No. 364. Russian Chargé d'Affaires denies story of Cossack guard for Russian Consulate ..	200
373	" ..	133 Tel.	6,	Situation at Tabreez. His Majesty's Consul-General reports repulse of a Royalist attack ..	201
374	" ..	134 Tel.	6,	Karun irrigation. Sheikh of Mohammerah claims right to option of any Concession. Proposed instructions to His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah ..	201
375	" ..	135 Tel.	6,	Russian troops for Resht. Refers to No. 372. Russian Chargé d'Affaires has informed him of dispatch of ..	201
376	To Sir G. Barclay ..	Telegraphic Private	6,	Transfer of bank's specie to Tabreez. Advisable to postpone (see No. 371*) ..	201
377	To India Office ..	..	6,	Road Concession from Kuh Malek Siah to Nasratabad. Transmits No. 73, Part X, and No. 359. Sir E. Grey proposes to inform Sir G. Barclay of attitude of Home Office, and inquires opinion of India Office ..	201
378	Sir A. Nicolson ..	124 Tel.	6,	Dispatch of Russian troops to Resht. Refers to No. 369. M. Isvolsky's reasons for. M. Isvolsky has heard that Indo-European line has been cut by Aim-ed-Dowleh ..	202
379	" ..	128 Tel.	8,	Dispatch of Russian troops to Resht. Refers to No. 378. Minister for Foreign Affairs says troops are to reinforce Consular guard, and for protection of Russian subjects and other foreigners at Resht and Enzeli. Consul will abstain from all intervention ..	202

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381	" "	137 Tel.	8,	Persian telegraphs. A stipulation has been inserted in draft Agreement for right of co-operation in construction of any extension of Arabistan lines ..	203
382	" "	138 Tel.	8,	Sheikh of Mohammerah. Sheikh has asked Major Cox for advice. Has instructed Major Cox to ignore request ..	203
383	" "	139 Tel.	8,	Turco-Persian frontiers. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports recrudescence of Turkish aggressions ..	203
384	" "	140 Tel.	8,	Situation at Tabreez. His Majesty's Consul-General reports capture of Marand by Royalists ..	203
385	To Russian Chargé d'Affaires ..	..	8,	Increase of Russian Consular guard at Resht. Refers to No. 367. Transmits telegram sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg (No. 369) pointing out desirability of His Majesty's Government having some explanation in case of questions being asked ..	204
386	To India Office ..	..	8,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 317. Transmits No. 374. Sir E. Grey suggests that His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire should proceed to Mohammerah ..	204
387	Sir G. Barclay ..	141 Tel.	9,	Situation at Meshed. Major Sykes reports outbreak of troubles ..	204
388	" "	142 Tel.	9,	Shah and Constitution. Russian dragoman had conversation with Shah. His Majesty appeared despondent ..	205
389	" "	143 Tel.	9,	Persian telegraphs. Barker should be authorised to undertake preliminary work if Minister of Telegraphs presses for construction of second line to Shahrud. Arabistan negotiations are being hastened ..	205
390	Sir A. Nicolson ..	131 Tel.	10,	Advice to Shah. Minister for Foreign Affairs has received information similar to that in No. 388. Minister for Foreign Affairs informs him Council for discussion of has been postponed ..	205
391	Sir G. Barclay ..	144 Tel.	10,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 374. Further details concerning Concession ..	205
392	India Office ..	..	9,	Abadan Island. Lord Morley sees no objection to dispatch of amended telegram proposed ..	206
393	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	296 Tel.	11,	Russian proposals. Refers to No. 390. His Majesty's Government suggested that no loan should be made until Shah had appointed Ministry composed of men deserving of confidence ..	206
394	To Sir G. Barclay ..	88 Tel.	11,	Karun irrigation. His Majesty's Government considering whether Cox should at once visit Sheikh of Mohammerah. His Majesty's Consul there should be kept informed of scheme referred to in No. 391, and should be instructed to advise Sheikh not to attend to Ter Meulen ..	206

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396	To India Office ..	..	11,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 161. Transmits copy of No. 389. In view of information contained in this telegram, Sir E. Grey proposes to instruct Sir A. Nicolson to explain situation to Russian Government, and ask if they wish Indo-European Department to undertake preliminary work ..	206
397	" "	..	11,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 386. Transmits Nos. 391 and 394. Sir E. Grey considers it of importance that Major Cox should visit Sheikh at once ..	207
398	Baron Gericke ..	..	11,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 341. Sir G. Barclay's information as to Dutch Concession is not exact. If Concession were granted to a Syndicate, they would be warned that consent of His Majesty's Government and Sheikh are necessary ..	207
399	Sir G. Barclay ..	145 Tel.	12,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 394. His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah is being kept informed. Sir W. Willcocks is shortly going to Mohammerah ..	207
400	To Mr. F. Strick ..	..	12,	Sirri oxide. Refers to No. 362. Imperial Bank have agreed to suggestion, and are instructing Brown to act in capacity of agent ..	208
401	India Office ..	..	12,	Bahrein. Agrees to acceptance of amended note ..	208
402	" "	..	12,	Karun irrigation. Transmits copy of telegram to Viceroy, dated 11th March, in regard to ..	208
402*	Sir A. Nicolson ..	143 Tel.	14,	Anglo-Russian co-operation. Minister for Foreign Affairs will shortly reply as to steps to be taken by the two Governments. Cabinet divided as to whether Russia should make her share of advance. Point submitted to decision of Emperor ..	208*
403	Sir G. Barclay ..	147 Tel.	14,	Meshed. His Majesty's Consul - General reports city controlled by Assembly. No amelioration of situation ..	209
404	" "	148 Tel.	14,	Resht and Tehran. Tehran-Resht road in hands of Nationalists to within 40 miles north of Kasvin ..	209
405	" "	24	Feb. 11,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 284. Has drawn attention of Russian colleague to report that usual repairs on Khaf-Nasratabad line have not been executed during the past year, and pointed out that Tehran-Meshed line has been repaired ..	209
406	" "	25	13,	Attendance of British and Russian Ministers at a banquet given by Emir Bahadur Jang on 6th January. Explains reason of ..	209
407	" "	26	13,	His Majesty's Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari. In reply to No. 177. Concurs in Captain Keyes' view ..	210
408	" "	27	13,	Zil-es-Sultan. Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked why the two Powers had warned Zil that their guarantees would be cancelled by his return to Persia. Minister for Foreign Affairs has secured guarantees from the Shah ..	211



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409	Sir G. Barclay ..	28	Feb. 17, 1909	Opening up of communications in Luristan. Refers to Nos. 405 and 579, Part XV, and No. 233, Part XVI. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire containing report by His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz on recent interview with Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh .. .. .	211
410	" ..	29	18,	Bakhtiari and Samsam. Salar Ashraf, one of Bakhtiari Chiefs who recently left Tehran for Ispahan under orders from Shah, has requested a message to be sent to Samsam through His Majesty's Consul-General urging former to listen to Bakhtiari .. .. .	214
411	" ..	31	23,	Events in Resht. Transmits despatch from Mr. Gardner reporting on. Sipahdar has accepted Governorship of Resht (see No. 303) .. .. .	214
412	" ..	32	23,	Bushire customs receipts. Transmits copy of note from Minister for Foreign Affairs pledging .. .. .	215
413	" ..	33	23,	Foreign loans and Concessions. Refers to No. 267. Transmits copies of Declarations of Nationalists in Tehran and Astrabad in regard to question of .. .. .	216
414	" ..	34	25,	Events in Persia. Transmits usual monthly summary of, by Mr. Smart and Major Stokes .. .. .	217
415	" ..	36	25,	Claim of Tabreez Anjuman to customs receipts. Refers to No. 286. Transmits copy of despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, inclosing copy of letter from Acting Director of Customs to the Russian Bank in regard to .. .. .	222
416	" ..	37	25,	Situation at Ispahan. Refers to No. 283. Situation remains unchanged. Unlikely that Shah will grant requirements reported in No. 265 .. .. .	223
417	" ..	38	25,	Situation at Tabreez. In continuation of No. 286. Reports events. Transmits copy of despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Tabreez .. .. .	223
418	" ..	39	25,	Execution of basti. Refers to No. 340. Transmits copy of note to Persian Government and reply of Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject .. .. .	225
419	" ..	40	25,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 328. Objections to making preliminary advance to Shah, as suggested by M. Isvolsky. But the two Governments might act together if Russian Government would accept additional condition indicated in No. 339 .. .. .	226
420	" ..	41	26,	Situation at Ispahan. Refers to No. 416. Samsam has dispatched telegram to Persian Anjuman in Constantinople, informing them that conquest of Shiraz at hand, and asking them to "fix the advance on Tehran" .. .. .	226
421	Sir A. Nicolson ..	137	28,	General situation in Persia. Has communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs modifications in Russian proposals. Conversation concerning .. .. .	227

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422	Sir A. Nicolson ..	145	Mar. 4, 1909	Dispatch of Russian troops to Resht and Russian Julfa. Transmits copy of note received from Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting (see also No. 364) .. .. .	228
423	" ..	146	5,	Turco - Persian frontier. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Rifaat Pasha that it was desirable question of should be settled, and that the good offices of His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government might be of use .. .. .	228
424	" ..	149	8,	Dispatch of Russian troops to Resht. Refers to No. 379. Transmits note from M. Isvolsky giving reasons for .. .. .	229
425	" ..	150	8,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 321. Transmits copy of <i>aide-memoire</i> addressed to Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting various questions relating to .. .. .	230
426	Sir G. Barclay ..	149 Tel.	15,	Oil Syndicate. Payment of Bakhtiari guards. Refers to No. 272, Part XIII. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz, dated 10th March, reporting that he has been approached by Sardar Moh-tashem and Sardar Bahadur with object of arranging for Syndicate to take over management and payment. Transmits reply .. .. .	230
426*	Consul-General Cox ..	170 Tel.	15,	Sheikh of Mohammerah. Has been ordered to proceed to Mohammerah to reassure Sheikh. His Majesty's Consul has communicated representations from Sheikh. Gives substance .. .. .	231*
427	To Mr. J. R. Preece ..	..	15,	Abadan Island. Refers to No. 333. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been authorized, if he sees no objection, to instruct His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire to assist Mr. Reynolds .. .. .	231
428	India Office ..	..	15,	Tehran-Sharud telegraph line. Refers to No. 396. Concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal .. .. .	231
429	Sir G. Barclay ..	150 Tel.	16,	Situation at Resht. Caucasians are continually arriving from Russia, and part of Tehran-Resht road is controlled by them .. .. .	232
430	" ..	151 Tel.	16,	Bar silver at Imperial Bank at Enzeli. Reports 50,000L. worth lying in custom-house at Enzeli, and cannot be conveyed to Tehran without risk. Suggests bank should claim from underwriters .. .. .	232
431	" ..	152 Tel.	16,	Persian financial situation. Submits opinion as to financial requirements of the country, and conditions which should be attached to any advance .. .. .	232
432	" ..	153 Tel.	16,	Shah and Constitution. In interview with Russian Chargé d'Affaires Shah expressed concern at delay of representations. M. Sabline suggested to His Majesty a meeting of representatives of all parties .. .. .	233
433	" ..	154 Tel.	16,	Tabreez. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that Royalists have occupied Julfa .. .. .	233

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434	To Sir G. Barclay ..	93 Tel.	Mar. 16, 1909	Karun irrigation. Dutch Government emphasize ill-defined nature of option granted to late Dutch Minister, and say that any Dutch Syndicate that receives Concessions will be warned that support of His Majesty's Government and acceptance of Sheikh of Mohammerah must be obtained .. .. .	233
435	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	103	16,	Shah and Constitution, and possibility of Russian intervention. Russian Chargé d'Affaires says that it is difficult to avoid intervention. His Majesty's Government of the opinion that Shah should be made to understand that it would not be on his behalf. Question of advance .. .. .	233
436	Sir G. Barclay ..	155 Tel.	17,	Turbat-i-Haidari. His Majesty's Consul at Meshed reports troubles at .. .. .	234
437	" ..	157 Tel.	17,	Sheikh of Mohammerah. Refers to No. 426*. Observations on points 1, 2, 3, and 4. If aggression which he fears is Turkish, he might be informed of No. 249, Part XIII (see No. 253, Part XV). Negotiations for land on Abadan Island .. .. .	234
438	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	323 Tel.	17,	Arabistan telegraphs. Refers to No. 381. To ascertain if Russian Government would agree if assured as proposed in last paragraph .. .. .	235
439	" ..	326 Tel.	17,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to Nos. 150 and 389. To explain situation to Russian Government, and to ask them whether they wish preliminary work in construction of second line to Sharud to be undertaken by Indo-European Department .. .. .	235
439*	" ..	328 Tel.	17,	Shah and Constitution. Reports conversation with Russian Chargé d'Affaires concerning attitude of Shah, prospects of Constitution, and proposed loan .. .. .	235*
440	To Sir G. Barclay ..	95 Tel.	17,	Arabistan telegraphs. Refers to No. 381. Russian Government is being consulted .. .. .	235
441	To the Dutch Minister ..	..	17,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 398. Thanks for assurance that Netherland Government would not fail, in event of Concession being granted to a Dutch Syndicate, to point out that they could undertake nothing without support of His Majesty's Government and Sheikh of Mohammerah .. .. .	235
442	To Sir G. Barclay ..	32	17,	Bahrein. Refers to No. 280. Approves acceptance of arrangement. To impress on Persian Government that His Majesty's Government do not consider it as a final settlement .. .. .	235
442*	Sir A. Nicolson ..	152 Tel.	18,	Observations of His Majesty's Government on Russian proposals. Transmits summary of Memorandum received from Minister for Foreign Affairs dealing with .. .. .	236*
443	Sir G. Barclay ..	158 Tel.	18,	Bunder Abbas. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that Nationalists have taken over Customs. Has asked for dispatch of a ship .. .. .	236
444	" ..	159 Tel.	18,	Situation in Persian Gulf. Has instructed His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire to countermand the gun-boat .. .. .	236

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446	" ..	161 Tel.	18,	Bunder Abbas. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports arrival of gun-boat at Bunder Abbas and withdrawal of Belgian Customs Director .. .. .	236
447	" ..	162 Tel.	18,	Bunder Abbas. Has informed His Majesty's Consul-General that gun-boat should only remain if British subjects are in danger .. .. .	237
448	" ..	164 Tel.	18,	Sheikh of Mohammerah. Refers to No. 437. Gives text of telegrams received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire concerning position of .. .. .	237
449	" ..	165 Tel.	18,	Bunder Abbas. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that Karguzar has been elected Governor by Nationalists .. .. .	237
450	" ..	166 Tel.	18,	Situation in Gulf. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire thinks presence of a ship would be desirable. Does not consider necessary, but has no objection .. .. .	238
451	" ..	167 Tel.	18,	Bunder Abbas. Has informed His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire that His Majesty's Consul-General at Bunder Abbas is in relations with Governor, who is, however, not to be officially recognized .. .. .	238
452	Consul-General Cox ..	211 Tel.	18,	Bunder Abbas. Instructions contained in No. 447 will be carried out. Reason for request for dispatch of gun-boat .. .. .	238
453	India Office ..	..	19,	Robat garrison. Transmits copy of telegram from Viceroy, dated 17th instant, relative to .. .. .	239
454	Sir A. Nicolson ..	155 Tel.	19,	Joint representations. Minister for Foreign Affairs considers recall of Nasr-ul-Mulk should be suggested to Shah. Loan to Persian Government .. .. .	239
455	Sir G. Barclay ..	168 Tel. Very Conf.	19,	Reports in "Novoe Vremya." Russian Chargé d'Affaires gives him to understand that Colonel Liakhoff is largely responsible for alarmist news .. .. .	239
456	" ..	169 Tel.	19,	Accident to Shah. Reports .. .. .	240
457	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	361 Tel.	19,	Nasr-ul-Mulk. Refers to No. 454. Agrees as to advisability of recall of .. .. .	240
458	To Sir G. Barclay ..	99 Tel.	19,	Bushire. Approves instructions to His Majesty's Consul at, as reported in Nos. 444, 447, and 451 .. .. .	240
459	To Mr. J. R. Preece ..	..	19,	Proposed Bakhtiari guard for Syndicate. Gives substance of No. 426 .. .. .	240
460	To India Office ..	..	19,	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 317. Transmits copy of note from Netherland Minister (No. 398), also of No. 434. Sir E. Grey of opinion that note is fairly satisfactory .. .. .	241
461	Imperial Bank of Persia ..	..	19,	Abadan Island. Refers to No. 427. Reynolds would be glad if Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. would act as purchasers. Bank have communicated with Messrs. Gray, Dawes, and Co. .. .. .	241



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463	" ..	171 Tel.	20,	Sheikh of Mohammerah. Sardar Assad will probably press Sheikh to assist Nationalists ..	241
464	" ..	172 Tel.	20,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 442*. Adheres to view in No. 431. In view of necessity for prompt action, suggests that His Majesty's Government should act with Russian Government, subject to condition indicated in No. 342. Condition on which advance might be made (see No. 116) ..	242
465	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	363 Tel.	20,	Disturbances in Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 450. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of steps taken .. ..	242
466	To Sir G. Barclay ..	100 Tel.	20,	Disturbances in Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 450. Request has been sent to Admiralty for gun-boat for Bushire, and for similar instructions to be sent to gun-boat at Bunder Abbas.. ..	242
467	Sir G. Barclay ..	174 Tel.	21,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 464. Concurs with Resident-Governor as regards point 5. Observations on point 3..	242
468	" ..	175 Tel.	21,	Sardar Assad. Refers to No. 463. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports arrival of at Mohammerah. He is said to be trying to induce Nationalists to take action .. ..	243
469	" ..	176 Tel.	21,	Situation at Bushire. Has sent substance of No. 466 to His Majesty's Consul at Bushire, also telegram informing him of Secretary of State's approval of Nos. 444 and 447 .. ..	243
470	Sir A. Nicolson ..	172	18,	Proposed joint action at Tebran. Refers to No. 442*. Transmits Russian Memorandum on subject of .. ..	243
471	India Office ..	..	20,	Appointment of Major Redl as Military Attaché at Meshed. Transmits copy of papers relative to .. ..	245
472	" ..	..	20,	Oil guard at Ahwaz. Transmits copy of telegram to Viceroy, dated 17th March, informing him of No. 318 .. ..	246
472*	Admiralty ..	.. Confidential	22,	Bluejackets at Bushire. Transmits copy of despatch to Admiral Warrender informing him that, if situation is unsettled, Foreign Office has requested ship to be sent. Any intervention is undesirable unless unavoidable .. ..	246*
473	Sir G. Barclay ..	179 Tel.	22,	Situation at Julfa. His Majesty's Consul-General reports Julfa still held by Nationalists .. ..	246
474	" ..	180 Tel.	22,	Russian Consular guard at Resht. Acting British Vice-Consul reports arrival of ..	246
475	" ..	181 Tel.	22,	Persian Minister to London. Persian Government have asked whether Montaz-ul-Mulk would be acceptable. Hears nothing but good of him .. ..	247

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477	" ..	183 Tel.	22,	Sardar Assad. Refers to No. 463. His Majesty's Consul-General reports arrival of at Mohammerah. Sardar Assad proposes to march with Samsam on Tehran ..	247
478	" ..	184 Tel.	23,	Accident to the Shah. Refers to No. 456. Czar has sent his condolences. Has made inquiries after His Majesty's health. Suggests message which might be sent by the King if thought necessary .. ..	247
479	" ..	185 Tel.	23,	Situation at Bushire. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reporting that Seyyid Murtaza has taken over control of Government on behalf of Nationalists. Customs not yet interfered with .. ..	248
480	To Mr. Bryce ..	64 Tel.	23,	Nomination of Persian Minister at Washington to London. In view of Persian Government's proposal, asks details as to character of .. ..	248
481	To Sir G. Barclay ..	102 Tel.	23,	Abadan Island. Refers to No. 437. Oil Syndicate wish Gray, Dawes, and Co. to act as purchasers. What is objection to purchase through a third party? ..	248
482	" ..	105 Tel.	23,	Bushire situation. Approves action as reported in No. 479. Suggests leaving it to discretion of Consuls how much to demand ..	248
483	To India Office ..	..	23,	Extension of wireless telegraphy in Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 331. Figures officially furnished to Foreign Office bear out Mr. Akers' statement as to cost of installation at Zanzibar .. ..	249
484	Sir G. Barclay ..	186 Tel.	24,	Situation in Persian Gulf. His Majesty's Consuls at Bushire and Bunder Abbas report maintenance of order .. ..	249
485	" ..	187 Tel.	24,	Abadan Island. Refers to No. 481. Concurs in reply made by Major Cox as to purchase through an intermediary .. ..	249
486	" ..	189 Tel.	24,	Bushire and Bunder Abbas customs. Refers to No. 482. Last four months' instalments overdue (see No. 131). Bushire receipts being absorbed for Ain-ed-Dowleh's robberies. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bunder Abbas will probably obtain half receipts .. ..	249
487	" ..	190 Tel.	24,	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 432. Composition of meeting proposed by Shah proves his insincerity. Saad-ed-Dowleh will not attend. Has presented joint note with Russian colleague expressing disapproval of selection .. ..	250
488	" ..	191 Tel.	24,	Murders at Shah Abdul Azim. Reports murder of four bastis by some of Shah's roughs. Has presented joint note with M. Sabline urging punishment of culprits..	250
489	India Office ..	..	24,	Lease of land on Karun or Shat-el-Arab. Is of opinion that encouragement might be given to British capitalists of repute desirous of leasing land .. ..	250

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490	India Office ..	..	24,	Karun irrigation. In reply to No. 460. Agrees that no exception need be taken to explanation of Netherland Government ..	250
491	" ..	..	25,	Loan to Sheikh of Mohammerah. Lord Morley concurs in terms of proposed telegram. Transmits copy of telegram from Viceroy, dated 19th March, urging grant of loan ..	251
492	Treasury ..	..	25,	Anglo-Indian loan. Concurs in proposed instructions to Sir G. Barclay ..	251
493	Sir G. Barclay ..	192 Tel.	25,	Nationalist revolt. Reports spread of to Hamadan and Shiraz ..	251
494	" ..	193 Tel.	25,	General situation. Shah may possibly proceed to further acts similar to those reported in No. 488, or may provoke intervention by outrage on foreigners. Requests authorization to make communication in sense of second paragraph of No. 439* ..	252
495	" ..	194 Tel.	25,	Situation in the Persian Gulf. Major Cox reports Nationalists have taken over Jask customs ..	252
496	" ..	195 Tel.	25,	Situation at Tabreez. His Majesty's Consul-General reports great suffering among poorer classes, and doubts whether resistance can be prolonged much ..	252
497	" ..	196 Tel.	25,	Situation in Azerbaijan. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports that Rahim Khan has stopped and perhaps destroyed last two mails from Europe, and has also plundered large amount of foreign imports ..	252
497*	To Sir G. Barclay ..	108 Tel.	24,	Bushire customs. Concurs in No. 486 ..	252*
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CONFIDENTIAL.

## Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

### PART XVII.

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No. 1.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1909.)*

(No. 120.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Paris, December 31, 1908.*

WITH reference to Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 313 of the 26th instant and to your telegram No. 307 of the 28th instant in regard to Persia, I have the honour to report that the Russian Ambassador is telegraphing to St. Petersburg the following account, in which I concur, of an interview which he and I had with the Zil-es-Sultan this evening:—

“L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et moi avons fait aujourd'hui la communication identique qui nous a été prescrite à Zilli Sultan. Il nous a répondu que, se soumettant aux conseils des deux Puissances, il se décidait à rester en Europe, mais a demandé si la garantie qui lui avait été promise subsistait toujours. A notre réponse que rien n'était changé il nous a prié de faire protéger plus efficacement ses intérêts, et a de nouveau cité le cas de son jardin à Téhéran, saisi par sa sœur, dont il demandait aux deux Gouvernements d'obtenir la restitution. Il nous a prié, en terminant, d'avoir en vue l'impossibilité pour lui de résider en Europe indéfiniment, car il s'y sentait désagréablement et aurait désiré pouvoir dans un délai déterminé retourner dans sa patrie. Nous lui avons répondu que ce délai serait déterminé par l'établissement en Perse d'un ordre de choses stable et normal. Zilli part un de ces jours pour Nice.”

At the close of the interview the Zil requested me, in the presence of the Russian Ambassador, to come to see him on the 2nd January, as he had some business with His Majesty's Legation at Tehran on which he desired to speak to me

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No. 2.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)*

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, January 1, 1909.*

WITH reference to the proposals which M. Isvolsky is about to formulate respecting Persia, I am informed by his Excellency that his discussions with the Departments concerned have not yet come to an end. A meeting is, however, to be held to-night, and M. Isvolsky hopes that the discussions may then be terminated.

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No. 3.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)*

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 1, 1909.*

SITUATION at Ispahan.

According to a telegram which I have received from Mr. Consul-General Grahame, there is great agitation in Ispahan. M. Sabline tells me that, partly as a Nationalist demonstration and partly as a protest against the Governor, a number of people have taken refuge in the Russian Consulate-General.



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No. 4.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

You are authorized to have the proposed interview with His Highness. (See your telegram No. 120 of the 31st December, 1908.)

*Foreign Office January 1, 1909.*

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No. 5.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

His Majesty's Government believe that the garden referred to by the Zil is the property of his sister. What is his grievance with regard to it? (See Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 120 of the 31st December, 1908.)

*Foreign Office, January 1, 1909.*

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No. 6.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 1, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 8th April, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copies of despatches as marked in the margin,\* from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, respecting the improvement of means of communication between Dizful and Western and Northern Persia.

Sir E. Grey proposes, subject to the concurrence of Lord Morley, to instruct Sir G. Barclay to discuss the whole question with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, when the latter visits Tehran, in the light of the recent decision, to postpone all plans of railway construction.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey considers that it would be premature, in the present disturbed state of Persia, to embark upon an extensive project of the nature in question.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

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No. 7.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1909.)*

(No. 531.)

Sir,

*Paris, December 31, 1908.*

WITH reference to the telegram No. 313, of the 26th instant, from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which you communicated to me on the 28th, and to your telegraphic instruction No. 307 of the 28th, I have the honour to report that the Russian Ambassador and I had an interview with the Zil-es-Sultan this evening.

My Russian colleague stated to the Zil-es-Sultan that we had given an account to our respective Governments of our interview with His Royal Highness on the 22nd instant, and that we had been instructed to inform him that our Governments would wish him not to return to Persia until a stable and normal state of things had been established in that country. If, however, notwithstanding this advice, the Zil should return to his native country, the Russian and British Governments must withdraw all the guarantees which they had promised to His Highness on his leaving Persia.

M. de Nélidow and I then gave to the Zil a Memorandum of our communication.

\* Mr. Marling, No. 214; Mr. Marling, No. 246; Sir G. Barclay, No. 289.

I inclose a copy of the one which I handed to His Royal Highness, which, *mutatis mutandis*, is identical with the one which my Russian colleague gave to him.

After a few moments' consideration of the communication, which was translated to the Zil by the Persian Minister, who acted as interpreter at the interview, His Royal Highness stated, as I had the honour to inform you by my telegram No. 120 of to-night, that, in view of the friendly advice given to him by the two Governments, he would conform himself to it, and would remain in Europe, but he inquired whether the guarantee which had been promised to him on his departure from Persia would in that case still subsist. As I had arranged with the Russian Ambassador, I replied to that question, which I had anticipated, by saying that, as he did not intend to return to Persia, there was no change in the matter of guarantees. He then asked how it was that his garden at Tehran had been taken possession of by his sister with the consent of the Russian Legation—he was told, but could not believe—and without opposition from the British Legation.

M. de Nélidow and I stated that we knew nothing of the circumstances of the case, but that we had informed our respective Governments of the complaint which His Royal Highness has made to us on the subject.

The Zil then begged us to cause his interests to be protected in a more effectual manner, and to request the British and Russian Governments to obtain the restitution to him of his garden. Finally he urged that the two Governments should bear in mind the impossibility for him to reside in Europe for an indefinite period. He was over 60, and life in Europe was not agreeable to him. He had to alter all his habits, and he would have wished to return to his own country, and he would desire to do so within some fixed period. Meanwhile he would shortly return to Nice.

M. de Nélidow and I replied that the time for his return to Persia would depend on the establishment in that country of a stable and normal state of things.

At the close of our interview with the Zil His Royal Highness stated, in the presence of the Russian Ambassador, that he had some business with the British Legation at Tehran, regarding which he would like to see me, and he appointed the 2nd proximo for the purpose. I told M. de Nélidow, after taking leave of the Zil, that I had no idea what the business could be respecting which he desired to see me.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 7.

*Memorandum communicated to Zil-es-Sultan.*

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre à Paris est chargé par son Gouvernement de donner, conjointement avec l'Ambassadeur de Russie, à Son Altesse Zil-es-Sultan le conseil de ne pas retourner en Perse aussi longtemps qu'un ordre de choses stable et normal n'y aura été établi. Dans le cas où, malgré cet avertissement, Zil-es-Sultan se déciderait à rentrer dans sa patrie, les Cabinets de Londres et de Saint-Petersbourg déclarent se dédire de toutes les garanties qu'ils avaient promises à Son Altesse à son départ de la Perse.

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No. 8.

*Memorandum communicated by Mr. J. R. Preece, January 2, 1909.*

I GAVE the Zil-es-Sultan the message received from the Foreign Office. Some little time after this he had a visit from the Persian Minister, who told him that the Russian and English Ambassadors wanted to see him; they came that afternoon, and communicated a message in effect the same as I already had given him.

To me and to them the Zil replied that as they would not guarantee his safety he would certainly not go back to Persia. It was of the utmost value to him, and he would not make such a sacrifice. In the evening we received the "Times," with the news of the new movement in Persia, and His Royal Highness was then of the opinion that the arrival of the Ambassadors with their message was most opportune, and that certainly in the present position of affairs in Tehran he did not think it at all safe for him to return.

The next day and for some days after he received telegrams from the Shah,



Na'ib-es-Sultaneh and his own people urging him to return at once with the Jelal-ed-Dowleh. All these telegrams I have seen, and translations are attached herewith.

The Prince has sent, through the Persian Minister, these telegrams to the Ambassadors.

It is not surprising that they have very much disturbed His Royal Highness, who does not see well what to do. On the one hand, he wishes to comply with the desires of the two Governments who have agreed to guarantee his safety; on the other, the desires of the Shah and his brother and others give him much cause for thought, and he does not know well which way to turn.

He had a family council one day with all his sons, at which I was present. One was for his complying with the Shah's telegram; two others were against this, and urged compliance with the desires of the two Governments; the fourth had no opinion.

The Prince later on explained to me that he really did not know what to do. His faith in the value of the English guarantee had been much shaken by the want of support of the English Legation in the question of his garden of Saadabad. This had been taken from him by his sister at the Shah's order, although it had been in his possession for over thirty years, and nothing had been done by the Legation to get it back, and to his protests he got no reply from the Legation. If this occurred immediately after his departure, what might he expect later on? In reply to a question, they had asked him for papers to substantiate his right to the garden. How was he to get these papers? He was in France; his papers were in charge of the Imperial Bank in Tehran; no one but him could get them. Besides, what papers did his sister show to substantiate her right to the garden? It was a case simply got up by the Shah and her to break down the faith of the people in his protection by England, and it had succeeded beyond their expectations.

Another point which distressed him very much was the enmity shown him by the Russians. This he had gained solely by reason of his friendship to us as to the Consul-General at Ispahan, &c. The Russian Consul-General had from time to time asked him to do things to which it was impossible for him to agree, and so he had been at continual enmity with him. He had succeeded in seducing his sister and her family from him, and the Russian Legation had given her their support.

He wishes that the English Government should use their influence at the present time with the Russians to eradicate this feeling and put him and the Russians on a friendly footing. If the English Government have no objection, he would, on his return to Persia, go via St. Petersburg. Sir Arthur Nicolson and he are old friends, and he does not imagine for a moment but that he would do his best to help him to this end.

The Prince points out that sooner or later he must return to Persia on account of his property; it is absolutely necessary for him to do so. The money he had in England is all spent, and a great deal of that which he had in Bombay. The last three years have been most expensive ones to him. He has received no pay or revenues from the Persian Government and has drawn large sums from his deposits abroad. He has a large family in Persia, and he cannot maintain that or his sons, &c., here. If he does not return soon his property and the revenue he receives from it will disappear.

With regard to his position with the popular party, he says what he did in giving 20,000*l.* to the National Bank and his communications with the popular party was done entirely on the advice, and even insistence, of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. When a British Minister practically tells him what to do he was bound to do it; there was no other course.

The relations between the Zil-es-Sultan and Jelal-ed-Dowleh are most strained. They do not live together, and have but very little communication. The Zil, I gather from what I hear from other sources, attributes the difficult position he is in entirely to the action of the Jelal in Tehran.

December 30.—In a last talk I have had with the Zil-es-Sultan he expresses himself as being between two stools. On the one hand, he is anxious to comply with the views and wishes of His Majesty's Government, and does not wish to embarrass them in any way. Otherwise he would have suggested that he should visit London and discuss with the Foreign Office the situation, but he thinks that might be mistaken by the Russians and hence he does not propose it. On the other, he does not see how he can well delay going back to Persia in accordance with the orders of the Shah. If he continues to disobey them, the Shah may turn round on him and say you are no longer my subject. He therefore asks the Foreign Office

to advise him or do something for him which will relieve him from this extremely inconvenient and embarrassing position. He would remind the Foreign Office that he has been a friend to England all his life, and that it is on account of this friendship that he has got to be evilly looked upon by Russians and his own countrymen. That he has been guaranteed his life, &c., by successive Ministers and lastly by the English Government, and it was on this guarantee that he left the country.

The Prince has empowered me to say that he has no idea of putting himself forward in any way or fashion for the throne of Persia, and as evidence of his good faith he will give a paper to His Majesty's Government to this effect if they wish it. He is willing that they should, if they think it necessary, put an English officer to remain with him and he will pay him. Also that he will go to Persia, arrange his affairs, and, after three months return; stay eight or nine months and again return, but that it is very urgently necessary on account of his large family that now and again he should go to Persia. Anyway, his object is to do nothing but what is in accordance with the desire and wish of the English Government.

#### Annex.

##### *Translation of Telegrams communicated to Zil-es-Sultan on behalf of Shah.*

*Téhéran, le 25 décembre, 1908.*

REÇU télégramme par Sadr Azam; joyeux de votre bonne santé; venez vite; amenez aussi Djelaled Dowleh.

*Téhéran, le 25 décembre, 1908.*

Le télégramme de votre Altesse a été reçu par Sa Majesté avec beaucoup de bienveillance. Elle ordonne que votre Altesse se mette le plus tôt possible en route pour se présenter devant elle. Elle ordonne en outre, avec la même bienveillance, que votre Altesse amène avec elle son Altesse Djelaled Dowleh, pour vous présenter ensemble et avec espoir au pied du trône impérial.

*Téhéran, le 25 décembre, 1908.*

Le télégramme de votre Altesse m'est arrivé, et je suis infiniment reconnaissant à votre Altesse de m'informer de son arrivée. J'espère que cet honneur me sera fait le plus tôt possible. Amenez aussi avec votre suite Agha Djelaled Dowleh.

*Téhéran, le 25 décembre, 1908.*

Plus tôt vous pourrez venir, mieux cela vaudra.

*Téhéran, le 27 décembre, 1908.*

Votre télégramme m'est arrivé. J'ai transmis moi-même à Sa Majesté le télégramme que vous aviez écrit. Elle m'a fait savoir qu'elle avait fait télégraphier elle-même deux jours auparavant à votre Altesse de se rendre en Perse avec Djelaled Dowleh. Ce télégramme doit être entre les mains de votre Altesse. Sa Majesté ordonne de nouveau que votre Altesse et Djelaled Dowleh se mettent avec espoir, le plus tôt possible, en route et viennent à Téhéran.

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No. 9.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)*

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 2, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S property. Your telegram No. 2 of yesterday.

The locked box which the Zil-es-Sultan has deposited at this Legation is said to contain the title-deeds to the garden which he has been told he should produce. His

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Highness asked that the box might be sent after him, but when he was summoned to Tehran he withdrew this request.

(See inclosures in my despatches Nos. 247 and 307 of the 10th September and 3rd December, 1908, respectively.)

[257] No. 10.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)*

(No. 3.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 2, 1909.*

SEIZURE of property of Imperial Bank by Ain-ed-Dowleh.  
My telegram No. 462, dated the 31st December. The Persian Government has paid 7,000 tomans of the stolen money, and Ain-ed-Dowleh has refunded 15,000 tomans. I am continuing to press for the restitution of the rest of the money.

[258] No. 11.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)*

(No. 4.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 2, 1909.*

SITUATION in Tehran. Telegram No. 429 from Sir G. Lowther repeated to me in your telegram No. 1 of yesterday.

I believe the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires is doing his best to get rid of those in refuge at the Embassy, but there are still 270 there this morning.

[259] No. 12.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)*

(No. 5.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 3, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.  
According to a telegram from Mr. Wratislaw, the Governor of Maragha has beaten the Nationalist forces badly.

[260] No. 13.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)*

(No. 6.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, January 3, 1909.*

SITUATION at Ispahan.  
In continuation of my telegram No. 1 of the 1st instant, His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan reports that there was fighting yesterday between the troops and the malecontents. It is not known how many casualties occurred. The soldiers, who are out of hand, their officers being powerless, have pillaged the greater part of the bazaars. Complete anarchy now reigns in the city. The Governor and other local authorities are in bast at His Majesty's Consulate-General. Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the Ilkhane, with a number of Bakhtiari is expected to arrive to-day, and will join his forces to those of the malecontents. Telegraphing last night, Mr. Grahame did not think that British subjects run any immediate danger.

The trouble, it appears, is principally due to grievances against the Governor, and on first hearing of the agitation I urged the Persian Government to give the malecontents such assurances as would bring about the restoration of order.

M. Sabline and I had a telegraphic conversation with our Consuls this morning, and as a result a Memorandum is being handed to the Shah through the Grand Vizier, urging the dismissal of the incompetent Governor, the withdrawal of the worst of the regiments, and the handing over of the functions of the Governorship to the Ilkhane. We are holding the Persian Government responsible for British and Russian losses.

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No. 14.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1909.)*

(No. 600.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 19, 1908.*

I GAVE M. Isvolsky this evening a paraphrase of the instructions which you had sent to Sir F. Bertie in regard to the warning to be conveyed to the Zil-es-Sultan as to the attitude which would be observed towards him were he to return to Persia, and I expressed the hope that he would be willing to dispatch similar instructions to M. de Nélidow, so that the communication might be a joint one. M. Isvolsky said that he would do so; and I told him that his Highness would arrive in Paris to-morrow and would stay at the Grand Hotel.

M. Isvolsky took the occasion to tell me that he was about to recommend to the Emperor that the Special Persian Envoy should not be received by His Majesty; but that, of course, he could not tell me what decision His Majesty would take. He said that he had been told that the fact of the Envoy not being received in audience might offend the Shah, but he thought that it would have a good effect on the latter. He himself would see the Envoy and give him some wholesome advice; and if he had a letter from his Sovereign, means could be found for transmitting it to its high destination.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 14.

*Aide-mémoire.*

LE Gouvernement impérial partage entièrement l'opinion du Cabinet de Londres exposée dans l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade britannique du 6 (19) décembre, année courante, qu'il serait désirable de faire une communication identique au Prince Zil-es-Sultan, l'avertissant qu'en cas de son retour en Perse il ne saurait compter sur la protection des deux Puissances qui lui avait été assurée lors de son départ de la Perse.

Le Ministère impérial vient d'envoyer par télégraphe des instructions en ce sens à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Paris, l'invitant à s'entendre avec son collègue britannique quant aux modalités de la démarche à faire.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 7 décembre, 1908.*

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No. 15.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1909.)*

(No. 602.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 21, 1908.*

I LEFT with M. Isvolsky an *aide-mémoire* explaining that Sir G. Barclay was endeavouring to induce the Persian Government to allow the Imperial Bank of Persia to have a lien on the Customs revenues at Bushire in order to secure the payment of the interest and arrears on the loan contracted with the above-mentioned institution, and I stated that His Majesty's Government would be glad if the Russian Government would instruct their Representative at Tehran to support Sir G. Barclay in the steps he was taking.

I have the honour to transmit copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that the necessary instructions have been sent to M. Sabline.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.



Inclosure in No. 15.

*Aide-Mémoire.*

DANS un aide-mémoire en date du 3 (16) décembre courant, l'Ambassade britannique avait bien voulu exprimer le désir de voir appuyer par le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Téhéran les instances de Sir G. Barclay auprès du Gouvernement persan au sujet de la garantie du service des emprunts persans conclus à la Banque Impériale de Perse.

Le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères avait été saisi de cette question par un télégramme de M. Sabline encore avant la réception de l'aide-mémoire susmentionné, et des instructions ont été immédiatement envoyées au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie l'invitant à soutenir de son côté les démarches du Représentant de la Grande-Bretagne.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 7 décembre, 1908.*

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No. 16.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1909.)*

(No. 604.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 22, 1908.*

THE newly-arrived Persian Minister, Isaac Khan, called on me yesterday, and we talked on the situation in Persia. Isaac Khan trusts that the two Governments will continue to urge the Shah to convoke an Assembly, though he hopes that it will be a more honest and more capable body than the last one. He told me that, with very few exceptions, the Members of the last Assembly were working merely for their own personal advantage, and were in turn largely influenced by the various political clubs which had been elected in the capital and elsewhere. These Enjumens were most corrupt bodies, and were ready to assist any aspirant to important governmental or provincial posts for a substantial money consideration. The principal needs of Persia at the present moment were, according to Isaac Khan, some financial assistance and a thorough reorganization of the several Departments of the Administration. He considered, indeed, that the latter reform was of more importance than the convocation of an Assembly. He did not think that the Shah himself was unwilling to govern on constitutional principles, but he was surrounded at present by evil reactionary counsellors, and he thought that it would be a great advantage if the Grand Vizier and the Sipah Salar were removed. He trusted that it would be possible to prevent the return to Persia of the Nasr-ul-Mulk. M. de Hartwig paid me a visit later in the day. His views on the situation practically coincided with those held by Isaac Khan, but he entered into greater detail. He considered that the real crux of the situation was the deplorable financial situation, and that, until some immediate remedies were applied to it, there was the danger that the country would drift into complete anarchy, and a crisis occur which might compel both the British and Russian Governments to intervene in order to protect their interests. He was strongly of opinion that all possible means should be adopted to avoid the necessity of intervention, either in the near or remote future. There was also the possibility to be taken into consideration that the Shah might apply to Germany for financial aid, and be willing to grant any concession to obtain it. M. de Hartwig quite understood that the British Government would not for one moment think of tendering financial aid until an Assembly was convoked, but he was confident that the Shah would hasten to promulgate an electoral law and to summon an Assembly, if he were allowed to understand that possibly the two Governments would consider the question of affording financial assistance as soon as his promises became accomplished facts. M. de Hartwig said that it was essential to surround the Shah with better counsellors than those which at present advised him, and there were a few men, and especially the Nasr-ul-Mulk, who were competent to form a satisfactory Cabinet. M. de Hartwig expressed some anxiety lest Sattar Khan should soon proclaim the autonomy of Azerbaijan, and for that reason he was desirous that the Shah should lose no time in taking the necessary steps towards the convocation of an Assembly. He thought that if the Tabreez population were assured that a Parliament would meet to which they could elect Deputies the situation in Azerbaijan would immediately improve, but delay was most dangerous.

M. de Hartwig took some pains to impress on me the cordial way in which he had co-operated with the British Legation in all Persian affairs, and his earnest desire that the Anglo-Russian understanding would eventually result in re-establishing in Persia a Liberal and constitutional régime.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

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No. 17.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1909.)*

(No. 605.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 25, 1908.*

MAHMOUD KHAN, Ala-ul-Mulk, the Persian Special Envoy, called on me yesterday afternoon. He informed me that he had seen M. Isvolsky, whom he had found very severe; and that he had been unable to wait upon the Emperor, as His Majesty was not receiving visits of condolence in respect to the death of the late Grand Duke Alexis. Unfortunately, he had already left Tehran before an intimation to the above effect had reached that capital.

Mahmoud Khan then dwelt at some length on the back-slidings of the last Persian Assembly, and expatiated on its incompetency, the corrupt and selfish aims of its Members, its assumption of duties properly appertaining to its executive Government, and on other misdeeds which had caused it to be thoroughly discredited throughout the country. He said that the general attitude of the Assembly, and the disorders which had taken place in the country during its Sessions, combined with the anarchic activity of the political clubs, showed clearly that Persia was not ripe for representative institutions of a modern type. The grievous situation in Azerbaijan was by no means caused by Liberal movement in favour of a Constitution, but was anarchy organized by a brigand, Sattar Khan, with the aid of brigands from the Caucasus. The grant or otherwise of a Constitution for Persia would have no effect on the proceedings of Sattar Khan and his adherents.

Mahmoud Khan said that the Shah was, of course, in favour of a Constitution; all right-thinking Persians were of that opinion. But he regretted that the two Governments were, through their Representatives at Tehran, exercising pressure on His Majesty to immediately grant a Constitution even before order had been introduced into the Administration, which was in a chaotic condition. The first need of Persia was that her finances should be placed on a better footing, and the next most urgent necessity was the reorganization of all Departments of the State. When the various branches of the Government had been reformed, and a good Administration was in working order, then an Assembly might be convoked, if it was possible to find competent men to compose it. In India and in Egypt His Majesty's Government had established an admirable system of government, but they themselves did not consider that the moment had yet arrived for endowing either India or Egypt with a Constitution on modern European lines; and Persia was far behind both India and Egypt. We wished to build a house in a hurry, before even the foundations were properly laid. The experience of the last Assembly had thoroughly disappointed all the intelligent and commercial classes in the country; and the peasants had no comprehension of an Assembly and had no desire that one should be established. If we forced on the Shah to promulgate an electoral law and the convocation of an Assembly we should plunge the country again into disorders, and we should both be compelled to intervene actively in the internal affairs of Persia. He knew that neither the British nor the Russian Government desired to adopt that course. He pleaded that the two Governments, who he knew were animated with the sincerest desire to benefit Persia, should devote their best endeavours to reorganizing the finances, to giving some pecuniary assistance to the Government, and to insisting on the thorough reorganization of all branches of the Administration. Their advice and assistance on these points would be invaluable. But he feared that if we both continued to insist on what was premature, and might be dangerous, we should defeat the objects we both had in view.

I think that the above is an accurate summary of all that Mahmoud Khan told me. I did not interrupt him, as I wished him to unburden his mind; but when he had concluded, I told him that I could not agree with what he had laid before me. In the first place the Shah had given both Governments solemn promises to carry out certain measures, and that hitherto he had failed to fulfil these promises. I did not believe that the majority of the population were against an Assembly; on the contrary, I was

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sure that they ardently desired it, and that if a Constitution were not granted there would be renewed troubles. It was quite possible that the last Assembly had many defects and shortcomings, but I was sure that among the educated and mercantile classes there were a sufficient number of men competent to be Deputies; and it should be possible for able men, and such did exist in Persia, to draw up an electoral law which should secure the return of those who had an interest in the well-being of their country. However, these were points on which those on the spot were far better able to judge than myself. All I could tell him was that neither the Russian nor the British Government would deflect from the course which they were now following. I asked him what were his plans. He said he was about to make a little tour to the European capitals. At this moment we were interrupted by a visit, and our conversation terminated.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

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No. 18.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1909.)*

(No. 608.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 27, 1908.*

I INQUIRED of M. Isvolsky yesterday whether he had received from M. Nélidoff any report as to the interview which he and Sir F. Bertie had had with the Zil-es-Sultan in Paris. M. Isvolsky read to me a telegram which he had received on the subject, and said that His Majesty's Government would be glad to know what advice he could propose should be given to his Highness in respect to his future movements. M. Isvolsky said that he had been so much preoccupied during the last day or two, that he had not really had time to give much thought to the subject. Had I any suggestion to make? I told him that I had received no special instructions as to the result of the interview, but that my Government deprecated the return of his Highness to Persia in present circumstances. I noticed in the telegram which he had read to me that the Zil-es-Sultan had expressed his willingness to follow the advice which the two Governments might be disposed to give him, and that he had dwelt on the inconvenience and expense to which a prolonged stay in Europe would put him. Would it not be possible to inform the Zil-es-Sultan that the two Governments would wish him to remain in Europe until affairs in Persia had become more stable and normal? It was not quite clear whether the Shah had in fact requested him to return, as no direct summons seemed to have been issued by His Majesty.

M. Isvolsky replied that he thought that on the whole it would be better to give the advice which I had suggested, and that he would telegraph to M. Nélidoff in that sense. I said that I would therefore telegraph to you that he proposed that the Zil-es-Sultan should be requested to remain in Europe until the situation in Persia became more stable, and I would inquire if this advice to his Highness met with your views. His Excellency assented.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

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No. 19.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1909.)*

(No. 611.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 28, 1908.*

M. MILIUKOFF, in the course of his speech in the Duma on the 25th instant, referred to the condition of Persia, and while he did not deny that the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had acted correctly, he stated that there was a dual Russian policy in Persia, and he criticized very severely the action of Colonel Liakhoff. M. Isvolsky told me that he had intended to reply to M. Miliukoff, but as that gentleman was the last speaker on the list submitted to the President of the Duma, he was informed that were he to answer the speech the whole debate might be reopened and a prolonged discussion take place. He had therefore desisted from his intention, but would cause an article to be inserted in the "Rossia" which would serve as a reply to the strictures of M. Miliukoff. The "Rossia" has published the article, which,

after explaining the basis on which the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg are acting in regard to Persia, states that if there has been delay in carrying out the necessary reforms in Persia the responsibility lies with the Persian Government and cannot be attributed to any want of effort on the part of Great Britain or of Russia. The article further says that the reports that a dual policy is being followed by Russia in Persia are based on biased telegrams from special correspondents and have no foundation in fact. As to Colonel Liakhoff, the "Rossia" says that that officer intends to take legal proceedings against certain newspapers, and explains that as he is in the Persian service he is bound to obey implicitly all the orders which he receives from the Shah. The "Rossia" refers to the statement made by the British Foreign Office in the House of Commons that British officers remain on the active list of the British army even when employed by foreign Governments as a proof that there is nothing exceptional in the position of Colonel Liakhoff at Tehran.

I am afraid that these attacks in the Duma on Colonel Liakhoff defeat their object and that the likelihood of his being removed has considerably diminished of late.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

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No. 20.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1909.)*

(No. 613.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 28, 1908.*

IN accordance with the instructions with which you had furnished me, I spoke to M. Isvolsky on the 26th instant in regard to the situation in Persia, and I gave him an *aide-mémoire*, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.

M. Isvolsky told me that he had spoken very seriously to the Persian Special Envoy as to the failure of the Shah to act up to his promises, as he did not wish that gentleman to imagine that the two Governments had any intention of deviating from the line which they had adopted, or that there was the smallest difference of opinion between the two Cabinets. At the same time he had doubts as to whether it was prudent to continue to insist on the convocation of an Assembly, &c., without at the same time affording the Shah and the Persian Government some means of strengthening their position. Both Governments were taking a considerable responsibility on themselves in urging the Shah to convoke an Assembly and then leaving him unassisted and exposed before a situation which might develop into a very dangerous one. We could not say with certainty that the convocation of an Assembly would of itself restore order and tranquillity, or that such an Assembly would be composed of moderate, intelligent, and competent men. Past experience rather pointed to a contrary opinion. He was not wavering from the line which he had followed in conjunction with His Majesty's Government, but he felt that we should put before the Shah some outline at least of a policy, and accompany it with such assistance and assurances as would remove the fears which the Shah evidently felt in regard to the possible revival of a situation similar to that which so nearly imperilled his life and throne on a former occasion.

M. Isvolsky said that the Persian Treasury was empty and the Administration completely disorganized, while the Shah was surrounded with evil and reactionary counsellors, and was evidently exceedingly anxious as to his future. It seemed to M. Isvolsky that something might be done on the following lines: That the Shah should be informed that he must add to the existing Council some competent men elected by the mercantile and other respectable classes in the country, and that this Council should elaborate an electoral law as speedily as possible. The Shah should also completely reconstruct his Ministry by calling to his Councils enlightened men, such as Nasr-ul-Mulk and Saad-ed-Dowleh, and should eliminate the present Grand Vizier and Amir Behadur Jang. His Majesty should also call upon M. Bizot to make an immediate report on the finances of the country, in which he should state to what extent and in what manner a remedy might be found. If M. Bizot recommended an advance, and if the Shah had actually carried out the above proposals, the two Governments should be prepared to grant an advance under adequate guarantees for its proper disbursement. The Shah should undertake in writing that, as soon as the electoral law was elaborated, elections should be held and an Assembly convoked, and if the Shah showed his firm determination, both by word and act, to carry out



the above-mentioned proposals, the two Governments should be ready to give to His Majesty such assurances as would tranquillize his mind as to his person and his future.

M. Isvolsky remarked that in the *aide-mémoire* I had given him His Majesty's Government formulated as one essential condition to an advance that a Constitution should be in working order; and this seemed to be postponing to a rather distant date a remedy to the most crying need of the Government. Without some funds no possible reforms could even be initiated and no Constitution be properly started. He said that he hoped that I would not mind him speaking with perfect frankness, but he thought that we were allowing considerations of home policy to exercise too great an influence over our treatment of the Persian question. England, perhaps, was able to regard the situation in Persia with more equanimity and with greater patience than Russia, as the more serious troubles were occurring in Northern Persia in proximity to the Russian frontier, and Russian commercial interests were suffering more seriously than those of Great Britain. He had sketched out to me the main lines of a programme which he thought might meet the immediate necessities of the situation and give the Shah some confidence in pushing forward the measures which both Governments were anxious to see put into practice.

I told M. Isvolsky that I would embody in a telegram to you the substance of what he had said to me, and that I would, before dispatching the telegram, send him the draft so that he might make any corrections which he might deem necessary. I therefore sent M. Isvolsky a draft telegram which summarized his proposals; and he replied that my telegram accurately gave the general substance of his observations, but that he would be obliged if I did not send it until he was able to give a fuller exposition of his views, which he trusted to be able to do in two or three days. I had, subsequently to my writing to M. Isvolsky, received Sir G. Barclay's telegram, in which he expressed some anxiety as to the situation and had mentioned that the bazaars might be closed. I informed M. Isvolsky, therefore, that I would hold back my telegram; but that I trusted he would place me in a position as soon as possible to acquaint you with his views, as recent telegrams which I had received from Tehran showed that the situation was becoming worse rather than better, and that the Shah was exhibiting distinct signs of becoming more disinclined to act up to his promises.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 20.

*Aide-mémoire.*

LA question d'une avance à faire au Gouvernement persan peut être de nouveau soulevée par le Shah; et dans ce cas les vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique sont les suivantes: Si M. Bizot, après une étude approfondie de la situation financière, informe les deux Légations qu'une avance est nécessaire, le Gouvernement anglais examinerait la question s'il sera à même de s'associer dans une garantie des intérêts d'un emprunt suffisamment assuré. Cependant on ne peut émettre aucune opinion avant la promulgation d'une loi électorale et avant que la date prochaine des élections ne soit fixée. Du reste, le Gouvernement britannique pose comme conditions essentielles qu'une Constitution soit en fonctionnement et que des garanties satisfaisantes soient accordées quant au déboursement de l'argent. En vue des considérations émises dans un rapport de Mr. Marling dont le contenu a été déjà communiqué au Ministère Impérial, le Gouvernement anglais est d'avis, si M. Bizot le croit possible, qu'il serait à désirer de se passer d'un emprunt même si une Constitution est déjà réalisée.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 13 (26) décembre, 1908.*

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No. 21.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)*

(No. 615.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 31, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article from the "Official Messenger" of the 30th instant, on the subject of the establishment of a Russian Consulate-General at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 21.

*Extract from the "Official Messenger," dated December 17 (31), 1908.*

IN view of the continued increase at the Mission at Tehran of the amount of very difficult political work, and consequently the impossibility arising thereby of the staff being able to devote the necessary time to small and complicated commercial, legal, and Consular matters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is raising the question of relieving the Imperial Mission of its Consular functions, and of instituting a Consulate-General in the Persian capital.

It is proposed to transfer to the new Consulate-General all matters of a Consular character which may arise within the Tehran district, or come before the Mission from other Consulates. It would serve at the same time as a Court of the First Instance for legal matters, and, in addition, would aim at the gradual combining of the various branches of Russian economic interests in Persia, as in the Consulate there would be concentrated supervision over all Russian commercial and industrial enterprises and Concessions within the limits of Persia, and the faculty of granting protection and co-operation to them locally. Towards meeting the expenditure caused by this step, the Ministry proposes to devote certain credits which are allotted in the Estimates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but which circumstances have now made clear are no longer required for these particular purposes.

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No. 22.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)*

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 4, 1909.*

THE Russian Legation are led to believe from information which has reached them from the palace that the engagement of German officers as instructors for the Persian army is contemplated, and that the Shah is in negotiation with the German Government on the subject.

M. Sabline is reporting the matter to the Russian Government.

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No. 23.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 4, 1909.*

SEIZURE of property of Imperial Bank by Ain-ed-Dowleh.

The 15,000 tomans which, as reported in my telegram No. 3 of the 2nd instant, have been restored by Ain-ed-Dowleh, are part of a sum of about 30,000 tomans which was being sent by post to Tabreez, and which had been seized by Ain-ed-Dowleh. The news of this third act of plunder only reached me this morning, owing to an interruption of telegraphic communication with Tabreez.

I am addressing a note to the Persian Government in which, while still holding them responsible, I am demanding the attachment of Ain-ed-Dowleh's house in Tehran.

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The Grand Vizier and the Minister of War are giving two banquets this week for the Diplomatic Corps, and I have written to them that, in consequence of this further robbery, I am compelled to abstain, with my whole staff, from attending these entertainments.

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No. 24.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 4, 1909.

SITUATION at Ispahan.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan in a telegram dated yesterday reports that several soldiers were killed in desultory fighting which continued all day and night. Efforts were made by the Governor-General to effect a compromise with his opponents. It was reported that in the afternoon some 200 more Bakhtiari entered the town, and Mr. Grahame was informed in the evening by the Karguzar that, pending the arrival of Samsam-es-Sultaneh on Monday, Zargham-es-Sultaneh had proclaimed himself Governor-General of the town. Samsam will be received as a national hero by the population.

A crowd of the panic-stricken followers of Iqbal-ed-Dowleh and the major part of two regiments poured into the Consulate-General later in the evening. Mr. Grahame reports that they are under control.

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No. 25.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)*

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 4, 1909.

SITUATION at Ispahan.

According to a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General the palace of the Governor was looted this morning by townsmen and others. The Governor has sent in his resignation and it has been accepted. The family of the Zil-es-Sultan have implored Mr. Grahame to give them British protection, and have requested that the British flag may be hoisted over a garden belonging to His Imperial Highness where they may take refuge.

I have asked M. Sabline to send instructions to his Consul-General to co-operate with Mr. Grahame for the protection of the Zil-es-Sultan's family, and I have instructed Mr. Grahame to grant them protection, and have authorized the hoisting of the British flag over the garden.

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No. 26.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 4, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 2nd ultimo on the subject of Oxide Concessions in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin,\* which has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran respecting the claim of the Moin-ut-Tujjar that the Island of Sirri is included in his Concessions.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that the inability of the Moin to produce the original Firmans upon which his claim is based is fairly satisfactory proof that the claim is not well-founded.

A contract now having been signed, as you are aware, by Messrs. Ellinger, on behalf of the Moin, with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., providing for the export of red oxide from Hormuz for a period of three years, it is of less importance, from the standpoint of British interests, to avoid entering into competition with the Moin in regard to the Island of Sirri.

\* See Part XVI, No. 414.

Sir E. Grey would be glad, before replying to Sir G. Barclay's telegram, to be furnished with the observations of Lord Morley on the situation which has now arisen.

In the meantime it is proposed, as suggested in your letter of the 2nd ultimo, to draw the attention of Messrs. Strick to the possibility of oxide deposits on Dalmah and Sir Abu Nuair.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 27.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 4, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo, respecting a request of the Persian Minister of Telegraphs that the Indo-European Telegraph Department should erect a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud, on the Tehran-Meshed line.

I am to state, in reply, that Sir E. Grey considers that the Russian Government might object to work of this nature, which can scarcely be regarded as the maintenance of an existing Concession, being carried out in the Russian sphere. In these circumstances, and in view of the impending exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad telegraph lines, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it would be well to defer any action in the matter for the present.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 28.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)*

(No. 1.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 1, 1909.*

THE interpellation in regard to the action of Colonel Liakhoff was, as I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 550 of the 29th November, 1908, referred to a Commission. This Commission has examined the question, and has decided that it cannot be accepted by the Duma. The reasons for this decision are the following:—

According to an arrangement made between the Russian and Persian Governments on the 24th May, 1905, the Russian officers in the service of the Persian Government receive their pay from the latter, and as regards their duties are placed under the Persian War Minister. Consequently, neither the Russian Government nor the Russian Minister for War could be held responsible for the action of Russian officers performed in the execution of their duties. In respect to the complaint against Colonel Liakhoff that he issued an order which was blameworthy, the introducers of the interpellation advanced no proofs in support of their charge, which does not agree with the facts as shown in the reports which were laid before the Commission.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

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No. 29.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)*

(No. 5.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 3, 1909.*

I CALLED yesterday afternoon on the Zil-es-Sultan by appointment, as he desired to speak to me on a matter of business which he had with His Majesty's Legation at Tehran, but His Royal Highness did not refer at the beginning of the conversation to that matter. He spoke of the interview which the Russian Ambassador and I had had with him on the 31st ultimo. He said that he was grateful for the interest which the British and Russian Governments had shown in his welfare and property, and the guarantees which they had given to him on his departure from Persia, and the advice which they had offered to him, and which he had accepted, not to return for the



present to his native country. He wished to know, however, how long it was probable that the two Governments would desire him to remain away, for he was getting old and his affairs in Persia required to be attended to by himself personally. I reminded the Zil that the two Governments had stated the time to be dependent on the establishment of a stable and normal state of affairs in Persia. To this he replied that that was a very vague definition, for in his opinion, given the character of the Shah and of his present advisers, the chaotic condition of Persia might continue for years. There was no money for administrative purposes, no army, and no confidence on the part of the people in the Government. All the money that could be squeezed out of the people was taken possession of by Court favourites. I asked the Zil whether public opinion and the want of money would not before long force the Shah to grant a Constitution. The Zil replied that the Shah possessed about 10,000,000*l.* of jewels which he could sell or mortgage for his own purposes, and that a Parliament such as the one which had been instituted and abolished would be quite useless. The Zil then said that he foresaw that the Shah would press him to return to Persia. What reason could he give for not obeying His Majesty's commands? I told His Royal Highness that the advice which had been given to him by the British and Russian Governments was prompted by the feeling that his return to Persia might be made use of by persons acting without his consent or knowledge to foment disturbances, and that he could quite well reply to any pressure for him to return to Persia by stating that the British and Russian Governments wished him not to do so. In this he acquiesced.

The Zil then repeated what he had on a previous occasion said with regard to his having favoured British interests in the south of Persia, whereby he had incurred the displeasure of the Russian Government, and he expressed some apprehension lest they might still bear him ill-will, though if he had been Governor in the north he would have favoured Russian interests so far as he could, compatibly with his position as a patriotic Persian. I reminded the Zil that Russia and England had agreed to respect the independence and integrity of Persia, and that they were acting together in the guarantees and the advice which they had given to him. He then asked whether I thought that he might ask His Majesty's Government for a renewal of their guarantees. I said that for him to make such an application would be to throw doubt on the guarantees already given. This he admitted, but he mentioned the case of his garden, and I told him that, as he had already been informed, it had been referred to the two Governments. He then asked what would the British Government do supposing that his property in the vicinity of the Bakhtiari tribes were pillaged by them, acting on their own account or instigated thereto by the Shah or persons prompted by His Majesty. To this I replied by asking the Zil what he would do himself if he were in Persia, and he answered that in that case the Bakhtiaris would not only fear reprisals but would probably not dare to attack his property, for he would have numerous retainers and adherents ready to defend it, but in his absence they might not feel confident of support, and therefore might not defend it properly. The Zil did not pursue this matter.

He came to the subject of the business which he had with His Majesty's Legation. He said that when he left Tehran he placed in the custody of His Majesty's Minister a box containing valuable jewels, shares and securities of various kinds, and important papers and bank books. These he now required for the settlement of business matters, and he would wish the box to be forwarded to His Majesty's Embassy at Paris. He would be quite ready to pay any expenses incurred in forwarding it safely. I told the Zil that there might be some difficulty, as a box containing such valuables might require an escort, and the moment that an escort was employed it would be known that there was something worth pillaging, and a Persian escort in the present state of affairs might not be very reliable. Further conversation elicited the fact that the box is not large, and might not attract attention, and might perhaps be conveyed to Paris by Mr. Churchill who, the Zil said, was soon coming home.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

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No. 30.

Messrs. Ziegler and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 5.)

Sir,

Manchester, January 4, 1909.

REFERRING to the correspondence which passed between us during the autumn of last year, we have to-day received a telegram from our house in Ispahan, informing us that the Shah's troops have looted the bazaar in that city, and that the warehouses of our two chief clients, Hadji Mirza Mahmoud and Hadji Seyd Hassan, have been entirely cleared out by the soldiers. The two Persians aforesaid held goods belonging to us for a considerable amount. We therefore appeal to you for protection, and we now beg to ask you to be good enough to act for us in this matter, as you did during the Tabreez episodes, namely, to instruct the British Legation by wire to inform the Shah's Government in Tehran that our losses will have to be made good by the Persian Government.

Trusting that you will give effect to our urgent appeal, we remain, &c.

(Signed) PH. ZIEGLER AND Co.

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No. 31.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, January 5, 1909.

SPECIAL Envoy from the Shah.

The Special Envoy has now left St. Petersburg, and has gone to Berlin. The Russian Ambassador there has been instructed to ascertain what he does and what he says. When the Envoy left St. Petersburg he was dissatisfied with the coldness of the reception which M. Isvolsky accorded him, and in a vexed frame of mind because the Emperor had not received him. In M. Isvolsky's opinion, the Envoy, during his visit to Berlin, will probably try to raise money there.

In a day or two I am to receive the Memorandum which is being prepared by the Russian Government on Persian affairs.

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No. 32.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 5, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Consul at Shiraz states in a telegram dated yesterday that he is informed that the Chief of the Kashgais is being urged to try a similar *coup* in Fars to that carried out by the Bakhtiaris in Ispahan.

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No. 33.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 5, 1909.

SITUATION at Ispahan.

This morning M. Sabline and I had another telegraphic conversation with our Consuls at Ispahan.

The Ilkhane with 1,000 Bakhtiari is in possession of the town. He is guarding the foreign firms and maintaining order. The town is quiet. The Persian soldiery has dispersed. Two of the local authorities, who would be quite useless and one of whom has already refused to accept the post, have been appointed Deputy Governors by the Shah.

My Russian colleague and I are again urging to-day that the Ilkhane, as the only force capable of keeping order, may be temporarily appointed as Governor of the city, and we are informing His Majesty of the instructions we are sending our Consuls to hold the Ilkhane responsible for the maintenance of public order and for the security of British and Russian subjects.

According to Mr. Grahame, posts and travellers are being attacked between Kum  
[1629] F



and Tehran by some 100 Bakhtiari, who are on their way from Tehran to Ispahan. We have instructed our Consuls to press the Ilkhane to control these men.

Confidential information has reached Mr. Grahame which goes to show that the relatives of the Bakhtiari Khans in Paris and Tehran are in touch and in harmony with them.

I am instructing Mr. Grahame to remind the Ilkhane that, unless he uses his influence to maintain order, he is likely to risk losing our sympathy, of which he has recently received the assurance, conveyed through Captain Lorimer.

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No. 34.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 5, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

The receipts of the Indo-European Telegraph Company in respect of local traffic have been claimed by the Nationalists, and local traffic has in consequence been suspended. The Nationalists now threaten that, unless local traffic is reopened, they will cancel the Company's Concession as regards Azerbaijan. The London office has granted the Company's agent at Tabreez permission to deal with local traffic, but the Nationalists declare that they will cut the line unless the receipts are handed to them. The Persian Government have been applied to by the Manager here for permission to do this, and have been warned that they will be called upon to pay an indemnity of 500*l.* a-day if the line is cut.

M. Sabline and I have instructed our Consuls at Tabreez to urge the Nationalists to await the settlement of the question at Tehran with which the two Legations are dealing, pointing out to them the serious consequences as interrupting international traffic if the line is cut.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires and I will support the Company here if necessary.

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No. 35.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 5, 1909.

I APPROVE your action with regard to situation in Ispahan mentioned in your telegram No. 6 of the 3rd instant.

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No. 36.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 5, 1909.

SEIZURE of Imperial Bank's money by Ain-ed-Dowleh.

I approve the action taken by you, as mentioned in your telegram No. 8, and have informed the bank in a private letter that the Shah has appropriated the money.

[626]

No. 37.

*Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received January 6.)*

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, E.C., January 4, 1909.

I HAVE to acknowledge your letter of the 30th December, which was by mistake addressed to me at Kilberry, Argyllshire, and only reached me at Stansted on the evening of the 2nd instant.

I note the Persian Government state that from December 1908 to March 1909 they propose to pay us 13,000 tomans per month, and 30,000 tomans monthly thereafter.

If for urgent political reasons we agree to such a course, I would recommend that his should only be done provided the Bushire Customs are hypothecated to us for the

service of the entire Government debt, that the Bushire receipts should be laid aside month by month against interest accruing, and in the event of the Bushire receipts not sufficing for this purpose we will have hypothecated to us in like manner the Customs receipts of any other port or ports on the littoral between Mohammerah and Bunder Abbas, both places inclusive, and there should not be any question whatever as to these payments being regularly made in future.

Roughly speaking, the total Government debt to us at this date is about 526,000*l.*; of this sum 310,000*l.* is in excess of our Concession limit, which is 216,000*l.* It will therefore be apparent to you that after the present year we will require a sinking fund, in addition to the monthly interest of 30,000 tomans above alluded to, to gradually liquidate the Government's debt to us in excess of the Concession limit, and for this purpose we would suggest an additional payment of 13,000 tomans monthly being insisted upon for this purpose. Even with this proposed payment it will take eight years to bring the Government's indebtedness to the bank within the terms of our Charter, Deed of Settlement, and Concession. The circumstances under which the excess has grown up are well known to His Majesty's Government, and appear to us to fully justify the provision for liquidating the debt above alluded to.

I have, &amp;c.

T. JACKSON,  
Chairman.

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No. 38.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)*

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 6, 1909.

INDO-EUROPEAN Telegraph Company at Tabreez. My telegram No. 13 of yesterday.

The Company have accepted the Nationalist's terms pending the consent of the Persian Government.

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No. 39.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)*

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 6, 1909.

SEIZURE of property of Imperial Bank near Tabreez. My telegram No. 8 of the 4th instant.

The Shah sent to beg me not to abstain from attending the two official banquets of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War. I consented to this on condition that the Bushire customs were pledged from to-day for all the money of the Imperial Bank appropriated by Ain-ed-Dowleh.

This the Persian Government have now done.

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No. 40.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)*

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran January 6, 1909.

ISPAHAN situation.

In reply to the representations which, as reported in my telegram No. 6, my Russian colleague and I made to the Shah on the 3rd instant, His Majesty stated that he had no confidence in the Ilkhane, and that he would not follow our advice and appoint him provisional Governor of Ispahan.

A repetition at Ispahan of the situation at Tabreez may possibly be the effect of an attempt by the Shah to impose another man. The Ilkhane is at this moment the *de facto* Governor.

Mr. Grahame says that the real grounds of the movement are the private grievances of the Bakhtiaris and of the clergy in regard to land taxation, though the movement calls itself Nationalist, and it is possible that there is a sediment of Nationalism in its composition.

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No. 41.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)*

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 6, 1909.*

RETENTION of the oil guard.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that Captain Lorimer still recommends the retention of the Indian guard at the Oil Syndicate's works, after consulting Reynolds of the Syndicate, who has recently resumed charge of operations.

I imagine that the removal of the oil guard is no longer contemplated, in view of the possibility of the events at Ispahan giving rise to troubles.

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No. 42.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)*

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.**Tehran, January 6, 1909.*

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
(Sent to India.)

[44428]

No. 43.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 6, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th August, 1908, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a despatch, as marked in the margin,\* from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, respecting the Taoona murders.

Sir E. Grey proposes, if Lord Morley concurs, to approve the terms of the note addressed by His Majesty's Minister to the Persian Government.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[45502]

No. 44.

*Foreign Office to Mr. D'Arcy.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 6, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th December, 1908, in which you urge that His Majesty's Government should retain, at the public expense, the Indian guard now stationed in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz for the protection of the operations of your Syndicate.

I am to state, in reply, that His Majesty's Government would not be justified in retaining the guard any longer at the public expense, since it is not necessary on public grounds, but solely in the interests of your Syndicate.

In these circumstances, Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn at an early date whether your Board is prepared to bear the expense involved.

I am to add that, in view of the present financial condition of the country, it would be useless, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, to request the Persian Government to reimburse the cost.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

\* See Part XVI, No. 390.

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No. 45.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)*

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Paris, January 7, 1909.*

THE Zil-es-Sultan has written to me to ask for a reply to his request respecting the box which he deposited in the custody of His Majesty's Legation at Tehran before leaving Persia. (See my despatch No. 5 of the 3rd instant.)

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No. 46.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)*

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Paris, January 7, 1909.*

I HAVE received a letter from the Zil-es-Sultan, requesting that fresh instructions may be given to the British Consul-General at Ispahan to give special protection to the members of His Highness' family and to his interests. The Zil says that it is on account of the disturbed state of affairs at Ispahan and the fact of his being under British protection that he makes his request.

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No. 47.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)*

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 7, 1909.*

ISPAHAN situation. My telegram No. 16 of yesterday.

Farman Farma has been appointed by the Shah as Governor of Ispahan. His Highness, however, is not proceeding at once to his post. He is sending a deputy accompanied by 300 Bakhtiari under Serdar Zafar and other Chiefs. As at present arranged, they will leave Tehran in a day or two. It is evident that the Shah hopes to sow discord between the Bakhtiari by this means.

Following is very confidential: I learn from a very confidential source that Sardar Assad, from Paris, has bidden his tribesmen, both in Ispahan and Tehran, to throw in their lot with the Nationalists; it is therefore quite possible that on their arrival at Ispahan the Chiefs from Tehran may compose their differences with the Ilkhane.

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No. 48.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)*

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 7, 1909.*

SITUATION at Ispahan. My telegram No. 19 of to-day's date.

I have been approached by Prince Farman Farma, who wishes to know what our attitude is in regard to the situation at Ispahan. In reply I told His Highness that the maintenance of order was the only thing we desired. He has telegraphed announcing his appointment to Samsam-es-Sultaneh at Ispahan.

Mr. Grahame has instructions to press Samsam to reply to His Highness's telegram in such a manner as not to exclude a peaceful settlement, which Prince Farman Farma hopes to effect. I am asking M. Sabline to send instructions in the same sense to his Consul-General.

I am told by Farman Farma that the attitude of Samsam will decide the number of troops he will take with him to Ispahan.



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No. 49.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)*

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 7, 1909.*

ISPAHAN situation. My telegram No. 19 of yesterday.

A telegram to Samsam-es-Sultaneh from the Bakhtiari Chiefs in Tehran has been shown to His Majesty's Consul-General, from which it is clear that there is no dissension between them. The telegram advises Samsam to prepare to resist Farman Farma, who is stated to be about to proceed to Ispahan with four regiments and artillery.

Mr. Grahame regards the situation as serious, as he thinks that in the event of hostilities foreign lives and property would be in danger.

I am continuing to do all I can to further a peaceful settlement of the situation.

[45675]

No. 50.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 7, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 28th August, 1908, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Imperial Bank of Persia,\* forwarding a statement showing the improved results of the working of their branch at Nasratabad during the year ended 20th September, 1908.

I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be furnished with the observations of Lord Morley upon this communication.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

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No. 51.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)*

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 8, 1909.*

SITUATION in Tabreez.

In a telegram dated yesterday His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports that on the 6th instant the local Assembly sent a Delegate to establish himself in the custom-house for the purpose of controlling the receipts. The Assembly has not yet decided into which bank to pay the receipts.

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No. 52.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 8, 1909.*

SITUATION.

In view of your telegram No. 368 of the 28th ultimo, M. Sabline and I have abstained from making any further representations to the Shah, but it is believed that His Majesty is about to reissue his anti-Constitution Rescript of the 22nd November, 1908.

The situation is meanwhile going from bad to worse. Had the Shah followed our advice in dealing with the Ispahan situation, or were he willing to do so even now, it might be possible to induce Samsam-es-Sultaneh eventually to retire, but His Majesty maintains his attitude of short-sighted stubbornness in regard to this as he has done in regard to our advice on other matters. I doubt that in his penniless condition he will be able to send troops to Ispahan, and even if they go there is very little chance of their being successful.

It is not impossible that, after Samsam's usurpation of power in defiance of the

\* See Part XVI, No. 147.

Shah at Ispahan, the example of the Bakhtiari will be followed by other tribes, e.g., the Kalhors at Kermanshah and the Kashgais at Shiraz.

Though it may be too late to arrest the growing anarchy by the grant of a Constitution, which is a *sine quâ non* of financial assistance, I consider that in the establishment of a constitutional régime lies the only hope of guarding against developments which it is impossible to predict with any certainty, but which might involve the disintegration of Persia, or at least the forcible dictation of terms to the Shah by the Nationalists.

I hope that instructions will shortly reach us.

I learn that Samsam is endeavouring to get into touch with Satar Khan at Tabreez.

[1002]

No. 53.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)*

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 8, 1909.*

SITUATION at Ispahan.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports that Samsam-es-Sultaneh has issued a Proclamation to the inhabitants of Ispahan to the effect that the Bakhtiari will withdraw from the town, taking with them three chief priests, and abandoning the population to the mercy of the Shah and the soldiers, unless the inhabitants appoint representatives for a local constitutional Assembly within three days.

The town is being fortified by the Bakhtiari.

I fear it is too late for counsels of conciliation now that Samsam-es-Sultaneh has shown his hand as a Nationalist, but I have authorized Mr. Grahame to see him if he thinks it would make for conciliation.

[896]

No. 54.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 8, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S garden (see telegram No. 2 of the 2nd instant from Tehran). We can do nothing until the title deeds are produced. Are they kept in the box? The latter is forming the subject of telegraphic correspondence with Sir G. Barclay.

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No. 55.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 8, 1909.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 2 of the 7th instant. I am informed by Sir G. Barclay that His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan is doing his utmost to afford family of Zil-es-Sultan protection in that town.

[566]

No. 56.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 8, 1909.*

GARDEN belonging to Zil-es-Sultan. The box in His Majesty's Legation belonging to His Imperial Highness contains securities, jewels, and other articles of value, and he wishes to have it with him in Paris.

What safe means are there of conveying it thither? If Mr. Churchill's responsibility were safeguarded, could he take it to His Imperial Highness?

[37035]

No. 57.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 8, 1909.*

SUBSIDY for German school. See your despatch No. 270 of the 2nd October, 1908, and my telegram to Mr. O'Beirne No. 153 of the 4th June, 1908.

I have never received any expression of opinion from Russian Government in reply to my above telegram.

It seems probable that reason is that they shared view of their Minister in Tehran that proposed representations should not be made by him as well as by His Majesty's Legation.

Are you of opinion that we by ourselves should warn Persian Government, in view of present circumstances, viz., arrival of Persian Envoy in Berlin and discussion respecting lien of Imperial Bank on Bushire customs.

If your reply is in the affirmative, it would be well to enter a caveat in general terms, without alluding specifically to subsidy for German school.

[1112]

No. 58.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 9.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 8, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 17th December, 1908, as to the retention of the Indian guard at the oil works in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz, and the question of the employment of Lieutenant J. G. L. Ranking, an officer with the guard, as Vice-Consul in place of Captain D. L. R. Lorimer while on leave.

As regards the second point, it will be seen from the inclosed telegrams that Captain Lorimer is being granted leave out of India, and that Lieutenant Ranking will succeed him. I am to request that the grant of the necessary Consular powers to Lieutenant Ranking may be arranged. Lieutenant James Gabriel Lancaster Ranking is his full description. It should be explained that his substitution for Captain Lorimer while on leave will apparently cause a diminution in the sum divisible between the British and Indian Exchequers, the immediate effect being a decrease of rupees 336 : 7 : 4 a-month (269l. 3s. 4d. a-year), as marginally shown.\*

As regards the expenditure incurred by the dispatch of the additional guard for the protection of the oil works, the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, in their letter of the 7th December, 1907, sanctioned "the charge to Imperial funds of one-half of the expenditure involved by the dispatch of the proposed infantry guard at a total initial cost of 266l. 13s. 4d., and by their maintenance at Ahwaz for a period of six months at the rate of 1,824l. a-year"; and subsequently it was proposed that this latter sum should be increased by approximately 268l. 16s. a-year to 2,092l. 16s. a-year, to provide a more adequate rate of pay for Lieutenant Wilson and Lieutenant Ranking,

\* *Captain Lorimer's Emoluments.*

(Indian Foreign Department List, October 1, 1908.)

	Rs.	a.	p.
Pay .. .. .	500	0	0
Acting allowance .. .. .	266	10	8
Exchange comp. allowance .. .. .	47	14	8
Local allowance .. .. .	200	0	0
Sumptuary allowance .. .. .	100	0	0
Total .. .. .	1,114	9	4

*Lieutenant Ranking's Emoluments.*

(Viceroy's Telegram of December 31, 1908.)

	Rs.	a.	p.
Pay as Probationer, Political Department .. .. .	450	0	0
Exchange comp. allowance .. .. .	28	2	0
Local allowance .. .. .	200	0	0
Sumptuary allowance .. .. .	100	0	0
Total .. .. .	778	2	0
Difference .. .. .	336	7	4 a-month.

the officers with the guard, with retrospective effect from the date of their landing at Mohammerah.

With regard to the maintenance of the guard beyond the 17th December, 1908, the date mentioned in your letter under reply, it is observed that the Oil Syndicate have been invited to defray the further charge to public funds on that account. The charge will continue to be at the rate approximately of 174l. 8s. a-month (2,092l. 16s. a-year) till Lieutenant Ranking succeeds Captain Lorimer, presumably on the 15th January, 1909, and thereafter at the same rate, if it should be found necessary to replace Lieutenant Ranking with the guard by another officer on the same emoluments. Information on the point is promised in the Viceroy's telegram of the 31st December, 1908.

It is assumed that, in the event of the Syndicate wishing to dispense with the guard, a moiety of its cost subsequent to the 17th December, 1908, including the return journey to India, will be defrayed by the British Exchequer.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 58.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*December 23, 1908.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 20th July last as to Lieutenant Ranking's appointment at Ahwaz. Foreign Office have been informed of Lorimer's application for two years' leave, commencing on 15th proximo. Do you propose that Ranking should act for him? If so, what are your proposals as to his pay and allowance? While thus acting, would he be relieved entirely from his duties with the oil guard? and, if so relieved, would it be necessary to replace him by another military officer on the salary which you recommended for Ranking in your letter of the 8th October last? If the guard returns to India, can you give the approximate amount of transport charges? An early reply by telegraph is requested. Retention of oil guard is now under consideration in consultation with the Treasury.

Inclosure 2 in No. 58.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*December 31, 1908.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 23rd instant. Ahwaz Consulate. We are sanctioning Lorimer's leave; he will be succeeded by Ranking, who will draw allowances attached to post at Ahwaz in addition to salary of his grade as probationer in Political Department; as to the other points we will send further reply. We shall be glad if you will arrange for grant to Ranking of necessary Consular powers.

[1114]

No. 59.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 9.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter dated the 1st December, 1908, as to the situation in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to inclose copy of a despatch which he has addressed to the Government of India on the subject.\*

In connection with what is said in your letter under the heading of "British and Russian Consular Establishments," Viscount Morley would invite the attention of Secretary Sir E. Grey to the statements contained in recent political diaries of the Bushire Residency, that M. Ovseenko, the Russian Consul, left Bunder Abbas on leave on the 16th October last, and that M. Mathiew, his assistant, was also proposing to go

\* Not printed.

[1629]

H



on leave. The opportunity might be taken, if circumstances are favourable, for suggesting to the Russian Government the appointment of some other officer to Bunder Abbas.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[1153]

No. 60.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 9.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 8, 1909.*

I AM directed to inclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a Secret letter from the Government of India, dated the 8th October, 1908, regarding the possibility of a reduction of expenditure on consular establishments in Persia.

It will be observed that the Government of India confine themselves in their present letter to considering whether any of the Consulates and Vice-Consulates now existing can be abolished, and do not discuss in any detail the practicability of a reduction of the expenditure on the establishments attached to these posts, assuming them to be retained. Copy of a despatch drawing attention to the omission, and asking for the early submission of a report on this aspect of the question is inclosed.

As regards the practicability of abolishing any of the existing posts, Viscount Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views.

As regards the Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari, it may be observed that, though the withdrawal of the post may not be desirable at present, the question is worth considering whether it is necessary to maintain there both a Consul and an officer of the Indian Medical Service. According to the list of the Foreign Department of the Government of India of the 1st July the Medical Officer at Turbat was acting as Vice-Consul at Birjand, and this arrangement might be continued, if consular representation at Birjand as well as at Turbat is considered necessary.

As regards Seistan, the establishment, as shown in the above-mentioned list, consisted of a Consul, an Assistant to the Consul with the status of Vice-Consul, and a Medical Officer on plague duty. It seems a question whether in normal circumstances it would not suffice to maintain in Seistan a Consul and a Medical Officer. The reasons which led to the deputation to Seistan of an assistant to the Consul were stated in the Government of India's letter of the 21st July, 1904, inclosed in Sir H. Walpole's letter of the 29th September, 1904.

I am to take this opportunity to suggest that, when an officer of the Levant Service is available for the Consulate at Shiraz, which is being temporarily held by Mr. Bill of the Indian Political Department, Kermanshah might be transferred to the Levant Service and Shiraz allotted to the Indian Political Department.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 60.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

*Simla, October 8, 1908.*

WE have the honour to refer to paragraph 3 of our despatch dated the 26th March, 1908, in which we promised a further communication regarding the possibility of a reduction of expenditure in Persia.

2. We need not assure your Lordship that we have approached this question with a strong and determined desire to reduce, wherever possible, the burden which is thrown upon the revenues of India by the maintenance of our Consular establishments in Persia. And if after long and anxious inquiry we are not able, as we are not able, to recommend any measure of retrenchment, it is because the pressure of recent events, and any forecasts that we can draw from Persian affairs, have driven us to conclude that our interests will be gravely menaced by the weakening or impoverishment of our Consular staff. While the Anglo-Russian Agreement may point towards a policy of withdrawal, the vigorous intervention and insistence of Germany, the growing industrial interest of India in Persia, and the internal condition of Persia itself, all point unhesitatingly the other way.

3. At the present moment the Consular representation in Persia, outside Tehran, of Great Britain and Russia compares as follows: In the Russian sphere Great Britain and Russia are both represented at Tabreez, Resht, Ispahan, Kermanshah, Meshed, and Turbat-i-Haidari, while Russia in addition is represented at Ardebil and Asterabad; in the British sphere Great Britain and Russia are both represented at Kerman, Seistan, and Bunder Abbas, and Russia is also represented at Birjand; in the neutral zone Great Britain and Russia are both represented at Bushire, and in addition Great Britain is represented at Shiraz, Mohammerah, and Ahwaz. Thus Great Britain and Russia are each represented in thirteen places; Russia preponderating in both the Russian and the British spheres and Great Britain preponderating in the neutral zone. The Germans have, as yet, Consular representation only at Bushire, but important tours have been made by Herr Kurt Jung, Dr. Grothe, and others, and there are active agents for Germany in the Gulf and elsewhere. Neither Russia nor Germany show the least intention of reducing their activity. The Russian staff is appreciably stronger than the British, and Mr. Marling reported in his despatch No. 143, dated the 15th June, 1908, that in the last thirteen months the Russian Consular guards had been increased by four officers and 140 men.

4. In the Russian sphere Tabreez, Ispahan, and Resht are directly under the Foreign Office. Meshed is the head-quarters of the Governor-General of Khorasan, on whose good-will the security of the Seistan-Meshed trade route and the maintenance of British interests in Seistan and Kain largely depend; and the Consul-General is charged with the important duty of acting as an intermediary between Afghan and Persian officials, and generally of keeping a watchful eye on the Perso-Afghan frontier and Russian Central Asia. For military reasons the retention of our Consulate in Meshed is of peculiar importance. Commercially Kermanshah is important, because of the large and increasing volume of Indian trade which passes through that district; politically it is important on account of its proximity to the projected line of the Bagdad Railway, and its position as being on the best if not the only possible alignment of an extension of that railway to Tehran, and on a possible alignment of a railway from the north to the south of Persia. At the present moment Kermanshah has special importance as an outpost for obtaining trustworthy information regarding the designs of Germany in that quarter, the progress of the Turco-Persian frontier dispute, and developments in Luristan. As to Turbat-i-Haidari, your Lordship will observe from the correspondence, of which a copy is inclosed, that Captain Keyes, our present Consul, has somewhat lightly suggested (on the eve, it may be noted, of his departure) the abolition of the Consulate and the substitution of a native agency in its place. The suggestion is opposed on the weightiest grounds both by Major Sykes and Mr. Marling, and with special regard to the position occupied by Russia in relation to the sanitary cordon on the Perso-Afghan frontier, and the necessity for continuous and effective protection of the interests of Indian and Afghan traders in that neighbourhood. We are quite unable to recommend the suggestion for acceptance. Not only would our action, as pointed out by Mr. Marling, lend itself in appearance to the imputation that we had entirely abandoned Northern Persia to Russia, it would also make itself felt all along the eastern border, especially in Seistan, and might complicate our relations with Afghanistan.

5. In the British sphere we are already less represented than is Russia, and it seems scarcely necessary to justify the existence of our establishments at Bunder Abbas, Kerman, and Seistan, at all of which places His Majesty's Government apparently desire that British interests should be fully maintained. We only refer to the proposal made by Major Kennion for establishing a Vice-Consulate at Birjand to say that we understand that your Lordship will consult us regarding it on a future occasion.

6. There remains the neutral zone. Our relations with the Sheikh and the potentialities of the Karun Valley demand constant attention from our Representative at Mohammerah. The fresh discovery of oil at Ahwaz, the interest taken by the Germans in this neighbourhood, the importance of retaining control over the Bakhtiari, the possibilities of railway development, and of the extension of the operations of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in connection with the Ahwaz-Borasjun telegraph line, all point to the urgent necessity of retaining a representative at this place. Bushire and Shiraz, apart from important local interests, are the winter and summer residences of the Resident and Consul-General who watches our interest in the Gulf, and any abandonment of our position at either of these places would constitute a severe blow to our influence throughout the British sphere. The activity of the Germans must not be overlooked; already it has been proposed by Mr. Marling to establish a Vice-Consulate in Lingah.

6. From the foregoing considerations we are forced to conclude that no reduction



in establishments can be effected without serious risk to our political and commercial position, not only in Persia, but in Afghanistan. Events in the former country are now closely observed in the latter. The Afghans appear to have formed the impression that we are about to partition both Persia and Afghanistan with Russia. It is important at the present juncture that, in the absence of urgent and grave reasons for a change, no action should be taken which might lend colour to the interpretation which an intensely suspicious people like the Afghans appear ready to place on the Anglo-Russian Convention.

We have, &c.  
(Signed) MINTO.  
KITCHENER.  
C. H. SCOTT.  
H. ADAMSON.  
W. L. HARVEY.  
J. S. MESTON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 60.

*Major Sykes to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

*Meshed, March 28, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of a letter from Captain Keyes of the 14th March, 1908, in which that officer recommends the reduction of the Turbat Consulate to a Native Agency.

2. Captain Keyes' principal arguments are apparently three in number:—

- (a.) That the founding of the Consulate was not fully warranted;
- (b.) That Captain Iyass did not acquire an exceptional position at Turbat; and
- (c.) That, if we were to reduce the post to a Native Agency, it would counteract influences adverse to ourselves as well as the present arrangement.

3. To take the first point as set forth in paragraph 9 and elsewhere in the letter under reference, Captain Keyes is aware of nothing that occurred in the way of Russian obstructiveness after the affair of the Patna Nawabs in 1901, when the action taken "practically put an end to the objectionable zeal of the Russian officers." This and similar passages show that, in Captain Keyes' opinion, the foundation of the Turbat Consulate was needless.

I hardly think that my predecessors would have recommended the establishment of the Turbat post, or that the Government of India would have incurred the great expenditure involved without carefully examining the question; and this seems to be a sufficient reply to Captain Keyes' arguments.

4. The position originally held by Captain Iyass is also, I think, an acknowledged fact. Even in distant Kerman Captain Iyass was known, and I imagine that the Government of India do not require fresh proof that that official was the uncrowned King of Turbat. So far as Persian public opinion was concerned, even before Captain Keyes' arrival in Persia, it was a common report that the Czar had said that "Miller and Iyass never sleep."

5. Captain Keyes recommends the reduction of Turbat to a Native Agency, and thinks that the Meshed Consulate-General could then "as effectively counteract the evil effects to British trade and influence caused by the combined Russian Consulate and cordon as with a Consulate at Turbat." I can hardly imagine that this argument will commend itself to the Government of India, as, to lay down that a Native Agent can hold his own as effectively as a Consulate provided with a Medical Officer against a Russian official of Captain Iyass' experience and ability, who also commands Persian troops, surely needs no refutation. If, however, a parallel be desirable, we have the case of Birjand, where a hospital assistant was stationed by me in 1899, and where the Government of India is now contemplating the establishment of a Vice-Consulate, presumably on the grounds that a native hospital assistant is not the equal of a British official.

6. Throughout Captain Keyes' letter there is, in my humble opinion, what has recently been termed by His Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs as "a very intense view of the interests on the spot, which is not easily reconcilable with the larger interests elsewhere." I consequently propose to deal with the question in its wider aspect.

The Anglo-Russian Convention, which has recently been concluded, has, theoretically, put an end to the rivalry of the two Powers in Persia; and we are undoubtedly ready to observe it in the spirit as well as in the letter. Whether our rivals are equally ready to do so remains to be seen. In any case, our sphere in Persia has been made a small one, and practically consists of a slice of Eastern Persia with Persian Baluchistan and Kerman. Of these, strategically speaking, Eastern Persia is by far the most important, and it behoves us to guard our exiguous sphere by every legitimate means. Can any one then urge that the reduction of Turbat would not weaken our position in Eastern Persia, which consists of a series of centres of British influence parallel to the Afghan frontier? The answer must surely be in the negative.

7. We next have to consider the point of view of Persians and Afghans. Eleven years ago Sir Mortimer Durand strongly recommended the abolition of the Resht Consulate as being unnecessary; but the Nasir-ul-Mulk was instructed by the then Shah to point out to Lord Salisbury that the effect on Persian opinion would be serious. The post was, consequently, not abolished. When we compare Turbat, which is, generally speaking, the touring branch of this Consulate-General, and its position with regard to Meshed and Herat, we can easily foresee what Persians and Afghans would think if Captain Keyes' proposals were adopted. Their immovable opinion would be that we came to Turbat to show that Captain Iyass, in spite of his being in command of Persian troops, was not the permanent ruler of the district; but that, from some strange infirmity of purpose or from timidity we had shirked the completion of the task, whereas semi-bankrupt Russia shows no signs of relaxing her grasp, even on Southern Persia.

True, we might plead the Anglo-Russian Convention, but to that the reply would be, "Why has not Russia left Seistan?" To prove that the Afghans watch keenly our action at Turbat, I need only refer to the diary of the Native Attaché, Meshed Consulate-General, on special duty at Herat from the 5th-18th April, 1903. It shows clearly that evils did exist at that period or two years after the Patna Nawab's case, and that the Afghans considered the Russian action, which we subsequently checked, to be intolerable.

In short, to retire from Turbat, so long as the illegal quarantine cordon exists, would undoubtedly constitute a heavy blow to British prestige, and one that, in my humble opinion, we should have rightly deserved.

8. Another point is that the Government of India are anxious, for obvious reasons, to secure control of quarantine arrangements on the Perso-Afghan frontier; but a policy of scuttle or semi-scuttle would surely wreck this scheme, or at any rate make it infinitely more difficult.

9. To conclude, if Russia hands over quarantine arrangements on the Perso-Afghan boundary to us, they must undoubtedly be directed by this Consulate-General, which alone is in touch with the leading Persian officials of Khorassan and with the Governor of Herat. Turbat, Karez, and Birjand would then be the chief centres from which this quarantine would be worked. If my suggestion that Kain be replaced under Meshed be approved and the question of the frontier be treated as one, I think that the scope of the Turbat Consulate might be enlarged, and some expense be saved to Government by placing a medical officer as Vice-Consul at Birjand under the touring Consul at Turbat; but to reduce Turbat at a time when Persia is in the throes of a revolution, and so long as the Russians maintain the quarantine cordon, would appear to me to be unworthy of the steadfast policy of the Government of India.

10. Copies of this letter are being sent to His Majesty's Legation and their Britannic Majesty's Consuls for Seistan and Turbat.

Inclosure 3 in No. 60.

*Captain Keyes to Major Sykes.*

*Turbat-i-Haidari, March 14, 1908.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your indorsement of the 7th instant, I have the honour to submit the following Report on the maintenance of our Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari.

2. I have seen no papers relating to the Russian sanitary cordon from its institution  
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in 1897 till 1901, when the case of the Patna Nawabs again brought the matter into prominence, nor have I been able to obtain information of any cases of flagrant abuse of power on the part of the Russian officers of the cordon previous to that event. In the files you have sent me I have also found no record of any further cases of serious obstruction between 1901 and Captain Winter's arrival here in January 1904.

3. Captain Winter's instructions, contained in the marginally noted letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, were to the effect that he was to watch and report on the action of the Russian officers, and prevent, as far as possible, flagrant abuses on their part, especially as regards the preferential treatment of Persian as against British and Afghan subjects. I understand from these instructions that the British Consul was also to attempt to curtail the influence of the Russian officials in local matters unconnected with their sanitary duties. That this influence was believed to be considerable is shown by Sir Arthur Hardinge's despatch No. 199 of the 9th September, 1905, to the Marquess of Lansdowne, in which he alludes to Captain Iyass as having been, before Captain Winter's arrival, "almost a *de facto* local Governor."

In Captain Winter's instructions mention was also made of the attempts on Russia's part to attract the Afghan wool trade direct to Transcaspia.

I have not seen it stated officially, but I understand that this Consulate was never intended to be permanent.

4. I would now submit that the object aimed at in the institution of a temporary Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari, *i.e.*, the prevention of the acquisition of undue influence in sanitary and local matters by the Russian officers of the cordon and the consequent injury to British trade and influence, has been attained, as completely as is possible, by local action, and that all that is now required is an agency to report to His Majesty's Consul-General any fresh attempts to acquire influence beyond that which might legitimately be expected under the recently concluded Convention.

5. To take the original business of the sanitary cordon first, I have not been able to obtain information of any flagrant abuses of their position by the Russian officers since the institution of this Consulate, or, indeed, subsequent to the affair of the Patna Nawabs, the action taken by us in that case having apparently caused the Russian Government to direct their officers to moderate their zeal.

The merchants of the place inform me that since Captain Winter's arrival the examination of caravans has been conducted with more courtesy, and delays have been less annoying; but their complaints of the manner of conducting examination prior to this must seem rather strange to any one who has had the misfortune to make the acquaintance of the Turkish sanitary authorities.

The irrelevant questioning of every one who passes the cordon has also ceased since Captain Iyass completed his Gazetteer, and the inconvenience to the few British caravans proceeding to Meshed is as small as can be while a cordon exists. On the outbreak of plague in Seistan misdirected zeal and irksome regulations might have been expected; but considering that Russian doctors are in absolute ignorance of the latest discoveries regarding plague, look on Indian methods as criminally fatalistic, and themselves suffer from incredible nervousness, their moderation was surprising. It is also worthy of note that the outbreak of plague at Jangal, within a few miles of the cordon, was dealt with by Captain Watson without a protest from the Russians.

6. As regards the influence acquired by Captain Iyass, nothing I have learnt here warrants the statement that he was almost a *de facto* local Governor, or that his influence much exceeded that of other Russian Consuls who are able to procure the dismissal of officials incurring their displeasure. The fact, however, that he has officers and men of the Tehran Brigade and of the local regiments under his orders naturally gives him a certain advantage.

7. As regards the wool trade, Turbat-i-Haidari's importance has been transferred to Karez, which now has a custom-house competent to deal with all business. Although Karez is in the Turbat-i-Haidari Consular district the British Agent there is directly under the orders of His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed, which, rather than either of these two places, is the centre of the trade. There is not a single British Indian trader at Turbat-i-Haidari, and the small amount of British goods that find their way into the districts are purchased through middlemen in Meshed or Yezd.

8. To sum up, it was the existence of the sanitary cordon in any form to which we objected, not merely to the fact that it was under Russian officials; but if it were ever expected that our opening a Consulate here would lead Russia to give up the cordon, this hope should have been abandoned long ago. The question thus resolves itself into whether His Majesty's Consul-General could not with the assistance of a Native Agent

as effectively counteract the evil effects to British trade and influence caused by the combined Russian Consulate and cordon as with a Consul.

9. As I have mentioned above, the action taken by us in the affair of the Patna Nawabs practically put an end to the objectionable zeal of the Russian officers. If such a result could be produced before the ratification of the Sanitary Convention of Paris, with Anglo-Russian relations in the state they were in 1901, it is not too much to expect that, now our relations are on a different footing, the Russian Government will not again use the cordon as they did in this one instance.

As regards the influence of the Russian Consul, as he now is, in local matters, it must be remembered that seven years ago there was no telegraph line to Turbat-i-Haidari, and local officials and land-owners were in almost complete ignorance of the course of events in other parts of Persia.

This has all been altered in the last few years, and public opinion has been so educated that it has been put out of the power of the Russian Consul to obtain the influence he was at one time believed to possess.

A British agent in telegraphic communication with Meshed, 84 miles away, should be able to keep His Majesty's Consul-General sufficiently informed of the state of affairs here.

10. Should it be decided to reduce this Consulate to an agency, I would suggest that a Mahomedan hospital assistant with plague experience be appointed as British Agent. From what I have seen of our Indian hospital assistants in Persia, I consider that most of them are capable of more than holding their own against Russian doctors. Such a man would be able to carry on the work done by our Consulate hospital, which has been our chief agent for acquiring the position we now hold in Turbat-i-Haidari; while his professional visits would give him the opportunity of obtaining information inaccessible to the ordinary agent.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 60.

*Major Sykes to Government of India.*

*Meshed, May 4, 1908.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 29th April, 1908, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of Captain Keyes' letter of the 14th March, 1908.

I much regret that, by an oversight, the letter was not originally inclosed.

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Inclosure 5 in No. 60.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.*

(No. 83.)

Sir,

*Tehran, April 14, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch addressed by His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed on the subject of the retention of the Turbat-i-Haidari Consulate on its present basis.

In addition to the arguments which Major Sykes employs, with the conclusions of which I generally agree, I would venture to point out that there is another inducement to maintain the post as at present, *viz.*, the effect which it would have on feeling towards us in Persia generally. The recent Anglo-Russian Agreement, as you are aware, has produced among Persians at large the belief that we have abandoned Northern Persia to her hereditary enemy, nor, so far as I can see, is there at present any indication whatever that this erroneous view is being superseded by a juster view of the situation; certainly to reduce any Consulate in the Russian "sphere" would be cited as proof positive of that interpretation of the Agreement, and would react unfavourably on our interests here.

As regards paragraphs 8 and 9 of Major Sykes' despatch, it appears to me in the highest degree unlikely that the wish of the Indian Government to "secure control of quarantine arrangements on the Perso-Afghan frontier" will ever be realized. It appears to me far more probable that those arrangements will be placed by the Sanitary Council at Tehran under the immediate direction of one of its own members. The Council has for the last year shown far greater activity than heretofore in dealing with quarantine matters, as witness the efforts made to create a sanitary service on the northern coasts during the outbreak of cholera in the summer, and the dispatch quite



recently of Dr. Bongrand to Kasr-i-Shirin. But, apart from this, I may point out that it would not be easy to approach the Russian Government with a suggestion that we should be placed in charge of sanitary matters in the Russian "sphere."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure 6 in No. 60.

*Viscount Morley to Governor-General the Earl of Minto.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

*India Office, January 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to the Secret despatch of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 8th October, 1908, regarding the possibility of a reduction of expenditure on Consular establishments in Persia, I inclose copy of a letter that has been addressed to the Foreign Office on the subject.

2. The question, as is pointed out in that letter, cannot be confined to the narrower ground of the practicability in present circumstances of abolishing altogether any of the existing Consulates and Vice-Consulates, and I request that you will scrutinize in detail the various items connected with expenditure on the establishments attached to the existing posts, and furnish me with a Report at the earliest date that may be feasible on any economies that it may be possible to effect.

3. The form of the annual statement of your expenditure in Persia, which classifies the cost at the various posts under very few heads, precludes any efficient criticism in this country of the reasonableness of the scale on which these establishments are maintained. In particular further details are needed as to the item "Contingencies," and the cost of escorts and Consular guards should be separately shown. I must observe that the contrast between the cost of the appointments filled from the Levant Service and the Indian Departments respectively, as shown in the attached Table, is very striking, even when full allowance is made for the higher rates of Indian pay and for the special conditions of the Indian appointments on the Afghan border and in the Gulf. There is also a marked contrast between the cost of the posts at Kerman, Ahwaz, and Kermanshah, on the one hand, and in Seistan on the other. The expenditure on the latter has risen from 71,334 rupees in 1902-3 to 159,388 rupees in 1906-7, a total exceeding that of the charges at Meshed.

4. It will be observed that the question of the necessity of retaining the post of the Assistant to the Consul in Seistan and of maintaining a Consular as well as a medical officer at Turbat-i-Haidari is raised in the letter to the Foreign Office.

5. Your Excellency is aware of the importance attached by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to restricting the Consular expenditure in Persia within the narrowest limits consistent with a due protection of British and Indian interests. The considerations which render a strict insistence on economy necessary in regard to the demands on the British Exchequer apply with even greater force to India. I trust that your Excellency, when you furnish the Report for which I have asked on the details of this expenditure, will be able to effect material reductions. Unless this can be accomplished there will be an increasing difficulty in obtaining the sanction of His Majesty's Government to such increases of expenditure as your Excellency's Government may from time to time find it necessary to propose.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

Inclosure 7 in No. 60.

*Diplomatic and Consular Establishments in Persia.*

COMPARISON of Expenditure in 1906-7 on Posts filled from British and Indian Services.

<i>British Service.</i>		<i>Indian Service.</i>	
	£		£
Legation: Tehran ..	21,700	Legation: Tehran ..	2,800
Consulates-General—		Consulates-General—	
Ispahan ..	1,400	Bushire ..	14,600
Tabreez ..	1,200	Meshed ..	10,000
Consulates—		Consulates—	
Shiraz ..	900	Seistan ..	10,300
Mohammerah ..	700	Kerman ..	3,000
Vice Consulates—		Bunder Abbas ..	1,600
Tehran and Resht ..	1,400	Kermanshah ..	3,300
Bushire ..	700	Turbat-i-Haidari ..	6,200
Office allowance at Yezd ..	100	Vice-Consulates—	
Buildings ..	4,300	Ahwaz ..	3,000
Deduct receipts ..	300	Bam ..	500
	32,100	Buildings—	
		Bunder Abbas ..	3,200
		Seistan ..	300
		Ahwaz ..	200
			3,700
			59,000

[1163]

No. 61.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 9.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 6, 1909.*

WITH reference to Mr. Campbell's letter of the 23rd September last as to the arrangements to be made with the Russian Government for the exchange of the control over the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad telegraph lines, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to inclose copy of a despatch, with inclosures, from the Government of India, dated the 10th September, 1908.

As regards the question of the incidence of the cost involved in the exchange of the control, it will be remembered that in 1891 an arrangement lapsed by which the expense of controlling the Tehran-Meshed line, at an estimated maximum cost of 20,000 rupees (1,333*l.*) a-year, was shared between the Indian and British Exchequers in the proportion of 12 to 5. Since then the charge of maintaining the line (570 miles), with two terminal offices at Meshed and Tehran, has been borne exclusively by Indian revenues. On the other hand, if the proposals of His Majesty's Government as to the arrangements to be made for the exchange of the control over the two lines are accepted by the Russian Government, it has been estimated by the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department that the resulting cost of maintaining six officers at Tehran, Meshed, Turbat-i-Haidari, Khaf, Birjand, and Nasratabad, and also of keeping the line from Khaf to Nasratabad (about 350 miles) in repair will amount to 46,500 rupees (3,100*l.*) a-year. This expenditure is independent of any initial outlay that may be required to put the line, when it is handed over to us, into an efficient state.

The cost to India of controlling the Meshed-Tehran line was not included, presumably by an oversight, in the statement of charges on which the award of the Welby Commission was based, although account was taken of the Treaty allowance paid to the Persian Government in respect of the Telegraph line through Mekran. Lord Morley has no desire to disturb the settlement then arrived at, and he would not propose that a moiety of the existing expenditure of 20,000 rupees per annum on the Meshed-Tehran line should be borne by the British Exchequer. But Lord Morley trusts that Sir E. Grey will agree that any expenditure for purely political purposes on telegraph establishments, &c., in Persia, over and above a sum of 20,000 rupees per annum to be borne, as hitherto, by India alone, should be equally divided between the two Exchequers in the same manner as all other expenditure in Persia of a political character, and that he will obtain the sanction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to the adoption of this course.

As regards the arrangements to be made for the control of the Khaf-Nasratabad line, when the transfer is effected, and before the line is permanently taken over by the

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Indo-European Telegraph Department, I am to inclose copy of a note by the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department on the proposals made in the despatch of the Government of India. It seems desirable, as suggested by Mr. Kirk, to postpone a decision on the definite steps to be taken for working the line till it is known whether the Russian Government will agree to the proposed arrangement.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 61.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

*Simla, September 10, 1908.*

WE have the honour to refer to the Viceroy's telegram of the 16th April last, agreeing that, in the event of the consent of the Persian Government being obtained to the proposed exchange of telegraph lines in Persia between Great Britain and Russia, the Indian Telegraph Department should accept the initial transfer of the Khaf-Nasratabad section of the Meshed-Seistan telegraph line and carry on work until such time as the section is taken over permanently by the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

2. In his letter dated the 23rd February last, a copy of which is inclosed, His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Kain discusses the additions which it will be necessary to make to the existing telegraph staff when the transfer of the line is effected, and proposes *inter alia* (a) that Mr. McManus, Sub-Assistant Superintendent at Seistan, should be placed in charge of the section as Inspecting Telegraph Master, with a charge allowance of 100 rupees a-month in addition to his present salary; (b) that the entire Persian line staff should be taken over; (c) that one Indian Sub-Inspector should be added to the existing staff on a salary of 50 rupees a-month, and (d) that a British signaller should be posted to Khaf on a salary (inclusive of allowances) of 332 rupees a-month.

3. With reference to proposal (d), we apprehend that, in the event of the withdrawal of the British signallers from Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari, it will be possible to appoint one of them to Khaf on his present pay and allowances. The appointment of an additional British signaller for Khaf will not, therefore, be necessary.

As to proposal (c), we have ascertained that it will be impossible to obtain the services of a suitable Sub-Inspector for less than a salary of 100 rupees a-month, with a fixed travelling allowance of 30 rupees a-month and a horse allowance of 20 rupees a-month, which cannot be considered excessive in view of the high cost of living in Persia and the responsible nature of the work which he will be required to perform.

With these exceptions, we accept Major Kennion's recommendations.

4. The extra expenditure involved in these arrangements amounts to 850 rupees a-month, or 10,200 rupees a-year, distributed as follows:—

	Rupees.
1. Charge allowance to Mr. McManus .. .. .	100 per mensem.
2. Pay of one Indian sub-inspector (with travelling allowance and horse allowance) .. .. .	150 ..
3. Pay of Persian line staff .. .. .	600 ..
Total .. .. .	850 ..

5. We suggest that these proposals may be sanctioned provisionally now, in order that there may be no delay in giving effect to the transfer of the line so soon as the consent of the Persian Government has been obtained. We presume that the expenditure will, as usual, be equally divisible between Imperial and Indian revenues.

We have, &c.  
(Signed) MINTO.  
KITCHENER.  
H. ERLE RICHARDS.  
C. H. SCOTT.  
H. ADAMSON.  
J. O. MILLER.  
W. L. HARVEY.  
J. S. MESTON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 61.

*Major Kennion to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

*Seistan, February 23, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to request a reference to the Government of India's despatch, dated the 16th January last, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India on the subject of the telegraph lines from Meshed to Tehran and Seistan.

2. In the 4th paragraph of the above-cited paper it is mentioned that the Government of India are in possession of no very definite information regarding the system and number of employees on the Khaf-Seistan section. I submit in this connection a copy of a note recorded by Mr. Howson, Sub-Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, which I trust will be found to supply the details required.

3. It will be noted that the list of the Russian staff on the line given in Mr. Marling's despatch No. 250, Confidential, dated the 2nd December, 1907, is correct, with the exception of the inclusion of the mechanic, Constantinow, who worked on the Meshed-Seh Deh section, and who has since been withdrawn.

4. As regards the cost of up-keep, the inquiries I have made elicit the fact that no money is handed over by the local Governors of Seistan and Kain for this purpose. The Director of Customs, Seistan, has also told me that no money is paid from customs revenues. The "ghulams" and line staff are, it seems, paid direct by the Russians; and if the latter are reimbursed at all, it is probably from telegraph receipts at Meshed or Tehran. It may be noted that the "ghulams" on the southern section of the line have recently been complaining of not having received their pay. The inference may perhaps be drawn that the Russians, having failed to obtain reimbursement of sums previously spent on this account, and in view of their connection with the line being severed, have discontinued payment.

5. The following are suggestions as to action which it will be necessary to take when the line is handed over to us:—

(a.) At Nasratabad, Seistan, there are three rooms in the same telegraph building set apart for the Persian, Russian, and British offices. At the present time the British office is only used for the storage of material, our signaller doing his work in the Persian office. The line goes first to the Russian office, whence it is given to the Persian office by means of a commutator. The steps to be taken will be to remove the present terminal pole to outside the British office and to so connect the wires as to place the control of the line in our hands instead of as at present in the hands of the Russians. Or else—and this would be preferable as attracting less attention—for ourselves and the Russians to exchange rooms.

(b.) At Birjand, British, Russian, and Persian signallers have hitherto worked in the same office. If this arrangement continues no alteration of the wire will be necessary, though when occasion offers an endeavour should be made to obtain the use of a separate room and so to arrange the wire as to give our signaller the control of the line.

If, however, in the meantime, the Russians succeed in obtaining a separate room for their tape instrument, either with or without the control of the line, we should, I presume, expect them to transfer the privilege to us on the Agreement being brought into effect.

The latest information I have received on this subject is that orders have been received from Tehran not to allow the line wire to go first to the Russians' room.

(c.) At Khaf it will be necessary to arrange for a telegraph building and quarters for the signaller. The requisite instruments, in order to carry out the proposal of separate offices and commutators, will also have to be sent. This point will be further touched on in connection with line staff.

(d.) Although Mr. Howson's note shows that the line is ill-constructed, it would not seem necessary to undertake its reconstruction immediately. This could be done gradually, and the batteries, insulators, and other fittings could be replaced as they become worn out. An immediate inspection of the line with the view of making estimates for the future and the submission of indents would be advisable.

(e.) The introduction of telephones on the line, which has been suggested by Mr. Howson, would seem advisable on all grounds.



(f.) The only addition to the British staff on the line, which now stands as shown in the margin,\* would be a signaller for Khaf.

Both Mr. McManus and Mr. Howson, who are the Sub-Assistant Superintendents at Seistan and Birjand respectively, have experience of construction work, and the deputation of a special Inspector from India to look after the line would be superfluous. It would, however, be necessary to give a special allowance to the individual selected for the charge of the line. At present, as Mr. Howson is doing very useful political work in Birjand, it seems that the best and most convenient arrangement would probably be for Mr. McManus to have charge of the line as Inspecting Telegraph Master, with his head-quarters in Seistan, whence he would make an annual inspection of the line in the autumn. I should prefer, however, that a final decision on this point should be left pending a settlement regarding the Birjand Vice-Consulate.

As regards Khaf, it may be expected, when the exchange of lines takes place, that the Kniaz Vachadze will be transferred from this place and a Russian signaller sent in his place. In any case it would seem advisable that the British signaller sent to Khaf should have some experience of the country and be able to speak the language, so that, as his telegraph work will be small, he may be of use as a news-agent. The post, however, will be an isolated one, and should, I think, carry with it a special allowance. In this connection I would point out that it does not seem really necessary for either the Russians or ourselves to have a signaller at Khaf. A mutual agreement not to keep British or Russian signallers there would not, so far as I can see, prejudice our interests in any way, while there would be a material saving of expense. This, however, is a question on which Major Sykes is better qualified to express an opinion.

As pointed out by Mr. Howson, an Indian Sub-Inspector to take the place of the Russian mechanic will be indispensable.

The line staff of "ghulam bashis" and "ghulams" should be taken over as they stand. Their pay is adequate and their numbers sufficient. As Khaf will be a terminus, as far as our supervision of the line is concerned, it should be theoretically possible to manage with one "ghulam" at this post instead of two; but in view of a signaller being posted to this place who would require a peon, I would prefer to waive the question of this trifling reduction.

6. Since the line will remain the property of the Persian Government, it would be convenient that its control and maintenance should be carried out under the general superintendence of His Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Khan; and in these circumstances, if it is decided to keep a signaller at Khaf, he would, I presume, be under the same controlling officer. This suggestion should not be read to imply a recommendation that Khaf, which is at present in the Turbat Consular district, should be included in that of Seistan and Kain. This question would naturally depend on the ultimate decision arrived at regarding the Vice-Consulate at Birjand and Consular arrangements generally in Eastern Persia.

7. A statement showing the annual cost of the suggested telegraph and line establishment is appended.

8. Copies of this letter, with inclosures, are being sent to Tehran, Meshed, and Turbat.

\* Two Sub-Assistant Superintendents and one signaller.

# PROPOSED Telegraph and Line Establishment.

	Per mensem.	Total.
	Rupees.	Rupees.
1 Sub-Assistant Superintendent—		
Pay .. .. .	300	
Local allowance .. .. .	60	
Horse .. .. .	30	
Allowance for charge of line .. .. .	100	490
1 Sub-Assistant Superintendent—		
Pay .. .. .	300	
Local allowance .. .. .	60	
Horse .. .. .	30	390
1 Signaller (Seistan)—		
Pay .. .. .	175	
Local allowance .. .. .	35	
Horse .. .. .	30	240
1 Signaller (Khaf)—		
Pay .. .. .	210	
Local allowance .. .. .	42	
Horse .. .. .	30	
Special .. .. .	50	332
1 Indian Sub-Inspector (pay) .. .. .	50	50
2 Persian "Ghulam Bashis" (170 krans each) .. .. .	each 50	100
17 "Ghulams" (100 krans each) .. .. .	each 29-6-7	500
Total per mensem .. .. .	..	2,102

## Inclosure 3 in No. 61.

*Report on the Khaf-Seistan Telegraph Line by Mr. W. R. Howson, Sub-Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, Birjand.*

## LINE STORES AT PRESENT IN USE.

*Wire: Gauge.*—In my opinion the gauge is as near as possible to, if not identical with, Indian Telegraph iron wire, gauge No. 12, weighing 300 lbs. per mile.

The Russian Inspector informed me that the diameter of the line wire was 4 millim. This would be identical with Indian Telegraph wire, gauge No. 14, weighing 350 lbs. to the mile. This point, however, could easily be decided by sending a sample piece of wire to the Telegraph Store Yard, Calcutta.

*Wire: Faulty construction.*—In many places I found the line wire, even in summer time, stretched quite taut between the supports. Notwithstanding the short spans at present existing, this must result in a great strain on the wire, particularly during the winter months, when occasionally the temperature goes down in some places to zero.

*Joints.*—"Twist" and not "Britannia" joints are in use.

*Posts: Kinds.*—These are of poplar and pine (vernacular names: "safida," poplar, and "naju," sometimes called "sarv," pine).

*Posts: Dimensions.*—The posts average 20 feet in length, and are buried 3 feet in the ground. The average girth at the top is 9 inches and at the base 19 inches.

*Posts: Where obtainable and rate.*—Both kinds of posts are obtainable at Khaf at the rate of 20 krans (5 rs. 14 a.) each; and a limited number of poplar posts in the Sunnikhana district at an average rate of 10 krans (2 rs. 15 a.) each.

*Posts: Cost of transport.*—The cost of transport per post from Khaf to Seistan is 80 krans (23 rs. 8 a. 6 p.), and that of poplar posts from Sunnikhana to Seistan would be about 35 krans (10 rs. 4 a. 5 p.) each.

The posts are carried down and distributed shortly after cutting, whereas, if they were allowed to dry where cut, the cost of transport would be much less.

The number of poplar posts obtainable in the Sunnikhana district would be sufficient for our yearly requirements for the portion of the line from Sehdeh to Seistan, and it will only be necessary to indent on Khaf for the northern section.

*Posts: Number per mile.*—The Russians have adopted sixteen\* posts to the verst, which works out at 24.15 per mile.

\* From information received from the Russian Inspector.



The reason of such a high proportion is due to the prevalence of white ants which freely attack the portions of the post buried. It will be readily understood that the nearer the posts are to one another the less likelihood there is, when a post breaks off, of the wire sagging so near the ground as to be within reach of camels.

*Posts: Average life.*—I should set down the average life per post as seven years, though the Russian Inspector seems to think it only five years. It is interesting to note that the posts situated in the Hamun last much longer than those on dry land.

*Insulators and Brackets.*—The insulator (see Diagram II<sup>6</sup>) is an ordinary porcelain cup, and is fixed by means of cement to one end of a curved stalk the other end of which is screwed into the post.

I have found these insulators and stalks answer the purpose very well. If, however, the same pattern is not stocked by the Indian Government Telegraph Department, it could be replaced, as occasion demands, by the kind used in India (in Cashmere, for example). In this case, of course, brackets and backs would also have to be supplied.

*Technical.*—A list of the telegraph offices on the line will be found in the Tables attached.

*Circuit.*—All the offices are joined up for ordinary "open-circuit" working.

*Instruments.*—Each office is fitted up with a Morse set, consisting of relay (resistance 500 ohms), sounder, key, and galvanometer, fitted on a board. Also a two-plate lightning discharger and a four-bar switch or commutator. All the instruments are by Messrs. Siemens Brothers, London.

*Switch.*—Of all the above-mentioned instruments, the switch is the only one which calls for particular mention, on account of the part it plays in the "tapping" of messages.

This switch (*vide* Diagram No. 1<sup>6</sup>) is used for joining the line "direct" or for "K.O.," i.e., keeping open. With plugs inserted in holes 3 and 4 the line is joined direct, and with plugs in 1 and 2 both sides of the line are connected with the instruments. When, however, a station is working with one side, the plug connecting the other side to the instruments is removed, and that side remains "insulated" until such time as the plug is reinserted or the line joined "direct."

It is very easy to interpolate the "receiver" of an intermediate office by simply connecting a wire between the screw at one end of bar (C) and the earth screw of the receiver and at the same time throwing off the earth connection.

The plugs inserted for this interpolating would be 1 and 4 or 2 and 3.

By interpolating the receiver, an intermediate office can easily "tap" any telegrams that may be exchanged between an office on one side and another on the other side of the intermediate office.

*Batteries.*—The battery in use at present is the Medinger, a variety of the Daniell.

This class of battery has been introduced by the Russians in place of the Minotto battery formerly used by the Persians.

In my opinion the Minotto is, if anything, preferable, as it requires less supervision and cannot be so easily tampered with by the Persian telegraphists, the majority of whom know very little about technical telegraphy.

Should the Minotto battery be adopted by us, the necessary sawdust is obtainable in Meshed. A limited quantity of sawdust (mulberry and walnut) is also procurable in Birjand, but I think that, if an order be placed in advance with the local sawyers, sufficient could be collected for all the offices on the line. The extra cost of carriage from Meshed would thereby be saved.

*Line Staff: Persian Line Staff.*—Tables 1 and 2 show the present distribution of the Persian line establishment.

*Persian Line Staff: Their Salary.*—The Russians pay the Persian line staff at the following rates per mensem:—

						Rs.	a.	p.
"Ghulam Bashi" (170 krams)	..	..	..	..	..	50	0	0
"Ghulam" (100 krams)	..	..	..	..	..	29	6	7

The above rates cannot be reduced compatibly with efficiency, and I propose that the same rates be retained by us.

The salary of the "ghulams" includes the up-keep of a horse.

*Russian Inspectors.*—These have their head-quarters at Khaf and Shusp respectively, their sections being from Meshed to Sehdeh and Sehdeh to Seistan (Sehdeh is situated almost midway between Kain and Birjand).

It will be seen that the Russian Inspectors have selected as their head-quarters

\* Not reproduced.

places almost centrally situated in their sections. Their reason for the same is obviously to more efficiently supervise the line.

*British Inspector.*—I think one British Inspector would be able to supervise the whole line from Khaf to Seistan; but he should be allowed one Sub-Inspector, to whom I shall allude in a separate paragraph.

*British Inspector: His Duties.*—The duties of the Inspector would be to arrange for a supply of posts, the submitting of indents, and supervising the annual repairs of the line and the technical arrangements of all telegraph offices.

*Sub-Inspector: Why necessary.*—An Indian Mahomedan Sub-Inspector would, I think, be absolutely necessary to carry out the annual maintenance repairs, under the supervision of the British Inspector. He would also instruct the "ghulam bashis" and "ghulams" in the preparing and maintaining of batteries, the making of joints, and, in fact, in all the routine work necessary for them to know.

*British Telegraphists: How they may be utilized to assist the Inspector.*—The British telegraphists at Seistan and Birjand could, when necessary, issue orders, on an interruption occurring, to the "ghulams" of the office nearest to the fault to proceed on the line.

#### MISCELLANEOUS.

*Telephones.*—As the "ghulam bashis" at Buniabad and Bandan are unable to signal on the Morse instruments, it is absolutely necessary that they should be supplied with telephones to ascertain the state of communication, and it would consequently be necessary for the Inspector, Sub-Inspector, and British telegraphists to be also supplied with similar instruments, so as to be able to communicate with the "ghulam bashis."

*Telephone: Pattern.*—The most suitable telephone, in my opinion, is that by Ericson, of Stockholm, the same as is used by the Indo-European Telegraph Department on their Kirman-Robat wires.

(Signed) W. R. HOWSON,  
Sub-Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, Birjand.

#### Inclosure 4 in No. 61.

Table 1.—SHOWING present Line Staff, including Persian Telegraphists.

Names of Telegraph Offices.	Persian Tele- graphists.	Persian "Ghulam Bashis."	Persian "Ghulams."	Russian Inspectors.	Russian Mechanic.	Russian Signaller.
Khaf .. .. .	1	..	2	1	..	..
Buniabad .. ..	..	1	2	..	..	..
Kain .. .. .	1	..	2	..	..	..
Birjand .. .. .	2	..	2	..	..	1
Sarbisha .. ..	1	..	2	..	..	..
Shusp .. .. .	..	..	2	1	..	..
Neh .. .. .	1	..	2	..	..	..
Bandan .. .. .	..	1	2	..	..	..
Seistan .. .. .	1	..	1	..	1	1
Total .. .. .	7	2	17	2	1	2

*Note.*—The term "ghulam bashi" would correspond with our Indian telegraph sub-inspector, and that of "ghulam" with our Indian line-rider.

The Russian mechanic would also correspond with our Sub-Inspector; but he, like the latter, being more experienced and better trained than the "ghulam bashi," is naturally far superior to him.

The Russian Inspector is equivalent to the Inspecting Telegraph Master of India.



Table 2.—SHOWING Wire and Number of Posts from Khaf to Seistan.

From—	To—	Number of Posts.	Miles of Wire
Khaf .. .. .	Buniabad .. .. .	1,014	41.99
Buniabad .. .. .	Kain .. .. .	1,472	60.95
Kain .. .. .	Birjand .. .. .	2,091	86.58
Birjand .. .. .	Sarbisha .. .. .	1,211	50.14
Sarbisha .. .. .	Shusp .. .. .	1,700	70.38
Shusp .. .. .	Neh .. .. .	552	22.85
Neh .. .. .	Bandan .. .. .	1,368	52.34
Bandan .. .. .	Seistan .. .. .	1,632	67.57
	Total .. .. .	11,040	452.80

Note.—The line has been constructed with 16 posts to the verst, and this works out to 24.15 posts per mile.

Inclosure 5 in No. 61.

Note by Mr. Kirk on Government of India despatch dated September 10, 1908.

IF the Persian Government agree to the working arrangements over the Tehran-Meshed-Seistan lines as shown in the Memorandum I submitted on the 18th September last, a British telegraphist will have to be retained at Meshed, Turbat-i-Haidari, Khaf, Birjand, and Seistan. There are telegraphists from the Indian Telegraph Department at all these stations except Khaf. But the telegraphist of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Meshed can work the lines to Tehran and to Seistan as he did until lately. This will release the Indian Telegraph Department telegraphist at Meshed, and he can be transferred to Khaf.

As to the charge of the line from Khaf to Seistan, the officer in charge of the Tehran-Meshed line will be free to proceed at once to take over charge of the Khaf-Seistan section immediately the transfers of the lines, which would be made simultaneously, are carried out. With this arrangement it would be unnecessary to put the Sub-Assistant Superintendent at Seistan in charge of the line, and it will not be necessary to provide one Indian Sub-Inspector. There is a telegraphist at Seistan in addition to the Sub-Assistant Superintendent there. It might be taken into consideration whether the latter officer could not be recalled to India when the transfer of the line takes place, in order to reduce expenditure.

The Government of India ask that the extra expenditure involved by the payments of the salaries of the Persian line staff, amounting to 600 rupees per mensem, may be sanctioned provisionally. There appears to be no way of avoiding the payment of this charge on the transfer of the line, though it may be possible later to induce the Persian Telegraph Administration to meet the whole or some part of this expenditure from the traffic receipts of the line.

Perhaps the answer to the Government of India despatch might be kept in abeyance till it is known whether the Russian Government agree to the proposed working arrangement on the lines after transfer.

(Signed) H. A. KIRK.

October 8, 1908.

[1171]

No. 62.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received January 9.)

25, Abchurch Lane, London,  
January 9, 1909.

Dear Sir,

WITH reference to your inquiry by telephone this morning, I beg to inform you that the advance by the Indian Government to the Persian Government was not included in the amount of 526,000*l.*, the approximate amount of the Persian Government debt to the bank mentioned in Sir Thomas Jackson's letter of the 4th instant.

The Persian Government offer to pay the bank the sum of 30,000 tomans monthly,

and the bank has asked in addition to the latter sum a further amount of 13,000 tomans monthly, as a sinking fund to liquidate the amount of the bank advance in excess of the Concession limit. The sum payable annually would therefore be—

	Tomans.
30,000 tomans a-month = .. .. .	360,000 a-year.
13,000 tomans a-month (for sinking fund) = .. .. .	156,000 ..
Total .. .. .	516,000 ..
	£ s. d.
At exchange of, say, 50 krans per £ = .. .. .	103,200 0 0
The interest and amortization of the Indian loan of 290,000 <i>l.</i> is .. .. .	23,270 7 0
Making together .. .. .	126,470 7 0

In a letter addressed to our Tehran office by the Administrator of Customs in Tehran, dated the 15th May, 1906, copy of which I inclose, it was stated that the customs of Fars and the Gulf ports, including Mohammerah, for the financial year March 1905-1906 were expected to yield about 800,000 tomans, or, at, say, 50 krans per £, 160,000*l.*

If there are any other particulars you desire, I shall be happy to send them to you.

Yours faithfully,  
(Signed) G. NEWELL, Manager.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Administrator of Customs to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Monsieur,

Téhéran, le 15 mai, 1906.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre en date du 12 mai courant, par laquelle vous demandez des renseignements sur l'importance des recettes douanières du Fars et du Golfe Persique y compris Mohammerah.

Les comptes pour le dernier exercice Ilan-Il n'ont pas encore été clôturés définitivement, et les chiffres fournis pourront par conséquent être légèrement modifiés.

Je puis cependant dire dès à présent que les recettes nettes des douanes précitées, c'est-à-dire, les recettes brutes diminuées des dépenses d'administration, s'élèvent à 800,000 tomans environ.

Veillez, &c.  
(Pour le Ministre des Douanes et des Postes),  
L'Administrateur,  
(Signé) J. PRIEM.

[1181]

No. 63.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, January 9, 1909.

THE situation in Persia.

I saw M. Isvolsky to-day and spoke to him about the general state of affairs in Persia, which looks as if the whole country were in process of disintegration.

M. Isvolsky is strongly of opinion that intervention should be avoided, if possible, but at the same time he has grave doubt whether much good can be effected by the mere grant of a Constitution. I can see that his real opinion is that, if the two Governments wish chaos to be averted, the Central Government must be strengthened and financial aid given to it to set it on its legs again. M. Isvolsky expects to give me his Memorandum on the situation on Wednesday next, and he begged me, pending its reception, not to telegraph his views, so that I would ask you to say nothing about them. Everything here is being delayed by the Christmas holidays.

M. Isvolsky thinks that something should be done to prevent the establishment of independent Administrations at Tabreez and Ispahan, and would be glad of your views as to how the situation at those two towns could be dealt with.

[1629]

M



[1097]

No. 64.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 9, 1909.*

GERMAN instructors for Persian army.

My telegram No. 7 of the 4th instant.

The Russian Legation has received a positive assurance from the Shah that there is no truth in the rumour that His Majesty is trying to engage German officers as instructors for the Persian army.

[1116]

No. 65.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 9, 1909.*

TAGHI ZADE.

I have received telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez that Taghi Zade has returned there from Europe.

In reply to an inquiry of Mr. Wratislaw as to whether he has any responsibility for him, I have said that I consider that Taghi Zade's return cancels our guarantee with regard to his life and property.

[1174]

No. 66.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 9, 1909.*

IN my preceding telegrams regarding the situation at Ispahan I have referred to the Ilkhani. It would have been more correct to speak of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, as I now find that the Shah deposed him from the chieftainship some weeks ago. His recent action is probably in some measure traceable to his deposition.

The reply sent to Farman Farma by Samsam (see my telegram No. 20 of the 7th instant) is a frank avowal that he has espoused the Nationalist cause, though it contains professions of loyalty.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires and myself have received from Farman Farma a request for an interview this afternoon. His Highness will request me to press Samsam to retire from Ispahan, his reinstatement as Ilkhani being conditional on his doing so.

For the present I have limited myself, in concert with Russian Chargé d'Affaires, to instructing our Consuls to inform Samsam that we rely upon him for the maintenance of order. The instructions we sent regarding the advice to be given to him to reply to Farman Farma in a spirit of conciliation could not be acted on before it was too late to influence answer sent by Samsam.

I propose to inform Farman Farma that without further instructions from you I cannot see my way to tender further advice to Samsam.

To comply with the request of Farman Farma would be equivalent to aiding the Shah, who is now suspicious of Samsam having been instigated by us, but it might, on the other hand, should the Bakhtiari follow our advice, which is problematical, save us from a repetition of the Tabreez events and from an emulation of the Bakhtiari *coup* by other tribes.

[1157]

No. 67.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 9, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

Your telegram No. 12 of the 8th instant.

I will make arrangements for Mr. Churchill to take the Zil-es-Sultan's jewel box towards the end of this month, as I cannot spare him at this moment.

For how much does the Zil wish the box to be insured? If he will let us know the amount, we will insure it.

[1175]

No. 68.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 9, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

According to a telegram from Mr. Wratislaw, the village of Sardarud, which the Nationalists had lately occupied, was evacuated by them on the 7th instant. The Royalists stripped and released the few prisoners they had taken.

The engagement has been magnified into a great victory for the Royalist forces here in Tehran.

[1176]

No. 69.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 9, 1909.*

ISPAHAN situation. My telegram No. 29 of to-day.

My Russian colleague and I told Farman Farma, whom we saw this afternoon, of the communications made by us to Samsam, and stated that without instructions we could take no further action. He replied that should Samsam oppose him he feared widespread disturbance. Should it prove possible, on the other hand, to induce Samsam to retire, he believed himself able to secure tranquillity.

Farman Farma states that his Deputy, accompanied by the 400 Bakhtiari from Tehran, is leaving to-morrow. I understand that His Highness asserts his expectation of starting himself a few weeks later at the head of a sufficient body of troops to deal with the Bakhtiari Chief.

[1001]

No. 70.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 9, 1909.*

SITUATION throughout Persia.

You should inquire the views of M. Isvolsky on Tehran telegram No. 24 of the 8th instant.

When may Russian Government be expected to furnish us with their proposals?

[1001]

No. 71.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 9, 1909.*

PERSIAN situation.

With reference to your telegram No. 24 of yesterday, we are urging Russian Government to send us their proposals, which we have not yet seen.

[689]

No. 72.

*Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of your Board, that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reported on the 6th instant that the Persian Government had pledged the Bushire customs from that date for all money appropriated by the Ain-ed-Dowleh.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.



[559]

No. 73.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. Ziegler and Co.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, January 9, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, in which you request that the Persian Government may be informed that His Majesty's Government will hold them responsible for the losses incurred by you in consequence of the looting of the warehouses of two of your chief clients at Ispahan, who held goods belonging to you for a considerable amount.

I am to state, in reply, that, as at present advised, Sir E. Grey is disposed to think that your remedy (if any) is against your Persian clients, in whose possession your property apparently was at the time of its forcible removal. If, however, you will furnish to this Department exact details of the circumstances in which your goods were in the possession of your clients while still the property of your firm, Sir E. Grey is prepared to reconsider the matter by the light of the further particulars thus supplied.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[1177]

No. 74.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)*

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 10, 1909.*

SITUATION at Isfahan.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh, with whom His Majesty's Consul-General had an interview yesterday, professed the most conciliatory and loyal sentiments and declared that he was prepared to withdraw if he received a guarantee for the constitutional rights of the people of Isfahan and one for his own safety. Samsam however added that he could not abandon the people of Isfahan nor them he if the Shah sent forces against him.

I am communicating the substance of the above to Prince Farman Farma.

Mr. Grahame reports that one of the leaders of the malcontents, Agha Najafi, has left for Tehran, having broken with the Bakhtiari in fear of the Shah's anger.

[1178]

No. 75.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)*

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 10, 1909.*

GERMAN School Subsidy and Bushire Customs.

I will enter a general warning as suggested in your telegram No. 13 of the 8th.

I am meanwhile awaiting a reply to my telegram No. 461 of the 31st December, 1908. I would especially deprecate that the Bank should put forward any demands not included in my Note to the Persian Government of the 4th November, 1908, copy of which was inclosed in my despatch No. 293 of the 5th November, 1908, in view of the reparation given by the Persian Government for the seizures of the Bank's property by Ain-ed-Dowleh. The Kermanshah receipts were only encashed by the bank under an informal arrangement with the Customs and they should realize that 30,000 tomans a month, if formally guaranteed on the Bushire Customs, will be a more satisfactory arrangement than they had in regard to Kermanshah.

There would of course be no objection to demanding an extra monthly payment to compensate the Bank for the interest which, as the proposed arrangement only comes into operation on the 21st March, the Bank must temporarily forgo.

[1179]

No. 76.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)*

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 10, 1909.*

ATTEMPT on the life of Sheikh Fazlullah.

An attempt was made on Friday night to murder Sheikh Fazlullah, the reactionary Mullah. His assailant afterwards attempted to commit suicide. Sheikh Fazlullah was only wounded. Numerous arrests followed. Most of the people arrested were probably innocent.

[900]

No. 77.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 10, 1909.*

IF by sending Firman Firma to Ispahan Shah endangers lives of British subjects, His Majesty's Government will hold him responsible.

You should warn His Majesty in this sense.

[1235]

No. 78.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 5.)

Sir,

*Pera, January 3, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 534 of the 29th ultimo, with regard to a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the situation in Azerbaijan, and stating that the language of the second paragraph of my despatch No. 850 of the 9th ultimo is not quite clear.

On reading through again the draft of my despatch, I think that, owing to a want of clearness in my handwriting, the copyist inserted "agreed" instead of "argued," the word I intended to use. There is therefore no ambiguity in my language to Tewfik Pasha on that occasion, and I have never agreed with his Excellency that it would be desirable to dispatch Turkish troops to Tabreez to co-operate with any Russian force that might be sent to Persia. My language has always been in a directly contrary sense.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

[1599]

No. 79.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, January 11, 1909.*

(1.)

*Télégramme de M. Isvolsky, en date du 23 décembre, 1908 (5 janvier, 1909).*

AINSI que vous le verrez par un télégramme de M. Nélidoff, Zilli Sultan demande une protection plus efficace de ses intérêts matériels et, entre autres, la restitution du jardin qui lui appartenait à Téhéran, et qui se trouverait actuellement en la possession de sa sœur.

La Russie et la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient engagées à garantir la vie et l'honneur de Zilli Sultan et de sa famille; nous n'avions, en ce qui nous concerne, fait aucune mention de ses biens, et il n'est pas à notre connaissance que des garanties aient été données à ce sujet par la Grande-Bretagne.

Nous estimons que, par une intervention officielle en vue de la défense des intérêts matériels de Zilli, les deux Puissances pourraient être entraînées au delà des limites désirables, tant à cause du fait que les propriétés immobilières du Prince sont

[1629]

N



situées dans des localités très éloignées les unes des autres, qu'à cause du caractère souvent vague et contestable de ses droits.

Dans ces conditions nous estimerions préférable de nous en tenir pour la sauvegarde des droits de possession de Zilli Sultan à des représentations officieuses et amicales au Gouvernement du Schah, et cela dans le cas seulement où ces droits se trouveraient être réellement menacés.

Veuillez m'informer du point de vue à ce sujet du Gouvernement britannique.

(2.)

*Télégramme de M. Nelidoff à M. Isvolsky, en date de Paris, le 18 décembre, 1908 (3 janvier, 1909).*

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et moi avons fait aujourd'hui à Zilli Sultan la communication identique prescrite.

Il nous a répondu que, se conformant aux conseils des deux Puissances, il avait décidé de rester en Europe, mais a demandé si, dans ce cas, les garanties qui lui avaient été accordées restaient en vigueur.

A notre réponse que rien n'était changé à ce sujet, il a demandé que la sauvegarde de ses intérêts matériels fût plus efficace. Il est revenu plusieurs fois sur l'exemple de son jardin de Téhéran, dont sa sœur s'était emparée et dont il sollicite de nos deux Gouvernements la restitution.

Il demande qu'il soit tenu compte de l'impossibilité pour lui de vivre pour toujours en Europe, où il ne se trouve pas bien, et aimerait pouvoir rentrer au bout d'un temps déterminé.

Nous lui avons répondu que ce temps serait déterminé par l'établissement d'un état de choses stable.

Zilli Sultan part ces jours-ci pour Nice.

[1303] No. 80.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 11, 1909.*

ISFAHAN situation. My telegram No. 25 of the 8th instant.

Mr. Grahame reports from Isfahan that order is being maintained most satisfactorily, and that on Saturday a general assembly was held with a view to elections.

[1491] No. 81.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 11, 1909.*

GERMAN Military Instructors. My telegram No. 26 of the 9th instant.

The doctor of the Russian Legation, who is attached to the Palace, asserts that the question is definitely settled and that several officers and non-commissioned officers are engaged already.

[1768] No. 82.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to your unnumbered telegram of the 10th instant, I venture to point out that the warning will without doubt be understood by the Shah as intended to prevent troops being sent by His Majesty against Samsam, whom he in all probability regards in the light of a rebel. A more serious character therefore attaches to the warning than to a mere caveat regarding strictly British interests. As reported

in my telegram No. 6 of the 3rd instant, I have already put in a general caveat to the effect that the Persian Government will be held responsible.

In view of these circumstances, is it desirable that I should take separate action apart from my Russian colleague, who has not so far received instructions respecting the proposed warning, and who has been discouraged from head-quarters from making any representations without having previously received instructions?

If Firman Firma ever starts with troops it can only be after considerable delay, so that no harm will ensue owing to loss of time caused by this inquiry.

[1116] No. 83.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 11, 1909.*

I APPROVE your action respecting Taki Zade mentioned in your telegram No. 27 of the 9th January.

Your despatch No. 298 of the 19th November.

You should not afford support to his claim.

[1541] No. 84.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 11, 1909.*

PERSIAN Customs and the Imperial Bank. (See your telegram No. 461 of the 31st December.)

Provided that the arrangement be regarded as merely provisional, you are authorized to accept it.

Our object must be to have the receipts of the Bushire Customs put aside every month against interest accruing, and to secure the hypothecation of the whole of those customs for the service of the complete Government debt.

Should they prove insufficient, His Majesty's Government will be obliged to urge that the receipts from the Customs of the other ports in the south be similarly hypothecated.

526,000*l.* is the amount of the whole debt, which exceeds the sum of the Concession limit, the latter being 216,000*l.* Thus, apart from 30,000 tomans—the interest per month—we shall need a sinking fund after this year in order that the excess may be liquidated. To attain this, it will be necessary to have for eight years an additional sum of 13,000 tomans per month.

It must be borne in mind that Persia has received a joint advance of 300,000*l.* from the British and Indian exchequers, and care must therefore be taken that nothing be done whereby the security for that sum could be impaired.

[1343] No. 85.

*Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff, January 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to the inquiry made by the Russian Ambassador on the 7th instant, inquiring the meaning attached by His Majesty's Government to the request made by the Zil-es-Sultan to the two Governments "to cause his interests to be more effectively protected," it is clear from a further despatch received from Sir F. Bertie that the Zil contemplated a renewal of the guarantees already given him in August last by the two Governments for the protection of his family and property, with special reference to the question of his garden.

To renew the guarantees would, as Sir F. Bertie has pointed out to His Imperial Highness, tend to throw doubt on the validity of those already given, and this the Zil has admitted.

Sir E. Grey therefore thinks that it would be advisable for the two Governments to inform the Zil in this sense. In the view of His Majesty's Government, the protection accorded should be of a diplomatic character, and they have never contemplated the forcible protection of the Zil's property.



The point upon which the Zil is specially anxious for the intervention of the two Governments is his garden, which has been occupied by his sister.

The British and Russian Representatives are already endeavouring to settle this matter.

*Foreign Office, January 11, 1909.*

[1112]

No. 86.

*Foreign Office to Mr. D'Arcy.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 6th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of your Syndicate, that the monthly cost of the maintenance of the Indian guard, which is stationed in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz for the protection of the operations of the Syndicate, is estimated at, approximately, 174l. 8s. a-month.

I am to add that a telegram, dated the 6th instant, has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in which he states that Captain Lorimer, after consultation with Mr. Reynolds, reiterates the recommendation previously made, that the Indian guard should be retained in the interests of your Syndicate.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[1512]

No. 87.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)*

(No. 17.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 10, 1909.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 9 of the 8th instant I inquired of the Zil-es-Sultan whether the box which was left in the custody of His Majesty's Legation at Tehran contained the title-deeds of the Zil's garden, explaining at the same time that it was not possible to take any action in regard to the garden until the deeds were produced.

I have the honour to transmit herewith to you a copy of the reply from the Zil respecting the contents of the box in question.

The Zil states that the title-deeds are not in the box, but are deposited at the Imperial Bank at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

*Inclosure in No. 87.*

*The Zil-es-Sultan to Sir F. Bertie.*

Excellence,

*Paris, le 9 janvier, 1909.*

J'AI reçu votre aimable lettre et je vous remercie des démarches que vous avez faites auprès du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères au sujet d'Ispahan. J'ai également reçu une lettre de l'Ambassade russe m'informant des démarches faites dans le même sens. Pour ce qui est de mon coffret, il n'y a rien relatif à Saad Abad; il renferme seulement mes bijoux, des titres de rente, et quelques lettres de protection qui m'avaient été données par les différents Ministres de Sa Majesté britannique à Téhéran.

Tous mes titres de propriété, y compris ceux de Saad Abad, sont donc dans deux coffres déposés à la Banque Impériale de Téhéran et n'avaient heureusement pas été touchés lors du pillage de ma maison. Je ne peux pas y laisser toucher hors de ma présence. La question du jardin de Saad Abad est très simple; ce jardin était en ma possession, comme déjà depuis plus de vingt ans, au moment où j'ai quitté la Perse avec la garantie des Gouvernements anglais et russe que l'on ne toucherait pas à mes biens. Quelque temps après mon départ de Perse on a envoyé quelques Cosaques, qui l'ont pris de force des mains de mes agents.

Je n'aurais même pas à montrer de documents prouvant que ce ardin est à moi, car depuis vingt ans toutes les Légations à Téhéran savent qu'il est à moi et elles y ont été reçues. Quels documents, d'ailleurs, a pu montrer ma sœur pour s'en emparer? Pour le moment je ne demande que la justice et je veux que les Gouvernements britannique et russe tiennent leur parole. S'il le faut, j'accepte que ce jardin soit pris en garde par les Légations anglaise et russe ou par le Ministère de la Justice persan, jusqu'à ce que je revienne et puisse montrer mes documents. Si alors on reconnaît que je n'ai pas de droits, je m'incline; mais si mon droit est bon, je reste en possession de mon bien. Mais je ne peux pas supporter qu'en mon absence on s'empare de force d'un jardin qui est à moi. Sa Majesté le Schah et le Ministère de la Justice avaient donné ordre que l'on me rendît ce jardin. Je ne sais pas pourquoi on n'a pas donné suite à cet ordre. Je demande seulement qu'on me rende justice et que la protection promise soit effective, car ce jardin était en ma possession au moment où j'ai quitté la Perse.

Je pars pour Nice demain matin et je vous enverrai mon adresse.

Veillez, &c.  
(Signé) ZELLE SULTAN.

[1514]

No. 88.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)*

(No. 19.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 11, 1909.*

THE Persian Minister came to see me yesterday afternoon by appointment in order to introduce Mahmoud Khan, formerly Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, who desired to speak to me in regard to the situation in Persia.

As Mahmoud Khan does not speak French fluently I found some difficulty in following his remarks, and I therefore requested him to put what he had said in writing in order that I might communicate it to His Majesty's Government. He accordingly sent me to-day the Memorandum of which I have the honour to transmit to you a copy herewith.

I understand that he is leaving Paris shortly for Constantinople, where he is engaged on work in connection with the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

*Inclosure in No. 88.*

*Memorandum communicated by Mahmoud Khan to Sir F. Bertie.*

PUISQUE, d'une part, on est d'avis qu'on ne peut donner aucun appui au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Schah avant que la Constitution ne soit rétablie en Perse et les réformes commencées; puisque, d'autre part, en Perse, comme partout ailleurs, il est matériellement impossible de faire des réformes sans un appui financier; et puisque, enfin, selon l'avis des Cabinets de Londres et de Saint-Petersbourg, dans l'état actuel du pays, grâce au système inauguré et soutenu par Émir Behadour à la Cour, il est impossible que toute avance faite au Gouvernement ne reçoive un emploi tout autre que celui pour les réformes visées—n'est-il pas temps que les deux Puissances, laissant du côté toute équivoque, donnent à Téhéran franchement des conseils énergiques pour qu'on commence tout d'abord par écarter tout ce qui—personnage et autre—est considéré comme étant obstacle à la réalisation des projets des réformes, mesure dont peut résulter une entente aussi bien pour le rétablissement du régime demandé que pour une opération financière indispensable pour faire des réformes.

La présence des Représentants anglais et russe au dernier banquet donné par Émir Behadour, ne va-t-elle pas être exploitée auprès de Sa Majesté au profit de ce dernier, qui, apparemment, n'a organisé cette réunion que dans le but évident de faire voir dans cette présence à Sa Majesté l'approbation pour sa politique quand la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie, voire même leurs Agents en Perse, en pensent autrement.

Le départ pour Téhéran du Représentant russe—nouveau ou ancien—est très nécessaire.

*Le 11 janvier, 1909.*

[1629]



[1547]

No. 89.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 12.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a despatch to the Government of India, dated the 8th instant, with inclosures, relative to Persian telegraphs.

*India Office, January 11, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 89.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

My Lord,

*India Office, January 8, 1909.*

I HAVE considered in Council the letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 10th September, 1908, in which you apply for provisional sanction to certain proposals to enable the Indian Telegraph Department to carry on work on the Khaf-Nasratabad section of the Meshed-Seistan telegraph line, until such time as the section is permanently taken over by the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

2. I inclose, for your information, copy of a Memorandum\* by the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department suggesting modifications of the scheme you propose, and of a letter† addressed to the Foreign Office. It will be seen that it is proposed to postpone a decision on the definite steps to be taken for the working of the Khaf-Nasratabad section until it is known whether the Russian Government will agree to the working arrangements proposed in Mr. Kirk's draft Memorandum of the 18th September, 1908, and that the general question has been raised of the division between the two Exchequers of any future additions to existing expenditure, for political purposes, on telegraph establishments, &c., in Persia, over and above the 20,000 rupees per annum now borne by India alone.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

[1587]

No. 90.

*Messrs. Ziegler and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 12.)*

Sir,

*Manchester, January 11, 1909.*

WE beg to acknowledge receipt of your two communications of the 9th instant, and to thank you for the information with which you have been good enough to favour us in regard to the state of affairs in Ispahan, as per the 5th instant.

With respect to the looting mentioned in our letter of the 4th instant, beyond the bare facts notified to us telegraphically we have so far no further details. We know, however, from what you were good enough to write us on the 22nd October, 1908, that, whatever the nature of the claims for losses admitted by the Persian Government in the case of Russian subjects, His Majesty's Government will claim similarly on our behalf, and we have accordingly written to our friends in Ispahan for full particulars, with a view to submitting them to you in due course.

Meanwhile, with renewed and sincere thanks for the courtesy extended to us, we remain, &c.

(Signed) PH. ZIEGLER AND Co.

\* Dated 8th October, 1908.

† Dated 6th January, 1909.

[1632]

No. 91.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)*

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 12, 1909.*

THE Shah and Constitution.

The following communication was made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day to the two Legations by command of the Shah:—

"His Majesty has always been disposed to grant a Constitution but has been prevented by circumstances. He now feels that it is necessary to take a decision for a reasonable constitutional régime, but fearing that this will lead to disorders, he proposes that the two Governments should give him a guarantee in return."

I could obtain no precise information from the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the nature of the guarantee desired, but I gathered that His Majesty expected it to insure his throne and dynasty. Minister for Foreign Affairs added that a discussion could take place later in regard to its scope, as also the details of the Constitution.

In reply, I expressed to his Excellency my doubts as to whether anything more definite could be obtained than the assurances already given to the Shah on behalf of the two Representatives (see my telegram No. 447 of the 23rd December, 1908).

[1625]

No. 92.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)*

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 12, 1909.*

GERMAN military instructors. My telegram No. 37 of yesterday.

M. Sabline is, I find, sceptical, in view of the Shah's denial last week about the engagement of the German officers. He will, however, question His Majesty on Thursday when he is to have an audience.

Your telegram No. 13 of the 8th instant. I conveyed the warning therein indicated yesterday.

[1624]

No. 93.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 12, 1909.*

I APPROVE your action respecting the Indo-European Telegraph Department, as mentioned in your telegram No. 13 of the 5th instant.

[1696]

No. 94.

*Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)*

(No. 3.)

Sir,

*Odessa, January 9, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Mr. E. B. St. Clair, British Vice-Consul at Rostov-on-Don, reports, under date the 31st December, 1908, that "an Englishman informed me confidentially that an offer was made to him on very favourable terms to smuggle arms from Russia into Persia. I strongly dissuaded him from accepting the offer."

I have informed Mr. St. Clair that in this he did rightly, and I have requested him to report all details which may come to his knowledge in this or other cases.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. S. SMITH.

[1659]

No. 95.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)*(No. 21.)  
Sir,

Paris, January 12, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a Memorandum given to me last night by the Russian Ambassador on the subject of the claims of Zil-es-Sultan to the garden in the environs of Tehran.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

## Inclosure in No. 95.

*Memorandum communicated by the Russian Ambassador at Paris to Sir F. Bertie.*

L'AFFAIRE du jardin aux environs de Téhéran est inexactement présentée par Zil-es-Sultan. Sa sœur ne s'en est jamais emparée. L'été dernier des neveux de Zilli, descendants du Sirdar d'Erivan Khan-Baba-Khan, sujets russes, s'étaient adressés à la Légation de Russie pour être remis en possession de leur propriété, qui avait été saisie arbitrairement après la mort de leur père par Zilli. Comme le Prince n'avait aucuns documents de propriété, la Légation soutint la demande des héritiers de Khan-Baba-Khan, et le Schah leur fit remettre le jardin, abandonnant à Zil-es-Sultan de présenter des documents constatant ses droits à cette propriété. Ne les possédant pas, il n'a rien pu démontrer. Le jardin même se trouve en ce moment entre les mains d'autres personnes et sert de garantie à des dettes contractées vis-à-vis de la Banque Russe.

Le fait de la saisie arbitraire de ce jardin par Zil-es-Sultan est notoire et se trouve confirmé par de nombreux témoignages. Il n'existe aucun malentendu à ce sujet entre les Légations de Russie et de Grande-Bretagne.

*Ambassade de Russie, Paris,  
le 11 janvier, 1909.*

[1753]

No. 96.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)*(No. 40.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 13, 1909.

LIEN of Imperial Bank on Bushire customs.

From your telegram No. 19 of the 11th instant I understand that if and when the Persian Government accept the arrangement which I outlined in my telegrams Nos. 457 and 461 of the 28th and 31st ultimo respectively you would wish me to inform the Persian Government in general terms that this arrangement is regarded as provisional by His Majesty's Government, and that further conditions which may appear later to be necessary to safeguard the interests of the Imperial Bank are under consideration.

The Bushire customs, which tend to diminish, will be practically exhausted if the bank is ultimately to receive 43,000 tomans a-month. The telegraph receipts are an unknown quantity, and the Caspian fisheries are mortgaged until 1914. There would therefore be no sure security left except the receipts of the other southern ports for the British and Indian loans. Though it is true that these are amply sufficient, the bank has no branches there, so they would be inconvenient.

In communications with the Persian Government I have occasionally reminded them that the interest on this loan is in arrear, but in view of the obvious advantages of this default (see Mr. Marling's telegram No. 86 of the 31st March, 1908) I have not pressed the matter.

[1765]

No. 97.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)*

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 13, 1909.

ISPAHAN situation.

Between 200 and 300 Bakhtiaris with their Chiefs left here yesterday for Ispahan. I understand that the intention is that these should threaten Samsam-es-Sultaneh's home, but all the information I have received tends to show that it is very improbable that they will enter upon any hostilities against him. Prince Firman Firma's deputy leaves to-day for Ispahan.

[1777]

No. 98.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)*

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 13, 1909.

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

According to a telegram from Mr. Consul-General Wratislaw, the Shah's troops are interrupting communications on the road near Julfa. The last post from Europe was seized and carried off. It seems to be the intention of the Shah to reduce Tabreez to starvation by forming a blockade around the town. Fuel is almost unobtainable, and the prices of everything are rising. Around Salmas and Khoi fighting is in progress.

The same information has been received by M. Sabline, and he is asking for instructions from his Government.

[1768]

No. 99.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1909.

SITUATION at Ispahan.

I think, in reply to your private telegram of the 11th instant, that, pending further developments in the situation, the further warning mentioned in my telegram No. 17 of the 10th instant may be deferred.

My reasons are that you have already conveyed one warning (see your telegram No. 6 of the 3rd instant), and that Firman Firma seems disinclined to set out without delay.

[1181]

No. 100.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1909.

SITUATION in Persia.

In reply to your telegram No. 10 of the 9th instant, His Majesty's Government are opposed to any kind of intervention respecting the position in Tabreez or Ispahan.

We have not ceased to regard the granting of a Constitution as a factor of much importance in the restoration of order, and it may be that a wholesome influence may be produced on the Shah by the disturbances in those two places towards the granting of such a measure.

So long as there is no reform in the Shah's Government there will be no improvement of a permanent character; and while any proposals emanating from the Russian Government will be most carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, they hold that to give the Shah money would, in the present circumstances, be worse than futile, and would amount to intervention in Persia's internal affairs. For it is probable that such money would be employed in the suppression of the national movement on behalf of a Constitution; moreover, when once the money had been spent, the situation would be as bad as ever, even if not worse.



[44857]

No. 101.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 16.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 13, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 290, I transmit to your Excellency the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 22nd December, 1908, from the India Office, respecting the steps to be taken to secure the control of the Arabistan telegraph line in connection with the question of the extension of the Concessions of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

In view of the small amount of financial assistance to the Persian Government which is involved, I do not consider that an advance of 10,000*l.* to the Persian Government need be regarded as inconsistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Persian finance.

I have accordingly to request your Excellency to inquire whether the procedure indicated in the Memorandum of the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department meets with the concurrence of the Russian Government.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[42315]

No. 102.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 13, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, in reply to your letter of the 7th October last, respecting red oxide Concessions in the Persian Gulf, that he has been in communication with the Secretary of State for India on the subject, and that, as regards Little Tamb, he is of opinion that negotiations should be conducted with the Sheikh of Shargah through the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.

His Majesty's Government would be prepared to afford you their support in the negotiations in question; but I am to suggest that, before formulating your demands in regard to a Concession on Little Tamb, your firm might advantageously consider the possibility of oxide deposits being found on the Islands of Dalmah and Sir Abu Nuair. The former of these islands belongs to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, the latter to the Sheikh of Shargah.

A further communication will shortly be addressed to you with regard to Sirri.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[1891]

No. 103.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 14, 1909.*

THE Russian Ambassador made a communication yesterday from which it appears that the facts reported by you with regard to the attitude towards their fellow-tribesmen in Ispahan of the Bakhtiari, who are accompanying the Vice-Governor, are not known to the Russian Legation. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires should be kept fully informed of such facts when they come to your knowledge.

[1632]

No. 104.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 14, 1909.*

SHAH and Persian Constitution.

I approve your answer to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the presentation of the Confidential communication reported in your telegram No. 38 of the 12th instant.

[1812]

No. 105.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 14.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 13, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 1st instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of Secretary Sir E. Grey to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to discuss with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, subject to the restrictions involved by the recent decision to postpone all plans of railway construction, the whole question of the improvement of the means of communication between Dizful and Western and Northern Persia.

Lord Morley also agrees that it would be premature in the present disturbed state of Persia to embark upon an extensive project of the nature referred to. He would suggest that this should be stated in the instructions to Sir G. Barclay.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[1753]

No. 106.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 14, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 11th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin,\* which has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, respecting the transfer of the lien of the Imperial Bank of Persia from the customs receipts of Kermanshah to those of Bushire.

The draft of a telegram which, subject to the concurrence of Lord Morley, Sir E. Grey proposes to address to Sir G. Barclay in reply, is also inclosed.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[1901]

No. 107.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 29.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 14, 1909.*

AT the request of the Persian Minister at Paris, I received this morning Hadji Ali Gholi Khan, who described himself to me as Supreme Head of the Bakhtiari tribes. He was accompanied by a Persian, who interpreted for the Chief. He said that he had come to Paris to obtain advice in regard to his eyesight, and had remained on account of the deplorable state of affairs in Persia. Certain of his relatives at Tehran were not at one with the Chiefs now at Ispahan. He himself was in favour of a constitutional régime. The Shah had prevailed on the Bakhtiari of Tehran to set themselves against reforms, and had sent some of them to Ispahan in the hope of creating dissension amongst the tribes, and thus upsetting the re-establishment of order which was due to the Bakhtiari having taken possession of Ispahan. As long as the present Bakhtiari authorities remained supreme there there would be no fear of danger to the lives and property of foreigners. What he desired to urge was that the British Minister at Tehran should impress on the Bakhtiari of Tehran the importance of acting with the Bakhtiari at Ispahan in insisting on constitutional Government. If it were not established there would be anarchy in Southern Persia, and England would be obliged to intervene for the protection of her interests.

I observed to the Chief that, as he must be aware, the object of the understanding between England and Russia was the avoidance of intervention in the internal affairs of Persia. He replied that unless the Shah abandoned his present attitude there must be intervention, for the state of Persia would become worse and worse. The Mollahs were divided in opinion. Those at Tehran against constitutional Government had been

influenced by bribery. The greater part of the priests in other parts of Persia were for a change of system. The Baktiaris would be loyal to the Shah's dynasty if they could obtain proper reforms in the Government of the Kingdom.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1976]

No. 108.

*Mr. D'Arcy to Foreign Office.—(Received January 15.)*

Sir,

*Stanmore Hall, Stanmore, January 12, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter dated the 6th instant, we greatly regret the decision which His Majesty's Government has come to, the more so as it would appear from the telegrams published in the public press, more especially during the last fortnight, that the necessity for safeguarding British interests in southern Persia now, as compared with the time when it was first decided to locate a guard there, is not less but greater.

Also, seeing that the time is not yet, although it is now approximate, for forming a Joint-stock Company which could be called upon to pay for or towards the upkeep of the guard, and that consequently we shall have to add this expenditure to our other already heavy expenditure while we are getting nothing out of the country in return, the decision detailed in your letter now under reply bears very hardly upon us.

But we dare not under present conditions take upon our shoulders the responsibility of keeping a large staff of Englishmen in Persia without a guard, and I am therefore to inform you that while earnestly begging the Government to maintain the guard at the public expense for, say, three months from now, we will refund to His Majesty's Government its contribution to the cost of the guard from such time as it feels unable to continue this contribution.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) W. K. D'ARCY.

[1976]

No. 109.

*Mr. D'Arcy to Foreign Office.—(Received January 15.)*

Sir,

*Stanmore Hall, Stanmore, January 12, 1909.*

SINCE the accompanying letter was drafted, I have received and I thank you for your Office letter dated the 11th instant.

The fact that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has sent a second telegram on the subject emphasizes what I had occasion to write to you on the 28th December, 1908, and again under yesterday's date, in support of our plea that the Indian guard may be retained for, at all events, three months without our being made to pay towards its cost. I say three months, because I anticipate that within that period a Joint-stock Company will have been formed to work the Concession, and to so put an end to the heavy expenses that we are meantime having to provide ourselves.

With reference to the first part of your letter now under reply, I am not quite sure whether the monthly sum that you name covers the entire cost of the guard, or only the British Government's contribution thereto. I assume that the Indian Government pays a share of the cost, and has not refused to continue to do so.

174l. 8s., or 8,616 rupees per month, looks like the entire cost of the guard, but we understand that the Home Government alone objects to maintain the present arrangements in their entirety, and that consequently we are asked only to refund its contribution.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) W. K. D'ARCY.

[1955]

No. 110.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 15.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 14, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, stating that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, it would be well to defer for the present any action in the matter of the request of the Persian Minister of Telegraphs that the Indo-European Telegraph Department should erect a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud on the Tehran-Meshed line. The Director-in-chief of the Department has now asked for instructions as to the terms of the reply he is to address to the Director at Tehran for communication to the Persian Minister.

A refusal, or a merely procrastinating reply, may cause difficulties with the Persian Minister, with whom, in view of the questions that will arise in connection with the Arabistan telegraph line and the renewal of the Department's Concessions, it is desirable that the Director of the Department should stand on good terms. Mr. Kirk's Memorandum of the 4th December, 1908, shows that the Russian Government are believed to be anxious for the erection of the wire, and that, in the absence of assistance from the Department, the Persian Minister may ask for their help to complete it.

Viscount Morley would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the Russian Government might be asked whether they have any objection to the erection of the second wire by the Indo-European Telegraph Department pending the conclusion of the arrangements for the exchange of the Meshed-Tehran and Khaf-Nasratabad lines.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[1971]

No. 111.

*Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 15.)*

*Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,*

*January 14, 1909.*

Sir,

WE beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, and we thank you for the interesting information contained therein as to how we should proceed with the negotiations for obtaining the Concession for mining red oxide on the Island of Little Tamb.

We also thank you for your suggestion that, before putting forward our demand for a Concession on the above island, we might, with advantage, take into consideration possible oxide deposits on the Islands of Dalmah and Sir Abu Nuair, belonging respectively to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabhi and the Sheikh of Shargah.

This matter shall receive our very careful attention, and we shall endeavour to arrange to send a European representative to prospect for red oxide on these islands, as well as on other islands in that part of the Persian Gulf, during the present cool season, but, before sending him, we shall instruct our Bushire agent, M. Tigram J. Malcolm, to consult with and act upon the advice of His Majesty's Political Resident at Bushire.

We are glad to learn that we may shortly expect a further communication from you in regard to the Island of Sirri, as, from the samples hurriedly taken by the master of our steam-ship "Tabaristan" (extract from whose letter was inclosed in our letter to you of the 7th October last), the quality of the oxide on that island would appear to be of commercial value.

We have, &c.  
(For Frank C. Strick and Co.),  
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK.

[1629]

Q



[1998]

No. 112.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 15, 1909.*

GERMAN military instructors.

My telegram No. 39 of the 12th instant.

The Shah again denied to-day, at an audience which M. Sabline had with His Majesty, that there was any truth in the rumour that he was engaging Germans to act as instructors to the Persian army.

[2001]

No. 113.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 15, 1909.*

ISPAHAN situation.

Your telegram No. 24 of yesterday.

I have throughout been in the closest touch with M. Sabline. It had for some days been matter of common talk that the Bakhtiari who are being sent from Tehran would abandon the Shah on arrival at Ispahan. M. Sabline's opinion as to the probable attitude of the Bakhtiari coincided with mine. I did not consider it necessary to give him information, which had been communicated to me from a very confidential source, in confirmation of an opinion he already held.

I have now given him my information.

[2122]

No. 114.

*Mr. J. Simpson to Foreign Office.—(Received January 16.)*

Dear Sir,

*Dashwood House, London, January 14, 1909.*

RE Anglo-Russian Bank proposal.

Referring to the pleasure of the interview which I had with you on Tuesday last, and to my conversation on the telephone to-day, I now beg to inclose you copy of the letter referred to, which will show you the exact position of the negotiations with regard to this important proposal.

I have had a long interview with M. Notovitch, and, at my request, he has put his proposals into writing, which I thought it much better to submit to you in full. You will, I am sure, observe the great importance of the proposals that are made, and if you will kindly discuss them with Sir Edward Grey and Sir Charles Hardinge, as promised, I shall be glad.

It appears to me to be an exceptional opportunity for the British Government to take a hand in not only the southern but the northern part of Persia, which the Germans are trying so hard to do, as I explained to you.

Awaiting the favour of your early reply, believe me, &amp;c.

(Signed)

J. SIMPSON.

Inclosure in No. 114.

*M. Notovitch to Mr. J. Simpson.**Savoy Hotel, Embankment Gardens, London,  
January 14, 1909.*

Dear Sir,

I HAVE returned to-day from St. Petersburg, where I have had two long interviews with the Minister of Finance, and I have also seen the Chief of the Russian State Bank. As you are already aware, from the documents delivered to you, that I have formulated the project of the Anglo-Russian Economic Entente as an additional feature to the political one so successfully carried through by Sir Charles Hardinge, acting on the initiative of the greatest contemporary diplomat, His Majesty King Edward VII, of whom the history of Great Britain will have the right to be right proud,

because it is only thanks to his great diplomatic talents that Europe is, for a long time to come, spared even the probability of war, on account of this triple Anglo-French-Russian entente, which has thoroughly paralyzed any aggressive policy against any State of Europe and Asia. My project of economic entente between Great Britain and Russia has been last year a subject of discussion at several special conferences between M. Isvolsky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Deputy Minister M. Tcharykoff; M. Kokovtzeff, the Minister of Finance; M. Ridiger, the Minister of War, and others, and has received their moral sanction.

I consider it useful to create this economic entente under the common flag of an Anglo-Russian Commercial Association, as it could be judged from my scheme.

Both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance have approved the organization of the Anglo-Russian Bank, to which will be given, for the purposes of exploitation—

1. The Discount and Loan Bank of Persia, with all its rights, privileges, and Concessions;
2. The assent and support for the granting of a Concession to build railways in Northern Persia;
3. The construction of a port in Enzeli (Northern Persia), for which scheme the Government has already approved 120,000*l.*, of which there are 65,000*l.* not yet used up, and also the construction of another port at Astara, with the right of collecting all port tolls;
4. The right to establish money-lending bureaux ("lombards") in big Persian towns on the plan of such already in existence in Tehran;
5. The right to the Concession for building of oil pipe from Baku through Persia to the Gulf of Persia;
6. The right to the Concession for all sorts of insurance; and
7. In general, the right to all the undertakings in Northern Persia already existing in Russian Concessions, the acquisition of which will be helped by the Russian Government.

The Minister of Finance has agreed to deliver up to Anglo-Russian Bank the Discount and Loan Bank on the following conditions:—

1. The capital of the Anglo-Russian Bank to be not less than 2,500,000*l.*, and, to facilitate the foundation of such bank, 1,500,000*l.* only to be paid up in the beginning.
2. The Board of Directors to consist of Britishers and Russians in equal numbers.
3. The Chairman to be elected for five years—a British Chairman for the first five years, then a Russian for the next five years, and so on alternately. The Vice-Chairman to be elected for five years also, and it is to be so arranged that when the Chairman is British the Vice-Chairman to be Russian, and *vice versa*.
4. The head office to be in London.
5. The administration office to be in St. Petersburg.
6. The bank will have branches in Constantinople, Sophia, Belgrade, and Bucharest.
7. Anglo-Russian Bank will acquire for the nominal sum of 1,200,000*l.* the 1,200,000*l.* of shares of the Discount and Loan Bank.

The profits of the Discount and Loan Bank were always about 12 per cent. and could be more, but for unnecessarily great expenditure (bureaucratic system) of its Board of Administration.

Last year the profit was again 12 per cent., but because of losses on bills, &c., due to the revolutionary epoch, the bank has transferred part of the profits for the payment of these losses, and still paid 4½ per cent. in dividends.

The Anglo-Russian Bank will therefore acquire—

1. An existing bank with branches in Russia and Persia, with a rich inventory of real estate, large *clientèle*, and definite assured income, which will be greatly increased, thanks to the new statute of the Discount and Loan Bank, already confirmed by His Majesty the Emperor, which will enable the bank to enlarge its sphere all over Russia, and which will enable it to centralize all municipal and railway loans, the sale on credit system to different Town Councils of agricultural machines (4,000,000*l.* to 5,000,000*l.* per year) and implements, the building of commercial docks, and other constructions (canal between the Baltic and Black Sea) requiring capitals, all this in order to attract British capital for safe investments.
2. Several profitable Concessions in Persia.



3. The exclusive right to construct and exploit railways and ports in Northern Persia.

4. The construction and exploitation of an oil pipe through Persia, the profits of which are incalculable. The latter is proved by the offer from Rothschild's in Paris of a gift for charitable purposes of 1,000,000*l.*, for the consent of the Russian Government to assist Rothschild's to obtain such a Concession in Tehran.

The British capitalists will therefore be able to create, under the Anglo-Russian commercial flag, a new "Chartered Company" in Persia, thereby also putting a check on the German economic policy without any diplomatic difficulties.

If I have succeeded in getting the approval of Russian Government of this project and combination, it is because that only through such an economic *entente* it will be possible to establish solid and firm relations of long duration between Great Britain and Russia, which, when at no far future date the races of the Orient will wake up, will be extremely advantageous and useful to both Great Britain and Russia.

I am sure that your own Government will agree with my views and approve of my plan, from which there can be nothing but gain to the British policy, and I therefore beg of you, in case of any doubt in your mind *re* the utility and economic advantages of such an *entente*, to consult your Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the creator of the Anglo-Russian *entente*, Sir Charles Hardinge, and I have no doubt at all that the investment of British capital in this direction will receive your Government's active support, encouragement, and guarantee if needful.

I must add that the Minister of Finance, M. Kokortzeff, has advised big Moscow merchants to join British capitalists in this direction, and, after my visit to Moscow, the Committee of Moscow Exchange have authorized me to state that, in case of the Anglo-Russian Bank's realization, they will join it, and will support the bank's operations by intrusting the bank with their business now conducted through foreign bankers, as, for instance, in the Balkan Peninsula and Constantinople, where Russian banks have no branches.

The Minister of Finance, at my request, on the day of my departure, has instructed his representative in London, M. Rutkovsky, of all the above-mentioned conditions, in order that he may confirm them in the name of the Minister of Finance to the person who will come from me to see him on this business.

The following gentlemen in Russia have consented, if requested, to come on the Board of Anglo-Russian Bank:—

M. Konshin, Vice-Governor of Russian State Bank.

M. W. Timiriazoff, late Minister of Commerce, Member of Council of State, Chairman of Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, Chairman of Anglo-Russian Chamber of Commerce.

M. Kovalevsky, late Vice-Minister of Finance, Chairman of St. Petersburg Bank of Commerce, a gentleman well known in the financial world.

I trust that all and everything mentioned in this letter clearly shows the great advantages and utility of the Anglo-Russian *entente* on the firm and solid basis of mutual advantages.

Awaiting the favour of your esteemed reply, believe me, &c.

(Signed) N. NOTOVITCH.

[2143]

No. 115.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)*

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 16, 1909.

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

According to a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, there was some skirmishing yesterday between the Nationalists and the troops of the Governor of Maraga outside the town. Damage done was unimportant. It is believed that Ain-ed-Dowleh is waiting for the return of Rahim Khan, and he has not moved from his position.

Mr. Wratislaw, in a private letter written last month, says that "the people would probably still accept a favourable arrangement, but it must not be long delayed." Reconciliation between the two parties is likely to be made more difficult by the recent renewed activity of the Shah's irregular troops, which is also conducive to disorder.

[2140]

No. 116.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, January 17, 1909.

SITUATION in Persia.

I am sending on Tuesday, by private hand, a copy of the Russian Memorandum, which has now reached me. It should arrive in London on Thursday night.

The Memorandum begins with an exposition of the general situation, and then proceeds to make the proposals which follow:—

(R.) 1. Without in any way departing from principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of Persia, to recommend in a friendly way to the Shah that he should call to his counsels capable and energetic men, who have already given proof of their desire to extricate their country from the difficult situation in which it finds itself, specially mentioning Saad-ed-Dowleh and Nasr-ul-Mulk.

2. To express to the Shah the desire to see a representative Government established in Persia, necessity of which he has himself recognized, and without insisting on re-establishment of form in which that Government existed in 1907-8; to advise him to proceed without delay, with the assistance of those mentioned above and of other men of merit to elaborate a Law instituting a new legislative body which will be in accordance with usages and historical customs of the Persian people as well as with its religious ideas, and which will satisfy its needs and contribute to establishment of peace and order in Persia.

3. If the Shah gives sufficient proofs of his decision to follow advice of Russia and Great Britain to assist him in concluding an external loan, more or less considerable, on the condition of the institution of a Special Commission composed of the Directors of the Russian and British banks, with Persian Delegates—this Commission to control expenditure and to see that the expenditure is devoted exclusively to the wants of the country; to superintend various Budgets of the Administration; and to assist Minister of Finance in the revision and regularization of the laws regarding *malیات*.

4. In order to give a proof of their amicable feelings the two Governments would be ready to put at disposal of Persian Government an advance of 200,000*l.*, on the conditions arranged in 1906, in order to meet immediate expenses necessitated by introduction of reforms. (End of R.)

I was asked by M. Isvolsky to tell him what I thought of these proposals of the Russian Government. I replied that I noticed that the Memorandum, in speaking of the Council which should draw up the electoral law, made no mention of elected members being included in the composition of that body. It seemed to me that some elected members should be included. M. Isvolsky replied that he had only mentioned "men of merit," and had avoided going into details. I then added that, in my opinion, we should await a report from M. Bizot before touching upon the question of an external loan. M. Isvolsky replied that he had only sketched out the possibility of a loan, and perhaps no loan would be necessary. I think he would be quite willing to wait until M. Bizot has reported on the financial situation. I was quite sure, I said, that until an electoral law had been drawn up and dates fixed for the election and convocation of an Assembly, His Majesty's Government would not dream of an advance. When these steps had been taken, the question might perhaps then be considered by His Majesty's Government. M. Isvolsky pointed out that he had been careful to insert the proviso "if the Shah gives sufficient proofs," &c. He thought it best not to specify what proofs would be considered sufficient, but to leave it to the Representatives on the spot to decide that point. We could interpret "sufficiency of proof" in our own terms, and attach any conditions we liked. Of course the Shah must give proofs of his good faith before securing an advance, and he had no desire whatever to make an advance immediately.

I explained that what I had said to him only represented my personal views after first reading the Memorandum.

I should add that the Cabinet have discussed and approved this document.

[1629]

R



[2141]

No. 117.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, January 17, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 17 of to-day respecting Persia.

The press are annoying M. Isvolsky by guesses and inventions as to what is passing between the British and Russian Governments with regard to Persia. His Excellency suggests the simultaneous issue at St. Petersburg and London of an identic "communiqué," and would be grateful if you would draft one and telegraph it to me. He thinks that in any such communiqué only a very general idea of the views of the two Governments should be given, and stress should be laid on non-intervention.

[2144]

No. 118.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 17, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaidjan.

In continuation of my immediately preceding telegram, His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the Nationalists, in the course of hostilities of rather a more serious nature which took place yesterday outside the town, got the upper hand. They have succeeded in stopping communications between Ain-ed-Dowleh's forces and those of the Governor of Maraga.

[2157]

No. 119.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 312.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 15, 1908.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 203 of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to state that the theft of Messrs. Stevens' gold while in transit between Tabreez and Urumia has been the subject of repeated representations to the Persian Government during the past year.

I have now addressed a further note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs pressing for a speedy settlement of the case, but I fear that it would be useless in the present deplorable financial condition of the country to expect that any satisfaction will be obtained.

It is no less true now than when Mr. Marling wrote his despatch No. 111 of the 7th May last, that the Persian Government are at their wits' end for money, and Messrs. Stevens' claim, as indeed all others involving pecuniary compensation, stands little or no chance of being settled as long as the present régime continues.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2158]

No. 120.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 313.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 15, 1908.*

IN my telegrams of the past few days, I have reported the institution by the Shah of a Council of State, and I now have the honour to transmit a translation of the Regulations which have been issued for the working of this Council, and which have been informally communicated to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nothing is said in this document as to the number of the members of this body, but I understand that it is to consist of some sixty Councillors the majority of whom have already been summoned to the meetings of the Council, as reported in my despatch No. 310 of the 4th instant. It will be noticed that the Regulations now issued confer considerable powers on the members. Indeed, given a Shah ready and able to co-operate

in the work of reform, and given Councillors endowed with intelligence and courage to make good use of their powers, it might well be that the Council would prove, for the present, better adapted to the needs of the country than an Assembly of representatives of the people. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions is present. There is too good reason for thinking that the Shah, in granting the Council, is seeking to hoodwink the two Legations, and that he is as reluctant as ever to consent to any effective change in the rule of the camarilla with which the country has been cursed since the events in June. I understand that the membership of the Council is not yet complete, but its composition, up to the present, may, I presume, be taken as a fair indication of what it is intended to be. I need not trouble you with a list of the names. It will be sufficient to say that for the most part it is composed of ignorant and reactionary men. There are, I notice, one or two capable and independent members, but I am told that these regard the Council as a farce.

Before Ala-es-Sultaneh gave me a copy of the new Regulations, my Russian colleague and I had asked for an audience for Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky, in order to inquire of the Shah what measures he had decided to adopt with a view to the fulfilment of his engagements. As you are aware, His Majesty sought to evade this audience, pleading indisposition. It was evident that some delay must occur, and as we thought it desirable, on the appearance of the Regulations, that we should lose no time in making it clear to the Shah that we could not regard the institution of the new Council as a fulfilment of his engagements, my Russian colleague and I decided to address a joint Memorandum in this sense to His Majesty.

I inclose a copy of this communication, which was presented to His Majesty through the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 120.

*Regulations for the Assembly of Councillors of State.*

In the name of God, &amp;c.

(Translation.)

(After a preamble as to the Shah's solicitude for the welfare of the people.)

A "MEJLISS" has been instituted at the Court to promulgate justice and to stop oppression, and to prevent infringements of the laws of Islam, dated 26th November, 1908.

*The Rights given to the Assembly of Councillors of State.*

Article 1. Supervision over all Ministries [with power] to investigate and discuss [affairs], with the cognisance of members of a Committee chosen from the Assembly and possessed of expert knowledge in the [various] branches.

Art. 2. Supervision over revenue and expenditure under the conditions stipulated in Article 1.

Art. 3. Every one of the Ministers must write out instructions relating to his Ministry, and send them to the Assembly. In case of approval by the Assembly and the Cabinet, they will be submitted by the Grand Vizier to the Shah, to be signed if found correct.

Art. 4. The Assembly will have the right to send for the Ministers, if necessary, and if any Minister cannot attend he may send his assistant to explain an affair.

Art. 5. It is possible that Ministers may be accused by the Assembly of infringing the laws of Islam or of taking bribes, or of other faults. In this case, a Committee of the Assembly must be formed, and make investigations in the presence of the Grand Vizier and with the knowledge of the Ministers. In case of proof, the punishment and dismissal of the Minister may be demanded of the Shahs.

Art. 6. Instructions relating to the revenues of the State must first be brought before the Assembly with the knowledge of the Grand Vizier. The Assembly has the right to investigate them and to make any observations as to modifications to the Shah through the Grand Vizier in order that a decision may be given.

Art. 7. The Assembly of Councillors of State will be opened and closed for fixed periods in the course of the year in accordance with the Shah's orders.

Art. 8. Members of the Assembly must not be in Government employ, and should



any Member receive Government employ, he must resign his membership of the Assembly and another will be appointed in his place by Imperial command.

Art. 9. In case a matter is secret, the Grand Vizier and responsible Ministers are not bound to discuss the matter in public, and a Committee can be chosen from the Assembly, by vote, to discuss the question.

Art. 10. All the sittings and debates of the Assembly are public and will be held in the presence of all its Members, excepting in cases provided for by Article 9 [see note\*].

Art. 11. Members of the Assembly may submit to the Shah, through the Grand Vizier, petitions and necessary representations relating to the Assembly.

Art. 12. [Relates to petitions.]

Art. 13. [Relates to absolute freedom of Members from influence.]

Art. 14. Members of the Assembly may not be prosecuted for speeches or representations which they may make in the course of debates, excepting in cases where they may contravene the Assembly's regulations, in which case they will be dealt with according to those regulations.

Art. 15. [Absolute freedom of Members in voting.]

Art. 16. Proposals as to the reform of new "instructions" [see note†] or alterations in one of the existing instructions are part of the duties of the Ministers of State. The Assembly of Councillors of State has the right to request for reforms in the new instructions as to the clauses relating to their own specified duties or the alteration of existing instructions, but they must first ask the Shah's permission through the Grand Vizier. If the Shah's authority has been given, its acceptance or refusal will be referred to the Council of Ministers.

Art. 17. The instructions which are prepared by the Council of Ministers of State after investigation and acceptance by the Assembly of Councillors of State, and if the Imperial command has been given for them to be carried out, will then come into force. If the above-named instructions are entirely thrown out by the Assembly . . . [The remainder is so obscure that I cannot translate it.]

Art. 18. Should a list of instructions be read Article by Article at the Assembly of Councillors of State, and if the majority should not vote for its acceptance Article by Article, and if after that it should not receive the vote of the majority of the Committee, those instructions will not come into force.

Art. 19. The time fixed for the service of the Members of the Assembly is two years, and after the expiration of that period the choice of Members for a second time will be renewed by order of the Shah.

Art. 20. Any concession given internally or externally [to natives or foreigners] will be with the approval of the Assembly.

Art. 21. Besides the Articles of the instructions which have been written to define the duties of the Councillors of State, the internal regulations for the Assembly will be prepared by a vote of the majority in the Assembly and will be submitted to the Shah through the Grand Vizier and Cabinet, and will come into force after approval and signature by His Imperial Majesty.

(Signed) MOHAMMED ALI SHAH KAJAR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 120.

*Joint Memorandum communicated to His Majesty the Shah of Persia.*

THE Representatives of Great Britain and Russia have frequently advised His Imperial Majesty the Shah, in His Majesty's interests and in those of his dominions, to fulfil the pledges in regard to the convocation of an elective Assembly which His Majesty has so often given to the two Representatives as well as to his own people, and to proclaim an amnesty to his subjects in arms at Tabriz.

The two Representatives now venture respectfully to point out to His Majesty that the institution of the Council of Notables cannot in any way be regarded as a fulfilment of His Majesty's promises, as its Members are not elected by the people, and they beg His Majesty to inform them when it is proposed to convoke the promised Assembly.

\* This Article does not mean that the debates will be held in the presence of the general public—G. P. C.

† "Instructions." This word appears to relate to the present Rules and Regulations, and is evidently another word for "Constitution."

In making this inquiry of His Imperial Majesty, the two Representatives beg to repeat their conviction that the convocation of an elective Assembly and the Proclamation of an amnesty offer the only hope of a termination of the present deplorable situation in the country.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.  
SABLINE.

December 14, 1908.

[2159]

No. 121.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 314.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, December 17, 1908.*

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my despatch No. 277 of the 8th October last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of letters exchanged between Messrs. Lynch's agency at Ahwaz and ter Meulem, Gratama, and Co., respecting the allegations made by Herr Hygind, in an article published by the "Berliner Tageblatt," that the Dutch firm had been recently obliged to request the intervention of this Legation in order to compel Messrs. Lynch to transport their corn to Mohammerah.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 121.

*Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Messrs. ter Meulem, Gratama, and Co.*

Dear Sirs,

*Ahwaz, November 9, 1908.*

IN an article on the trade of Arabistan the following has appeared in a recent issue of the "Berliner Tageblatt":—

"Recently a Dutch firm was obliged to request the intervention of the British Legation to compel Messrs. Lynch to transport their corn to Mohammerah, where it was to be shipped on board a sea-going vessel, and the Legation informed Messrs. Lynch that they were a Company to which the British Government paid a subvention, and that they therefore could not be allowed to indulge their private opinions and jealousies."

It is incomprehensible to us how such a damaging statement could have found currency, and as you are the only Dutch firm hereabouts we should be obliged if you will inform us if the report was made with your knowledge or sanction, or whether there is any truth in it.

Regretting to trouble you, we are, &c.

(Signed) LYNCH BROTHERS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 121.

*Messrs. ter Meulem, Gratama, and Co. to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.*

Dear Sirs,

*Ahwaz, November 9, 1908.*

IN reply to your private letter of even date, since you appeal to us, we have pleasure to inform you that our firm did not call for the intervention mentioned in the article referred to.

We remain, &c.  
Handelsvereeniging Holland-Perzie,  
(Signed) TER MEULEM, GRATAMA, AND Co.



[2160]

No. 122.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 315.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 17, 1908.*

I DO not know that I need trouble you with the various petitions from the Nationalists which have reached me during the past week or two. One of them, however, calls for special mention with reference to the telegrams which have recently passed between your Department and this Legation in regard to the Austrian Minister's desire to convoke a meeting of the Representatives, with the exception of the British and Russian, for the purpose of deciding on some step to show their sympathy with the Constitutional movement.

The petition in question, signed by between 500 and 600 persons, was presented to the Austrian Legation with the request that M. de Rosthorn, as doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, would circulate copies to his colleagues. This was too good an opportunity to be lost by M. de Rosthorn, and in complying with the memorialists' request for the circulation of the petition he asked his colleagues to acquaint him with their views, and suggested the desirability of a meeting of the Chiefs of Missions to consider it. M. Sabline and I have replied that our instructions precluded us from taking part in the proposed meeting, and I doubt whether M. de Rosthorn will persevere with his project, as it has been made clear to him by several of his colleagues that they could not join in any collective action in regard to a matter of this kind without the approval of the two Legations most interested.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S. 27th December.—Since I wrote the above M. de Rosthorn has circulated to the Legations the answers received from his colleagues and the reply he proposes to send to the memorialists. The terms of his reply are unobjectionable. It reminds the petitioners of the efforts of the British and Russian Legations to induce the Shah to re-establish a Constitutional régime, and states that M. de Rosthorn is authorized by his other colleagues to say that these efforts have their entire sympathy, that they hope that they will be crowned with success, and that they are ready to join them within the limits of their competence should the case arise.

I noticed, from a perusal of my colleagues' answers to M. de Rosthorn's Circular, that the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires is the only one who concurs without reserve in the proposal to hold a meeting to consider the petition.—G. B.

[2161]

No. 123.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 316.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 19, 1908.*

YOU were so good as to authorize me by your telegram No. 349 to accept, subject to the omission of certain words, an amended note, the text of which had been submitted to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in substitution for the note of the 9th April last, inclosed in Mr. Marling's despatch No. 101 of the 24th April, in which Mushir-ed-Dowleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed the Persian claim to the sovereignty of Bahrein. As you will remember, Ala-es-Sultaneh made the proposed substitution conditional on the Grand Vizier's concurrence.

The matter was submitted to the Grand Vizier in Council at Begh-i-Shah on the 14th instant, when his Highness pronounced against the proposed amended note in the strongest terms, declaring that Mushir-ed-Dowleh's note was an admirable one, and that to change it would be giving away the Persian case. British activity in Bahrein, and British pretensions in regard to that island, could not be allowed.

The influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is, I fear, not strong enough to modify the refractory attitude of the Grand Vizier, and I therefore do not propose to press further for the amended note. Such a course might, indeed, lead to the fall of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as I should have to make it clear in any further representations that Ala-es-Sultaneh had himself submitted the proposed text to the Legation before the Grand Vizier had seen it, a fact which Ala-es-Sultaneh fears would have most damaging results for himself.

In the circumstances the wisest course seems to be to return Mushir-ed-Dowleh's objectionable communication. This course commends itself to Ala-es-Sultaneh, who sees in it an escape from the disclosure above indicated, and I have to-day addressed to the Persian Government the note, of which a copy is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 123.

*Sir G. Barclay to Ala-es-Sultaneh.*

Your Highness,

*Tehran, December 19, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to return herewith a communication addressed to Mr. Marling by your Highness' predecessor on the 9th April last. On receipt of this communication Mr. Marling lost no time in pointing out to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh that His Majesty's Legation could not accept it, and his Excellency promised to substitute for it an amended note. During the period since my arrival, I have frequently asked for a fulfilment of this promise, but without any satisfactory result, and it would not be consistent with my duty that I should allow any longer time to pass without recording officially and in writing that the communication which I now return is altogether inadmissible.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2162]

No. 124.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 317.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 19, 1908.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 339 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a certified copy and a translation of the Muin-ut-Tujjar's Firman of 1904.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 124.

*Muin-ut-Tujjar's Firman of 1904.*

(Seal of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah.)

(Translation.)

BE it known that, since by Imperial Firmans and Rescript the Islands of Hormuz, Larek, Bostaneh, Henjam, Kishm, and the places of Minab and Khamer are rented by and intrusted to the care of Haji Agha Mohammed Muin-ut-Tujjar, latterly, according to the investigations made by His Highness Sultan Abdul Mejid Mirza, Sadr Azam (Ain-ed-Dowleh), and in view of the excellent supervision of the former (Muin-ut-Tujjar), in these years the profits and revenues of those places show an important increase, and this has rendered necessary an increase in the taxes and rent, and (since) the term of the lease is not yet completed, and since we have taken into consideration the efforts and services rendered by him, especially in developing the prosperity of the island, therefore, after the necessary inquiries and careful investigation by His Highness the Sadr Azam, it is decreed by us that the above-mentioned islands and places shall remain in the lease and possession of Muin-ut-Tujjar, and his Concessions are protected as in the past, but that he shall increase the former taxes and rent of those places by 12,000 tomans according to the detailed account given below. He shall receive every year 2,000 tomans of that amount, which sum by a separate Firman is assigned to his children.

The remaining 10,000 tomans he must pay to the Government every year.

Therefore from the date of the issue of this Imperial Firman henceforth we intrust the above-mentioned islands and places to Muin-ut-Tujjar, and decree that



absolutely on no account whatever shall a single dinar, except the above-mentioned sums, be demanded of him, and all the above-mentioned places shall be considered as concerning and specially vested in him as in the past without any modification. However much profit accrues from the mines of red oxide and salt and sulphur of those places, and the difference between the assessed and the actual taxation of the above-mentioned places, shall belong to Muin-ut-Tujjar himself. The Governors and Government officials shall have absolutely no right to interfere in the affairs of these places, and must consider the collection of taxes and the administration of the above-mentioned places as intrusted to Muin-ut-Tujjar. We decree that the Mustofis and Secretaries register and deposit in the archives this Imperial Firman, and that all His Majesty's servants according to our command without disobedience or evasion shall hold themselves responsible for (the execution of) the contents of this Imperial Firman.

*Rajab-Lou-il, 1322 (September-October, 1904).*

(In the margin.)

1. This Firman was read when it received the Imperial signature. The Mustofi and Accountant of Fars has read and registered the Imperial Rescript. Let him add the sum of 12,000 tomans, the increase of the taxes and Government receipts of the Islands of Hormuz, &c., accepted by Muin-ut-Tujjar, from this year henceforth to the Budgets of the ports of Fars, and let him write to that effect in the margin of the Imperial Rescript and the above-mentioned sum will be added to these receipts.

(In the handwriting of the Vazir-i-Defter (i.e., the Imperial Secretary of Finance).)

2. Former taxes and imposts of the district of Minab and the islands above detailed, which are leased and intrusted to Muin-ut-Tujjar, viz.: 16,594 t. 9 k. 3 s., as detailed in the text, are included in the Budget of the ports for this year, Lou-il. The sum of 12,000 tomans recently accepted by Muin-ut-Tujjar in virtue of this Imperial Rescript has been included in the accounts for this year, and will be added to the receipts of the Budgets of the ports for future years.

(Seal of Mustofi of Fars.)

*Note.*—Following is summary of detailed account referred to above:—

Taxes of the district of Minab and of the islands mentioned above to be paid by Muin-ut-Tujjar:—

	T.	k.	s.
Original amount .. .. .	16,594	9	3
Increase in virtue of this Firman .. .. .	12,000	0	0
	28,594	9	3
Deduct the sum of 2,000 tomans settled by separate Firman on children of Muin-ut-Tujjar .. .. .	2,000	0	0
Net total to be paid to Persian Government every year .. .. .	26,594	9	3

(On back of Firman, seals of Sadr Azam, Mustofis, and others; in all, nineteen seals.)

This translation correctly represents the sense of the original Firman, but is not a word-for-word translation.

(Signed) W. A. SMART, Acting Vice-Consul.

*Tehran, December 19, 1908.*

[2163]

No. 125.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received January 18, 1909.)

(No. 319.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 23, 1908.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 436 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at

Bushire transmitting a letter from Lieutenant Wilson, in which are embodied that officer's views as regards the desirability of retaining the Indian guard at present employed for the protection of the Oil Syndicate's works in Arabistan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 125.

*Captain Trevor to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 106.)

Sir,

*Bushire, November 24, 1908.*

IN amplification of Major Cox's telegram No. 230, dated the 16th November, 1908, regarding the retention of the Indian oil guard, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Excellency's information, copies of the two communications cited, which have been received from Lieutenant A. T. Wilson in charge of the guard.

I have, &c.  
(In the absence of the Consul-General),  
(Signed) A. P. TREVOR, Captain, First Assistant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 125.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Captain Trevor.*

My dear Trevor,

*November 13, 1908.*

YOUR letter of the 10th November, 1908, regarding the retention of the Indian oil guard under my command, reached me yesterday at Mohammerah, so I have stayed here a day extra in order to answer it. Communication with Bushire from Mohammerah is not possible by wire at present except via Constantinople, so I write instead of wiring.

I think Lorimer's reply and the Syndicate's may be both correct without being mutually contradictory. The Syndicate, I take it, consider that the presence of Indian oil guards at Maidan Minaftun is not now necessary. With that view I deliberately concur. The people as well as the Khans are fairly well-disposed to the Company, and not likely to cause trouble at Maidan Minaftun.

Lorimer, I believe, considers that the guard should be retained in order that it may be utilized should the Company commence operations at Deh Luran, Behbahan, or elsewhere; he also is not convinced that the Khans will remain in their present frame of mind—apparently an abnormal one. I fully agree with him. I have travelled extensively over the whole country from Dizful to Behbahan and from Mohammerah to Hindian, and I believe that, should boring operations be commenced at a new place, obstacles will be met with similar to those encountered at Mamatain, i.e., popular opposition fostered by the avarice of local Chiefs, and that the presence of an Indian oil guard will be almost essential.

Mr. Reynolds comes out again as manager shortly, I believe, and until we hear whether he proposes to commence borings elsewhere than at Maidan Minaftun, I think that, for this reason alone, decision should be deferred.

The laying of the pipe will be a big business, and local opposition may be aroused in places whither the Oil Company have not yet penetrated, but which will be traversed by the line. The line will pass within a few miles of the Ab-i-Gargar, which has been recently crossed, according to report, by raiding parties of the Beni Turuf, bent on annoying Sheikh Khazzal; these parties have robbed the Oil Companies and my mails. See also Ahwaz Vice-Consul's diaries of the 29th October and the 5th November, 1908.

When the operations against the Beni Turuf are concluded, perhaps next month, this aspect of the question will assume different proportions. If they are heavily punished, well and good; if they are successful, it may mean a lot of trouble. For this reason also delay in deciding is advisable.

The Oil Company must, of course, learn eventually to fend for themselves, but meanwhile, until things are more developed, I consider that the guard should be retained, not for present, but for future necessities.

So much for the guard, *quid* guard; it remains to consider its position as my escort. As you are no doubt aware, I have been so confident that no untoward event would occur at Maidan Minaftun that I have left most of the escort there alone, and myself

[1629]

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with three or four men spent twenty-five days in each month travelling all over the country mapping and reporting, and have visited practically every town, village, and valley within 100 miles of Jaru. I am gradually extending my work on these lines, and last month was able to penetrate the unknown Kuhgalu country. Next spring I shall be able to enter the Kuhgalu country again and reconnoitre it thoroughly.

The opening up of relations with the Kuhgalus may, or may not, be of importance, but it is a task for which His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul for Arabistan will find it difficult to obtain time. He has to cover an enormous area, and move with a large caravan, the latter a serious obstacle in the Kuhgalu country.

If, therefore, Government think this work—partly geographical, partly political, partly military in its scope—worth continuing, and if they wish it to remain in my charge, they may consider it an additional reason for retaining the escort, at all events, till the end of next summer (1909).

If it is the 100l. which is bothering them, let the question of housing be shelved till 1909, when it may be conveniently raised again. I inclose an official letter to facilitate this solution, should you desire to adopt it; if not, please destroy.

If any men of the escort get sickly I shall send them to India at once, so there need be no anxiety on the score of their health, and the heat affects me less than it does them.

Lorimer goes on leave at the beginning of next year, and it would be a pity if his departure synchronized with that of the guard.

I have sent a copy of this letter to Lorimer.

Yours sincerely,  
(Signed) A. T. WILSON.

P.S.—If a compromise on the question of the escort is necessary, could you not leave the officers and the cavalry (eight), and transfer the infantry (twelve) to Bunder Abbas? They are willing to serve their three years, of which only one has expired. They are well-behaved, accustomed to the country, and in all respects I think suitable.

A. T. W.

Inclosure 3 in No. 125.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Captain Trevor.*

Sir,

*November 12, 1908.*

WITH reference to my letter dated the 1st August, 1908, asking for 100l. for buildings to accommodate the escort under my command, I have the honour to state that, no reply having been received, I have expended what was necessary on tent floors, reed shelters, stone and mud walls, &c., in order to make men and horses comfortable and to protect them from rain and sun.

2. These shelters are not of a solid or enduring type, but they will last for twelve months, at the conclusion of which, if no decision has been come to regarding the provision of buildings, I will again submit a request for permanent accommodation.

3. In my opinion, therefore, the question raised in my above-quoted letter has ceased to be urgent, and decision may be usefully deferred for some months.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. T. WILSON, *Lieutenant,*  
*In Charge Indian Oil Guards.*

[2165]

No. 126.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 321.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 28, 1908.*

I RECENTLY received two notes from His Highness Ala-es-Sultaneh, complaining that certain Seistan muleteers had been stopped at two points some 40 miles within the frontier of the Persian Province of Kain by Afghan horsemen, who demanded passport fees and took goods and guns from the caravans.

Upon referring the matter to His Majesty's Consul in Seistan, I learnt that it has apparently been the custom of the Seistan muleteers on their annual migration from Seistan to Kain to take a road which leads by a short cut through a corner of Afghan territory in Jowain, in which case they have on previous occasions paid dues to the

Afghans; that in the case referred to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a caravan was travelling by this route when some Afghan sowars came up with it in debatable territory to the south-east of Asperan and took guns and goods from them in lieu of customs and passport dues; and that the two points mentioned, Shaora Shah Beg and Khurmakha, are quite close to the frontier as generally recognized, and are certainly not 40 miles within Persian territory.

Understanding that the Seistan Karguzar had placed himself in communication with the local Afghan authorities, by which means it was hoped that some settlement of the difficulty might be effected, and desiring to avoid being drawn into any discussion as to the precise position of the frontier, I contented myself with communicating to the Persian Government the facts as reported to me.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2166]

No. 127.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 322.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 28, 1908.*

WITH reference to your telegrams Nos. 351, 358, 359, and 360, respecting the proposed communication to be made by the British and Russian Ambassadors in Paris to the Zil-es-Sulten that in case of his return to Persia the British and Russian Governments can no longer hold themselves responsible for his protection in virtue of the assurances given to him on the eve of his departure for Europe in August last, I have received information that the Zil has sent urgent telegraphic appeals to the Shah in consequence.

His Highness telegraphed to the Shah that he would remain in Europe pending the Shah's further orders, but that he was very surprised at the communication made to him by the two Ambassadors, notwithstanding the spontaneous invitation sent to him by His Majesty to return to Persia, and adding that Naib-es-Sultaneh would take His Majesty's orders on the subject.

To Naib-es-Sultaneh, his younger brother, the Zil telegraphed at considerable length, saying that the obstacles placed in the way of his return evidently emanated from Tehran, that the representations of the two Ambassadors were most unexpected, and that his sole object was to live in peace on his estate in Ispahan, which he hoped he would be allowed to do.

The Grand Vizier stated on the 24th December to my Oriental Secretary that the Jelal-ed-Dowleh and Ala-ed-Dowleh had both been given permission to return to Persia, and I understood that they are on their way.

If a new régime is inaugurated under the auspices of Saad-ed-Dowleh, I believe the proposal is that the Zil-es-Sultan should be sent back to Fars. Farman Farma has now refused the appointment that Jelal-ed-Dowleh should be sent to Yezd and Ala-ed-Dowleh to Kermanshah as Governors. All these appointments would be desirable in the interests of order and relative good government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2167]

No. 128.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 323.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 29, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 12th or 13th October last Ain-ed-Dowleh forcibly seized the sum of 317,495 krans from a messenger of the Imperial Bank of Persia, who was carrying specie for the requirements of the local branch of the bank at Tabreez.

Upon being informed of this incident by Mr. Wood, I made an urgent demand on the Persian Government for the repayment of the sum taken, and requested that, should the money be repaid in Tehran, a further sum of 7½ per cent. for transfer charges must be added to the original sum taken.

The money has not so far been refunded, though I have renewed my representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dwelling on the fact, which has become clear



from the reports received by the bank by post from Tabreez, that the Central Government was aware at the time of Ain-ed-Dowleh's seizure of the bank's property.

I have now presented to his Highness a bond for signature which has been drawn up by the Imperial Bank for the whole amount involved, namely, 349,016.35 krans, which includes interest at 12 per cent. up to the 10th instant, 7½ per cent. premium for transfer charges, 650 krans in cash, and the cost of a rifle and ammunition taken from the bank's messenger.

As regards Ain-ed-Dowleh's second seizure of the bank's property, to which your telegram No. 356 of the 17th instant referred, I have to state that I had already on the 15th instant, upon the information supplied to me by Mr. Wood, addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs demanding the immediate restitution of the sum involved. I received, in reply, the promise of the Grand Vizier that the money would be refunded on or before the 24th instant, on which date the money was not forthcoming, and a second undertaking was given me that the matter would be settled on the 28th instant. This likewise has not been fulfilled.

I am continuing to press the Persian Government in the matter, but I cannot hold out much hope that, in their present almost penniless condition, they will be able to pay back the money. I had thought of demanding the attachment of Ain-ed-Dowleh's house in Tehran, but this course does not commend itself to the Manager of the bank, who fears that it might lead to the Government's shelving the claim on to Ain-ed-Dowleh. With a view, however, to preventing Ain-ed-Dowleh from perpetrating a third seizure, I have requested Mr. Wratislaw to inform him that such a step is under consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2168]

No. 129.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 324.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 29, 1908.*

I HAVE kept you informed by telegraph of the steps taken by the two Legations with a view to inducing the Shah to fulfil his pledges and restore constitutional government, and I now have the honour to report them in connected form by despatch.

In my despatch No. 313 of the 15th instant I reported that, on the appearance of the Regulations defining the functions of the new Council, my Russian colleague and I presented a joint Memorandum to the Shah pointing out that the institution of this Council, the members of which were nominated by His Majesty, could not be regarded as a fulfilment of his promises. During the next day or two reports reached the two Legations that the Shah was wavering, and on the 16th instant Saad-ed-Dowleh sent word to my Russian colleague that he had a message from His Majesty which he wished to deliver to the two Representatives, and asking him to fix a meeting for the next day. Saad-ed-Dowleh's record in the past has been, as you are aware, far from stainless, but I fancy that the evil that has been said of him is largely attributable to the spite of his enemies. He possesses, it is true, in a degree unusual even for a Persian the faculty for intrigue, but he is at least a strong man, and for the moment it suits his game to work for the cause of the Nationalists, who distrust him no doubt, but who see in him one of the few men left in the country who would have the courage openly to oppose the palace camarilla. He is, moreover, a native of Tabreez, and would therefore be well qualified to gain the confidence of the Tabreezis.

The meeting took place on the 17th instant at this Legation. Saad-ed-Dowleh said that His Majesty had lately been pressing him to accept office and that he had refused, except on condition that constitutional government should be restored. This alone could save the country. His Majesty was now favourably disposed towards a Parliamentary régime, and had deputed him to ascertain from the two Representatives whether their Governments would make an advance of 400,000*l.* if he followed their advice. M. Sabline and I explained that such an advance could not possibly be made under the existing régime. It would, therefore, not be enough merely to promulgate an electoral law. Parliamentary government must be started, and it would only then be possible to devise the necessary guarantees for the proper spending of the money. Understanding, from some words let dropped by Saad-ed-Dowleh, that the Shah feared that these guarantees might involve the occupation of custom-houses or Persian territory, I said that the two Governments had no such thought, though naturally

proper security for the regular payment of interest would have to be provided. It behoved the Persian Government at once to give M. Bizot every facility for studying the financial position, for thus only would he be in a position to indicate to the two Governments what guarantees were necessary.

All this would take time, and in the meanwhile the Shah would do well to avoid any delay in making his good intentions known to the people, and Saad-ed-Dowleh, although we could not prescribe the details of a suitable Constitution, could count on the support of the two Representatives and our advice, should he require it, in his efforts to induce the Shah to publish the promised electoral law.

Before leaving, Saad-ed-Dowleh intimated to me that numbers of persons were about to seek bast at the Legations, and that the bazaars even might be closed. I strongly deprecated such a course, as likely to lead to disorders and hamper the action of the two Legations.

On the following day Mr. Churchill and M. Baronowski again saw Saad-ed-Dowleh, who said that he had not seen the Shah, but had had our answer conveyed to His Majesty. M. Baronowski handed to him a scheme for a Constitution which he said had been prepared some time ago by a group of Persians. It was made clear by the two dragomans that they could express no opinion as to its suitability for Persia beyond saying that it contained clauses which would evidently require modification in order to make it acceptable to the Nationalists. I have since had reason to suspect that this scheme was prepared at the Russian Legation under M. de Hartwig, and that the electoral law which forms part of it was the one which the Shah had been on the point of promulgating when the sham anti-constitutional demonstration was held at Bagh-i-Shah on the 7th November (see my telegram No. 366).

We had intended abstaining for a time from further representations to the Shah and to leave it to Saad-ed-Dowleh to combat the reactionary influences surrounding His Majesty, but on Sunday, the 20th, events took a turn which seemed to us to render it desirable that we should renew our advice to His Majesty.

For some days ominous reports have been circulated that the foreign Legations were about to be invaded by bastis. I myself received applications for bast from several quarters. Most of the Legations kept their gates carefully closed. The Turkish Embassy was a conspicuous exception, and on the evening of the 20th a small number of Nationalists sought refuge there, their numbers being greatly increased on the following day. So far as I know the only other Legation to give asylum was the Austrian, where a few bastis were lodged for a time in an adjoining house. It is perhaps not irrelevant to mention here that the Austrian Minister has been in close touch with the signatories of many of the recent Nationalist petitions—one Petition, indeed, he is known to have recast for the petitioners; or to recall the fact that the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires was the only Representative who unreservedly supported the Austrian Minister's proposal for a meeting of the Chiefs of Missions to consider the Petition addressed to him as doyen (see my despatch No. 315).

The Shah was believed to be on the point of yielding, and as it was obviously desirable that, if he did so, it should be attributed to the advice of the two Legations rather than to the intervention of the Turkish Embassy, we decided to renew our representations, and to endeavour to obtain from His Majesty such an assurance as would suffice to break up the bast. Accordingly on the 21st Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky sought an audience of the Shah in order once again to urge His Majesty to lose no time in putting in hand the elaboration of the promised electoral law. Failing to obtain an audience, they made their representations to the Grand Vizier, who promised to convey what they had said to His Majesty and to secure an audience for them on the following day. They left his Highness with their impression strengthened that His Majesty was on the point of giving way.

That evening a message reached the Russian Legation from the Shah inquiring whether the two Representatives would give him guarantees if he followed their advice. My Russian colleague consulted with me, and we decided that if at the following audience the Shah would promise to follow our advice Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky would give him verbally the following assurance:—

"So long as His Majesty fulfils sincerely the rôle of constitutional Sovereign, he will have the support and sympathy of the two Representatives of Great Britain and Russia, and the two Representatives will, in case of necessity, and should he seek it, afford him protection for his person. The two Representatives are, however, persuaded that the best guarantees against the danger foreseen by His Majesty would be the re-establishment of the constitutional régime and his sincere co-operation for its good working."

[1629]

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The audience next day took place just after His Majesty had received an important Nationalist deputation, which had come armed with a commentary on the late Constitution prepared by the highest clerical authority at Nejed, and tending to prove Article by Article that the Constitution was in accordance with the precepts of Islam. The dragomans found the Shah apparently very favourably disposed. He said he wished the two Representatives to know that he was resolved to carry out the promises he had made, and that he had all along intended to do so, but he did not wish it to be thought that he was giving way in consequence of people having taken refuge at the Turkish Embassy. His Majesty then asked if the two Legations would be willing to give him the assurance that if he followed their recommendations, the Parliamentary régime would not again result in disorders. Mr. Churchill replied that his requirements as regards a guarantee had been considered by the two Representatives, who had authorized their dragomans to give his Majesty certain assurances. Mr. Churchill then read the assurances to him and he took them down in Persian. He asked that they might be amended so as to include his throne and family, and that some words might be added condemning the late Medjliss. Mr. Churchill replied that they were only authorized to give him the assurances as they stood. His Majesty asked that they should be given him in writing, to which Mr. Churchill replied that this could not be done without instructions from the two Governments to whom we would submit the matter for consideration.

The two dragomans then urged the Shah to lose no time in intrusting the elaboration of the promised electoral law to the new Council. His Majesty said this was what he proposed to do, and he hoped that the new National Assembly and the Senate would be ready to work before the month of Moharrem (begins the 24th January). On the dragomans endeavouring to obtain from His Majesty an undertaking in writing, which would enable us to persuade the bastis to leave the Turkish Embassy, the Shah seemed disposed to consent, but said he must see the Grand Vizier first. His Majesty then withdrew, and a quarter of an hour later Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky were joined by the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The former made great difficulty about the written undertaking, but finally it was arranged, with the consent of the Shah, that an engagement in the sense desired should be signed by the Grand Vizier and deposited with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the inspection of a Delegate of the two Legations. The document was drafted forthwith by the two dragomans, and was to the effect that, on the day after the bastis left the Turkish Embassy, the Shah would issue a Rescript, ordering the preparation of an electoral law by a Committee appointed by His Majesty to form part of the new Council. The promised document was not forthcoming at the appointed hour, but my Russian colleague and I thought it well to inform the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires of the assurance which it had been intended to record. Sadreddin Bey, when I visited him, thanked me for our communication, and promised to bring it to the knowledge of his bastis, who, he said, numbered some 280. He feared, however, they would not be satisfied. At any rate, they would have to be given guarantees for their lives and property. These he was trying to obtain. Sadreddin Bey assured me that, when the first refugees arrived, he felt persuaded that their lives were in danger, and it was not until the next morning, when considerable numbers flocked to the Embassy, that he had any suspicion that it was intended as a political demonstration. I pointed out to him that it would have been a wise precaution to keep his gates closed, in view of the rumours which had been going about as to the imminence of bast, but it is only fair to say that I have since ascertained that the first man who presented himself to the Embassy was generally believed to be in danger of arrest.

On Christmas eve the dragomans again visited the Grand Vizier, to remonstrate with him for the non-fulfilment of his promise. They found his attitude entirely changed from their last interview. There had been a large meeting the day before at the house of Naib-es-Sultaneh, the Shah's uncle, at which had been present the Ministers of State, leading members of the clergy, and other prominent reactionaries, the result of which was to fortify the reactionary influences in the Shah's entourage. These had, I have since heard, been further encouraged by a Report sent by the Persian Minister in St. Petersburg of M. Isvolsky's speech in the Duma, the Report being so worded as to give the impression that the Russian Government did not care whether the Shah followed the advice of the two Legations or not. Possibly, also, Mme. de Hartwig's action in industriously circulating the report that her husband was returning within a fortnight was not without its harmful effect. Anyhow, the Grand Vizier, when the dragomans saw him, showed all his old stubbornness, taking his stand on the ground that no form of Parliamentary government could be made consistent with Moham-medan law.

The absence of any satisfactory and tangible result of our representations is disappointing. We had at one time, I feel convinced, brought the Shah to the point of yielding, but in the end the reactionary influences, centred principally in the persons of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War, proved too strong for us. Whether we shall ever succeed in inducing Mohammed Ali to make a serious effort to fill the rôle of a constitutional Sovereign is in any case doubtful, but it is abundantly clear that we shall never do so until these two men are got rid of, and I trust that the instructions which I am led by your telegram No. 368 of the 28th December to expect will bid us include in our next representations advice to His Majesty of the most cogent kind to dismiss them from his councils.

The situation in Tehran is not free from anxiety. The arrests which have been frequent during the past few days have given rise to a panicky feeling among the Nationalists, and there is no doubt that unless the gates of the Legations were kept constantly closed they would all, especially this Legation, be at once invaded by bastis. The Nationalists have now had recourse to the closing of the bazaars as a demonstration, a step which is never free from risk, but which, in the present case, is fraught with more than usual danger in view of the active reactionary propaganda which the Palace entourage are conducting, and of the large numbers of unpaid troops in the capital who must be longing for an excuse for pillage.

The interests of public order thus make it highly desirable that the Shah should yield without delay, but, apart from this, there is another possibly imminent development which it seems to me very desirable to forestall. I have gathered from persons in the councils of the Nationalists that the agitation in the past few days has served to crystallize the aspirations of the party, and that at no distant date we may find ourselves face to face with a definite demand for the restoration of the old constitutional régime without modification. So far-reaching a demand would add to the difficulties of reconciliation between the Shah and his people, and might also place us in a position where it would be hard to escape an embarrassing responsibility. In all the advice we have addressed to the Shah we have been careful, in order as far as possible to limit our responsibility, to advise generally the restoration of a constitutional régime and to avoid prescribing any details. Should the Nationalists now formulate far-reaching demands, it would not be easy to avoid the responsibility, I do not say of indorsing them, but of striking a balance between the two opposing parties. In these circumstances it seemed to me desirable that if the two Governments were prepared to adopt threatening tactics with the Shah, the moment had come for doing so. I had gathered from M. Sabline that M. Isvolsky, in his interview with the Persian Special Envoy, had used language quite consistent with the possibility of leaving the Shah to settle matters with his own people. Few considerations would weigh more with the Shah than the knowledge that a withdrawal of Russian sympathy was imminent, and I accordingly ventured to suggest in my telegram No. 452 that a threat in this sense should be used.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2169]

No. 130.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 325.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 31, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the month of December 1908.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 130.

No 13.—*Monthly Summary.*

*Tehran.*

*Shah and Constitution.*

ON the 8th December the official Gazette, "Iran," published an article on the new Council of State, the members of which would, it stated, be "elected." The



Regulations for this Council were printed and published on the 11th December. A translation was inclosed in Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 313 of the 15th December. The Shah refused to receive the British and Russian Dragomans on the plea of indisposition, so the two Legations sent a joint Memorandum to the Foreign Minister on the 14th December, saying that the Council of Notables could in no way be regarded as a fulfilment of His Majesty's promises, as its members were not elected by the people. The Shah having in the meantime made overtures indirectly to Saad-ed-Dowleh on the 16th December, the British and Russian Legations entered into *pour-parlers* with that gentleman with a view to the new régime being ushered in under his auspices. He had an interview with the British and Russian Representatives on the 17th December to discuss the matter, and the two Dragomans have seen him several times since. On the 20th December a number of persons, including the leading Mujtehed, Sadr-ul-Ulema, took refuge at the Turkish Embassy. Their numbers increased the following day to 270, at which figure they remain on this date. On the following day the British and Russian Representatives decided to send their Dragomans to the Bagh-i-Shah, in order to impress upon His Majesty the urgency of granting the demands of the people in order to avoid complications. They had an interview with the Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, from whose language they concluded that the Shah was wavering and the moment ripe for an audience, which was arranged for the following day, the 22nd December, when they were received by the Shah. His Majesty declared that he intended to keep his promises and to summon Deputies to a new Assembly. He proposed to intrust the task of elaborating an electoral law to a Select Committee of the Council of State, and hoped that the new National Assembly and Senate would be inaugurated before the beginning of the month of Moharrem (24th February). He would, however, only publish his Decree on the subject after the refugees had left the Turkish Embassy, and he asked for certain assurances from the two Legations. On the whole, the Shah's attitude seemed very promising, but a subsequent interview of over two hours' duration with the Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister proved less successful. The following day the clergy and Notables met at the Naib-es-Sultaneh's house and undid whatever good might have been done by the representations of the two Legations, for it was apparent on the 24th December, when the two Dragomans again saw the Grand Vizier, that the Shah had again gone back upon his word. On the 29th December the principal bazaars were closed, but were entirely reopened two days later. Sani-ed-Dowleh, the first President of the late Assembly, who took refuge at the Italian Legation on the 23rd June, and has lived in retirement at his house ever since, waited on the Shah with a deputation of Nationalists on the 22nd December, and submitted an admirably drawn-up statement of the reasons for which they urged His Majesty to re-establish the Constitution. The Shah received them well, and stated that he intended to do so, but asked them to use their influence to get the refugees to leave the Turkish Embassy. A number of people have also taken refuge at Shah Abdul Azim, and some twenty Nationalists went to the Austrian Legation, but did not remain.

On the whole the situation may be described as somewhat critical, and it is impossible to foretell what difficulties the Shah's obstinacy may not eventually lead to. As it is, the so-called "troops" collected at Bagh-i-Shah are a standing menace to the public. Comparatively trivial acts of violence on their part have been reported of late, but it is to be feared that as time goes on they may get completely out of hand and even attack private houses. The Chief Munshi of His Majesty's Legation was roughly handled by gendarmes outside the Turkish Embassy on the 26th December at 6 P.M. Strong representations are being made on the subject.

A rumour was current during December that the German Minister was endeavouring to obtain the concessions rejected from the German Bank's Concession by the National Assembly. It turns out that Amir Bahadur sounded the German Minister as to the chance of obtaining money for such concessions, but that the German Minister gave him no encouragement. He stated to a member of this Legation that he had advised Amir Bahadur to urge the Shah to follow the advice of the British and Russian Legations.

The Austrian Minister took action at the beginning of December in consequence of the appeal made to him in his capacity as doyen by the Nationalists who sent him a Petition sealed by some 500 to 600 persons. After communicating with all his colleagues, he informed the Nationalists that the British and Russian Legations had been and were still urging the Shah to re-establish the Constitution, and that their action had the sympathy of the rest of the Corps Diplomatique, who were willing, should the opportunity arise, to co-operate with them.

Naib-es-Sultaneh gave a dinner of 150 covers to the European Colony on the 14th December on the occasion of the marriage of his eldest son, Zil-es-Sultaneh, to the daughter of Prince Jelal-ed-Dowleh.

The Shah has invited the Zil-es-Sultan, his son Jelal-ed-Dowleh, and Ala-ed-Dowleh to return to Persia. It will be remembered that a few days before the *coup d'Etat* of the 23rd June, Jelal-ed-Dowleh, Ala-ed-Dowleh, and Serdar Mansur were arrested and expelled. Serdar Mansur, after staying in custody for several months at Firuz Kuh, was brought to Tehran and detained in Amir Bahadur's quarters at Bagh-i-Shah. He was told that he could buy his freedom for 60,000 tomans. He eventually succeeded in obtaining permission to go to his house for a few hours, and availed himself of the opportunity to take refuge at the Russian Legation.

The Russian Legation has used its influence with the Shah to obtain the release of several important political prisoners, including Suleiman Khan, the notorious leader of the Anjumen of "the brothers of the Kazvin gate" and Daood Khan. His Majesty's Legation is now endeavouring to do the same for the ex-Deputy of Tabreez, Musteshar-ed-Dowleh, who is still at Bagh-i-Shah.

(Signed) G. P. CHURCHILL.  
*Oriental Secretary.*

December 31, 1905.

*Tabreez.*

The situation is reported on in a separate despatch.

*Resht.*

On or about the 25th December the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires received alarming telegrams from his Consular Agent at Resht, stating that numbers of Nationalists had taken refuge at his house, and that the local authorities threatened to use force to compel them to leave.

*Meshed.*

1. As reported in last month's summary, the situation in Meshed on the 1st December was serious. The Nationalists gained adherents every hour and the bazaars remained closed. Representations were made to the Governor-General demanding a Constitution and a general amnesty, the latter to be counter-signed by both Consulates-General. The Shah telegraphed to the Governor-General and to the leading reactionaries to use their influence to disperse the Nationalists. The Shah added that the Kerbela letter was a forgery, but the Governor-General was convinced of its authenticity, and has been endeavouring to discover how it reached Meshed. There is no doubt that this letter from the leading priests at Kerbela was in a great measure the cause of the crisis. During the 2nd December almost every man of importance joined the Nationalist party; the Governor-General was much alarmed, and stated that he could not rely on his troops. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General was asked to forward a telegram from the Nationalist leaders to the Shah through His Majesty's Minister. Captain Franklin refused to forward the telegram in original, but said he would send a précis of it. The telegram recounted how the late Shah and the present Shah had both declared that Persia was a constitutional country and they constitutional Monarchs; that since the dispersal of the National Assembly the Shah had not retrieved his promise of a new one, but had been deceived by bogus telegrams, &c., as to the true wish of the people in the matter; that the people earnestly desired a Constitution, and would act in accordance with the orders of the priests of Kerbela until it was granted them. Captain Franklin also received two letters in the same strain. One letter added that the people had taken, and would continue to take, every precaution for the safety and well-being of foreigners as well as of the people generally, and that they desired to maintain the friendly relations existing between themselves and the subjects of other Powers. A copy of this letter was also sent to the Russian Consul-General. In the second letter, the British Government was thanked for their friendly attitude towards the Constitutional party.

On the 3rd December the Governor-General withdrew his guns and pickets from the streets to the neighbourhood of the Ark. Practically all the leading reactionaries,



finding the movement too strong for them, joined the Nationalists, who also received offers of assistance from outlying districts. They seized the telegraph office, but did not interfere with our signallers. The situation remained unchanged until the 7th December, on which day the Governor-General stated that the Shah had telegraphed that he would grant a sort of Cabinet of Justice if the people left the shrine and opened the bazaars. The Nationalists, on the other hand, demanded—

- (1.) A local Assembly;
- (2.) A general amnesty; and
- (3.) A delay of one month in the realization of the revenue.

These demands were communicated to the Shah.

On the 8th December the Governor-General asked Captain Franklin to get him a loan of 1,000*l.* from the Imperial Bank to enable him to pay his troops, but this was refused by the Manager. The Nationalist leaders informed Captain Franklin that a local Assembly had been elected.

On the 9th December Haji Abdul Rahim, one of the Nationalist leaders, visited the Governor-General to secure his consent to the following conditions:—

- (1.) Abolition of the Sarsang (a local grain tax).
- (2.) Non-realization of the revenue till the Persian New Year.
- (3.) The recognition of a local Assembly.
- (4.) General amnesty.

The Governor-General gave his assent to all except (3). There was much dissension among the Nationalist leaders, many of whom were suspected by their followers. On the 11th December the Governor-General informed the Nationalists that he was prepared to remove the Sarsang, dismiss the present Begler Beggi, and grant a general amnesty if the people would disperse. These conditions were eventually accepted and the people dispersed, though the principal Nationalist priests and a representative of each guild remained in the shrine. Haji Abdul Rahim is credited with being the chief cause of this ignominious ending to the movement.

2. Major Sykes returned from his tour on the 23rd December.

#### *Astrabad.*

1. Writing on the 11th December our Agent reported that some 2,000 people assembled in a Mosque demanding the restoration of the Constitution. They were joined by 150 Turcoman horsemen. Their leaders then interviewed the Governor, who declared that he was a Constitutionalist himself. The crowd then dispersed, but the bazaars remained closed.

2. Mr. Miller, who was so active some years ago as Russian Consul in Seistan, has now been transferred from Liverpool to Astrabad.

#### *Ispahan.*

1. Serdar Zafar (late Salar Arfa), who was instrumental in getting detachments of Bakhtiari to go to Tabreez, has been using the favour he thus earned with the Shah to get his brother, Semsam-es-Sultaneh, deposed from the post of Ilkhani of the Bakhtiari. The tribe is now divided into two parties, and trouble may be anticipated. In the event of trouble, the Bakhtiari Road, which has so far remained undisturbed, will probably become unsafe. Semsam-es-Sultaneh was summoned to Tehran by the Shah, but declined to go on grounds of health and because disturbances would occur in the tribe if he went. He was willing to go if His Majesty's Minister would protect him. It is uncertain whether he retains his post of Ilkhani.

2. A telegram was received by the local clergy on the 8th December from the leading reactionary clergy at Tehran, stating that a "Court of Justice" consisting of Princes and Notables had been formed at Tehran.

3. Mr. Grahame, His Majesty's Consul-General, returned from leave on the 23rd December.

4. On the 29th December a demonstration took place against the Deputy-Governor, and some 200 persons attempted to take refuge in the Consulate-General, but were not allowed to do so.

#### *Yezd.*

Reports received from His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul contain details of some fourteen different robberies on the roads leading to Yezd. No road is safe, but the Kerman and Nain Roads are the most unsafe. Posts can only get through by circuitous routes. The robberies to the south are attributed to Lashanis and other Fars tribes, and the Governor of Yezd states that these tribes will continue to commit depredations until a strong Governor-General is appointed to Fars. Whatever be the truth of this, the Governor is responsible for the guarding of the roads in the Yezd district. Unfortunately, he is a tool in the hands of Mushir-ul-Mamalek and Sadr-ul-Olema, and has intrusted the payment of the road guards to them. These two men have been trying to get road guards at half the rate of pay allowed by the Government. In this they have not been successful, and meanwhile many road guards, who have received no pay for seven or eight months, have deserted. The Governor stated to Mr. Blackman that he had appointed one Mohammed Taki Khan to take charge of the Isfahan Road, and Mr. Lemon of the Telegraph Department was told to apply to this man for an escort. When he did so Mohammed Taki Khan merely laughed, and declined to give him an escort. Trade is going from bad to worse, and will soon cease altogether. The town and neighbourhood of Yezd are likewise infested with bands of robbers, who visit the houses of wealthy Parsees, illtreat them, and rob them of all their household goods and money. A young Parsee was recently brought to the Church Missionary Society Hospital with one arm slashed off at the elbow. He had refused to guide a robber band to the house of a wealthy Parsee. The robbers are often masked, but even when the Parsees can identify their assailants they dare not complain for fear of reprisals. In one case, when an appeal was made to the Governor, he declined all responsibility. An Armenian clerk of the Indo-European Telegraph Department was attacked in the street on his way to work by a man who attempted to deprive him of his great coat. The clerk produced a revolver, whereupon his assailant decamped. No soldiers are forthcoming for the duties of guards in Yezd, the present guard of the Imperial Bank of Persia consisting of two so-called artillerymen, unarmed save for one old sabre.

#### *Seistan.*

1. His Majesty's Consul returned from Kain on the 30th October.

2. Mr. Hart relieved Mr. McMurray as local Manager of the Imperial Bank on the 29th October.

3. On the return of His Majesty's Consul from Kain, it appears that there was some question of who should pay the first call. The Russian Consul called on Major Kennion, but was unable to persuade his Military Attaché, Colonel von der Flaas, to come with him, the latter maintaining that Major Kennion should call first, but he apparently changed his mind, as he called alone a week later. The Russian Consul and his Military Attaché are known to be on very bad terms, and no longer live in the same house. Mr. Bravine mentioned to Major Kennion the difficulties of his position with an Attaché so much senior to himself.

4. The Russian Consul has asked for permission from Colonel von der Flaas to visit Robat, offering in return to arrange for permission for any British officer to visit Tashkent. The Government of India are prepared to permit the Russian Military Attaché to visit Robat provided a British officer is allowed to visit Kuskh, and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has concurred in this.

#### *Kerman.*

Telegraphing on the 24th December, His Majesty's Consul reported that for four weeks no posts had arrived at or left Kerman, owing to lack of money and insecurity of the roads.

#### *Kermanshah.*

Semsam-ul-Mamalek, Governor of Kasr-i-Shirin, finding himself unable to fight the Kalhur and Guran tribes, was deposed from his Governorship by them, and threw himself on the mercy of Daood Khan, the Kalkur Chief. Daood Khan holds himself absolutely independent of the local Governor, and fears no one except the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh. The result is that the roads are in the hands of Daood Khan's tribesmen,



and two posts have been robbed. His Majesty's Consul thinks that if Daood Khan is not punished the country will gradually become unsafe for Europeans, and British trade, which is considerable, will suffer. A strong Governor is required. The present Governor is Chief of a local tribe, and is afraid to act against all the other tribes, as he may any day cease to be Governor, and will then be at their mercy. A Russian doctor on his way to Hamadan was recently attacked by tribesmen and compelled to pay a sum of money, but this was restored on his arrival at Hamadan.

#### Shiraz.

The Province of Fars remains in a disturbed condition, and further robberies of caravans are reported. The latter part of November was marked by an agitation, which threatened at one moment to be serious, against the Governor and Ata-ed-Dowleh, Begli Begi. All the principal merchants combined to send a telegram to Tehran, complaining of the impossibility of carrying on their business owing to the widespread disorder prevailing throughout the province. There was also a movement to close the bazaars, but this did not take shape. An inflammatory placard was posted up all over the city, calling on Shirazis to rise against the present régime.

2. Salar-es-Sultan started on the 21st November for Lar. Before leaving he wrote to His Majesty's Consul promising to deal with the absconding debtors of Lar. He has been warned by the Lari Seyyid against visiting Lar. Mr. Bill considers that the latter's movement contains elements of real danger to the little order that remains. It seems certain that a force of Arabs, on its way to join Salar-es-Sultan, was severely defeated by villagers of the district, with a loss of some eighty killed. A Parsee merchant, who is usually well informed, told Mr. Bill that he thought that if Soulat-ed-Dowleh was deposed from the post of Ilkhani of the Kashgai he would refuse to come to Shiraz, and would make the government of the tribe, if not of Shiraz itself, impossible. Soulat-ed-Dowleh had provided much of the ammunition expended in the Shiraz riots last year. He was disposed to keep in with the Government as far as the intrigues of his brother would let him, and had actually paid a considerable portion of the absurdly light revenue of 16,000*l.* assessed on the Kashgais. This he was able to do owing to robberies on an unusually extensive and profitable scale, committed for the most part beyond the limits of Fars by roaming bands of Kashgais last summer. Soulat-ed-Dowleh would probably not discredit himself by an open alliance with the Lari Seyyid, but would give him valuable, though clandestine, support if dismissed from the post of Ilkhani.

3. Sirdar Firouz has left Shiraz, and it is reported that he will not return.

4. Captain Angineur, of the French army, arrived on the 21st November, and left for Bushire on the 25th.

#### PERSIAN GULF.

##### Bushire.

1. M. Mathiew, the Assistant to the Russian Consul at Bunder Abbas, arrived on the 8th November by steamer. He is said to be on leave and travelling as a tourist.

2. The Resident left on the 18th November for Jask in His Majesty's ship "Perseus," and returned on the 24th in His Majesty's ship "Sphinx."

3. The Russian steamer "Tigre" arrived from Odessa on the 20th November, and left next day for Bussorah. M. V. Kadloubowsky, the new Russian Acting Consul-General, and M. Mishtolt, the agent of the Russian Steamship Company, arrived by her.

4. Two large robberies were reported on the Shiraz road in the latter part of November, and travellers from the interior complained of being greatly oppressed and ill-treated by the road guards.

5. Captain Williams, I.M.S., Residency Surgeon and Chief Quarantine Medical Officer in the Persian Gulf, returned from leave on the 25th November.

##### Bunder Abbas.

1. A German, by name M. Rosenfeld, in the service of Messrs. Wonckhaus, of Lingah, who is expressly sent to Bunder Abbas to procure pilgrims for the "Sicilia," landed from that vessel on the 12th November, and put up in the house of Agha Ghulam Ali.

2. There has been keen competition between the agencies of the Hamburg-Amerika line and the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company in the booking of pilgrims for Jeddah, and the rates of from 3*l.* to 4*l.* usually charged were reduced to 1*l.*

3. M. Otto Brandly, a Swiss, arrived from Europe on the 11th November, and left for Kerman on the 17th. He called at His Majesty's Consulate and asked advice as to the safety of the roads, &c., and stated that he was going to Kerman to buy carpets for the "Eastern Rug and Trading Company of New York"; he also stated that he was formerly in the employ of Messrs. Ziegler at Sultanabad. He put up with Agha Ghulam Ali, and kept company with the German, M. Rosenfeld.

#### Lingah.

1. Sadeed-es-Sultaneh, Russian Consular Agent, arrived from Bunder Abbas by the Russian steamer "Tigre" on the 18th November.

2. In compliance with orders received by him from Tehran, the Moin-et-Tujar's agent is building kilns for treating the sulphur ore which is being extracted from the mines at Bostaneh. The agent is also engaged in building some store-houses on the foreshore between Mallow and Bostaneh to store the sulphur prior to shipment. As no drinking water is available near the mines, a reservoir is also being built.

It is reported that the Moin is endeavouring to farm from the Persian Government the Yerd Mountain and the Island of Faroor, in order to work the oxide mines which are said to exist there.

#### Mohammerah.

1. The Sardar Arfa has been successful in his expedition against the Hawizeh tribes. On the 26th November he wrote to say his force had arrived within 8 miles of the Beni Truf, when the latter submitted and accepted his nominees as Sheikhs, and agreed to expel the rebellious Sheikhs.

2. Saif-ed-Dowleh, Governor of Arabistan, spent some time in camp with Sardar Arfa. He returned to Ahwaz on the 15th November.

(Signed) C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché.

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No. 131.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 326.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 30, 1908.*

It would, I think, only cause confusion were I to send you a copy of the reply which, as I telegraphed on the 28th instant, the Persian Government have returned to my request that the Bushire Customs receipts should be affected to the interest on the Bank's advances to the Government. It is so obscurely worded as to be incomprehensible to any one unfamiliar with the details of the transactions to which it refers. A short extract is all I think that I need trouble you with. It runs thus:—

"Besides the amounts already paid to the Imperial Bank, the Customs Administration will pay at Bushire, from this month of December, 12,967 *t.* 7 *k.* 35 *c.*, on account of the interest of the loan of 1901, and from the 21st March, 1909, the Customs Administration will arrange to pay 30,000 tomans a month, so that the Bank may be assured that it would receive 360,000 tomans a year."

As the Imperial Bank will doubtless have explained to you, what is known as the 1901 advance, amounting to nearly half the Government's total indebtedness to the Bank, is already expressly secured on the Customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf, it being agreed in 1901 that the advance should be paid off in monthly instalments of 30,000 tomans. This agreement has not been adhered to, the interest only, amounting to some 13,000 tomans per month, having so far been paid.

You will notice that it is not stated in the present note that the 30,000 tomans a month promised from the 21st March next is to be paid from the Bushire Customs, and there is also another point left in doubt, *i.e.*, whether the sum in question is the interest on the whole of the Bank's advances to the Government, or whether it

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represents the interest and sinking fund of the 1901 portion only of those advances. In the former case, and if the money were to be paid from the Bushire Customs, the Bushire receipts would be affected permanently, or at least until the Bank's advances are paid off or converted. In the latter case the assignment as security of the Bushire receipts would only be tantamount to a re-affirmation of the Agreement of 1901, under which the advance in question was made, and would only tie up the Bushire receipts for some two and a half years.

Supposing that I could get the Bushire receipts expressly affected from the 21st March next to the extent of the 30,000 tomans a month, and that this sum were expressly recognized as being in respect of the interest on the total of the advances, I trust that the Imperial Bank would not reject such an arrangement, which would, I presume, on general grounds, be welcome to His Majesty's Government, merely because some of its interest would be in arrear for the current half year. It is true that this arrangement would involve the Bank foregoing interest on all their advances, except that of 1901, for this half year, i.e., a sum of some 90,000 tomans, which would have to be added to the total of the Government's debt to the Bank, but it is perhaps relevant to mention—and this is a point to which a greater part of the note is devoted to labouring—that during the time that the Bank had the Kermanshah receipts it derived from them a sum of 108,000 tomans in excess of the regular interest, and this sum was used for the extinction of a portion of the debt. The note argues that as during the half year March to September 1908, the Bank received more than its interest, it is reasonable that during the half year September 1908 to March 1909, it should be content with less than the usual half-yearly interest.

I await the answer to my telegram before pressing the Persian Government any further.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

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No. 132.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 327.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 30, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith three Reports on the general situation in Azerbaijan which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez during the month.

It will be seen that the city and immediate neighbourhood of Tabreez are no longer the scene of hostilities between the Royalist and Nationalist parties, and, indeed, it is clear that, despite the alarmist rumours which have been actively spread by the Russian section of the population, the Nationalists have, since their final defeat of Ain-ed-Dowleh's forces within the city, succeeded in maintaining comparative order and securing to the foreign residents an exceptional degree of protection during the recent troubles.

Fighting has continued, since the time of Mr. Wratislaw's last Report, in the direction of Maragha, and in the various encounters which have taken place, the Nationalists have been repulsed, as also in an attack which was made on Ain-ed-Dowleh's camp at Basminch on the 6th December.

During the latter part of this month Ain-ed-Dowleh has been showing considerable activity, and, besides endeavouring to cut off supplies from Tabreez, has been interfering with the postal service between that place and Tehran. I have made a protest to the Persian Government on this subject, and I have reported to you in separate despatches the action I have taken in regard to Ain-ed-Dowleh's seizure of the property of the Imperial Bank of Persia and Rahim Khan's capture of Messrs. Castelli's carpets.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 132.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabreez, November 18, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks on the situation at Tabreez as I find it on resuming the duties of my post:—

Since the retirement of the Shah's forces the town has been entirely in the hands of Satar Khan and Bagher Khan, and the military party. A Rump Enjumen still exists, but it has little or no say in affairs, though meetings are constantly held which any one who pleases attends. Ijlat-el-Mulk informed me last week that he had resigned his position as Governor, finding it untenable in view of the arbitrary conduct of Bagher Khan; but I understand that he still retains the functions of a figure-head, and that Satar Khan intervened to patch up a truce between him and Bagher Khan. There have been rumours of dissensions and rivalry between Satar and Bagher, but I do not think that the friction amounts to much at present.

Order is fairly well maintained within the town, indeed the quarter inhabited by the Christian and foreign element seems as safe as ever it was, and I notice no change in its aspect. Foreigners generally speak with gratitude of the attitude towards them of the Nationalists throughout the troubles, and, with the exception of the Russians, show no apprehension for their personal safety.

The only ground on which serious exception can be taken to the conduct of the Nationalists is their practice of levying forced contributions on the richer native members of the community, whose reluctance to pay up is overcome by threats of assassination, and, in some instances, by the infliction of corporal punishment. Money has, however, to be found somehow for the payment of the troops, who, in the case of natives, receive from 2 to 6 krans a-day each, while volunteers from the Caucasus get as much as 10 krans. Receipts are given for such contributions, but it is highly improbable that accounts will ever be rendered or that the leaders refrain from keeping a considerable percentage in their own pockets.

The opportunity afforded by the lull in active operations has been used to revictual the town, and very considerable stores of grain and flour are now stocked in the Ark for future emergencies. For these supplies the Government share in this year's crops has been commandeered from the neighbouring country districts, as well as much of the grain due to the landlords. Here again receipts are given for what is taken.

These exactions naturally embitter the persons concerned, and the sufferers grumble a good deal in secret at the existing state of things. It is obvious that it cannot go on indefinitely, for Tabreez is living on its capital, and when that is exhausted it is difficult to see how the local "army" is to be maintained.

There is considerable distress in the villages which were devastated by the Karadagh and Maku horsemen. Most of their cattle were driven off by these brigands, and, consequently, many farms remain unploughed and unsown, a dismal prospect for next year.

Trade is being resumed on the Julfa road, but merchants still show a certain timidity in intrusting their consignments to it. This is still more markedly the case in the trade with Europe via Khoi. The reluctance which undoubtedly exists to engage in commercial operations is, however, due to fear, not of the Nationalists, but of the Shah's friends.

The attitude of my Russian colleague throughout the disturbances has not unreasonably caused him to be regarded with the greatest dislike and suspicion by the Nationalists. Impartial Europeans, to say nothing of natives, seem convinced that he all along acted in the interests of the reactionary party, while professing the rôle of honest broker; and his colleagues are very sore at the cavalier way in which he has treated them. He is, by conviction, a fervent upholder of the right divine of Kings to govern wrong, and considers passive obedience to be the first duty of the subjects, even of so unestimable a monarch as the Shah of Persia. Personal considerations too render him a warm partizan of the old régime. Prior to the constitutional movement, the Russophile proclivities of the then Valiahd and the subservience of the Karguzar, Haji Mufakhir-ed-Dowleh afforded him a very privileged position in Tabreez, which he certainly abused, to the detriment of the numerous Persian subjects having business transactions with Russians. Since then he has lost most of his influence, and is now, I believe, doing all in his power to bring on a Russian intervention as the only means of



restoring his prestige. His own reports on the situation are much exaggerated, and he, in addition, inspires some of the highly coloured telegrams sent to certain Russian newspapers for which subordinate members of his staff act as correspondents.

The concentration of Russian troops at Jalfa which is now going on points to the conclusion that his efforts are likely to be successful. What would happen in that case it is impossible to predict. The more militant Nationalists declare that they would resist the entry into the town of any Russian force, however strong it might be, but it is doubtful if they could induce many men to follow them in so hopeless a course.

Ain-ed-Dowleh has, as yet, shown no sign of moving from his position at Basminch against the town, though he has received reinforcements. It is not likely that he could do much unaided against the Nationalists.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 132.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 21.)  
Sir,

*Tabreez, November 23, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, the translation of a letter which has been addressed to my colleagues and myself by the Enjumen of Tabreez, drawing attention to the misdeeds of the Royalists and to their own correct attitude towards foreigners, and expressing the expectation that we shall let the correct facts be known. I have, of course, returned no answer to this communication, which was doubtless addressed to me in connection with their telegrams to London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, referred to in my telegram No. 66.

The Nationalist cause has scored two notable successes during the past week by the acquisition of Maragha and Marend. "Fedais" have been gathering in Maragha for some days, and their action was finally prompted by the approach of the son, the Chardowli Chief Selim Khan Bahadur-es-Sultaneh, appointed by the Shah Governor of the town, who was coming to take possession of the place on behalf of his father. He returned to his own place round about Sainkaleh on receiving the news of the Nationalist occupation. Bahadur-es-Sultaneh had orders from the Shah a month ago to join Ain-ed-Dowleh with all his forces, but he declined to do so, on the pretext that his own country was being attacked by Shahsevend raiders.

The Nationalists have made a large haul of arms and ammunition at Maragha, but I doubt if they will get any great acquisition of strength from the willing or unwilling adhesion of the inhabitants, who have for long enjoyed comparative peace and good government under the influence of the family of a local Notable, Muzaffer-ed-Dowleh. The latter is at Tehran in the Shah's power, and the Maragha people based their previous refusal to declare for the Constitution on the ground that such a course would get their patron into trouble.

Sujai Nizam, son of the late lamented Sujai Nizam and inheritor of his title, fled from Marend to Maku on the 21st instant after a feeble resistance. His departure should put the whole of the Russian road in the hands of the Nationalists, and I think that they know their own interests sufficiently well to keep it open for trade. I will give them a hint to this effect.

Owing to the irregularity of the post I have no news of what is going on at Salmas, beyond the report that the local Enjumen has been re-established. Nor are any precise details to hand concerning the murder of Ikbal-es-Sultaneh, the Maku Chief, and there seems even to be some small doubt as to whether the people of Tabreez were not premature in their rejoicings on this event.

A Delegate has gone from Tabreez to Urumia to incite the people to declare for the Constitution.

The situation in Tabreez itself remains the same. Satar Khan makes a great parade of his Turkish medal, and he and Bagher Khan have had medals with their own effigies struck at Constantinople, of which samples reached Tabreez last week.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 132.

*Enjumen of Tabreez to Consul-General Wratislaw.*

(Translation.)

*November 20, 1908.*

ACCORDING to nature's law all human beings are in relations with, and should be beloved by, each other. This point is nowadays attracting the attention of all the diplomats on the earth, and they endeavour to enforce the law of civilization and freedom of their respective nations in order to protect the rights of mankind.

Unfortunately in this progressive era the Persian Government is influenced by a sudden negligence, and a disgusting enmity is produced between the noble people of Azerbaijan which will have an evil result. Notwithstanding all the loss inflicted on the interests and rights of mankind, it is impossible to familiarize the hearts of the Royalists with the just demands of the nation and to turn them to peaceful courses.

They are still preparing to commence hostilities, gathering troops, stopping the supply of food to the oppressed nation, and rendering the roads unsafe. You the Representatives of the foreign nations witnessed how, during the last five and a-half months, the Government functionaries and savage horsemen did every kind of wrong to the life, property, business, commerce, and honour of the nation, and afforded an example of every kind of wickedness which is quite contrary to the order of the world.

Despite these circumstances, it is happily the case that from the beginning of the Tabreez disorders till now no one of our foreign brethren has suffered at the hands of Liberals and Constitutionalists.

If you are inclined to help the civilized world, you will assuredly not refrain from giving correct information under these serious circumstances till the people of Azerbaijan respect the righteousness which is yours.

Inclosure 4 in No. 132.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 23.)  
Sir,

*Tabreez, December 2, 1908.*

SINCE the date of my last Report the Nationalist cause has received a rather serious set-back at Maragha and Binab. Both these places were occupied without difficulty by a force sent from Tabreez, which only just anticipated the Chardowleh horsemen coming from the west. Besides exacting the usual pecuniary contributions from friends and foes alike, the Nationalists indulged at both places in excesses which fortunately have not hitherto been the rule, and at Binab the inhabitants rose against them and drove them out of the town with considerable loss. The Chardowlehs seem to have helped, but details are lacking, and the affair is given as little publicity as possible. The evacuation of Maragha immediately followed, but it is probable that an effort will be made to recover that place.

The two leaders of the expeditionary force were imprisoned on their return to Tabreez and one, I hear, bastinadoed.

From Salmas, too, fighting is reported between Nationalists and Makulis. The former receive considerable assistance from Armenian "fedais," who are strong in the district which, previous to the constitutional régime in Turkey, they made their headquarters for incursions into Ottoman territory.

An Enjumen was elected nearly a fortnight ago at Urumia on the initiative of Muhteshem-es-Sultaneh, but it is a colourless Assembly, and not likely to last for long.

According to the latest news from Urumia the Turkish troops continue to hold their positions on Persian territory.

Nationalists' accounts of the incident at the Derediz Road station do not at all coincide with the original Russian story. In a letter addressed by the Enjumen to my Russian colleague, and published in the local "Enjumen" newspaper, they declare that the chief of the station, a Russian subject named Mirza Nourouz Ordubadi, without provocation, shot down one of the Nationalist road-guards, and they request M. Pokhitonow to have Mirza Nourouz brought here for an inquiry to be held. One of my gholams, who recently passed the Derediz on his way to and from Julfa, brought me back the same account.

The only road stations now held by the Russians are those at Julfa and Yam  
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(between Sofian and Marend). The main station at the Aji Bridge outside Tabreez has remained vacant since the fight there, in spite of the request of the Enjumen that it should be reoccupied, and their offer to place a guard at the bridge for the protection of the employés.

An article appeared in the last number of the "Enjumen" referring to the arrival of Russian troops at Julfa, and stating that, though it was not believed that Russia intended to intervene, the people were prepared to resist any attack.

Persons who have recently visited Basminch report the situation of Ain-ed-Dowleh's troops to be very bad. Many of them are sick, and they suffer much from cold and privation. Winter has set in early this year, heavy snow has fallen already, and the weather is very cold. It seems that unless an attack is made at once on Tabreez it will have to be postponed till the spring. Ain-ed-Dowleh is again reported to have resigned, and to have been succeeded by Vezir Nizam. A deputation called on him last week with a Mollah from Kerbela bearing a message in favour of the Constitution, purporting to be from the Kerbela Mujtehed, to which he replied expressing pro-Nationalist sentiments. He certainly appears lukewarm in support of the Shah's cause.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

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No. 133.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1909.)*

(No. 330.)

Sir,

*Tehran, December 31, 1908.*

I NOTICE from Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 309 that M. de Hartwig fears that unless the two Powers hold out hope to the Shah of financial assistance His Majesty may turn to Germany.

I do not doubt that the Shah, in his urgent need, has applied to the German Legation, as he has, I know, to the French Minister, with a view to obtaining an advance, but Count Quadt has denied in the most positive terms to one of my staff that he has given any encouragement to such applications; and it does not seem likely that any Power, however desirous to get a stake in the country, should adopt as a means to this end that of assisting an autocracy whose days are in all probability numbered. There have lately, it is true, been rumours that the German Minister was in negotiation for various Concessions in return for a loan; and the other day Moin-ut-Tajjar asserted to Abbas Kuli Khan that Ifthar-ut-Tajjar, the representative of Hajji Ali Akbar and Co. was negotiating for a German group, who were offering 60,000l. for the Sirri Red Oxide Concession. I have been unable to obtain any confirmation of the rumours; indeed, the person through whom Count Quadt was said to be dealing has declared to the Russian Legation that there was no truth in them. With regard to Moin-ut-Tajjar's story, improbable as it was, I thought it well to mention it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, reminding him of the caveat I had put in in reference to the Sirri Concession, and his Highness declared that there was no truth in the story, and added that he would never allow a Concession to be given to Germany or any other nation but Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. Ala-es-Sultaneh's influence at Bagh-i-Shah is rather a broken reed to trust to, but I have little doubt that were he to hear of anything of the kind he would take care to give us a warning.

The Persian Government is at this moment at its wits' end for money, and would doubtless dispose of any Concession it had to offer for what it would fetch, but in the present condition of the country it would be difficult to find a market. I gather from the Russian Bank that they have been assured by Mendelsohn's and the Dresdner Bank that they will not embark in any financial venture in Persia. In these circumstances Persian Concessions are not likely to find a ready market in Berlin. My informant attributes the constantly recurring stories of German efforts to obtain Concessions in Persia to the attempts of persons who are on the look-out for a commission and who have a vague idea that Germany is seeking a stake in the country, to dispose of Concessions which are for the most part unpractical and valueless. Such a one was mentioned among the recent rumours referred to above, viz., the Petroleum Concession in Ghilan, an undertaking which could not possibly be profitable except in Russian hands.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[2190]

No. 134.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)*

(No. 12.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 5, 1909.*

I ASKED M. Isvolsky to-day if he had received any information from M. Sabline as to the Persian Government desiring to obtain the services of German officers as instructors to the Persian army. His Excellency said that he had heard nothing on this subject; but he knew that the Special Envoy, who had recently been here, was now in Berlin, and he had asked the Russian Ambassador in that capital to ascertain if possible what the Envoy was saying and doing. The Envoy had left St. Petersburg dissatisfied with his visit. He complained that he had not been received by the Emperor, and that he had been scolded by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He would doubtless endeavour to obtain a loan at Berlin, or something to carry back with him, as he could not well return to his country empty handed.

M. Isvolsky added that his Memorandum regarding the measures which, in his opinion, the British and Russian Governments might take in regard to the general situation was nearly ready, and he hoped in a day or two to be in a position to communicate it to me. I told him that I should be very glad to receive it, as I was anxious to forward it for your examination as soon as possible.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[2201]

No. 135.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)*

(No. 23.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 11, 1909.*

IN view of the reports which Sir G. Barclay had been good enough to repeat to me regarding the situation both at Tabreez and Ispahan, I called on M. Isvolsky yesterday and gave him the substance of what I had received. I pointed out to his Excellency that the country seemed rapidly to be approaching a state of disintegration, and that it was of the highest importance that the two Governments should come to some understanding as to what measures should be taken to endeavour to prevent the movement from extending. It was believed that the Shah was about to issue a rescript establishing a Constitution, but I would be grateful if he could give me the Memorandum which he had been elaborating, so that my Government might examine without loss of time the proposal which he had formulated. He said that owing to the Christmas holidays he had been unable to finally conclude the Memorandum, but that he hoped to give it to me at the latest on the 13th instant. I have since written a letter to M. Isvolsky, begging him, if possible, to let me have the document even before that date. M. Isvolsky observed that the situation in Persia was certainly most disquieting; semi-independent or practically independent Governments were being established both at Tabreez and at Ispahan, and the authority of the Shah seemed to be in process of dissolution. He much doubted if the mere announcement of a Constitution would be sufficient remedy to the very grave condition of affairs, and it seemed to him to be essential that the Central Government should be strengthened and furnished with means to pay the troops, otherwise the movement would spread and we should see a series of independent Administrations or Governments established throughout Persia, which would mean chaos and anarchy, and a situation would arise which might force both the Russian and British Governments to intervene for the protection of their subjects and of their interests. He need not reiterate his oft-repeated assurances that the Russian Government had not the slightest desire to intervene; it would be against their interests to do so, but circumstances might prove too strong. He was glad to say that although Sattar Khan was assuming the rights of an independent authority, the Julfa-Tabreez road was open, caravans were passing unmolested, and hitherto no Russian subject had been assassinated or maltreated. Oriental countries had a curious way of emerging from situations which appeared hopelessly entangled, and usurpers of authority suddenly became its loyal supporters; still the situation was critical, and he would be glad to hear what were the views of His Majesty's Government. He was glad to hear that the Saad-ed-Dowleh had been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was inclined to co-operate with the two Legations.



I told his Excellency that though matters might possibly have gone so far that the proclamation of a Constitution might not allay the agitation, still there could be no objection to still insisting on its issue, as it might do some good. I agreed with him that the mere promise or enactment even of a Constitution would not be a universal cure; still it was a step in advance. He did not seem to agree entirely, and thought that the principal need was to strengthen and reform the Central Administration, and supply it with some financial assistance under proper guarantees.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[2250]

No. 136.

*Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)*

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir,

Brussels, January 15, 1909.

I RECEIVED yesterday a note from the Ala-ed-Dowleh, saying he was in Brussels and would like to see me, and he came to luncheon to-day.

His name is probably well known at the Foreign Office, for he was sent as Governor-General of Fars, where I first met him, to receive Lord Curzon at Bushire, and his attitude in regard to the ceremonial of the reception was largely responsible for the Viceroy's refusal to land there. In the early days of the Persian constitutional movement he was, I fancy, regarded as a reactionary, but was exiled by the present Shah after the dismissal of the Nasir-ul-Mulk, and then recalled on reaching the Caspian, and he has now for the past few months been once more a fugitive in several European countries from the restored despotism of the Palace camarilla. He is a Kajar, a soldier, and a strong, vigorous administrator of the old, rather bloodthirsty type, quick to crucify or brick up alive highway robbers and troublesome nomads, and is, I think, personally known to Sir Charles Hardinge, during whose residence in Persia he did good service, if my memory serves me right, in Arabistan, and who will probably concur in the above estimate of his character.

He told me that he had just been requested by the Shah to return to Tehran, in order, as he believed, to be offered a high Government post, but that he was very unwilling to obey the summons, as even if he could feel personally secure, it was impossible for him to render useful service to a Government devoid of money or troops, and he asked what I myself should advise. I said that I had been too long out of touch with Persian affairs to be able to express an opinion worth having, but that it seemed to me hopeless to try to help the Shah so long as His Majesty persevered in his present fatal course.

As regards the existing situation, he anticipated that Ispahan would almost at once become the scene of a bloody conflict between opposing parties of Bakhtiaris, the tribe, which had hitherto been kept loyal by bribes, being now divided, the majority on the side of the Shah, and a large minority on that of Samsem-es-Sultaneh, with whom were Agha Nejefi and the other religious leaders in Ispahan. The whole south would, he thought, follow the example of that city, beginning with the great Kashgai tribe in Fars, and in the north he heard the nomads of Khamseh (the province south-east of Azerbaijan) had now risen, whilst Meshed and Asterabad were seething, and the Ala-ed-Dowleh lay helpless before Tabreez. I asked if it were true, as I had seen in a newspaper telegram from Constantinople, that the Ulema of Nejefi had anathematized the Shah, and he said he had no doubt of it, as their present Chief Mujtehed, Agha Mullah Kazim, had always been a decided Nationalist. He also told me that the Zil-es-Sultan was still in France, having received a private warning that if he carried out his intention of returning to Persia he would probably be assassinated, and that all the chief capitals of Europe now contained Persian political refugees, there being 300 of them in Paris alone.

I asked if, in his opinion, the re-establishment of the Medjliss would restore peace to Persia, as it had seemed to me that that body in the day of its power had been rather impatient and unruly, and had sought to wrest the executive authority from the Government, instead of being content to act either as a check or a spur upon it. He thought a new Assembly, if convoked before it was too late, would profit by the experience and errors of the past, and would prove more conciliatory. The widespread desire throughout Persian society for the restoration of the Medjliss was due, not to any abstract preference for a Constitution or Parliamentary ideal—that feeling was confined to a

comparatively small class—but to the belief that without it there was no security for individuals, for personal liberty, or for property against a Government which had abdicated all its former functions, except that of extorting money from rich merchants (such, for instance, as the Amin-es-Zarb), or, failing them, from whomever it could. The majority of Persians wished not to abolish, but to limit, the Shah's power, which had been so oppressively used, and they believed that an effectual restraint on its abuse would be provided by the continuous existence, side by side with it, of the Medjliss. The deposition of the Shah and the succession of his infant son under a Regency might, by aggravating the reign of anarchy, make matters even worse than they already were.

A Persian's views on public questions are peculiarly liable to be coloured by personal considerations, and the ancient tag, *Quid leges, sine moribus*, is peculiarly applicable to all Persian constitutional experiments, but I have thought that the opinions expressed by so creditable a specimen of his countrymen as the Ala-ed-Dowleh on the present state of Persian affairs might be worth reporting to you, as a supplement to the much fuller and more trustworthy information which you regularly receive from Tehran.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. HARDINGE.

[2443]

No. 137.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)*

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, January 18, 1909.

KARUN irrigation.

Information reached me yesterday to the effect that a Concession for the irrigation of the Karun had been obtained by a Dutch Syndicate. Upon questioning the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, his Excellency admitted that an option for two years for the Concession, details of which are to be the subject of subsequent negotiation, has just been accorded to the late Dutch Minister here, who is now in Europe.

Until I told M. Sabline he knew nothing of this, though the Russian Legation is in charge of Dutch interests.

I shall defer reminding the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sir C. Spring-Rice's note to the Persian Government, copy of which was inclosed in his despatch No. 277 of the 7th November, 1906, until I have seen a copy of the document supplied to M. de Sturler, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised me.

[2454]

No. 138.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)*

(No. 34.)

Sir,

Paris, January 17, 1909.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 13 of the 9th instant, I informed the Zil-es-Sultan that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran would make arrangements for his box deposited at the Legation to be brought back to Europe by Mr. Churchill, and I inquired whether he wished to have the box insured.

I am now in receipt of a letter from the Zil, copy of which I have the honour to inclose herein, inquiring whether it would be best to have the box conveyed by Mr. Churchill or forwarded after having been insured. In the latter case, His Royal Highness inquires the approximate cost of the insurance.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 138.

*Zil-es-Sultan to Sir F. Bertie.*

89 bis, Promenade des Anglais, Nice,  
le 15 janvier, 1909.

Excellence,

J'AI reçu votre lettre à Nice. Je connais très bien Mr. Churchill, attaché à la Légation anglaise à Téhéran, et j'ai pleine confiance en lui pour la mission que vous

[1629]

2 A



voulez lui confier. Seulement, je crains que Mr. Churchill n'hésite à se charger d'une pareille mission, car le coffret en question, outre les titres de rente, renferme des bijoux d'une valeur approximative de 100,000L. Voyez-vous même s'il est préférable de confier le coffret à Mr. Churchill ou de l'expédier en l'assurant? Dans ce cas-là, pouvez-vous me dire à peu près ce que je devrai payer pour l'assurance?

Veillez, &c.  
(Signé) ZILLI SULTAN.

[2489] No. 139.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 19.)*

Sir, *India Office, January 18, 1909.*  
IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, I am directed to state that Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the telegram which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran respecting the transfer of the lien of the Imperial Bank of Persia from the customs receipts of Kermanshah to those of Bushire.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[2557] No. 140.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)*

(No. 48.) *Tehran, January 19, 1909.*  
(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION at Ispahan.

His Majesty's Consul-General, in a telegram No. 15, dated to-day, reports that the Bakhtiari have arrested the official delegated by the Persian Government to collect taxes, and are trying to raise a loan of 20,000 tomans on this security. They are provisioning the town and are erecting fortifications. Some 150 Bakhtiari are reported to have left the city on the 17th instant for Murchikhar, and the number at present in Ispahan is about 1,500. Mr. Grahame adds that information which he has received tends to confirm the opinion that the Bakhtiari from Tehran will not fight those at Ispahan.

[2553] No. 141.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)*

(No. 49.) *Tehran, January 19, 1909.*  
(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION.

I received a visit this morning from a leading Member of the late Parliament, who came to see me on behalf of some Tehran Nationalists. He said that they heard that the establishment in Persia of some measure of control was being contemplated by the British and Russian Governments, and he explained that his party desired either that the two Governments should only intervene so far as to secure the re-establishment of the Constitution, by which good government could not of course at once be secured, but which would go half-way to gain it, or that England and Russia should leave the Shah to settle matters with his people, and abstain from all intervention. He said that the Nationalists realized the necessity of foreign advisers, and that next Medjliss, which would act with more wisdom than the last, would call them in; but what the Nationalists particularly desired to avoid was the imposition of foreigners by the two Governments.

In reply, I said that the restoration of a constitutional régime alone had been aimed at in the representations made by the two Representatives, and that as these had now failed, further representations, and of the nature of which I could tell him nothing, were now being considered by His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government.

[2564]

No. 142.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)*

(No. 50.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.  
KARUN irrigation.

*Tehran, January 19, 1909.*

I have received a copy of the document mentioned in my telegram No. 47 of yesterday from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The terms of the document are vague, and it merely states that a two years' option for a "Concession d'exploitation à Ahwaz" is given by it to the late Dutch Minister.

I have asked Saad-ed-Dowleh to keep me informed, and have reminded his Excellency verbally of Sir C. Spring-Rice's note to the Persian Government.

[1955]

No. 143.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 19, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 14th instant respecting the erection of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud, on the Tehran-Meshed line, in which Viscount Morley suggests that the Russian Government should be asked whether they have any objection to such a course, pending the conclusion of the arrangements for the exchange of the Meshed-Tehran and Khaf-Nasratabad telegraph lines.

In reply, I am to state that Sir E. Grey is of opinion that if the Russian Government are, as has been stated, really anxious for the erection of the additional wire, it will be an inducement to them to hasten on the exchange of the two lines. Moreover, the erection of the wire in question must undoubtedly be regarded as more than the maintenance of the existing Concessions, and he therefore considers that the subject should remain in abeyance until the questions of the exchange of the telegraph lines and of the duration of our Concessions have been settled. It will then be possible for the Russian Government themselves to erect the second wire.

Sir E. Grey would deprecate the course suggested in your letter under reply, and would propose, subject to Lord Morley's concurrence, to send copies of the correspondence to Sir A. Nicolson with instructions, of which the draft is inclosed,\* to explain the situation to M. Isvolsky, and to intimate that His Majesty's Government are anxious to arrive as soon as possible at a settlement of the other questions, especially those of the Arabistan line and of the renewal of Concessions, when they hope to be able at once to transfer to the Russian Government the Tehran-Khanikin line, and to effect the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[2141]

No. 144.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 54.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.  
SITUATION in Persia.

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

With reference to the official communiqué which M. Isvolsky wishes to make to the press (see your telegram No. 18 of the 17th instant), I have drawn up the following, which you might suggest to him:—

"With reference to statements which have recently appeared in the press, it is officially announced that the British and Russian Governments do not contemplate any departure from the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Persia laid

down in the Anglo-Russian Agreement. The two Governments are agreed that the establishment of representative government in a form which will satisfy the needs of the Persian people is the sole means of restoring order, and, as their interests are adversely affected by the continuance of the financial and administrative anarchy at present prevailing, they are exchanging views as to the renewal of friendly advice to the Shah on the subject."

[2140] No. 145.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

FINANCIAL advance to Persia.

Reference is to your despatch No. 285 of the 22nd October.

Apart from other considerations, His Majesty's Government cannot even consider the question of an advance to Persia before M. Bizot's financial report has been received. Does it appear probable that he will be able to furnish it before very long?

[1753] No. 146.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

TRANSFER of the lien of the Imperial Bank of Persia from Kermanshah to Bushire customs.

See your telegram No. 40 of the 13th instant.

His Majesty's Government regard the proposal as a provisional one, and expect that further payments in the future will be provided for by the Persian Government. In accepting the proposal, you should warn the Persian Government of this.

Seeing, however, that we shall be free to raise the question again a year hence, in any case, it is not necessary to make this stipulation if you think that by doing so we should be endangering the arrangement. If at the expiration of the year it be considered advisable that the Bushire customs should not be further mortgaged for the bank's debt, the extra 13,000 will have to be collected at some other port, where, for the purpose of encashing the necessary sum, an official of the bank would have to be stationed.

[2663] No. 147.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 22.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

ON the 11th instant Count Benckendorff handed to Sir C. Hardinge the telegram, of which a copy is inclosed, from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran to M. Isvolsky, relative to the threat of the Nationalists at Tabreez to cut the telegraph wires of the Indo-European Telegraph Company in the event of the telegraph taxes not being paid to them.

M. Isvolsky wished to know what, in my opinion, should be done if the threat were carried out.

Sir C. Hardinge replied to Count Benckendorff's inquiry that, so far, I had not considered such a contingency, which, it was to be hoped, would not occur.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

Inclosure in No. 147.

*M. Sabline to M. Isvolsky.*

(Télégraphique.)

*Téhéran, le janvier, 1909.*

D'APRÈS une communication de la Compagnie du Télégraphe Indo-Européen, l'Endjumen de Tabriz lui aurait notifié que les fils télégraphiques seraient coupés ce soir même, si les sommes perçues pour la transmission des télégrammes locaux et dues au Gouvernement du Schah n'étaient pas remises à l'Endjumen.

Ces sommes représentent 3,000 roubles par mois, tandis que les pertes résultant d'une interruption du service atteindraient 5,000 roubles par jour.

Après entente avec mon collègue de Grande-Bretagne, nous avons chargé nos Consuls à Tabriz de notifier, par le moyen qu'ils trouveraient le meilleur, à l'Endjumen que pareil acte de sa part serait une provocation évidente à l'adresse des Puissances à cause de l'importance internationale de la ligne en question, et qu'il devrait attendre quelques jours jusqu'à la solution de cette affaire par les Légations avec le Schah.

Avant d'entamer des négociations avec le Schah à ce sujet, nous avons décidé avec mon collègue de demander des instructions à nos Gouvernements, d'autant plus que les revenus de la ligne servent de garantie à l'emprunt anglais.

[2664] No. 148.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 23.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

THE Russian Ambassador spoke to Sir C. Hardinge on the 11th instant on the subject of the possibility of M. de Hartwig's return to Tehran, and said that he had written at great length on the matter to M. Isvolsky by his last messenger. His Excellency felt convinced that M. de Hartwig would not be allowed to return, but inquired what Sir C. Hardinge thought should be done.

Count Benckendorff was told in reply that the return of M. de Hartwig to Tehran could not fail to be interpreted as a renewal of the unfortunate situation which had prevailed during last summer, and it would be absurd to imagine that he would change his ways. As his Excellency had written quite recently on the subject, it might be better to await developments.

Count Benckendorff said that he felt convinced that all the new names would be made on the Russian new year, three days later, and that it would then be possible to see whether M. de Hartwig had been moved elsewhere. It was therefore better to wait.

I am of opinion that if M. de Hartwig returns to Tehran, nothing will persuade the Shah that Russian sympathies are not with him and his creatures, and against everything else in Persia. M. de Hartwig and Colonel Liakhoff stand for this in the public mind in England also. If it had not been for their action in the summer, there would not have been even a pretext for the agitation which endeavours have been made to create. All that I desire is to be able to defend M. Isvolsky and the Russian Government against these attacks. It is because I can do so with more effect if M. de Hartwig is removed, and could do so with crushing effect if Colonel Liakhoff were removed, that I attach importance to these points. I wish to defend M. Isvolsky because I have been impressed by the moderation, restraint, and adherence to the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention which he has shown since the Persian *coup d'état* of the summer, under very trying and provocative circumstances.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[2680] No. 149.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 24.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

THE Russian Ambassador called at this Department on the 13th instant and handed to Sir C. Hardinge the telegrams copies of which are inclosed, relating to affairs at Ispahan.

[1629]



Sir C. Hardinge told Count Benckendorff that, according to the information which I had received, the Sam-Sam and his Bakhtiari had declared themselves on the side of the Nationalists at Ispahan; that the Firman Firma had no intention of going there at present; and that the Bakhtiari, who were escorting the Deputy Governor, were not, as M. Isvolsky imagined, hostile to the Sam-Sam, but had telegraphed to him urging him to resistance, and this telegram had been seen by His Majesty's Consul-General. Sir C. Hardinge added that under these circumstances it was, in my opinion, desirable to await developments.

In my opinion, until the Shah reforms his Government and put it on a footing which inspires confidence, it is useless for him to send a Governor or troops to Ispahan. Nor do I think that any good purpose would be served by our attempting to influence the Sam-Sam until His Majesty listens to our advice, as such a course would only result in our advice being equally disregarded on both sides.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

Inclosure in No. 149.

*Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff.*

(1.)

*M. Sabline to M. Isvolsky.*

*Le 25 décembre, 1908 (7 janvier, 1909).*

LE Prince Firman, avant de se rendre à son nouveau poste de Gouverneur d'Ispahan, a désiré avoir avec le Ministre d'Angleterre et moi une entrevue privée.

Elle a eu lieu aujourd'hui.

Le Prince est convaincu qu'il n'aura pas de peine à rétablir l'autorité du Schah à Ispahan; il nous demande, en vue de prévenir l'effusion de sang, d'agir par l'entremise de nos Consuls sur Sam-Sam-us-Saltaneh pour obtenir qu'il quitte la ville aussitôt après l'arrivée des troupes du Prince.

Le Ministre d'Angleterre, partant de l'idée que pareille démarche en faveur du Schah pourrait porter préjudice aux efforts des Légations pour le rétablissement de la Constitution, a résolu de demander des instructions à son Gouvernement.

Je crains qu'une attitude indifférente des deux Légations n'ait pour conséquence de créer à Ispahan un état de choses comme celui à Tabriz, ce qui, je crois, pourrait être prévenu par des conseils amicaux donnés à Sam-Sam au nom des deux Gouvernements.

D'après nos renseignements, Sam-Sam ne dispose pas de forces considérables et ne peut s'attendre à recevoir des renforts.

(2.)

*M. Isvolsky to Count Benckendorff.*

Nous trouvons extrêmement désirable de prévenir à Ispahan des complications comme celles de Tabriz, complications également préjudiciables aux intérêts russes et anglais. Pour cette raison nous nous rangeons à l'avis de notre Chargé d'Affaires et serions d'avis de faire donner par l'entremise de nos Consuls à Sam-Sam-us-Saltaneh le conseil de ne pas en venir à une collision avec Firman Firma.

Cette mesure, qui n'aurait d'autre but que celui de prévenir une effusion de sang dont pourraient avoir à pâtir les étrangers—ne saurait, dans notre opinion, porter atteinte à nos négociations avec le Schah.

Veuillez vous en expliquer avec Sir Edward Grey et nous télégraphier.

[1955]

No. 150.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 28.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2 of the 4th instant respecting the erection of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud on the Tehran-Meshed line, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence which has passed between this Department and the India Office on the subject.<sup>a</sup>

I request your Excellency to explain the situation to M. Isvolsky, and intimate to him that His Majesty's Government are anxious to arrive as soon as possible at a settlement of the other questions pending—especially those of the Arabistan line and of the renewal of the Concessions of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, referred to in my despatch No. 16 of the 13th instant.

Your Excellency should add that in such an event His Majesty's Government hope to be able at once to transfer to the Russian Government the Tehran-Khanikin line and to effect the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

[1812]

No. 151.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 9.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

I HAVE received Mr. Marling's despatches Nos. 214 and 246, and your despatch No. 289 of the 4th November, 1908, respecting the improvement of means of communication between Dizful and Western and Northern Persia.

I have read these reports with much interest. I consider, however, that it would be premature, in the present disturbed state of Persia, to embark upon any extensive project of the nature in question.

It would be advisable for you to discuss the whole question with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, on the occasion of his approaching visit to Tehran, and in the light of the recent decision to postpone all plans of railway construction in Persia.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY

[1976]

No. 152.

*Foreign Office to Mr. W. D'Arcy.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 20, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 12th and 13th instant respectively, relative to the retention of the Indian guard at the oil works in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz.

In reply, I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey regrets that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to undertake the cost of the guard any longer.

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of your second letter under reply, I am to state that the attitude of the Government of India is the same as that of His Majesty's Government, and that the total cost of the guard, which amounts to about 174l. 8s. per month, will therefore be debited to you as from the 17th instant, unless you desire the guard to be withdrawn.

Sir E. Grey would be glad of an early answer.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[2695]

No. 153.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 37.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 20, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Zil-es-Sultan expressing his gratitude for the protection accorded to his family at Ispahan, and requesting that this protection may be extended to certain of his servants whose names are given in the translation of a telegram inclosed in the Zil's letter above mentioned.

I have acknowledged the receipt of His Royal Highness' letter, and stated that I will communicate its contents to you.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 153.

*Zil-es-Sultan to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Villa Fantaisie, 89 bis, Promenade des Anglais, Nice,  
le 16 janvier, 1909.*

Excellence,

JE vois par la dépêche que j'ai reçue d'Ispahan que ma famille est protégée, et je vous suis très reconnaissant de ce que vous avez bien voulu faire. Je vous envoie la traduction d'une dépêche signée par un certain nombre de mes dévoués serviteurs. Ils ne peuvent, faute de place, habiter chez moi à Bagh Noo et profiter ainsi de la protection accordée à ma famille. Ils ne font pas de politique, ne sont ni d'un parti ni de l'autre, et si le Gouvernement britannique voulait étendre sur eux la protection qu'il veut bien me donner, je lui en serais très reconnaissant.

Veuillez, &c.  
(Signé) ZELLÉ SULTAN

Inclosure 2 in No. 153.

*Telegram received by Zil-es-Sultan.*

(Translation.)

*Ispahan [non datée].*

Il n'y a pas de place à Bagh Noo. Demandez à la Légation anglaise de donner des ordres au Consul pour qu'il nous protège aussi.

(Signé) MONADJEM BACHI,  
SOLEIMAN,  
BAGHER,  
FATEH,  
MOSLEH,  
HASSAN ALI,  
MONCHI BACHI,  
FAZLOLLAH.

[2698]

No. 154.

*Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 7. Commercial.)

Sir,

*The Hague, January 20, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 101 of the 8th May, 1907, I have the honour to report that a recent telegram from Tehran to the "Cologne Gazette" announcing the grant by the Shah of a Concession to a Dutch Company for executing the project of irrigation in South-West Persia is causing no small satisfaction in the Netherland press. The message in question states that this enterprise, which will include the work of damming the River Karun at Ahwaz, reposes on the conclusion of a previous understanding between Holland and England. The shares of the Company about to be

formed will be placed on the German and other markets as well as on those of London and Amsterdam.

The above report doubtless indicates the inception of the scheme long cherished by M. Graadt van Roggen, the Dutch engineer until recently employed by the Persian Government, whose name is already known to you, for irrigating the Ahwaz district and restoring it to its former fertile condition. In an interview published by the "Nieuwe Courant" the Dutch engineer aforesaid observes that the execution of the work will entail considerable labour, such as excavating operations and the construction of canals. It will, however, be productive of far-reaching results for the agricultural, shipping, and other industries of the Netherlands. The construction of a lock of armoured concrete with movable iron gates at the Karun rapids at Ahwaz will give employment to the iron foundries and concrete factories of Holland, while the work of excavating will be done by Dutch hands, and Dutch electric engineers will supply the plant and fittings for lighting the district. No doubt it will be necessary to procure dynamos and water turbines from abroad—probably from Germany or Switzerland—as they are not manufactured in the Netherlands. Similarly, agricultural implements of large calibre will, at the outset, at any rate, have to be supplied from America. When once the drained area has been prepared for cultivation by these powerful mechanical contrivances a large exportation of grain and cotton will assuredly follow.

M. Graadt van Roggen likewise anticipates that Dutch vessels will receive the transport trade in connection with the new venture. The duration of the Concession, which is for ninety-nine years, will secure to more than a single generation the benefits to be derived from the enterprise. By the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab by Dutch steam-boats as far as Mohammerah the carrying trade of Russian goods may fall to the Netherland flag. The prophetic vision of this enthusiast further sees cargoes of grain bringing relief to the famine-stricken districts of British India, and bales of cotton being consigned from the reclaimed desert to the looms of Bombay.

It is stated in the press that by the terms of the Concession equality of opportunity will be accorded to all; it was, however, also stipulated that the head-quarters of the Company shall be in Holland, that the Directors should be of Dutch nationality, and that the conduct of all technical matters in Persia should be in Dutch hands.

It remains to be seen whether M. Graadt van Roggen, who is at present at The Hague, will now return to Persia on behalf of the new Company.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ACTON.

[2745]

No. 155.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 21, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the weather is now very severe, and that Satar Khan has ordered his troops to avoid fighting outside the town. Hostilities have been suspended since the 16th instant.

[2826]

No. 156.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 21, 1909.*

ANGLO-RUSSIAN negotiations in regard to Persia.

There is a general impression here that Anglo-Russian control is about to be imposed on Persia. This impression is due to the press reports which have reached Tehran as to the present stage of the Anglo-Russian *pourparlers*.



[2827]

No. 157.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 21, 1909.*

PERSIAN finances. Your telegram No. 26 of yesterday.

I have seen the Financial Adviser to the Persian Government, and he tells me that he is being given all the information available in regard to the finances of the country by the Persian Government, who, in its urgent need for money, now realizes the necessity of helping him. He hopes to be able to present a report to the Shah in about three weeks, copies of which he will communicate to M. Sabline and myself.

Russian Financial Agent is in favour of a conversion and unification of Persian debt. Amount of loan to be 8,000,000*l.*, which would leave a substantial balance to cover future deficits after the conversion of the present debt, which amounts to between 6,000,000*l.* and 7,000,000*l.* M. Astrogradsky tells me that he telegraphed a day or two ago to the Russian Minister of Finance recommending this course.

In order to obtain effective financial reform, both M. Astrogradsky and M. Bizot consider that the appointment of a European Treasurer-General and a Financial Inspector is essential.

[2443]

No. 158.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 21, 1909*

KARUN Irrigation Concession.

In reply to your telegrams Nos. 47 and 50 of the 18th and 19th instant, the Persian Government should be informed that His Majesty's Government reserve their right to raise objections to the proposed scheme in view of the fact that the warning which Sir C. Spring-Rice addressed to Ala-es-Sultaneh on the 2nd October, 1906, has been disregarded by them.

In the meantime Major Cox should keep in touch with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, keep him *au courant* of the affair, and sound him as to his views.

[2848]

No. 159.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

(No. 38.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 17, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a Memorandum which I received last night from M. Isvolsky regarding the measures which might be taken by the Governments of Russia and Great Britain in view of the deplorable situation in Persia. M. Isvolsky requested that I would call on him this afternoon before I dispatched any telegram to you on the subject, as he would like to have a talk with me.

I called on his Excellency this afternoon and he asked me what I thought of the Memorandum. I did not think it necessary to allude to the exposition of the situation as given in the Memorandum, though perhaps there are one or two passages on which some observations might be made, but I told him that I did not notice any allusion to provision being made for elected members of the Council which was to elaborate an electoral law.

M. Isvolsky remarked that he had not wished to encumber his proposals with details, or to prescribe too closely the composition of the Council. He had mentioned "hommes de mérite," and he remarked that elections would take time, and discussions would ensue as to how and from what classes they were to be elected, and so forth. It was best to hasten on the work of the Council.

In regard to a loan, it seemed to me, I said, that this question was by no means pressing, and that it had better be left alone until M. Bizot had made his report, which should be asked for, as a loan might perhaps not be necessary at all. His Excellency agreed with this view, and said that he had thrown out the idea of a loan if one should be required, and had sketched the control which it would, in that case, be necessary to institute. I remarked that a control was a trifle dangerous, and would probably meet with strong opposition in Persia.

His Excellency said that he had made the control as innocent as possible, and as little official as possible. If a loan were accorded, some supervision was absolutely essential over the mode in which it was expended.

I then said that, in regard to an advance, I was quite sure that my Government would not entertain the proposal, in any case until an electoral law had been elaborated and published and dates fixed for the elections and for the convocation of an Assembly. I believed that no one was of the opinion that the last Assembly was a competent or trustworthy body; but there was a very strong section of public opinion in England who would regard any advance to the Shah at present as practically furnishing him with funds to combat, and if possible to crush, the popular or national movement, which doubtless was regarded by the Shah as a revolutionary movement.

M. Isvolsky replied that he quite appreciated what I said, but that he had carefully stated in the Memorandum "if the Shah gives sufficient proofs of his decision to follow the advice of Russia and England." He had purposely left the conditions to an advance vague in phrase, as we should then be perfectly free to decide whether the proofs afforded by the Shah were or were not sufficient. We might quite rightly say that we were not satisfied until an Assembly had met or elections had been held, or lay down any other condition; but he thought it should be left to the Representatives on the spot to inform their Governments when they considered that the Shah had given such proofs of his good faith as would justify an advance being made, under conditions, to the Persian Government. It must not be forgotten, however, that some funds of a modest amount must soon be given, unless we wished to see the whole machinery get even more out of gear than it was at present. The Government were living from hand to mouth; and this condition of existence, in view of the gravity of the situation, could not be allowed safely to continue for much longer. I said, "Then I am to understand that you do not propose to hand over to the Shah 200,000*l.* within the next few days." He replied, "Certainly not. It is for the two Governments to choose the time when an advance could be made, and it would be made to the Persian Government." He said that it was most necessary to eliminate the Grand Vizier and the other reactionary elements from the Shah's Councils, and an advance could be made with more safety to a renovated Government.

I unfortunately forgot to mention to M. Isvolsky that there was no proposal as to an amnesty for those in arms, and I did not allude to a personal guarantee to the Shah, as he seems to have rejected the idea in one part of his Memorandum, though presumably the Shah will not allow it to be forgotten.

M. Isvolsky said he did hope that it was fully understood that Russia had no intention of employing armed intervention of any kind. The Minister of War, at the sitting of the Cabinet when the Memorandum was under discussion had urged that nothing at all should be done, and that the Persians should be allowed to stew in their own juice, and the Viceroy of the Caucasus had also expressed similar sentiments. He cited these instances to me to show me that those who might be thought to be in favour of intervention were ardently anxious for complete abstention from all interference of any kind. He himself felt that, if the two Governments remained with folded arms, Persia would rapidly crumble to pieces, with independent republics or some kind of Government established throughout the country. Such chaos and anarchy would ensue that both Governments would be compelled to intervene forcibly, and this measure must if possible be avoided.

I told M. Isvolsky that I would telegraph to you the principal points of the Memorandum and would dispatch a copy of it by a private hand, leaving direct for London on Tuesday morning.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 159.

*Memorandum communicated by M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.*

LOIN de s'améliorer, l'état de choses en Perse se complique de jour en jour et la situation dans laquelle se trouve ce pays devient extrêmement grave. Dans l'Azerbaïdjan les affaires vont en empirant : le pouvoir du Schah n'y existe plus que nominativement, la lutte des parties continue, l'importation baisse progressivement; tout dernièrement encore le parti révolutionnaire a exigé que les versements dus par la Compagnie du



Télégraphe Indo-Européen soient remis à la caisse de l'endjoumen de Tauris. Récemment des troubles ont également éclaté à Isfahan et cette ville se trouve à l'heure qu'il est aux mains des Bakhtiaris. La population de Méched refuse de payer les impôts. La situation en Chilan et dans maintes autres provinces est non moins menaçante. Une partie des Moudjtéhids de Nedjef lance des Proclamations dans le pays entier afin de soulever la population contre le Schah, en appelant cette dernière à défendre ses droits et privilèges. D'autre part, le trésor du Schah est vide, et l'armée ainsi que l'Administration, n'étant pas rémunérées, se voient contraintes de vivre de pillages et d'exactions opérés sur la population paisible. Si les événements continuent à se dérouler dans cette direction, nul ne peut prédire où s'arrêtera la désorganisation de l'Empire des Kadjars.

La Russie et l'Angleterre, dont les intérêts économiques ont déjà considérablement souffert ces derniers temps à la suite des troubles en Perse, devraient prendre en sérieuse considération l'état de choses actuel dans ce pays et s'appliquer à fixer un plan d'action en vue de parer à des complications ultérieures pouvant les obliger à se départir de leur attitude passive à l'égard des événements en Perse.

Se conformant strictement au principe de non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures de la Perse, les Gouvernements russe et britannique se sont bornés jusqu'ici exclusivement à donner au Schah des conseils amicaux de rétablir le régime constitutionnel, aboli de fait après les événements du 10 (23) juin, 1908. Les deux Gouvernements avaient adopté cette ligne de conduite, dans la conviction que la restauration du régime absolu en Perse était impossible et que le seul moyen de pacifier le pays était la réalisation par le Schah des vœux du peuple. En même temps la Russie et l'Angleterre se rendent clairement compte toutes les deux que le rétablissement de la Constitution persane dans une forme identique à celle qui existait avant la dissolution du Medjlis n'est également point désirable, car ceci ne pourrait que précipiter le pays dans un état d'anarchie plus profond encore. Le premier Medjlis, qui s'appuyait sur les endjoumens révolutionnaires, a donné des preuves décisives de son incapacité complète de diriger le pays dans une voie nouvelle. Cet avis est partagé par un nombre considérable d'hommes d'élite en Perse qui ont quitté le parti progressif pour se ranger du côté des réactionnaires. Ce fait est une des causes principales des hésitations du Schah et il a même provoqué de sa part, tout récemment, après de nouvelles instances des deux Légations en faveur du rétablissement de la Constitution, la demande de lui garantir sa sécurité personnelle et celle de sa famille et de son trône, s'il se conforme aux conseils qui lui sont donnés. Les deux Gouvernements se sont abstenus d'une réponse directe à ce sujet, car ils se rendaient clairement compte qu'une pareille garantie serait difficilement réalisable et pourrait les entraîner trop loin.

Le Gouvernement Impérial considère que, dans ces circonstances, une pression sur le Schah afin d'obtenir le rétablissement de la Constitution ne saurait à elle seule atteindre le but que les deux Puissances se sont proposé. Si l'on veut arriver à pacifier la Perse, ainsi qu'à établir dans ce pays un ordre stable, il est indispensable non seulement d'y instituer une forme rationnelle de gouvernement représentatif, mais aussi d'aider en même temps le Gouvernement du Schah à introduire les réformes indispensables, parmi lesquelles s'impose en premier lieu une réforme financière, et ensuite des réformes administratives, militaires, et judiciaires.

Contrairement à l'opinion généralement établie, la Perse par elle-même est un pays riche, possédant des ressources considérables; ce fait a été constaté, entre autres, par Mr. Marling, ex-Chargé d'Affaires de la Grande-Bretagne à Téhéran. Mais ses riches ressources sont dilapidées: une partie des revenus du pays est détournée par l'Administration corrompue en commençant par les agents subalternes et en finissant par les Ministres eux-mêmes; le reste est dépensé sans aucun profit réel pour le pays, grâce au système financier tout à fait insuffisant, si toutefois il est possible de parler d'un système financier quelconque en Perse. Une branche seulement des ressources de l'État est solidement organisée: ce sont les revenus douaniers. Depuis que M. Naus et ses employés belges ont organisé l'Administration Douanière en Perse, les revenus des douanes de ce pays ont considérablement augmenté; ils ont atteint actuellement la somme d'environ 5,000,000 de roubles par an. En défalquant de cette somme un chiffre de 2,500,000 roubles affectés annuellement au service des emprunts conclus par la Perse pour 32,000,000 de roubles à la Banque d'Escompte et de Prêts de Perse, et pour 2,500,000 roubles à la Banque Impériale de Perse, nous obtenons une somme de 2,500,000 roubles de revenu net par an qui reste aux mains du Gouvernement persan. Une autre source de recettes qui pourrait être fort considérable, mais qui malheureusement ne l'est pas à cause de l'absence complète d'une organisation

quelconque, dans le sens européen de ce mot, est le maliat, ou dîme instituée par le Koran sur les biens arrosés par l'eau. La plus grande partie de cette dîme, perçue sur les contribuables dans des proportions extrêmement grandes et avec une rigueur atteignant la cruauté, est détournée presque totalement par les agents de l'Administration, entre les mains desquels elle passe pour entrer dans les caisses du Trésor, qui n'en touche en réalité qu'une minime partie. Enfin, le Gouvernement persan dispose d'une troisième source de revenus, laquelle, si elle était dûment régularisée, aurait pu lui assurer l'entretien d'une force armée considérable. Cette source est un impôt militaire spécial que la population est tenue de verser au Gouvernement pour l'entretien d'un certain nombre de soldats qu'en vertu d'un usage immémorial le peuple doit fournir au Schah. En réalité, une grande partie de ces soldats n'est pas appelée sous les armes; le reste est mal payé, ou pas payé du tout, et les sommes qui auraient dû être affectées à l'entretien des forces armées sont appropriées par les membres de l'Administration.

On voit que les ressources du pays sont très appréciables et, pour que ce dernier puisse sortir de sa situation actuelle, il suffirait d'organiser ses finances et son Administration.

Il est fort probable que si le Schah se décide à entrer franchement dans la voie des réformes, il lui faudra disposer d'une certaine somme pour subvenir aux dépenses nécessitées par la réorganisation de son pays. Les recettes actuelles du Gouvernement persan sont suffisantes pour assurer le service d'un nouvel emprunt extérieur, même considérable; la somme de 2,500,000 roubles qui lui reste actuellement des revenus douaniers pourrait à elle seule suffire à payer les intérêts et l'amortissement d'un emprunt de 32,000,000 de roubles environ. Mais il n'est guère impossible que la Perse soit même en état de se passer d'un emprunt de cette dimension; elle pourra peut-être se borner à instituer un contrôle sérieux sur ses recettes actuelles pour en augmenter le rendement, et il ne lui faudrait qu'une somme relativement modérée pour faire face aux dépenses que nécessiteraient ses premiers pas dans la voie des réformes.

Si le Gouvernement britannique partage le point de vue exposé plus haut, le Gouvernement Impérial propose un plan d'action commune visant à sauvegarder les intérêts économiques de la Russie et de l'Angleterre en Perse, plan qui pourrait être formulé de la manière suivante:—

Il est hors de doute en ce moment que la Perse ne peut sortir de sa position extrêmement difficile qu'au moyen de réformes, parmi lesquelles s'imposent tant une réforme financière que la réalisation, dans la mesure du possible, du désir exprimé par la population d'obtenir une forme de gouvernement représentatif. Dans ce but la Russie et l'Angleterre pourraient—

1. Sans s'écarter en quoi que ce soit du principe établi de non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures de la Perse, donner au Schah le conseil amical d'appeler au pouvoir des hommes capables et énergiques ayant déjà fait preuve par leurs actes de leur désir d'aider le pays à sortir de la situation difficile où il se trouve, tels que Saad-ed-Dovleh, qui a élaboré les projets des institutions représentatives en Perse et qui vient d'ailleurs d'être nommé Ministre des Affaires Étrangères; et Nasr-ul-Mouk, lequel, étant Président du Conseil et Ministre des Finances, a rédigé les projets de réorganisation des finances persanes et des lois sur la maliat, ainsi que le premier projet d'un Budget normal.

2. Tout en exprimant au Schah le désir de voir instituer en Perse un Gouvernement représentatif, dont la nécessité avait été reconnue par lui-même, mais sans insister sur le rétablissement de la forme dans laquelle ce régime existait en 1907-8, lui conseiller de procéder sans délai, à l'aide des personnes mentionnées au § 1<sup>er</sup> et du Conseil de l'Empire actuel, ainsi que d'autres hommes de mérite, à l'élaboration d'une loi instituant un nouveau corps électif qui répondrait aux us et coutumes historiques du peuple persan, ainsi qu'à ses idées religieuses, satisferait à ses besoins et contribuerait à l'établissement de la paix et de l'ordre en Perse.

3. Si le Schah donne des preuves suffisantes de sa décision de suivre les conseils de la Russie et de l'Angleterre, lui accorder l'appui des deux Puissances en vue de la conclusion d'un emprunt extérieur plus ou moins considérable, à la condition de l'institution d'une Commission spéciale composée des Directeurs des banques russe et anglaise à Téhéran et de Délégués persans, laquelle Commission—

(a.) Contrôlerait le déboursement des ressources de l'État et veillerait à ce que ces ressources soient affectées exclusivement aux besoins du pays;

(b.) Surveillerait l'ordre d'élaboration des devis des assignations annuelles pour toutes les branches de l'Administration, ainsi que le mode d'application de ces devis,



en conformité avec le Budget qui serait dressé par le Département des Finances persan avec l'aide de la Commission de Contrôle; et

(c.) Assisterait le Ministère des Finances du Schah dans la revision et la régularisation des lois sur le maliat.

4. Afin de donner au Gouvernement du Schah une preuve de leurs sentiments amicaux envers la Perse dans un moment aussi difficile pour elle, la Russie et l'Angleterre seraient prêtes à mettre à sa disposition une avance de 5,000,000 de fr., sur l'emprunt à conclure, aux conditions fixées en 1906. Cette avance serait destinée à subvenir aux dépenses immédiates nécessitées par l'introduction des réformes.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 3 (16) janvier, 1909.*

[2849]

No. 160.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

(No. 39.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 17, 1909.*

M. ISVOLSKY remarked to me this afternoon that he was much put out and troubled with the reports which were appearing in the press as to the discussion between the two Governments in regard to Persia. Some of the reports were fantastic inventions, while others were a distortion of facts. He had received a telegram from Count Benckendorff, explaining that it was unfortunate that misleading reports should appear, especially in the British Parliament, which would shortly reopen. He had done his best to keep the whole matter secret, but as several Departments had been examining the subject-matter of his Memorandum, he supposed that some correspondents had picked up stray bits of information here and there which they embellished according to their fancy. He thought it was necessary that some communiqué should be given to the press which would check these mischievous reports. I told him that in my opinion it would perhaps be best to leave the matter alone, as nothing would prevent some papers from commenting and criticising. His Excellency did not agree with me, and said that some communiqué had better be made; and one had apparently already been given to Reuter in London, which appeared to him to be a very cautious and good one. I asked whether we could not leave the matter there. He said that it would be known that the Memorandum had been communicated, and he thought it would be well if some further communiqué were issued. I said that in that case it ought to be very carefully worded; and if he liked, I would ask if you would kindly draft one, as you were in the best position to know how it should be drawn up. He said he would be most grateful if I would do so, and then an identic communiqué could be issued simultaneously at London and St. Petersburg. In the meantime, we both might decline here to give any information. I said that I had always refused to make any statements to correspondents; and, indeed, as I only received the Memorandum late last night, I had not been in a position to give any information even if I had wished to do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[2904]

No. 161.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 22.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 20, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter of the 19th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the instructions contained in the despatch which Sir E. Grey proposes to send to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg respecting the erection of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud on the Tehran-Meshed line.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[2907]

No. 162.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 21.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 21, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 4th instant, asking, in view of the information furnished by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran as to the nature of the Moin's Concessions, for Viscount Morley's observations on the situation in respect of Mr. Strick's application for Oxide Concessions on Sirri and other islands in the Persian Gulf.

Lord Morley agrees that it may be held that the Moin has established no claim to be regarded as the holder of a Concession on Sirri. The situation there and on the other islands in the possession of the Persian Government thus appears to remain as it was stated in Mr. Wilson Fox's semi-official letter to Mr. Strick of the 23rd October, 1908, viz., that it is for Mr. Strick to make such applications as he may think fit in the circumstances to the Persian Government, without any assurance at present of support by His Majesty's Government.

Lord Morley agrees in the view expressed in the third paragraph of your letter that the conclusion of the three years' contract between Messrs. Weir and Co. and the Moin as to the Hormuz oxide removes the main objection to competition with the Moin on the part of Mr. Strick or other British firms by means of oxide from Sirri or elsewhere. Such competition may possibly result in a coalition between Mr. Strick and the Moin.

It is observed from the inclosure to your letter of the 13th instant that Messrs. Strick have been authorized to approach the Resident in the Gulf with a view to a Concession from the Sheikh of Shargar on Little Tamb, and that their attention has been called to the possibility of oxide deposits being found on Dalmah and Sir Abu Nuair.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[2931]

No. 163.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, January 22, 1909.*

COMMUNIQUE to press respecting recent Anglo-Russian negotiations relative to Persia.

The draft contained in your telegram No. 54 of the 20th instant was conveyed by me to M. Isvolsky; he fears that the misinterpretations and comments now appearing in the papers would not be checked by it, and thinks it is rather too curt in tone. The following might, in his view, be substituted with advantage:—

(R.) "Russian and foreign press have announced that *pourparlers* are at present taking place between the Governments of Russia and England concerning Persian affairs.

"Telegraphic agency of St. Petersburg learns from an authorized source (or we are authorized to state) that Russia and Great Britain have no intention whatever to depart from the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Persia. At the same time the two Governments are of opinion that state of affairs in Persia imperiously demands the introduction of a practical form of representative government, in order to assure the realization of indispensable economic, financial, and administrative reforms.

"As the present troubles endanger numerous economic interests which Russia and England have in Persia, the two Governments are exchanging views on the subject, in order to be in a position to give the Persian Government advice in the sense above mentioned." (End of R.)

M. Isvolsky is anxious that no time should be lost in issuing the communiqué, and I would therefore beg to be informed of your views as soon as possible.



[2974]

No. 164.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, January 22, 1909.*

FOLLOWING communication made by Russian Ambassador:—

"Tabreez Nationalists have demanded that local customs shall be paid to Anjuman, on ground that, not being assigned to Russian debt, they go to Shah, and may be used against Nationalists.

"Director of Customs has asked local branch of Discount Bank to comply, stating that otherwise he would apply to English Bank.

"Russian Consul-General has instructions to declare that customs revenues are assigned to service of debt, and to advise Nationalists not to raise question.

"Should these negotiations break down, it is hoped English Bank will not comply with wish of Director of Customs."

You should communicate with bank in sense desired by Russian Government.

[1114]

No. 165.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 22, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant on the subject of the Russian Consulate at Bunder Abbas.

In reply to the suggestion in the last sentence of your letter that the appointment of some other officer to succeed M. Ovseenko should be proposed to the Russian Government, I am to state that Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it would not be advisable to mention the matter to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs until M. Hartwig has left St. Petersburg and until the new Russian Minister is installed at Tehran.

I am to add that, according to the information in the possession of this Department, there has recently been no cause for complaint against M. Ovseenko.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[3061]

No. 166.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Paris, January 23, 1909.*

PERSIA.

I am informed by the Zil-es-Sultan that the Andjuman of Ispahan has demanded the payment by him of the sum of 500L., representing one-tenth of the taxes due next year, which begins on the 21st March. His Royal Highness fears that the payment of this sum would be construed by the Persian Government as an act of hostility. On the other hand, if he refuses, the whole Nationalist party will be opposed to him, and his property will be endangered, and further demands of a similar nature may be made. He considers the matter very pressing, and asks for a reply by telegraph.

[3048]

No. 167.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 23, 1909.*

ISPAHAN situation.

In a telegram dated to-day His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan reports that the Iqbal-ed-Dowleh proposes to start for Tehran to-morrow morning, Mr. Grahame having obtained a safe-conduct from the local Assembly, and a verbal promise of a Bakhtiari guard from Samsam-es-Sultaneh.

Mr. Grahame, at his request, proposes to accompany him one stage of 12 miles,

and to send on to the second a Persian servant of the Consulate. He considers that this arrangement presents no risks, and should meet all requirements.

In reply to Mr. Grahame's request for my sanction, I have replied that he must not accompany Iqbal-ed-Dowleh, or after he has left the Consulate-General in any way engage the responsibility of His Majesty's Government.

Iqbal-ed-Dowleh is most unpopular, and deserves this reputation.

[3065]

No. 168.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 23, 1909.*

AZERBAIJAN customs receipts. Your telegram No. 29 of yesterday.

I am informed by the Chief Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia that as yet no receipts from the Tabreez customs have been paid into their Tabreez branch.

Instructions are being sent to the local Manager to refuse to receive and disburse them locally, should he be requested to do so.

[2931]

No. 169.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 23, 1909.*

PRESS communiqué on subject of Anglo-Russian negotiations respecting Persia.

In reply to your telegram No. 24 of yesterday, you should inform M. Isvolsky that His Majesty's Government accept his text, and we propose to have the communiqué published on Monday, the 25th instant, in the daily morning papers.

[2907]

No. 170.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 23*

OXIDE Concessions in the Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your telegram No. 448 of the 23rd December, 1908.

It seems to us that it is no longer so necessary to act with such caution with regard to Sirri, seeing that a contract has been concluded for three years with Andrew Weir in connection with Hormuz, and the Moin-ut-Tujjar, we consider, has failed to establish his claim to be recognized as the holder of a Concession on Sirri.

Following refers to your despatch No. 330 of the 31st December:—

Moin's statements are not, in our opinion, of much importance, in view of the assurances which were given to us in August of last year by Messrs. Hadji Ali Akbar and Co. We should, however, be glad to see Strick's application for the Sirri Concession, which he is anxious to secure, given preference to that of Messrs. Hadji Ali Akbar and Co., but, in view of our assurances to the latter, you cannot do more than give your support to the two applications concurrently.

[3236]

No. 171.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)*

(No. 42.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 23, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, copy of a letter from Zil-es-Sultan, respecting the demand for payment of taxes on the part of the Andjuman of Ispahan, which formed the subject of my telegram No. 17 of to-day's date.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1629]

2 E



Inclosure 1 in No. 171.

*Zil-es-Sultan to Sir F. Bertie.**Villa Fantaisie, 89 bis, Promenade des Anglais,  
Nice, le 21 janvier, 1909.*

Excellence,

JE vous envoie copie de la dépêche que je viens de recevoir de mes agents à Ispahan. L'Andjouman d'Ispahan ordonne de payer un dixième de l'impôt. Les impôts de l'année courante ont déjà été perçus entièrement, et cet ordre vise les impôts de l'année prochaine, qui pour nous commence le 21 mars. La somme que l'on me réclame actuellement se monte à 2,500 tomans, soit 500l. Cette avance étant réclamée par l'Andjouman et non par le Gouvernement, je ne sais quelle conduite tenir. Si je donne à mes agents l'ordre de payer cette somme, peut-être le Gouvernement croira-t-il que je fais acte d'hostilité envers lui. D'autre part, si je refuse de payer, j'ai contre moi tout le parti Nationaliste, et je ne sais pas alors ce qu'il adviendra de mes biens et propriétés. Comme vous le voyez, Excellence, la situation est fort embarrassante pour moi, d'autant plus que mes agents insistent sur la nécessité d'agir rapidement. Que dois-je faire? Ne voulant pas être accusé ni dans un cas, ni dans l'autre, je vous serais reconnaissant de demander à votre Ministère des Affaires Étrangères la conduite que je dois tenir en cette occurrence. J'ai d'autant plus besoin d'être fixé sur ce que je dois faire, que la situation actuelle pouvant se prolonger à Ispahan, je suis exposé à être de nouveau l'objet de pareilles sollicitations.

J'ai préféré vous envoyer une lettre qu'un télégramme pour mieux vous expliquer la situation, mais dès que vous aurez une réponse du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, je vous prie de me la transmettre par télégramme. Le temps presse, et il est nécessaire que j'envoie rapidement des ordres à mes agents.

Veillez, &c.  
(Signé) ZELLÉ SULTAN.

Je vous rappelle que le mot "Andjouman" est synonyme de Club Nationaliste.

Inclosure 2 in No. 171.

*Demand Note.*

L'ANDJOUMAN d'Ispahan ordonne de payer un dixième de l'impôt. Ce que vous devez payer se monte à 2,500 tomans (500l.). On est bien pressé; donnez l'ordre de payer bien vite.

(Signé) SOLEÏMAN.  
AHMED.  
HASSAN ALI.

A son Altesse Zellé Sultan.

[3348]

No. 172.

*Mr. W. K. D'Arcy to Foreign Office.—(Received January 25.)*

Sir,

*42, Grosvenor Square, London, January 23, 1909.*

I AM in receipt of your Office letter, dated the 20th instant, relative to the Indian guard at Ahwaz.

In the circumstances, as we dare not under the present circumstances take upon our shoulders the responsibility of keeping a large staff of Englishmen in Persia without a guard, we have decided until further notice to pay the cost thereof, viz., 174l. 8s. per month.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) W. K. D'ARCY.

[3325]

No. 173.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)*

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 25, 1909.*

PROVINCIAL Nationalist movement.

Russian Legation have received report from their Consul at Astarabad that Nationalist movement in Mazanderan is very active, and that a possibility exists of its being joined by the Turcomans.

Consul also reports having been sounded by the Governor as to the manner in which a coalition of the provinces on the Caspian littoral would be regarded by Russia. Instructions have been sent him from St. Petersburg to rebuke the Governor for making an inquiry of this nature, and to state that such coalition would enjoy no sympathy from Russia.

[3353]

No. 174.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)*

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 25, 1909.*

AZERBAIJAN customs receipts. Your telegram No. 29 of the 22nd instant.

In reply to my inquiry, His Majesty's Consul-General reports by telegraph that the customs receipts were to be paid into a bank and remain there at the disposal of the Customs and not to be sent to Tehran, and that there has been no question of their being handed over to the local Assembly.

Following paragraph is very confidential. It is clear from Mr. Wratislaw's telegram that the Russian Ambassador's statement was based on very inaccurate information.

The local Director of Customs has assured the Assembly that the entire customs receipts are absorbed by the Russian debt, and he hopes that this will settle the matter.

[3356]

No. 175.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)*

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 25, 1909.*

PERSIAN finances.

French Financial Adviser, in a recent interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed his Excellency of his views, as described in my telegram No. 53 of the 21st instant, last paragraph.

Saad-ed-Dowleh has now requested M. Bizot to make arrangements in Paris for the appointment of Frenchmen to the two posts in question, having obtained the Shah's consent to their establishment.

M. Bizot has written to the Minister of Finance in Paris, and the French Minister has telegraphed to his Government.

[3357]

No. 176.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)*

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 25, 1909.*

SITUATION at Ispahan. My telegram No. 54 of the 23rd instant.

According to a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General, the late Governor refuses to leave without a guarantee for his safety from Mr. Grahame. Several of his followers left yesterday. Some 140 persons, most of them the Governor's suite or soldiers, are still in "bast."

I am most unwilling to take any steps for giving protection to the Governor outside the Consulate, who is a very undeserving object. The safe-conduct of the local Assembly and the Bakhtiari guard should be enough.

[1153]

No. 177.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 25, 1909.*

BRITISH Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari.

Please refer to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 83 of the 14th April, 1908.

Seeing that the distance from Meshed to Turbat is only 84 miles, and that there is a telegraph line the whole way, I consider that to maintain at a cost of 6,500*l.* per annum the establishment of the Consulate at the latter place is a needless extravagance, the more so seeing that, as has lately been decided, the Military Attaché at Meshed is to be maintained, and he could pay periodical visits to Turbat, if the necessity arose.

Captain Keyes considered that the case would be met by a native agency.

Do you agree with this officer's view, or do you adhere to Mr. Marling's opinion?

Supposing it is necessary for the post at Turbat to be held by a European, could not the Consular Agency there be intrusted to the Indo-European Department's official, when once the telegraph lines have been exchanged? If that be not practicable, an alternative whereby several thousand pounds annually might be saved would be for an officer of the Levant service to hold the post. Such an officer could be available in due course.

In your opinion, would this course be satisfactory?

[3470]

No. 178.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)*

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, January 26, 1909.*

TELEGRAPHS in Persia.

I have communicated a Memorandum to the Russian Foreign Office, giving the substance of your despatches Nos. 16 and 28. I was informed verbally yesterday by M. Tcharykoff, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, that all the British proposals were agreeable to the Russian Government, and he promised that in a day or two he would let me have a reply in writing. With regard, however, to the conditions concerning the control of the lines in Arabistan, the Russian Government would prefer that the nationality of employes should not be restricted to British and Persian, but would like that Russian signallers might also be employed in the event of this being rendered desirable by the development of Russian trade in the south. I think this is only desired as a compliment, and I trust that the desire may be acceded to. I doubt whether it is likely to be taken advantage of for some time to come. The Russian Government would prefer, and I think you share this view, that negotiations for the exchange of telegraph lines should be carried on distinct from the others. They wish that all these arrangements with regard to telegraphs in Persia should now be disposed of as quickly as possible.

[3488]

No. 179.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)*

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, January 26, 1909.*

FINANCES of Persia.

Appointment of French Treasurer-General and Financial Inspector.

I was told to-day by M. Isvolsky that he saw no objection to these appointments, but was waiting to hear what you thought about them. I said that the position of persons controlling the finances in a country such as Persia would be a very strong one, and I presumed, therefore, that the functions to be performed by these two officials would be strictly defined. I added that no third party, even though that third party were France, could be admitted to deal with Persian affairs on an equal footing with Great Britain and Russia. M. Isvolsky replied that he regarded the two officials as nothing more than mere assistants to M. Bizot.

[3424]

No. 180.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)*

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 26, 1909.*

NATIONALISTS in Azerbaijan.

I have received following telegram No. 22 of the 24th instant from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"Letter has been addressed to the Consuls by the local Assembly. Latter start that, having heard that a loan is being negotiated with a neighbouring Government by the Persian Government, they consider it necessary once more to declare that, as under the fundamental law the sanction of Parliament is requisite for any such loan, the nation will accept no responsibility for it.

"A successful engagement near Julfa has been fought by the Nationalists with the men of Baku."

[3482]

No. 181.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)*

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 26, 1909.*

ARABISTAN telegraphs.

Please see my telegram No. 423 of the 8th December, 1908.

Yesterday afternoon, at a meeting of the Minister of Telegraphs, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Indo-European Telegraph Department, an agreement in principle was arrived at verbally in regard to the control of the Arabistan lines. It will now be necessary for the Ministers to submit the proposal to the Shah in writing, and it is hoped that His Majesty's consent will be obtained very shortly.

It would be advisable, in the event of the control and repairs being handed over to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, to agree to forgo immediate payment for the iron telegraph posts, and I have ventured to authorize Mr. Barker to act accordingly.

Were we to insist on payment being made at once, to attempt to secure the control desired would be hopeless, and we hope that later it may be possible to utilize, as a *quid pro quo* for the extension of our Telegraph Concessions, whatever sum may be owing in respect of the iron posts.

[3061]

No. 182.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 26, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

You should ascertain from His Majesty's Consul whether the facts reported in Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 17 of the 23rd instant are accurate. If the answer is in the affirmative, you should suggest to His Majesty's Consul that he should try to effect a suspension of the demand made by the Anjuman of Ispahan. He might effect this by exerting his influence on Ilkhani in an unofficial manner.

[3357]

No. 183.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 26, 1909.*

LATE Governor-General of Ispahan.

With reference to the Governor-General's refusal to leave His Majesty's Consulate-General at Ispahan without a guarantee from His Majesty's Consul-General for his safety, I agree with opinion expressed in your telegram No. 59 of the 25th instant that protection outside Consulate-General is unnecessary.



[3578]

No. 184.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 27.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 17th December, 1908, relative to a visit to Robat of the Russian Military Attaché in Seistan.

*India Office, January 26, 1909.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 184.

*Major Kennion to the Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 15, 1908.

PERMISSION has been asked by the Russian Consul for Von der Flas to visit Robat. He said that in return he would obtain permission for our officers to visit Tashkend. I suggested that Khushk or a post on the Russian frontier would be a nearer parallel. He said he would refer matter.

Personally, I see no objection to proposal. There can, I think, be nothing about Robat that Russian Intelligence Branch do not already know.

Repeated to Foreign with Viceroy and Agent to Governor-General, Quetta.

Inclosure 2 in No. 184.

*Government of India to Major Kennion.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

December 8, 1908.

VON DER FLAS. Please see your telegram, dated 15th November, 1908.

Government of India are inclined to think that if Russian Consul reopens question, visit of Von der Flas to Robat can be permitted by you, provided he can arrange visit of British officer to Khushk, and that the matter had better be treated between yourself and your colleague as one for friendly settlement. But reference should be made to Minister at Tehran, this telegram being repeated to him.

[3600]

No. 185.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 27.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 26th January, relative to the Karun Irrigation Concession.

*India Office, January 27, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 185.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 26, 1909.

REPORT, dated the 21st ultimo, from Resident, Persian Gulf, states that, after consulting Minister at Tehran, he informed Sheikh of Mohammerah that no further developments had occurred in respect of the Karun Irrigation Concession. After repeating his appreciations, the Sheikh begged that his former request for a loan to enable him himself to finance an irrigation scheme on not too ambitious a scale, which a suitable British Syndicate would work for him, might be reiterated and pressed on his behalf by Major Cox. This request was made earnestly and a reply by telegraph was asked for. The Resident is apprehensive that the Sheikh, who from the outset has placed himself entirely in our hands, and relied upon us to look after his

interests, will receive a serious shock at news of Sturler's Concession. We take an anxious view of the situation. If given a free hand or supported, Sheikh could probably render impossible any work by concessionnaire. The suggestion we should like to make is that Resident should proceed to Mohammerah for purpose of discussing situation with, and reassuring the Sheikh. But nothing can be done by him unless he has full information as to the nature and scope of Concession to Sturler, as to result of objection lodged by His Majesty's Government, and as to whether it is possible even now by means of counter-Concession to cancel or neutralize Sturler's Concession. When fuller information has been received, we trust that an opportunity of expressing our views may be given us.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[3665]

No. 186.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)*

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 27, 1909.*

KARUN Irrigation Concession.

Telegram from Government of India to Secretary of State for India of the 26th instant and your telegram No. 28 of the 21st.

I have received a reply from the Persian Government to my note, reserving to His Majesty's Government the right to object to the Concession. Their note states that His Majesty's Government will have the right to object to anything contrary to their interests, and the Persian Government will take the necessary steps to remove such objections if a Company is formed and a Concession granted under the option.

I presume that if the interests of the Sheikh of Mohammerah can be effectively safeguarded there would be no objection to our continuing to maintain a neutral attitude, as our interests are identical with his. You will probably think it well to remind the Dutch Government of the conditions on which we agreed to remain neutral.

In the absence of a Dutch Representative here, I am unable to ascertain how the matter is likely to develop.

Following is confidential:—

It might be well to control at The Hague the assurance of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that nothing more definite than a mere option has been accorded, as I have private information that something more was granted.

[3601]

No. 187.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)*

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 27, 1909.*

ISPAHAN situation.

In a telegram dated to-day, His Majesty's Consul-General reports that Iqbal-ed-Dowleh, and most of his suite, escorted by three Bakhtiari Khans and a number of horsemen, left the Consulate-General this morning for Kashan.

[3482]

No. 188.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 27, 1909.*

ARABISTAN telegraph.

In reply to your telegram No. 61, dated the 26th instant.

Following is the arrangement which had lately been agreed upon by the British and Russian Governments:—

The Indo-European Telegraph Department would be ready to accept the proposal (to which you refer in your telegram No. 423 of the 8th December, 1908) when communicated to them by the Persian Minister of Telegraphs. In return, the Department

would offer, in the first instance, to reconstruct the Arabistan telegraph line, at a cost of about 6,000*l.*, on behalf of the Persian Telegraph Department, and subsequently to maintain it at an annual cost of about 600*l.*, on condition that the Persian Telegraph Department undertook to obtain an extension of the Concessions till 1945. Further, the Indo-European Telegraph Department would consent to advance to the Persian Telegraph Department the equivalent of ten years' rental of the Central Persian line in the form of a lump sum not exceeding 10,000*l.*, if this should prove necessary to insure that the Concessions be extended.

We should like the Agreement to be concluded on these lines, and Mr. Kirk, the Director-in-chief, is telegraphing the necessary details to Mr. Barker.

[3353] No. 189.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.*

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador, and, with reference to his Excellency's communication of the 21st instant respecting the reported demand of the Tabreez Nationalists for the payment of the local customs to the Anjuman, has the honour to state that telegrams dated the 23rd and 25th January have been received from His Majesty's Minister on the subject.

Sir G. Barclay reports that, according to the information of the General Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, no Tabreez customs duties have been paid into the Imperial Bank of Persia yet. The local Manager at Tabreez would, however, receive instructions, in the event of his being asked to receive them and disburse them locally, to decline to do so.

The Report of His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez is to the effect that there has been no question of the receipts in question being paid to the Anjuman, but that they were to be paid into a bank and remain there at the disposal of the Customs and not sent to Tehran. The Director of the Customs has, however, given the Anjuman the assurance that the entire receipts are devoted to the Russian Debt, and he hopes that this will settle the matter.

*Foreign Office, January 27, 1909.*

[2695] No. 190.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 42.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 27, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 37 of the 20th instant, in which you forward a letter from the Zil-es-Sultan asking that the protection of His Majesty's Government may be extended to certain of his servants.

I have to request your Excellency to inform His Imperial Highness in reply that His Majesty's Government regret their inability further to extend the protection afforded to him and his family.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

[2907] No. 191.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. Strick and Co.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 27, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant respecting red oxide Mining Concessions on certain islands in the Persian Gulf.

I am to inform you, with reference to the final paragraph of your letter, that His Majesty's Government have no objection to your making an application to the Persian Government in regard to the mines on Sirri; that, as you are aware from a semi-official communication dated the 23rd October, 1908, from the Board of Trade, another Company are also interested in this Concession; and that His Majesty's Government

cannot support one application in preference to the other, but that they will instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to support both equally and concurrently.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[3836] No. 192.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 28, 1909.*

'BANK and Bushire customs. Please refer to your telegram No. 27 of the 20th instant.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent me a note, according to which the interest on the advances made to the Persian Government by the Imperial Bank of Persia is to be paid from the 21st March in monthly instalments of 30,000 tomans from the Bushire customs, which are pledged for the purpose.

If by April no payment has been made in respect of the interest for this and last year on the Anglo-Indian loan, would it then be desirable for me to demand payment out of such portion of the Bushire receipts as may still remain?

It would in that case be necessary to arrange for the encashment of 13,000 tomans per mensem (as sinking fund for the Persian Government's debt to the Imperial Bank of Persia) from some other port in the south.

[3841] No. 193.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 28, 1909.*

SIRRI oxide.

Is it through the Persian Legation that Strick is conducting his negotiations for the Sirri Concession? If Strick has a representative in Tehran it would be advisable for me to see him, so that I may be able to form an opinion as to how I can best assist him, without, however, departing from our undertaking not to oppose application of the Manchester firm represented by Ifthar-ut-Tujjar.

Reference is to your telegram No. 30 of the 23rd instant.

[3846] No. 194.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 28, 1909.*

INSECURITY on trade routes.

State of roads is becoming increasingly insecure. Routes between Tabreez, Hamadan, and Kermanshah are now extremely bad, as well as those in the south.

Owing to the danger involved in remitting money, Chief Manager of Imperial Bank says that business is becoming impossible.

Reference is to my telegram No. 432 of the 12th ultimo.

[3488] No. 195.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 28, 1909.*

FRENCH Financial Inspector and Treasurer-General in Persia.

His Majesty's Government have no intention of objecting to the nomination of Frenchmen provided that the two officials are recognized as subordinate to the Financial Adviser (see your telegram No. 34 of the 26th instant). It is, however, in their opinion somewhat imprudent to propose the appointments before the meeting of a Parliament by which they may be approved.



[3348]

No. 196.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 28, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 17 of the 6th instant, the cost of the Indian oil guard in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz will, from the 18th instant, be borne by the Syndicate.

[3850]

No. 197.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)*

(No. 47.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 28, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 42 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inform you that I to-day received a visit from Akbar Mirza, a son of the Zil-es-Sultan, who has come to Paris on business. He inquired whether I had any information to communicate to him in regard to his father's affairs, and he read to me a telegram which has been received by the Zil-es-Sultan from another of his sons who is now at Tehran, stating that the Shah was much displeased at his return to Nice, the news of which had reached His Majesty, and desired that he would return to Persia immediately. The telegram urged the expediency of complying with His Majesty's commands.

Akbar Mirza further stated that the Zil had instructed the Imperial Bank of Tehran to pay to Mr. Churchill the sum of 200*l.* for the insurance of the box which he is to bring with him to Europe.

I informed Akbar Mirza of the instructions which had been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran by your telegram No. 33 of the 26th instant, in regard to the demand for the payment of taxes put forward by the Anjuman of Ispahan and of the inability of His Majesty's Government to extend further the protection accorded to the Zil-es-Sultan and to his family.

I have also addressed a letter to His Imperial Highness on the latter subject.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[3908]

No. 198.

*Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 29.)**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,**January 28, 1909.*

Sir,

WE beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, and thank you for the information contained therein, to the effect that His Majesty's Government have no objection to our making an application to the Persian Government for a mining Concession on the Island of Sirri.

We also thank you for pointing out that, in reference to the semi-official communication, dated the 23rd October, 1908, received by us from the Board of Trade, in the event of the firm named in that letter also making an application for the Concession, His Majesty's Government cannot support our application in preference to theirs.

With all deference, however, we venture to point out that, although the firm mentioned in the above letter is registered as a Limited Liability Company in this country, yet we have good reason for believing that it is a private Company formed a year or two ago to carry on the business of a Persian gentleman, who still holds the controlling influence, if not practically the whole interest in the firm, and, as stated in the letter from the Board of Trade above referred to, the Company may still be considered a Persian firm.

We have to-day cabled to our agents at Bushire in regard to negotiations for the Concession to work the minerals on the Island of Sirri, and we hope, with the assistance of the British Resident at Bushire, that we shall eventually succeed in obtaining this Concession on reasonable terms.

We have, &amp;c.

(For Frank C. Strick and Co., Limited),

(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK.

[3850]

No. 198\*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, January 29, 1909.*

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S box.

With reference to your telegram No. 30 of the 9th instant, it is asserted by the Zil that the Imperial Bank has received instructions from him to pay to Mr. Churchill, who is to bring the box to Europe, the sum of 200*l.* for purposes of insurance. Besides securities, the box contains 100,000*l.* worth of jewels.

If, in the present state of affairs, you consider the risk to be too great, Mr. Churchill should not bring the box, for there is of course no question of obligation on his part to do so.

[1629]

[3470]

No. 199.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 29, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copies of telegrams, as marked in the margin,\* on the subject of the negotiations relating to Persian telegraphs.

Sir E. Grey is disposed to think that there is no objection to acceding to the desire of the Russian Government that Russian signallers should be employed on the Arabistan line in the contingency named, but provision for this could more conveniently be made in a secret Agreement between Great Britain and Russia, and not in the understanding with the Persian Government, as the mention of such an eventuality might arouse the suspicions of the Persian Government, and thus delay the progress of negotiations.

As soon as the Persian Government have agreed to the extension of the Telegraph Concessions till 1945, including the prolongation of British rights over the Tehran-Khanikin line, a further Agreement might be concluded with the Russian Government, providing for the transfer of British rights over the Tehran-Khanikin line to Russia.

Sir E. Grey is inclined to deprecate raising with the Persian Government the question of the exchange of control over the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines until the other negotiations referred to have been concluded. He considers that if, as is apprehended, the Persian Government is reluctant to assent to the exchange, the fact of raising this question concurrently with the others might in the end retard rather than expedite the final solution of the several points under discussion.

Sir E. Grey proposes, subject to any observations the Secretary of State for India may desire to make, to telegraph in the sense of this letter to His Majesty's Representatives at St. Petersburg and Tehran.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[2162]

No. 200.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 29, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd ultimo respecting the claim of the Moin-ut-Tujjar that the oxide mines on the Island of Sirri are included in the Concession which he holds from the Persian Government regarding the Island of Hormuz.

As you are aware, the territorial status of the Island of Sirri is in dispute, and His Majesty's Government have never acquiesced in the Persian Government's claims to dispose of Concessions there regardless of the attitude of Great Britain.

I am to inform you, however, that a copy of the Moin's Firman has now been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and this document, as you will perceive from the copy inclosed,† contains no reference whatever to Sirri.

As, moreover, the Moin has not yet been able to produce, for the inspection of His Majesty's Minister, any title in original to the oxide mines at Sirri, Sir E. Grey is unable to accede to your request that any applications made by other parties for Mining Concessions on the island should be opposed by His Majesty's Minister.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[3841]

No. 201.

*Foreign Office to Messrs. Strick and Co.*

(Confidential.)

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, January 29, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 27th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a telegram, dated the 28th instant, has been received from

\* Nos. 178, 181, and 188.

† Not printed.



His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, inquiring whether you are negotiating through the Persian Legation in London with a view to acquiring the Mining Concession on the Island of Sirri. I am to request that you will furnish this Department with information on the subject, with a view to facilitating negotiations at Tehran.

Sir G. Barclay adds that if you have an agent at Tehran it would be well for him to call at His Majesty's Legation, in order that he may judge how your interests can best be furthered.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MAILLET.

[4023] No. 202.

Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 30.)

(Confidential.) Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
January 29, 1909.

WE beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of to-day's date, from which we note that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran inquired by telegram yesterday whether we are negotiating through the Persian Legation in London with a view to acquiring the Mining Concession on the Island of Sirri.

In reply, we beg to inform you that about three months ago, before Mirza Mehdi Khan was made the Persian Minister in London, he gave us to understand, as a private individual, he was in a good position to obtain from the Shah a Concession for the mining rights on the islands in the Persian Gulf belonging to Persia.

We thereupon made him the offer contained in our letter dated the 27th October, 1908, copy of which we inclose, but up to the present nothing has come of it.

We much regret that we have no representative at Tehran, and therefore are unable to avail ourselves of the suggestion made by Sir G. Barclay. As the negotiations through Mirza Mehdi Khan did not appear to be likely to lead to business, we have recently instructed our agents at Bushire, Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm, to endeavour to obtain the Concession, and we understand they are doing this with the knowledge of Major Cox, the British Resident at Bushire.

Thanking you for your letter, we are, &c.

(For Frank C. Strick and Co., Limited).  
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK.

Inclosure in No. 202.

Mr. Frank C. Strick to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
October 27, 1908.

Sir,

I SHOULD be obliged if you could ascertain whether it would be possible to obtain a Concession from His Imperial Majesty's Government of the mining rights on all the islands in the Persian Gulf belonging to Persia, excepting Hormuz, for a period of ten years, the royalty payable by me to be at the rate of 2s. per ton on all minerals or other natural products shipped from these islands.

In the event of this being possible, and terms being mutually agreed, I would be prepared to pay the sum of 1,000L. down for the option of accepting or declining such a Concession within nine months.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK.

[4105] No. 203.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) P. Tehran, January 30, 1909.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S jewel box. Your telegram No. 40 of yesterday's date.

The Imperial Bank of Persia told His Imperial Highness on the 20th that he must himself effect the insurance of the box, and this instruction was repeated by the Legation on the 26th instant.

It was understood that the 200L. which Zil-es-Sultan sent was for travelling expenses.

I should be glad if you could inquire by telegraph whether His Imperial Highness has now insured; and, if he has not, would you ask the Imperial Bank of Persia to do the needful and inform the Tehran branch by telegraph?

Pending reply I shall detain Churchill at Resht. He left here on the 27th.

[4106] No. 204.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) P. Tehran, January 30, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari.

I am awaiting the receipt of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed before replying to your telegram No. 31 of the 25th instant.

[4107] No. 205.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) P. Tehran, January 30, 1909.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN'S jewel box. Referring to my telegram No. 67 of to-day, I find I can effect the insurance in Tehran.

No action is needed in London as I am communicating with His Imperial Highness through the Embassy in Paris.

[4023] No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) P. Foreign Office, January 30, 1909.

CONCESSIONS for oxide in the Persian Gulf.

In reply to your telegram No. 65 of the 28th instant, Messrs. Strick approached the Persian Chargé d'Affaires in his private capacity last October, and asked his help in obtaining a Concession for mining rights. The Concession was to apply to "all Persian islands with the exception of Hormuz," was to last for a term of ten years, and the royalty was to be 2s. per ton exported. At the same time they offered to pay 1,000L. down if they might have a nine months' option for the acceptance or refusal of the Concession.

When the negotiations had dragged on for some time, Messrs. Strick, who have no agent at Tehran, communicated with Malcolm's, who are their agents at Bushire, instructing them to try to obtain the Concession.

You should assist Messrs. Strick as far as you properly can in obtaining a Concession for Sirri and such Persian islands as have not already been leased, and you should consult Major Cox on the subject.

[3488] No. 207.

Memorandum communicated to M. Cambon, January 30, 1909.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the French Ambassador, and, with reference to his Excellency's inquiry on the 28th instant as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the proposed appointments of a French Treasurer-General and a French Financial Inspector in Persia, has the honour to state that His Majesty's Government would not raise any objection to these appointments provided

[1629]

2 H



they are subordinate to that of the Financial Adviser. It would, nevertheless, perhaps be imprudent to introduce the question of these appointments before an elected Assembly meets in Persia and approves them.

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1909.*

[3850]

No. 208.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 49.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1909*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatches No. 34 of the 17th instant and No. 47 of the 28th instant regarding the conveyance of the Zil-es-Sultan's box of valuables to Europe.

It does not clearly appear from your Excellency's despatch No. 34 whether the Zil-es-Sultan has been informed that His Majesty's Government can accept no responsibility whatever for the safe transit of the box. If, therefore, His Imperial Highness has not been informed to this effect, your Excellency should do so now.

You should further inform the Zil-es-Sultan that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been authorized, in view of the disturbed state of Persia, to use his discretion as to whether or not Mr. Churchill can properly convey the box to Europe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[2122]

No. 209.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 43.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1909.*

IN my despatch No. 38 of the 28th instant I transmitted to your Excellency a copy of a document relating to certain commercial projects of an extensive character.

I have to request your Excellency to inform the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs confidentially of the contents of this paper, inquiring as to the accuracy of the statements made respecting the co-operation of and the conditions arranged with the Russian Government.

You should be careful to avoid committing His Majesty's Government in any manner with regard to these proposals.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[1163]

No. 210.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, in which you forward a despatch from the Government of India respecting the financial arrangements involved in the proposed transfer of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad telegraph lines.

Sir E. Grey observes that, provided the exchange is effected in accordance with the proposals of His Majesty's Government, it is estimated that, apart from any initial outlay, the annual cost of maintaining six offices and keeping the line in repair from Khaf to Nasratabad (350 miles) will amount to 3,100*l.*, as against a maximum charge of 1,333*l.* a-year for the maintenance of two terminal offices and the upkeep of the line from Tehran to Meshed (570 miles); and the hope is expressed in your letter that the sanction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury may be obtained to an arrangement whereby, in future, any expenditure for purely political purposes on telegraph establishments, &c., in Persia, over and above a sum of 1,333*l.* to be borne, as hitherto, by India alone, should be equally divided between the British and Indian Exchequers, in the same manner as all other expenditure in Persia of a political character.

I am to state in reply that in view of the adverse decision of the Lords Commis-

sioners in 1891, to which you allude, and of their Lordships' recent expressions of opinion as to the curtailment of expenditure in Persia, Sir E. Grey does not consider the moment opportune to make an application on the subject; that he would suggest the advisability of postponing further consideration of the matter until the exchange of lines has actually been effected; that the Persian Government might then be invited to contribute, as he understands is the case with regard to the Tehran-Meshed line, towards the cost of maintenance; that if no such contribution proves to be forthcoming, the Lords Commissioners might then be approached with a view to the additional cost involved by the transfer of the lines being borne by the British and Indian Exchequers in the proportion of 5 to 12, on the analogy of the distribution of the total cost prior to 1891.

With regard to the final paragraph of your letter under reply, I am to state that in view of the information contained in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 32 of the 26th instant (of which a copy has already been furnished to your Department), Sir E. Grey considers that the recommendations of the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in regard to the working of the line may be adopted.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[4108]

No. 211.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 31, 1909.*

PERSIAN finances. Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 34 and your telegram No. 95 in reply, repeated to me in your telegrams Nos. 37 and 38 of the 28th instant.

The appointment of a Treasurer-General without executive powers would, in the opinion of M. Bizot, be useless, and I concur in this opinion.

In order to introduce any improvement into the financial administration it is necessary to withdraw the provincial Treasurers entirely from the authority of the local Governors and place them solely under an official at the Ministry of Finance, in whose hands the whole financial administration would be centralized.

The best chance of effective reform, unless there is to be Anglo-Russian financial control, appears to lie in the centralization of authority in the hands of a capable European depending directly from the Minister of Finance in the same manner as M. Mornard already does for the Customs, for it is hardly conceivable that any Persian, even if he were supported by a popular Assembly, should be able successfully to combat the powerful influences at present favouring a lack of system which so easily lends itself to malversation.

I have avoided speaking of the Treasurer-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as I am ignorant of the nature of the forthcoming Anglo-Russian representations. But I think that Saad-ed-Dowleh realizes that he must have executive powers in order to be of any use, though I doubt whether he has any clear idea of his functions.

The following programme of the Treasurer-General's work has been sketched for me by M. Bizot:—

1. It must be his object to secure the payment of the *andiat* regularly, and to see that the expenditure with which it is now charged is met by it.

2. He must combat the irregular interference of local Governors in fiscal matters, and by degrees centralize all the revenues, including those of the customs, in the Treasury.

3. He should, in time, be able to elaborate a proper Budget, and insure its execution.

It appears to me that if the appointment of a Treasurer-General is to be carried through it would be better to settle the matter under the present régime. It may be difficult to induce an Assembly to allow the appointment after Parliament meets, and if it were then imposed the relations of the official appointed with the *Medjliss* would be more difficult than if his appointment were already an accomplished fact. Chauvinist though the former Assembly was, the Belgian Customs officials were retained by it.

Would not a "lettre de service" similar to that held by M. Bizot be sufficient to meet the objections to the possible intrusion of French influence?



[4109]

No. 212.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 31, 1909.*

TAXATION of Zil-es-Sultan's Ispahan property. Please see your telegrams Nos. 32 and 33 of the 26th instant.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the local Anjuman and Samsam-es-Sultaneh declare that "all must contribute to the public security," and decline to waive their claim to the Zil-es-Sultan's taxes. Mr. Grahame has been asked for advice as to payment of taxes by the son of His Imperial Highness, and I have instructed him to refuse to advise in the matter.

I could, if you desire, inform the Shah that Zil-es-Sultan has only yielded to *force majeure* in complying with the Anjuman's demands; but it would be wiser, I think, to let His Imperial Highness make his excuses himself, if he thinks it necessary.

[4139]

No. 213

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 57.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 24, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that an official communiqué appeared in yesterday's "Official Messenger" on the subject of the deliberations which have been taking place lately among high officials of the Russian Government on the subject of the situation in Persia.

The article refers to rumours which have been published recently in various Russian papers to the effect that serious differences of opinion had manifested themselves among the officials taking part in these deliberations, and that certain of them had advocated a forward policy in Azerbaijan as a set-off against concessions with regard to Balkan affairs. The communiqué points out that these statements are merely a repetition of former attempts to establish some sort of connection between events in the Balkans and Russian policy in Persia, and of false suggestions, which have already been contradicted officially, that Russia is aiming at intervention in the internal affairs of Persia, and seeks to acquire territorial acquisitions in that country. The article repeats the assurances already given that these rumours are absolutely groundless, and states that they do not correspond in any way with facts.

It will be seen that this communiqué is quite distinct from that which was drafted by M. Isvolsky and approved by you in your telegram No. 60 of the 23rd instant, and which will be published simultaneously by the two Governments. The publication of the present article was due to the fact that M. Isvolsky considered it necessary to deny the reports which have of late been current in local papers as to Russia's intention to seek compensation in Persia for the obstacles placed in the way of her policy in other quarters.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4142]

No. 214.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 60.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 26, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 16 and 28 of the 13th and 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I transmitted to the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, relative to various questions connected with telegraph lines in Persia.

I spoke to M. Tcharykoff yesterday on the subject, and he told me that the Russian Government agreed with all the proposals which were put forward in the *aide-mémoire*. They would, however, like that the condition referring to the sole employment of Persian and British signallers and officials on the Arabistan telegraph lines should be modified so as to permit of Russians being admitted as signallers should the necessity arise. M. Tcharykoff remarked that it was possible in the future

[4233]

No. 211\*.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 31, 1909.*

SITUATION at Ispahan.

Prince Farman Farma is trying to avoid going to Ispahan.

On the 29th a so-called regiment left here. Their strength is variously estimated at from 300 to 500 men.

[4110]

No. 212\*.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 31, 1909.*

AMIN-ES-ZARB'S debts.

A prominent Tehran merchant, Amin-es-Zarb, has for some time been in difficulties. He owes the Russian Bank 2,000,000 tomans and 500,000 tomans to the Imperial Bank of Persia. An offer has now been made by the Persian Government to take over his liabilities to both banks, and the following conditions are proposed:—

The Russian Bank would pay 150,000 tomans and the Imperial Bank 40,000 tomans to the Persian Government in cash "in order to pay the small creditors of Amin-es-Zarb." In return the Persian Government would take over from the banks the securities they hold, and would undertake to repay in five years the whole of Amin-es-Zarb's liabilities, together with 7 per cent. interest, charging a collecting commission of 5 per cent.

I understand that the Russian financial agent has telegraphed to St. Petersburg recommending that this offer should be accepted, and the General Manager of the Imperial Bank is telegraphing to his London office in the same sense.

As the debts are only secured in part, and the securities being landed property, would be difficult to realize. The proposed arrangement is undoubtedly the best that could be made in the interest of the banks; but, however attractive it may be for the two banks, the Persian Government would receive a lump sum of 190,000 tomans by the arrangement, which would besides enable it to make away with the debtor's estate. The result would be that the Persian debt would be increased by over 2,500,000 tomans, for it is very unlikely that the proceeds of the estate would be used to repay the banks.

that Russian trade in Southern Persia might develop, and it might then be of advantage if there were Russian signallers at certain points on the lines. He observed that the lines were neither in the British nor in the Russian zones, and, therefore, he hoped that no difficulty would be made in meeting this request. I told him that I would inquire of you. I trust that it may be found possible to grant the request of the Russian Government, as I doubt if it will be acted upon for some time, and I imagine that it would be regarded as a compliment.

M. Tcharykoff further said that the Russian Government thought that the negotiations as to the exchange of the telegraph lines between Tehran and Meshed and Khaf and Nasratabad, should be kept distinct from the discussions on the other questions. The above were the only modifications which the Russian Government would propose to the *aide-memoire* which I had communicated. He hoped to send me a reply in writing in a day or two.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

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Inclosure in No. 214.

*Memorandum communicated by Sir A. Nicolson to M. Isvolsky.*

HIS Majesty's Embassy would wish to recur to the question of telegraph lines in Persia, and to explain that since the date of the *aide-memoire* which His Majesty's Embassy had the honour to communicate to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 20th September (3rd October), 1908, and to which a reply is still awaited, certain fresh elements have been introduced on which His Majesty's Embassy would be glad to have the opinion of the Imperial Russian Government.

There have been already before the Imperial Russian Government—

1. The extension of the existing British Telegraph Concession to 1945 ;
2. The transfer to the Imperial Russian Government of the rights over the Tehran-Khanikin telegraph line ; and
3. The exchange of the telegraph lines between Tehran and Meshed and between Khaf and Nasratabad.

The fresh elements of which mention has been made are the following :—The Persian Government are anxious to improve and repair the telegraph lines in Arabistan, and the Persian Telegraph Department not having the requisite funds have applied to the Indo-European Telegraph Department to ascertain if that department would be prepared to carry out the necessary works and to take control of the lines. The Indo-European Telegraph Department would not be unwilling to meet the wishes of the Persian Telegraph Department, on the condition—

1. That the control should last till 1945.
2. That it should be permitted to employ telegraphists of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at telegraph offices at Mohammerah, Ahwaz, and at the station on the Tehran-Bushire line to which the Arabistan line may be connected.
3. That permission be accorded to connect the Arabistan line to the Tehran-Bushire line for the purposes of through working.
4. That permission be accorded to erect a second wire for the use of the Indo-European Telegraph Department should this be desired during the period of its control.
5. That a guarantee be given by the Persian Government that, with the exception of the employés of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, only Persian subjects will be employed in the telegraph offices and on the lines.

The replacing of the wooden posts at present in use by iron posts, and the general repair and upkeep of the line would, it is calculated, entail an initial outlay of about 6,000*l.* and an annual expenditure of about 600*l.* His Majesty's Embassy would wish to point out that it is desirable that the question of control over the Arabistan lines should be settled as soon as possible, so as to exclude the influence of any third Power in the telegraph system of Arabistan.

At the same time the opportunity should not be lost of securing from the Persian Government the extension of existing telegraph concessions to 1945 ; and His Majesty's Embassy considers that the extension of the concessions should be con-



nected with the acceptance by the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the proposal made to it by the Persian Telegraph Department. His Majesty's Embassy should add that the former department would be prepared to make an advance to the Persian Telegraph Department of ten years' rental of the Central Persian Telegraph—or 10,000*l.* The prolongation of the concessions to 1945, would of course apply also to the Tehran-Khanikin line, the rights over which will be transferred to the Imperial Russian Government.

The other fresh element is a proposal which has been made by the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs to the Indo-European Telegraph Department to erect a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud. In view of the impending transfer to the Imperial Russian Government of the control over the Tehran-Meshed line, and also to the fact that the line is within the Russian sphere, the British Government wish this proposal to remain in abeyance until the transfer has been effected, when the Imperial Russian Government will be able to consider whether they would wish to erect the second wire.

His Majesty's Embassy would express the earnest hope that all these questions should now be arranged with as little delay as possible, as a postponement of their settlement may lead to inconveniences and difficulties later.

[4146]

No. 215.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 64.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 26, 1909.*

I ASKED M. Isvolsky what he thought of the proposal that a French Treasurer-General and a French Financial Inspector should be appointed to supervise, and, as far as I understood, distribute among the several Ministries, the Persian revenues. He said that he saw no objection to the proposal, but had telegraphed to inquire the views of His Majesty's Government. He asked what was my opinion. I told him I could only give my personal opinion, and I must say that I was not very enthusiastic in favour of the proposal. It seemed to me that those who had control and supervision of the finance in a country like Persia would have a very strong position, and I thought that the functions of the two new officials should be very strictly defined. I did not know whether a *ménage à trois* would be a very satisfactory establishment in Persia, even though the co-partner was France. I presumed that, before the two officials took up their functions, their *lettres de service* would be submitted to the approval of the two Governments of Great Britain and Russia, and that it would be guaranteed that Russia and Great Britain retained the predominant position in Persia. M. Isvolsky said that he regarded the two new officials simply as assistants to M. Bizot; but he seemed to agree that it would be advisable to avoid a third party being placed on an equal footing with Russia and Great Britain. I said that I was expressing merely my personal opinion, as I had heard nothing from you on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[4312]

No. 216.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 1.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 30, 1909.*

WITH reference to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 26th instant on the subject of the Karun irrigation, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley would be glad to be favoured with the views of Secretary Sir E. Grey as to the attitude that should be taken by Major Cox in the discussion of the subject with the Sheikh of Mohammerah which appears to be rendered necessary by recent developments.

In view of the intimation made to the Netherland Chargé d'Affaires in the course of the conversation recorded in Sir E. Grey's despatch No. 53 to Sir C. Spring-Rice, dated the 9th April, 1907, and of the terms of Sir E. Grey's note to M. van Roijen of

the same date, Lord Morley hopes that it may be found possible to procure a cancellation of the Concession or such a modification of it as would be acceptable to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Lord Morley, I am to add, agrees with the Government of India as to the importance of safeguarding the position of the Sheikh.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[4173]

No. 217.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 49.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 49 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I addressed to the Zil-es-Sultan on the 10th instant, informing His Imperial Highness that His Majesty's Government could not accept any responsibility whatever for the safe transit and delivery of his box.

In accordance with your instructions, I have to-day informed His Imperial Highness that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been authorized, in view of the disturbed state of Persia, to use his discretion as to whether or not Mr. Churchill can properly convey the box to Europe.

I received last night your telegram No. 74 of yesterday, transmitting to me Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 67 of the same day, in regard to the insurance of the box in question. As Akbar Mirza, the son of the Zil-es-Sultan, is now in Paris, I requested him to come to see me this afternoon, and I inquired what he knew in regard to the questions raised by Sir G. Barclay. Akbar Mirza stated that he was uncertain as to the purpose for which the 200*l.* sent to the Imperial Bank was intended, and that his father estimates the value of the contents of the box at 200,000*l.* I have telegraphed in this sense to Sir G. Barclay, inquiring at the same time, at the request of Akbar Mirza, the cost of insurance for the amount above stated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

*Inclosure in No. 217.*

*Sir F. Bertie to Zil-es-Sultan.*

Sir,

*Paris, January 10, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Royal Highness that I have received instructions from Sir Edward Grey to acquaint you that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran will make arrangements for your box, now deposited at the Legation, to be brought to Europe by Mr. Churchill towards the end of this month. His Majesty's Government cannot, however, accept any responsibility whatever for the safe transit and delivery of the box, and in these circumstances I have been directed to ascertain whether your Royal Highness wishes to have the box insured, and, if so, for what amount.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[4174]

No. 218.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 50.)

Sir,

*Paris, January 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 47 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Akbar Mirza, stating that a further demand has been made by the Anjuman of Ispahan for the payment of taxes by the Zil-es-Sultan. I saw Akbar Mirza this afternoon, as reported in my immediately preceding despatch, and repeated to him what I had said on the



28th instant, namely, that you had instructed His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to suggest to His Majesty's Consul at Ispahan that he should use his influence with Ilkhani to secure the suspension of the demands put forward by the Anjuman.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 218.

*Akbar Mirza to Sir F. Bertie.*

5, Rue Villaret de Joyeuse, Paris,  
le 30 janvier, 1909.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

SON Altesse Impériale Zilli Sultan m'informe télégraphiquement qu'elle vient de recevoir d'Ispahan un télégramme de son locataire Mirza Hassan Ali Khan que l'Injoman a réclamé l'impôt pour la deuxième fois, en insistant vivement que l'impôt soit versé. Son Altesse Impériale ne sait quelle réponse donner. Je pense personnellement qu'il vaudrait mieux que Mirza Hassan Ali Khan voie le Consul d'Angleterre à Ispahan et donne à l'Injoman la réponse que celui-ci lui dicterait. Si votre Excellence pense qu'il doive en être autrement je la prie de vouloir bien me le faire savoir.

Veuillez excuser, M. l'Ambassadeur, mes demandes incessantes, et agréer, &c.  
(Signé) AKBAR.

[4345] No. 219.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 22.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, February 1, 1909.

I HAVE informed His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that I have received a telegram from Zil-es-Sultan stating that the insurance of his box must be effected at any rate. His Royal Highness has sent 200*l.*, which Mr. Churchill demanded, from Tehran, but His Majesty's Minister must make arrangements, which His Royal Highness will accept, for the insurance, if this amount is insufficient.

[4234] No. 220.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 1, 1909.

PERSIAN finances. My telegram No 53 of the 21st January. Owing to the Mularrem celebrations, M. Bigot's progress with his Report is being retarded, and he tells me that he cannot have it ready as soon as he had hoped.

[3348] No. 221.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 1, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 7th December, 1907, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, that for some months past he has been in communication with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and with the Secretary of State for India in regard to the retention of the Indian guard stationed in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz, in connection with the operations of the Burmah Oil Syndicate.

As you are aware, the Lords Commissioners sanctioned the charge to Imperial funds of one-half of the expenditure involved by the dispatch of the guard in question, at a total initial charge (exclusive of transport charges) of 266*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*, and by its maintenance at Ahwaz for a period of six months, at the rate of 1,824*l.* per annum.

The guard arrived in Persia about the 17th December, 1907.

At the end of six months, owing to the continued disturbed condition of Persia, it was felt that it could not safely be withdrawn; but steps were taken to determine

the period of its retention, and to arrive at a satisfactory solution as to the incidence of the resulting cost.

These steps, involving references to officers on the spot, the representatives of the Oil Syndicate, and the Government of India, have necessarily occupied some time, and, in view of the indefinite state of the question, a further communication to the Lords Commissioners was in the meantime deferred.

It has now been arranged with the Oil Syndicate that they will bear the cost of maintaining the guard from the 18th January, 1909, at the rate of about 174*l.* 8*s.* a-month.

From correspondence, of which copies are inclosed,\* it will be observed that the Government of India strongly recommend, on grounds which are explained, an additional allowance to the officers of the guard; in this recommendation both Lord Morley and Sir E. Grey fully concur.

I am accordingly to express the earnest hope that the Lords Commissioners will sanction the charge to Imperial funds of 67*l.* 2*s.*—being one moiety of 134*l.* 4*s.*—as additional salary to Lieutenants Ranking and Wilson for six months from the 17th December, 1907, to the 17th June, 1908, as well as half the cost of the guard, at the total rate of 174*l.* 8*s.* a-month for seven months from the 17th June, 1908, to the 17th January, 1909. Half the cost of the return journey to India will eventually become payable from the Imperial Exchequer.

I am to add that it has been with considerable reluctance that the Oil Syndicate have agreed to bear the future cost of the guard; and, in these circumstances, Sir E. Grey considers that any attempt to induce them to defray past expenditure would be foredoomed to failure.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[4388]

No. 222.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 2.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 28th January, relative to the Karun irrigation.

India Office, February 1, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 222.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 28, 1909.

I WILL consider, in consultation with Foreign Office, the suggestions regarding Karun irrigation made in your telegram dated the 26th January, 1909. Telegram was sent on the 21st January to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the following effect:—

“Please refer to your telegrams Nos. 47 and 50. Persian Government might be informed that, as the warning which Sir C. Spring-Rice addressed on the 2nd October, 1906, to Ala-es-Saltaneh has been disregarded by them, right to take objection to the scheme is reserved by His Majesty's Government. Resident, Persian Gulf, should keep in touch with Sheikh of Mohammerah, inform him of what is passing, and sound him as to his views.”

\* India Office, November 18; to India Office, November 27, 1908; India Office (extract noted), January 8, 1909.



[4485]

No. 223.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)*

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, February 2, 1909.*

RUSSIAN Memorandum on situation in Persia.

I was asked to-day by M. Isvolsky whether I had yet received a reply to the Russian Memorandum. I replied in the negative, but promised to telegraph to you to ask when one might be expected.

[4109]

No. 224.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 2, 1909.*

PAYMENT of taxes by Zil-es-Sultan to Ispahan Anjuman.

In reply to your telegram No. 72 of the 31st January, I agree that if excuses are required His Imperial Highness should himself make them.

[4108]

No. 225.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 2, 1909.*

TREASURER-GENERAL for Persia.

You are probably right in thinking that the appointment should be settled under the present régime. (See last paragraph of your telegram No. 70 of the 31st ultimo.)

If the Shah decides on immediate appointment, no objection would of course be raised by His Majesty's Government.

[4108]

No. 226.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 2, 1909.*

ANGLO-RUSSIAN co-operation in Persia.

Please refer to your telegram No. 70 of the 31st January and Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 17 of the 17th January.

The reply which it is proposed to send to the Russian Memorandum may be summarized as follows:—

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the best policy for the two nations to pursue would be not to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of Persia, but to allow whichever party is strongest to prevail. Such a policy may endanger British trade and, to a still greater degree, Russian trade, and if, in view of the probable losses consequent upon it, the Russian Government are not prepared to adopt it, His Majesty's Government are willing to co-operate with them as to any other course of action in the future.

His Majesty's Government agree with the Russian Government that the establishment of representative government offers the only hope of an amelioration in the situation, and, in consequence, are of opinion that the two Governments should endeavour to induce the Shah to carry out his promises and to grant an Assembly.

With regard to the Russian proposals, considered separately, His Majesty's Government propose to reply in the following sense:—

1. His Majesty's Government approve of the proposal to advise the Shah to call to his Council energetic men of ability for the elaboration of a scheme conferring representative government on the country, but they would also advise His Majesty to dismiss his present Councillors, who are reactionaries.

2. The advice which it is proposed to give to His Majesty has the entire approval of His Majesty's Government, who, however, suggest that a date should be fixed by

which a Constitution, acceptable to the Persian people, is to be granted. His Majesty should be warned that the two Governments will reconsider their attitude with a view to taking further action for the defence of their interests if he does not fulfil his promise by the date fixed.

3. With regard to the question of loan, His Majesty's Government are in favour of awaiting the report of M. Bizot. If the report makes it quite clear that Persian credit cannot be restored without a foreign loan, a careful study of conditions would be required. His Majesty's Government could, however, make no advance until the loan had been approved by an elected Assembly, and in any case they would be opposed to a large loan.

The opinion of His Majesty's Government is that until the establishment of representative government has taken place the question of control may be left open. They are in favour of giving the control of finances to the Assembly; this might be effected if a foreign expert were to organize a "Cour des Comptes." But they would raise no objection should the Shah immediately appoint a Treasurer-General.

4. For the present His Majesty's Government deprecate any advance at all.

[3836]

No. 227.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 2, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 14th ultimo, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin,\* from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, respecting the assignment of part of the receipts of the Bushire customs for the interest on the advances of the Imperial Bank of Persia.

In this telegram Sir G. Barclay raises the question of the service of the Anglo-Indian loans. Default cannot, of course, continue indefinitely, and Sir E. Grey would be glad of Lord Morley's views on the question of demanding resumption of payment.

He is disposed to think that the collection of the Gulf customs by or on behalf of His Majesty's Government, which a demand for repayment would probably entail, would be inopportune at the present moment, and might be regarded as interference in the affairs of Persia, which it would be advisable to avoid as long as possible.

He would be glad to know whether it would be feasible to impound, by the agency of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, the proceeds of the telegraph revenues, on which the advances are partially secured, should his Lordship agree that the collection of the customs should not be resorted to for the present.

With regard to the receipts of the Bushire customs, the Imperial Bank are satisfied for the present with the arrangement under which they will receive 30,000 tomans a-month; and Sir E. Grey proposes to instruct Sir G. Barclay that he need do nothing more in the matter until the receipt of further instructions.

As you are aware, the service of the bank's debt only forms a second lien upon the customs receipts of the Gulf ports.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[4491]

No. 228.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)*

(No. 71.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 30, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, relative to telegraph lines and Concessions in Persia.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.



Inclosure in No. 228.

*Memorandum communicated by M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.*

THE Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs deem it their duty to inform the British Embassy that they are prepared to proceed now to an exchange of telegraph lines in Persia, on the basis laid down in the *aide-mémoire* of the Embassy dated the 20th September (3rd October), 1908, and simultaneously with this are instructing the Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran to enter into an Agreement with the British Minister at Tehran on this subject.

As regards the proposals of the British Government, communicated by the Embassy in its *aide-mémoire* dated the 10th (23rd) January, 1909, respecting an extension of the term of the existing British telegraphic Concessions until 1945, and intrusting the repair of the Persian telegraph lines in Arabistan to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and the placing of these lines under its control, the Imperial Ministry take note of these proposals, and do not offer, on their part, any obstacles to their realization on the conditions put forward in the *aide-mémoire*. And they permit themselves only to express the hope that the British Government will not decline to introduce into point 5 of the conditions referred to an alteration to the effect that Russian telegraph officials, if such necessity shall arise in the future, may be permitted to work on the apparatus of the telegraph stations in Arabistan on conditions analogous with those which have been established with reference to the Khaf-Seistan line.

The Imperial Ministry on their part have the honour to acquaint the Embassy that they reserve to themselves, in the event of it being recognized as necessary, the right to induce the Persian Government to transfer to the charge of the Russian telegraph establishments the lines from Shahrud to the Russian frontier, and from Meshed to Askhabad, on similar conditions to those now existing on the Meshed-Seistan line. As regards the line from Shahrud to the Russian frontier, constituting the most important link connecting the Russian and Persian telegraphic systems, the Imperial Mission has already repeatedly made representations to the Government of the Shah on the subject of placing it in proper repair; nevertheless the condition of this line remains, as formerly, extremely unsatisfactory.

Whilst notifying the Embassy as above, the Imperial Ministry deem it their duty to explain that in their opinion it appears to be urgently necessary to separate negotiations on the question of any new Concessions from negotiations on the matter of an exchange between Russia and England of their respective lines, so as to preclude any delay in the decision of this latter question, which has been already perfected and regulated by both Governments. It is doubtless known to the Embassy that upon the first rumours of the intention of both Powers to exchange the right of control over the lines named, the Persian Government and the Medjliss regarded this fact with extreme suspicion, seeing in it a commencement (as imagined by the Persians) of the practical division of Persia on the basis of the Russo-English Agreement. In order to pacify the Persians and to put an end to similar rumours, the Russian and English Ministers deemed it necessary to attach to the exchange of lines the character of an entirely private agreement between the Russian and Indo-European Departments, which would make it evident that they are desirous of this exchange only in view of mutual advantages from a purely technical point of view—that is, as regards the maintenance of the line in proper repair, facility in supply of material, supervision of personal staff, &c. It would be advisable to leave this question on this basis still, and therefore its consideration together with questions of new Concessions appears undesirable.

In conclusion, the Imperial Ministry deem it their duty to mention that, taking upon themselves the rights of the British Government as regards control of the Tehran-Khanikin telegraph line, they have in view that all financial accounts between the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the Persian Government, both as regards the construction and the working of this line until its transfer into the charge of the Russian telegraph establishments, will be effected directly between the aforesaid Department and the Government of the Shah, and will not in any way concern the Imperial Government.

*St. Petersburg, January 16 (29), 1909.*

[4505]

No. 229.

*Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received February 3.)*

Dear Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, February 1, 1909.

WE are in receipt of yours of the 29th ultimo, and thank you for the copy of the Moin-ut-Tujjar's Firman, which we see contains no reference to the oxide mines at Siri, and we shall inform the Moin that, in the absence of proof that he has any title to these mines, you are unable to accede to our request that applications by other parties for Mining Concessions on the Island of Siri should be opposed by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

We are, &c.  
(Signed) ELLINGER AND CO.

[4506]

No. 230.

*Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received February 3.)*(Confidential.)  
Sir,Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
February 2, 1909.

WITH reference to our letters of the 28th and 29th ultimo, in regard to the Island of Sirri, we beg to inclose on separate sheet copies of cablegrams exchanged between our Bushire agents, Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm, and ourselves, under date of the 30th ultimo.

We have, &c.  
(For Frank C. Strick and Co.)  
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK

Inclosure in No. 230.

*Telegrams exchanged between Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm and Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.*

(1.)

*Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm to Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co.*

RECEIVED from Bushire, 30th January:—

"Samples sent per post. Our letter of the 23rd January contains all possible particulars. Inform us by telegram immediately if you have made application to the Government or Legation for Concession. Send us authority prospect Sirri. Will act with caution."

(2.)

*Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co. to Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm.*

Sent to Bushire, 30th January:—

"No application has been made, but we are in communication with Government. Legation, Tehran, have communicated with Foreign Office on the 28th January, inquiring who our agents at Tehran are. We have answered we have no agent at, but you are acting on behalf of us, and are acting in conjunction with the (Consul) Resident, Bushire. We give you authority prospect Sirri, also other islands. What islands have you the samples?"



[2848]

No. 231.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 46.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 3, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 38 of the 17th ultimo, in which you inclose a Memorandum from the Russian Government respecting the situation in Persia.

I have to request your Excellency to communicate the accompanying Memorandum, which has been drawn up in reply, to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

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Inclosure in No. 231.

*Memorandum to be communicated by Sir A. Nicolson to M. Isvolsky.*

HIS Majesty's Government have examined with much interest and careful attention the detailed Memorandum, communicated by the Russian Government to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the 3rd (16th) January, in regard to the deplorable situation which has arisen in Persia, and the measures which it may prove expedient to adopt.

After full consideration of all the circumstances, His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the best course to adopt would be for Great Britain and Russia to stand entirely aloof from the internal affairs of Persia, allowing the existing chaos to endure till whatever element in the country is strongest gains the day. During this interval, they would be prepared to face the danger which might be involved to British Misnercial interests.

On His Majesty's Government, however, cannot but recognize that it would be more difficult for Russia to maintain this attitude; she has a frontier and settled districts which are coterminous with the most disturbed part of Persia, and Russian trade has probably been more directly affected than that of Great Britain.

If, therefore, the Russian Government adhere to the view that it is impossible for Russia to adopt the course which His Majesty's Government consider would be advisable, they are prepared to co-operate with the Russian Government in regard to future action.

His Majesty's Government share the apprehensions of the Russian Government in regard to the present situation in Persia, and they agree that, until representative Government is established, the condition of the country is not likely to improve. They are indeed assured from reliable sources that, if a Constitution were granted, tranquillity would immediately be restored over the whole of Persia.

They therefore think that, for the present, the efforts of the two Governments should be directed towards inducing the Shah to fulfil his promises in this respect.

Dealing with the several proposals of the Russian Government in the order in which they are enumerated, His Majesty's Government would submit the following considerations:—

1. They gladly welcome the suggestion that the two Governments should advise the Shah to call to his Council able and energetic men, capable of assisting His Majesty in drawing up a scheme of representative Government. As a corollary to this, it would be advisable to recommend His Majesty at the same time to dismiss reactionary advisers such as the Grand Vizier and Amir Behadur Jang, who are believed at present to be the chief opponents of a popular policy, and to be largely responsible for the situation of affairs at Tabreez and Ispahan. His Majesty's Government would further suggest, with a view to reconciling Azerbaijan and Ispahan, that the Shah should be induced to proclaim general amnesty for all his subjects under arms.

2. His Majesty's Government entirely concur in the proposal to advise the Shah to elaborate at once a scheme of elective Government in conformity with the civic ideas of the Persian people.

This advice has already been given to His Majesty on more than one occasion by the Representatives of Great Britain and Russia, but hitherto with no result, and it

may be feared that the Shah will continue to disregard it, unless he is convinced that such a course will have inconvenient results to himself.

His Majesty's Government therefore suggest that a date should be proposed to the Shah beyond which the fulfilment of his pledge should no longer be postponed, and that it should be intimated to His Majesty that, unless a form of representative Government suited to the needs of the country be granted by a named date, he will get no support of any kind from the British and Russian Governments, who will reconsider their attitude to His Majesty and take measures to safeguard their interests.

3. His Majesty's Government consider that the question of a loan is by no means pressing, and that it had better be deferred until the receipt of the Financial Adviser's report, which they understand is likely to be ready in a few weeks. If that report shows that a foreign loan is essential to the re-establishment of Persian credit, the conditions under which an advance might be made would have to be carefully studied. His Majesty's Government would deprecate anything in the nature of a large loan, and could not consent to make any advance until an elected Assembly had approved of the transaction.

His Majesty's Government think that the question of control may also stand over until Constitutional Government is an accomplished fact; but the aim, in their opinion, should be to give the new Assembly control over the finances in some form, possibly by the institution of a "Cours des Comptes" organized by a foreign expert. If, however, the Shah decides to appoint a Treasurer-General at once, His Majesty's Government will not object.

4. To lend money to the Shah in present conditions would, His Majesty's Government consider, be regarded as a demonstration against the Constitutionalists in favour of personal government by His Majesty, and would constitute an interference in the internal affairs of Persia. The two Governments would, moreover, be surrendering their only hold over His Majesty without obtaining any *quid pro quo*.

*Foreign Office, February 3, 1909*

[3908]

No. 232.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 3, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th August, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copy of a letter from Messrs. Strick and Co. respecting the status of the firm of Hadji, Ali, Akbar, and Co.\*

Subject to the concurrence of the Board of Trade, Sir E. Grey proposes to reply that the firm in question is, notwithstanding the information of Messrs. Strick, a British firm, and that the constant rule of His Majesty's Government is not to discriminate between British firms in supporting their applications for concessions abroad, provided there is no doubt as to their respectability and no question as to their capacity adequately to carry out their obligations.

Subject to this rule, His Majesty's Government will, however, do what they can to assist Messrs. Strick.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[4601]

No. 233.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)*

(No. 54.)

Sir,

*Paris, February 3, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 42 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a further letter from the Zil-es-Sultan, containing a translation of a telegram which he has received from his agent at Ispahan respecting the action of the Anjuman of Ispahan in exacting by force the payment in advance of certain taxes due by His Imperial Highness only in the coming year.

\* No. 198.



Akbar Mirza again called at the Embassy yesterday and repeated what he had said on former occasions in regard to the desire of his father that his absence from Persia should not be indefinitely prolonged, and he requested that I would inquire whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give an assurance that in the event of an Agreement being reached between the Shah and the Constitutional party, which he thought might occur in a few months' time, the Zil-es-Sultan would then be permitted to return to Persia. The Zil was afraid, Akbar Mirza said, that the Russian Government might continue to oppose his return even after the constitutional régime had been re-established, alleging that his presence would lead to a recrudescence of disorder. He considered that such an apprehension was unfounded, and he did not anticipate that his return would be attended with any danger to himself. His desire was to return to Ispahan, as soon as order was re-established there, and live quietly with his family, taking no part in politics, and he was prepared to give an undertaking that he would act in no way contrary to the wishes and advice of the British and Russian Governments.

Akbar Mirza left Paris last night to rejoin his father at Nice.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 233.

*Zil-es-Sultan to Sir F. Bertie.*

89 bis, Promenade des Anglais, Villa Fantaisie,  
Nice, le 1<sup>er</sup> février, 1909.

Excellence,

J'ai reçu plusieurs télégrammes de mon intendant à Ispahan, Mirza Hassan Ali Khan, pour me tenir au courant de ce qui se passe. Il me dit que l'Andjoumen d'Ispahan, ayant à sa tête Sam-Sam-es-Saltaneh, est tout-puissant et veut percevoir l'impôt. L'également, cet impôt ne devrait pas être payé avant cinq mois, et, d'autre part, je ne devrais pas payer d'impôt, car la somme que je devrais verser est à décompter de la pension que doit me faire le Gouvernement persan. J'ai déjà télégraphié à mon intendant de ne prendre aucune décision sans demander conseil au Consul britannique et de suivre à la lettre les conseils qui lui seraient donnés par votre Représentant à Ispahan. Je vous envoie la traduction d'un télégramme que je viens de recevoir de mon agent, Hassan Ali, et, comme vous le voyez, on lui a pris 4,500 tomans (*sic*) en avance sur les impôts que j'aurais à payer l'année prochaine. Je me permets de vous rappeler que vous et l'Ambassadeur de Russie avez pris au nom de vos Gouvernements respectifs l'engagement de protéger ma famille et mes biens. Malgré cela, vous voyez les procédés dont on use à mon égard. Que puis-je et que dois-je faire? Je vous serais reconnaissant de communiquer ma lettre au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Londres, afin que, en connaissance de cause, on puisse prendre les mesures nécessaires.

Croyez bien, Excellence, que je regrette d'avoir à vous importuner aussi souvent, et veuillez, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 233.

*Hassan Ali Khan to Zil-es-Sultan.*

(Traduction.)  
(Télégraphique.)

[Non daté.]

ON m'a pris par la force 2,500 tomans (*sic*) comme avance. Veuillez m'envoyer en échange un chèque. Que dois-je faire? Peut-être que dans quatre jours on me réclamera de nouveau de l'argent.

[4742]

No. 234.

*Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received February 4.)*

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, February 3, 1909.

WITH reference to the interview our Chairman and Sir George Mackenzie had with you yesterday, I am instructed to forward, for your information, a translation of

the telegram which has been dispatched to-day to the Chief Manager of the bank in Tehran.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. NEWELL, Manager.

Inclosure in No. 234.

*Imperial Bank of Persia, London, to the Chief Manager of the Bank, Tehran.*

(Telegraphic.)  
(Translation.)

February 3, 1909.

REFERRING to your telegram of 31st January, after consulting with Foreign Office, Board approve if better terms not obtainable. With reference to Government indebtedness so largely in excess of authorized amount, Board is most anxious have same reduced as soon as possible. You might suggest inclusion of part of customs revenues Lingah and Bunder Abbas in addition to present lien on Bushire customs duty. If Persian Government will consent to the proposal above, you are authorized to say, in order to assist Government overcome financial difficulties, you will recommend Board rebate 25 per cent. of future interest annually on total Government debt by applying 3 per cent. of present 12 per cent. to reduction of Government debt.

[4708]

No. 235.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)*

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 4, 1909.

SHAH and Constitution.

Telegram No. 17 of the 17th January from Sir A. Nicolson, repeated to me in your telegram No. 43 of the 2nd instant, and your telegram No. 45 of the same date.

I venture to make the following observations on the Memorandum of the Russian Government and your proposed reply.

Is it not unnecessary to admit that the losses suffered by Russian subjects owing to the present condition of Persia are considerably greater than those of British subjects? If the probable diminution of our imports on the Trebizond route and the injury which is being done to our trade owing to the state of the southern roads be taken into consideration I am not indeed sure that it is a fact.

If the Shah could be persuaded to proclaim an amnesty for all his subjects under arms, it would in my opinion, increase the chances of pacifying Ispahan and Azerbaijan.

The dismissal of the present reactionary Ministers and more especially that of the Minister of War is, I think, essential before the elaboration of any scheme of representative Government can be attempted. The Russian Legation would, I believe, support this view.

The Shah is given, by the wording of the second Russian proposal, an unnecessarily easy opportunity of reverting to his old argument that constitutional Government is opposed to the laws of Islam, and I would suggest that any mention of "religious ideas" should be omitted.

The warning to the Shah, which you propose, would, I fear, be scarcely sufficient properly to impress His Majesty unless we were authorized to supplement it by an explanation that the impending change of attitude of the two Powers would, whatever other consequences it might bring, result in the sympathy of the two Powers being completely forfeited by the Shah personally. Now that the receipts of the Bushire customs are almost entirely pledged, His Majesty would regard a seizure of the customs with equanimity, and I believe that he would welcome control or intervention unless he could be made clearly to understand that he personally would lose if such measures were resorted to.

Could not "suited to the needs of the country" be substituted for "acceptable to the people" in the wording of the warning? What will content the Nationalists is not precisely known, but it will tend to make them more exacting if we ask for what will be acceptable to them.

Both Tabreez and Ispahan have declared that no loan, unless approved by the Assembly, will be recognized (see your answer to proposal No. 3).

[1629]

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[4768]

No. 236.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)*

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 4, 1909.*

KARUN Irrigation Concession. My telegram No. 62 of the 26th ultimo.

His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bushire reports that, in pursuance of my instructions, he requested His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah to interview the Sheikh on the subject of the Concession to the Dutch. The Sheikh considers that it would be better if the scheme were not put into execution, but he holds that in any case he has the right to do it; that, unless he held the Concession and influenced the Arab cultivators, they would certainly oppose it if it were attempted, and that it would be disastrous to attempt to coerce them. If he were promised British capital to work the scheme he could take up the Concession, and he wishes to be guided in the matter by the British Legation. In his opinion, it would be advisable for him to send a telegram to the Persian Government to warn them of the danger of granting a Concession to foreigners in view of the fact that the Arabs are disturbed by the rumours which have reached them of such a Concession, and that they would oppose it. The Sheikh also asks whether he has my approval in such a course.

In replying to Major Trevor, I have requested him to instruct His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah to tell the Sheikh that I am glad to have his views, but that I think it would be wiser not to make the proposed communication to the Persian Government at present, as the prospects of a Concession being granted seem still to be remote, and to add that I am consulting you as to what steps should be taken to safeguard his interests.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is well aware of the interest His Majesty's Government take in the matter, will keep me fully informed of any further developments. His Excellency tells me that M. de Stürler has expressed his dissatisfaction with the option.

I do not think that, for the present, anything more need be done here.

[4769]

No. 236\*.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)*

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 4, 1909.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I have been informed by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that the Persian Government has approached the Turkish Government with the proposal that the present Commission on the frontier should be dissolved, and that negotiations in Tehran or Constantinople should be resumed.

Saad-ed-Dowleh, whom I saw yesterday, complained that encroachments by the Turks on the frontier had been renewed. His Excellency promised to send me a detailed report of the information he had received.

[4872]

No. 237.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)*

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, February 5, 1909.*

SIRRI oxide. Your telegram No. 41 of the 30th ultimo.

His Majesty's Consular officer at Bushire has replied to my inquiries that Malcolm has taken no action himself as he understood that Strick was applying through the Foreign Office and the Legation.

Samples of the oxide on Sirri Island have been sent home by Malcolm, but the person he sent to collect them states that the deposits on the island are scanty, and hardly worth working. Malcolm has therefore suggested in writing to London that the deposits should be properly examined before proceeding further.

Malcolm has stated that he will take no action except through the Bushire Residency and the Legation here.

[4875]

No. 238<sup>c</sup>.*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*(No. 139.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.*Foreign Office, February 5, 1909.*

AFGHAN refugees.

We are ascertaining the views of the India Office on the course of action you propose in your telegram No. 53 of the 5th instant.

If Strick had an agent here I might see my way to helping him indirectly, and I would suggest that if he decides to go on with the business he should appoint one. Unless he does so it would be difficult to do more than merely present his application, in view of our promise to Haji Ali Akbar and Co.

[4873]

No. 238.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 5, 1909.*

AMIN-ES-ZARB'S debts.

Another proposal for taking over Amin-es-Zarb's debts to the two banks has been made by the Persian Government since that reported in my telegram No. 73 of the 31st January.

150,000 tomans at once and 200,000 tomans within fifteen months to be advanced to the Government by the two banks.

The Persian Government to pay Amin-es-Zarb's debts to the banks immediately on the conclusion of a foreign loan or within a period which has not yet been fixed, but of not less than ten years.

The Russian Financial Agent has telegraphed the new proposal to the Russian Finance Minister, who is in Paris, and who, before leaving St. Petersburg, gave orders that no decision on any question involving an increase of the Persian Government's debt is to be taken during his absence. Mr. Wood is also telegraphing to his London office.

The Managers of both banks are anxious to accept the new proposal, but the political objection to the former proposal applies more strongly to the present one.

[3348]

No. 239.

*Foreign Office to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 5, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd ultimo, in which you intimate the assent of your Syndicate to bear the cost of the retention of the Indian guard in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz, as from the 17th ultimo, at a cost of 174l. 8s. a-month.

I am to state that this sum represents the cost of maintaining the existing guard in Persia; should, however, circumstances render the retention of a guard expedient beyond a certain period, it is presumed that the dispatch of reliefs will become necessary, and that this would involve some additional expenditure.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[5025]

No. 240.

*Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 6.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Board of Trade, February 5, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd January forwarding copy of a letter from Mr. J. Simpson and of a communication addressed to him by M. N. Notovitch suggesting that His Majesty's Government should support the formation of an Anglo-Russian Bank in Persia.

In reply I am to transmit to you, to be laid before Sir E. Grey, the accompanying copy of a Memorandum with regard to M. Notovitch's proposals which has been prepared in this Department.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GEO. J. STANLEY.



Inclosure in No. 240.

*Memorandum respecting proposed Anglo-Russian Bank.*

(Confidential.)

MR. J. SIMPSON, of Dashwood House, evidently Mr. Joseph Simpson, Managing Director of Messrs. Simpson and Partners (Limited), of Dashwood House, is reported to be a Company promoter of medium quality, and it is quite impossible to estimate what the means of such may be. Simpson and Partners (Limited) have been more particularly engaged in mining flotations. The foregoing, I may say, has been gathered from conversation with Messrs. Seyd.

The proposed bank is evidently to be much more than a bank in the English sense of that word; in fact, it would appear to be more of a promoting and investment Company. As such it would not attract the best banking men here as Directors.

Taking the enterprises which are proposed to "be given for the purposes of exploitation" to the bank, in the order stated by M. Notovitch, I may remark:—

1. The Discount and Loan Bank of Persia was established in 1891, so I am informed by Mr. Newell, of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and has continued ever since under somewhat different names from time to time, *e.g.*, the Banque de Prêts de Perse, the Banque d'Escomptes et de Prêts. Originally it was not directly fathered by the Russian Government, but in 1896, in order to avoid the shock to Russian prestige of its becoming bankrupt, the Russian Government took it over, its capital then being, I believe, 3,000,000 roubles, or, say, 120,000*l.*, which it still is (1,200,000*l.* in the copy of M. Notovitch's letter must be an error). The bank seems to pose as an independent bank, an institution which the Russian Government could disown in case of need, but no statement of accounts is published or obtainable, and the Imperial Bank and others take its paper, which is drawn chiefly, I gather, on the Russian Bank for foreign trade here, under the conviction that the Russian Government will never let the bank fail. On its own merits, however, the Imperial Bank have a poor opinion of it. I gather from M. Notovitch that its loans had not been carefully made. He instances one case in which it had advanced in all 400,000*l.* to one man, Amin-el-Zarb, a wealthy Persian, and had taken real estate as part security, also that it has a quantity of unsold Russian goods stored in different places, which, I gather from Mr. Maclean, have probably been brought out under the special facilities of duty and freight drawbacks, &c., for Persian indentors who have been unable to take up their purchases. One can readily understand how this state of things would come about in a bank worked by Russian Government officials. Mr. Newell, of course, was cautious in his statements, but my own impression is that the bank on its own basis is probably insolvent. The Russian Government would doubtless welcome British money to help to pull these particular chestnuts out of the fire. In connection with the foregoing I would refer to p. 14 of the Report of the British Indian Commercial Commission to Persia and p. 5 of Mr. Maclean's Report.

2 and 3. There is no suggestion that British contractors and manufacturers should share in the construction of, or in the supplying, plant to the railways and ports named, but only that, through the proposed bank, British capitalists should share in the prospective profits of financing and floating or working the several Concessions indicated. This is not sufficient from our point of view.

4. No doubt pawnshops make money in the East as elsewhere. We do not consider in this country, however, that they can properly be combined with banking.

5. An oil pipe from Baku through Persia to the Gulf might be a very valuable property, but its value would be owing to the amount of effective competition it could bring in India and other Eastern markets with the Burma Oil Company and the Companies (which are largely owned here) represented by the Shell Transport and Trading Company.

6. I question whether the right to a Concession to all sorts of insurance would be worth very much in Persia for a good while to come.

7. "Undertakings in Northern Persia already existing in Russian Concessions" are presumably existing Russian undertakings owned by Russian concessionnaires. The acquisition of these will be helped by the Russian Government, but it would be interesting to know who owns them now. This has the appearance of more chestnuts to pull out of the fire.

Regarding the conditions upon which the Ministry of Finance is prepared to deliver up the Discount and Loan Bank, I would say:—

1. The proposed paid-up capital of the new bank seems very high considering that the Imperial Bank of Persia only has a paid-up capital of 650,000*l.*, but this is explained, doubtless, by the fact that the Discount and Loan Bank, M. Notovitch states later on, is enabled by a new statute to enlarge its sphere to extend all over Russia.

2 to 5. I have already stated that the constitution of the proposed bank would not attract the best class of banking Directors here, still less would such men be attracted by having to sit on a Board with Russians, and they would certainly object to the management and bulk of the staffs in the Eastern offices being nothing but Russian, and also to the administration office being in St. Petersburg.

6. So far as regards Constantinople, this proposal would clash with another more in British interests which I understand is incubating.

7. I have already referred to this.

In conclusion, I cannot see from a commercial point of view the attraction in M. Notovitch's crude proposals. There is no evidence of another bank on the scale proposed being needed in Persia, and I question if there is any in Russia. A bank does well to begin on a moderate scale, and to increase its capital as the Directors are able to find use for it. A bank beginning with a million and a-half capital, and with full powers to act as a promoting Company, and worked by Russian officers, would have a very good chance of finding itself in "Queer Street" in a few years. If, however, it be desired on other than commercial grounds to seriously consider a proposal of the character proposed, the first step to take (it appears to me) is to investigate M. Notovitch and his high-sounding statements. Should these be found to be warranted, and that he has the solid support of the Russian Government, not a mere approval on the off-chance of his doing something, then it would be well for the Embassy in St. Petersburg to give him a hint that he had better place his proposals before some of the well-known financiers here, such as Baring Brothers and Co. (Limited), Coats, Son, and Co., Chadwick and Co., or the City of London Contract Corporation; it would then be possible for the Government to feel that they were on safe ground in anything that might be done.

As regards the bearing of the proposals on the position of the Imperial Bank of Persia, I have not seen a copy of the Charter of that bank, but it seems to me if the Discount and Loan Company of Persia have been able to do business in Tehran and other places (see the Report of the British Indian Commercial Mission already referred to) without protest from the Imperial Bank that it would be possible for the proposed bank, which will practically stand in the shoes of the Discount and Loan Bank, to do the same.

[5019]

No. 241.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)*

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 6, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

Mr. Wratislaw reports from Tabreez that several persons there have received letters from Ain-ed-Dowleh, in which he expresses a wish to see them and negotiate for peace. The Anjuman to whom these letters were referred have replied that they could not send delegates to Ain-ed-Dowleh, but that they would be glad to receive him if he would send any. The Anjuman at the same time suggested that a Consul not representing a neighbouring Power should be present at any discussion of terms, &c., which might take place.

[4708]

No. 242.

*Sir Edward Grey to A. Nicolson.*

(No. 148.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 6, 1909.*

SITUATION in Persia: reply to Russian Memorandum.

Please refer to my despatch No. 46 of the 3rd instant.

You should insert in the note to the Russian Government, at the end of paragraph 8,

[1629]

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the words: "His Majesty's Government would further suggest, with a view to reconciling Azerbaijan and Ispahan, that Shah should be induced to proclaim general amnesty for all his subjects under arms." This should follow immediately after "Tabreez and Ispahan."

In paragraph 9 the words "religious and" should be omitted.

In paragraph 11 "a form of representative Government suited to the needs of the country" should take the place of the words "a Constitution which is acceptable to his people."

The warning which it is proposed to give to the Shah would probably not make sufficient impression on him unless the two Representatives were allowed to elaborate it somewhat when giving it. They might explain that the impending change in the attitude of the two Powers would mean that His Majesty would lose all the sympathy of the two Powers, quite apart from other consequences to the country. Please put this suggestion before the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[5124]

No. 243.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 150.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 6, 1909.*

AMIN-ES-ZARB'S debts to the Russian and Imperial Banks (see Sir G. Barclay's private telegram of to-day and his telegrams No. 73 of the 31st ultimo and No. 79 of the 5th instant respectively).

It would be regrettable if the arrangement were put into force in view of the information contained in the above-mentioned telegrams. We should use all our influence to persuade the Imperial Bank to abstain, provided that the Russian Bank decide to do so. I should be glad to be informed of the views of the Russian Government, and you should ascertain these from M. Isvolsky.

[5196]

No. 244.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)*

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 8, 1909.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Mr. Wratislaw reports a rumour that an advance has been made in the Salmas district and elsewhere by small detachments of Turks.

I am informed by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that the Turkish Government, in order to protect their subjects and Consulates, have been obliged to send a guard of ten men under a corporal both to Urumia and to Khoi, and that no advance has been made beyond this necessary and purely protective measure.

Saduddin Bey is to-day informing the Persian Government of the step taken.

[5047]

No. 245.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 153.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 8, 1909.*

SITUATION in Persia: Russian Memorandum (see your telegram No. 59 of yesterday's date).

At present I am not prepared to go further than is indicated in paragraph 12, point 3. In my opinion it would be desirable to obtain the approval of an Assembly before making any advance. I should in any case be very reluctant to abandon this attitude except under conditions which had been very carefully considered, and in response to strong representations.

[5466]

No. 246.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 157.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 8, 1909.*

AMIN-ES-ZARB'S debts to Russian and Imperial Banks.

With reference to my telegram No. 150 of the 6th instant, I gather that, unless some unexpected obstacle arises, the Imperial Bank will accept the new proposal made by the Shah for taking over the debts of the Amin-es-Zarb. They have telegraphed asking for details of the scheme.

Much as I regret the bank's decision, I cannot prevent them from accepting what seems right to them in the interests of their shareholders. The temporary relief provided by the bank may have the effect of encouraging the Shah in his futile struggle against reforms, and it thus becomes more important than ever for us to be extremely firm in our attitude towards him.

[4708]

No. 247.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 8, 1909.*

SITUATION in Persia: Russian Memorandum and proposals. With reference to your telegram No. 75 of the 4th instant.

In their reply to the note of the Russian Government, His Majesty's Government have incorporated the suggestions contained in your telegram.

[5427]

No. 248.

*Messrs. Ph. Ziegler and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received February 9.)*

Sir,

*Manchester, February 8, 1909.*

CONFIRMING our lines of the 6th instant, we have pleasure in informing you that we have received the following message from our Ispahan friends:—

"Bakhtiari Chief excused himself. His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Ispahan, thinks that this is sufficient satisfaction. Please report this to the Foreign Office, London."

The telegram does not mention that the Bakhtiari Chief has given any undertaking that there shall be no recurrence of such episodes, but, in view of the above, we shall be much obliged if you will kindly let us know whether we are to instruct our friends in Ispahan that the incident is now to be regarded as closed.

We remain, &c.

(Signed) PH. ZIEGLER AND Co.

[5473]

No. 249.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)*

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 9, 1909.*

DISORDERS at Resht.

M. Sabline has received a message by telephone from his Consul at Resht to the effect that the house of the Governor was attacked yesterday by revolutionaries. The Governor was apparently killed, and troops took refuge in the Russian Consulate. The situation is considered critical. Telegraphic communication with Tehran is cut.

We are pressing the Persian Government to appoint a Governor acceptable to the people, and to take measures for the restoration of order and for the protection of British and Russian interests.



[5478]

No. 250.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)*

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 9, 1909.*

SITUATION at Yezd.

Disorders, in which several of the Governor's men have been killed, are reported by the British Vice-Consul at Yezd. The movement claims to be Nationalist. It is believed that the Bakhtiari of Ispahan are extending their field of action to Yezd.

[5459]

No. 251.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 9.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th instant, relative to the Sirri Oxide Concessions.

*India Office, February 9, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 251.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*February 8, 1909.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 2nd instant.

Resident in Gulf informs us that the amount of oxide worth working on Sirri is reported to be small by brother of Residency Agent at Lingah, who recently visited the island for the purpose of obtaining samples of oxide. Before proceeding further, therefore, intending concessionaire would be well advised to prospect the island carefully.

[5504]

No. 252.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)*

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 10, 1909.*

SITUATION at Resht.

In continuation of my telegram No. 82 of yesterday, I learn from a telephone message sent by the Russian Consul at Resht to M. Sabline that the town is in the hands of the revolutionaries (these are presumably Nationalists). For the moment foreigners are in no danger, and a provisional Government has been established.

[5705]

No. 253.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 11.)*

Sir,

*India Office, February 10, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 29th January and the 3rd instant, as to the negotiations with the Russian and Persian Governments concerning—

1. The transfer of the Arabistan lines to the control of the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the extension till 1945 of the Company's Concessions.
2. The Agreement with the Russian Government for the transfer of British rights over the Tehran-Khanikin line to Russia.
3. The exchange of control over the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines.

A Memorandum by the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department on the subject, dated the 4th February, 1909, is inclosed.

As regards the Arabistan lines, Viscount Morley agrees with Sir E. Grey that the wish of the Russian Government for the employment of Russian signallers on the lines, in the event of future developments of Russian trade in the south making it desirable, should be met by a secret Agreement between Great Britain and Russia, while the Agreement with the Persian Government should, as suggested by Mr. Kirk, stipulate that, without the concurrence of the British Government, no others than Persian subjects and members of the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department should be employed in the offices or on the lines of the system. The proposal in the Russian *aide-memoire* as to taking over the lines from Shahrud and Meshed to the frontier, on the conditions now existing on the Meshed-Seistan line, should admit of the employment of British signallers on the lines in question, if it should be thought hereafter desirable.

As regards the question of a further Agreement to be concluded with the Russian Government providing for the transfer to Russia of British rights over the Tehran-Khanikin line, I am to observe that Mr. Marling was instructed, by Sir E. Grey's telegram of the 26th February last, that the exchange of the Memoranda of the 23rd June and the 24th August, 1907, appeared a sufficient record of the Agreement between the two Governments, and that no further formality was contemplated. Lord Morley concurs in the view that any further Agreement with the Russian Government on the subject that may be necessary should be deferred till after the consent of the Persian Government to the extension till 1945 of the Telegraph Concessions has been received.

As regards the exchange of control over the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines, Lord Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's view that the matter should, if possible, be deferred till the other negotiations referred to have been concluded. But he observes from the *aide-memoire* that the Russian Government express the desire for an immediate settlement of the question of the exchange.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 253.

*Note by Mr. Kirk on Foreign Office letter dated January 29, 1909.*

I HAVE telegraphed to Mr. Barker at Tehran that, among the stipulations for our control of the Arabistan lines, there should be a guarantee that the Persian Government will allow the employment of no others than Persian subjects and staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the offices or on the lines, except with the concurrence of the British Government. With a stipulation in this form the suspicions of the Persian Government should not be aroused, and the Agreement, as to the employment of Russian signallers should the future development of Russian trade in the south of Persia make it desirable, can be made privately between the British and Russian Governments. This possible introduction in the future of Russian signallers into the Arabistan telegraph offices is not altogether desirable, and was not anticipated. If it were carried out entirely for trade purposes the employment would only be in the comparatively large centres of business such as Mohammerah and Ahwaz, and this would not be of much importance one way or the other.

As to the further Agreement referred to in the third paragraph on the subject of the transfer of the rights over the Tehran-Khanikin line, the Foreign Office telegraphed to Mr. Marling on the 26th February, 1908:—

"Your telegram No. 42.

"Cession of rights over Tehran-Khanikin line. Exchange of Memoranda appears sufficient as record of Agreement between two Governments, and no further formality is contemplated."

The information I have received is that the Persian Minister of Telegraphs is much opposed to the transfer of the Tehran-Meshed line to the Russians, and there is little doubt that if this question was pressed on him the settlement of the other telegraph questions would be delayed.

*January 30, 1909.*

(Signed) H. A. KIRK.

[1629]



The Russian *aide-mémoire*, since received, brings to notice that the Russian Government reserve to themselves the right to induce the Persian Government to make over to them the control of the lines from Shahrud to the Russian frontier and from Meshed to Askhabad, on similar conditions to those now existing on the Meshed-Seistan line. The employment of British signallers on the Meshed-Seistan line is one of the existing conditions, and if the employment of Russian signallers is agreed to on the Arabistan lines, it seems a matter for consideration whether the Russian Government should not be asked to agree to the employment of British signallers on the lines they state they may have to take over from Shahrud and Meshed to the Russian frontier.

It has also to be noted that the Russian Government ask that the negotiations for the renewal of British Concessions and the control of the Arabistan lines should be kept separate from the negotiations for the transfer of the Meshed-Tehran and Meshed-Seistan lines, so as to preclude any delay in the settlement of the latter question. Whereas the view adopted on our side is that if this latter question is pressed on the Persian Government at once this action will probably delay the settlement of all telegraph questions now under negotiation.

The last paragraph of the *aide-mémoire* refers to financial accounts between the Persian Government and the Indo-European Telegraph Department regarding the Tehran-Khanikin line. There are no such accounts, as the line is worked entirely by the Persian Telegraph Administration.

(Signed) H. A. KIRK.

February 4, 1909.

[5707]

No. 254.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 11.)

Sir, IN reply to your letter dated the 29th ultimo, as to the attitude of the Persian Government on the question of the status of Bahrein, I am directed by Viscount Morley to inform you that he concurs in the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to approve the action of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in returning the Mushir-ed-Dowleh's note of the 9th April, 1908, and to defer until a more opportune moment the further discussion of this subject with the Persian Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[5681]

No. 255.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 11.)

Sir, I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, and to state in reply that the Board concur in the terms of the communication which Sir E. Grey proposes to make to Messrs. Strick on the subject of Mining Concessions in the Island of Sirri.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) GEO. J. STANLEY.

[5736]

No. 256.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 28.)  
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* MY telegram No. 27 of 26th June and Mr. Marling's telegram No. 187 of 3rd July. Dr. Ismail Khan desires to return to Persia, and asks that he may be furnished with letter of protection by His Majesty's Government. He makes similar request on

Paris, February 11, 1909.

behalf of Mostepha Gholi Khan, formerly head of the Treasury under the Constitution. He says that they were both promised protection, if necessary, by His Majesty's Legation.

They are anxious to start for Persia in six days' time.

[5730]

No. 257.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 85.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 11, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

A fresh invitation has been sent by Ain-ed-Dowleh to the Nationalists of Tabreez to send Delegates to negotiate with him for peace, urging them to come to terms directly with the Shah in order to anticipate Anglo-Russian intervention.

Cavalry from Karadagh are blocking the road to Julfa.

The position of the Nationalists in Tabreez seems to be rather precarious, and bread is scarce in the town. Mr. Wratislaw thinks that a comparatively short blockade may compel surrender, as he understands that the reserves of grain are less than was supposed.

With the Kasvin, Maraga, and Julfa roads blocked, I gather that Tabreez is now almost completely cut off from supplies.

[5731]

No. 258.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 86.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 11, 1909.*

TURKISH guards for the Consulates at Khoi and Urmia. My telegram No. 81 of the 8th instant.

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has received a reply from the Persian Government to his communication, strongly objecting to Turkish guards being sent to Urmia and Khoi. The Persian Government add that the necessary measures for the protection of Turkish Consulates and subjects will be taken by the Government themselves.

[5732]

No. 259.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 87.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 11, 1909.*

SITUATION at Yezd. My telegram No. 83 of the 9th instant.

A number of Parsees have taken refuge with the Acting Vice-Consul.

Some Bakhtiaris, who appear to have been joined by the inhabitants of Taft, are in the vicinity, and are harrying the neighbourhood.

[5688]

No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 175.)  
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 11, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 157 [Amin-es-Zarb].

Imperial Bank of Persia, regarding Amin's affairs as hopeless, have unwillingly authorized Tehran Manager to accept Shah's last proposal, but I am without details.



[4768]

No. 261.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 11, 1909.*

KARUN irrigation. See your telegram No. 76 of the 4th instant.

It is unnecessary at present to make any further communication to the Sheikh, as I am ascertaining the opinion of the India Office on the question of making representations to the Netherland Government on the subject.

[4601]

No. 262.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 76.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 11, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 54 of the 3rd instant respecting the compulsory payment by the Zil-es-Sultan of certain taxes to the Anjuman of Ispahan and His Imperial Highness' desire to return to Persia.

I request your Excellency to inform the Zil, in reply to his inquiry, that His Majesty's Government cannot at the present time give any assurance of the kind desired, but that if and when Constitutional Government is established in Persia they will consult with the Russian Government as to the possible date of his return.

It might be advisable to explain to His Imperial Highness again that he is of course at perfect liberty to return to Persia whenever he desires at his own risk. If, however, he decides to obey the Shah's summons, His Majesty's Government cannot continue to protect him.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

[4768]

No. 263.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo respecting the Karun irrigation scheme, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit herewith, to be laid before Viscount Morley, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject.\*

In view of the communication which has already been made to the Sheikh, Sir E. Grey thinks it unnecessary, subject to Lord Morley's concurrence, to say anything further to him for the present, but to await the reply of the Netherland Government to the note which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to them, if Lord Morley sees no objection, and of which a draft is inclosed.†

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[5824]

No. 264.

*Mr. Lynch to Mr. Synge.—(Received February 12.)*

My dear Synge,

33, Pont Street, London, February 9, 1909.

I RETURNED on Sunday night from Paris, where I have been in communication with several of my Persian friends. Upon my arrival I was glad to find your letter of the 5th instant. So many thanks for all the trouble that you have taken in this matter, and in what I believe to be a good cause. You will remember that when we last met you suggested that it might be possible to work in harmony with the Foreign Office. This suggestion fell upon very willing ears, for, as I pointed out, neither myself nor any of my colleagues on the Persian Committee have any desire to advertise ourselves or to fry any fish of our own. I am certain that it would give us all the greatest possible

\* No. 236.

† See No. 341.

pleasure to range ourselves on the side of the policy of our Government, especially as most of us are loyal supporters of that Government. Personally, I should like nothing better than to frame a question on Persian affairs shortly after Parliament meets, the answer to which might at the same time show harmony between ourselves and the Foreign Office, and might also go far in the direction of allaying the fears of those who look with suspicion upon the *entente* with Russia.

With the object of carrying out a course of action of this kind, I inclose a further short Confidential Memorandum, which brings my former one up to date. With the view of determining our attitude when Parliament meets, I should be greatly obliged if I could be informed whether the proposal at the conclusion of this Memorandum finds any favour at the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,  
(Signed) H. F. B. LYNCH.

Inclosure in No. 264.

*Memorandum by Mr. Lynch.*

(Confidential.)

I HAVE already given some account of the telegram which was sent from Paris to the Shah by the Ala-el-Mulk. His Excellency left for Tehran a day or two after the dispatch of this telegram, but I have been acquainted with the nature of the Shah's reply. I must explain that telegrams from the Legation in Paris are sent through London, and His Majesty seems to have been under the impression that the Ala-el-Mulk had dispatched his telegram from London. In his reply His Majesty expressed surprise at the advice tendered to him by the Ala-el-Mulk. The gist of the answer was, I understand, the following:—

"When you were in St. Petersburg you telegraphed to me that neither the Government of Russia nor the Government of England were desirous of seeing the Constitution revived. You have since gone to London, and you now telegraph to me from London that, in the opinion of competent people, which you seem to indorse, the only solution for the present crisis is that I should revive the Constitution and convoke the Medjliss."

His Majesty seems to have left no doubt as to his displeasure over this contradictory advice. The Ala-el-Mulk, I am informed, replied to this telegram by stating that the advice had been tendered to him by the Persian Minister in Paris. The Shah responded by telegraphing to the Persian Minister in Paris that he was recalled, and must leave at once for Tehran. At the same time he caused a telegram to be sent to the French Foreign Office, notifying the recall of the Minister and suggesting the name of a successor. The Minister then telegraphed to the Shah that he was prepared to obey the commands of His Majesty and to return to Tehran, but that a considerable sum of money was owing to him on account of salary, and that he could not leave Paris before he had received this money and paid off his debts. On the other hand, M. Pichon, who is very friendly with the Minister, replied by telegraph to the Persian Foreign Office that there could be no question of considering the name of a successor before the debts contracted by the Minister in Paris had been paid by his Government. There the matter at present rests. It shows how the wind blows. I received this information, and transmit it in strict confidence. Should it be desired to sift it, I would beg that no knowledge may be displayed of the information which I have given.

My efforts have been directed to convincing the Constitutionals of two things: Firstly, that it is essential that they should by all possible means maintain order and security in all districts where they exercise influence; secondly, that they should try to persuade His Majesty that they wish him no harm, and that his person and his throne are alike safe in their hands. I am glad to be able to state that on these two points the Constitutional party are sound. They are not aiming at the destruction of the Persian monarchy. Their sole aim is to safeguard the exercise of its powers by effective guarantees of a constitutional nature. These guarantees are contained in their Constitution, already granted under solemn pledges; and they ask that this Constitution should be revived. Both the Shah and the Nationalists have learnt a lesson from the present struggle, and there is every reason to believe that the new Medjliss will be productive of tangible benefits for the Persian people. Moreover, in the opinion of the most competent observers, the last Medjliss never had a fair chance.



The long reign of Nasr-ed-Din Shah was attended by wholesale corruption of the governing class. That was the policy of the Shah. But there are still some competent and honest men to be found among that class, while the class below has to a great extent escaped these baneful influences. In Paris I met several men who would certainly not discredit any European Administration. All are alive to the fact that for some years to come it will be necessary to introduce foreigners into the Administration, and to give them large powers. But they rightly contend, it seems to me, that such appointments must be made by the Persian people, and not be imposed upon Persia from outside.

Opinions differ as to how far His Majesty is aware of the actual situation. Some say that everything is kept from him by the camarilla; others that he knows everything. But they are agreed upon this—that if the Shah could be persuaded that both England and Russia require him to revive the Constitution and convoke the Medjliss, he would not fail to act upon that advice. Therefore they suggest that an unequivocal declaration in this sense should be made to His Majesty by the two Governments as soon as possible.

The proposal which, therefore, I take the liberty of making is that His Majesty's Government should endeavour to procure such a joint and unequivocal declaration in such a way that no doubts may be left in His Majesty's mind as to its sincerity. It would seem to me that the present is a favourable opportunity for securing the sincere co-operation of Russia in the course which I have ventured to propose, inasmuch as our diplomacy is at present rendering to Russia substantial services in connection with Balkan politics.

(Signed) H. F. B. LYNCH.

[5832] No. 265.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 88.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 12, 1909.*

ISPAHAN situation.

I am told by Prince Farman Farma that, as a condition of his going to Ispahan, he is demanding 25,000 tomans before he starts, and more to be paid later. He is also asking for a force of 2,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.

He will not go as Governor but as Commander, and intends to make an attack on the homes of the Bakhtiari. He says he expects to leave in a fortnight.

I am afraid that, if the arrangement for the transfer of Amin-es-Zarb's debts from the banks to the Persian Government is carried out, the Shah will be in a position to comply with Prince Farman Farma's conditions.

The Chiefs of the Bakhtiari, who left Tehran recently, are at Kum, and are parleying with Samsam-es-Sultaneh.

[5831] No. 266.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 89.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 12, 1909.*

SERDAR ASSAD, the Bakhtiari Chief, is said to have left Paris for Ahwaz.

I should be glad if the Paris Embassy could be asked for a confirmation or denial of this story.

[5846] No. 267.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 90.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 12, 1909.*

A NUMEROUSLY signed Declaration, purporting to come from the Nationalist party in Tehran, has been sent to me. It states that, unless approved by the Assembly, no loans, direct or indirect, or Concessions will be recognized.

[5736]

No. 268.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 51.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 12, 1909.*

DR. ISMAIL KHAN and Mostepha Gholi.

Please furnish me with your opinion on their request, as contained in Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 28 of the 11th instant, and report what was the protection promised by His Majesty's Legation.

[5846] No. 269.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 185.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 13, 1909.*

LOANS to Persia. With reference to Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 90 of the 12th instant.

We are of opinion that any loans which may be made to the Shah contrary to the provisions of the Constitution may be subsequently called in question, and that it is doubtful whether it would be possible to uphold the validity of the loans which the two banks are now contemplating except against the personal property of the Shah.

[5986] No. 270.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 91.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 14, 1909.*

CONSTITUTION.

I have received a telegram, copies of which have been sent to the other Legations, from the Local Assembly at Ispahan, begging me to inform the proper quarter that there must be no change whatever in the form of the old Constitution after the sacrifices which the nation has made.

[5987] No. 271.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 92.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 14, 1909.*

AMIN-ES-ZARB'S debts. Your telegrams Nos. 47 and 49 of the 8th and 11th instant, respectively, and my telegrams Nos. 88 and 90 of the 12th instant.

The proposed arrangement for the settlement of Amin-es-Zarb's debts is becoming known. People however think that it is an arrangement with the Russian Bank only and do not yet realize that the Imperial Bank of Persia also is included. They think that bringing the matter to our notice is sufficient for us to try and defeat the scheme.

An arrangement which, by giving money to the Shah, sets the scales against the Nationalists, will naturally discourage and exasperate them, and in view of the recent Nationalist declarations it is morally certain that any debt contracted in this manner under the reactionary régime will be repudiated by an Assembly.

I do not know whether His Majesty's Government would support the Imperial Bank in the event of repudiation, but might not the Bank be induced to change their attitude by a hint that there is some doubt on this point?

[5988] No. 272.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 93.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, February 14, 1909.*

SITUATION in Tehran.

As a Nationalist demonstration the greater part of the Bazaars has been closed since yesterday.



[5989]

No. 273.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 14, 1909.*

PROTECTION for Dr. Ismail and Mustapha Kuli Khan. Your telegram No. 50 of the 12th instant.

There is, as far as I can ascertain, no record of any assurances given to either of these persons. Verbal assurances may have been given, and Churchill, who will shortly arrive in London, could tell you if they were and of what nature they were.

I am told that the doctor helped the Legation in the past with information, but I know of no reason why either should be singled out for special protection, and I would deprecate giving any assurances.

[6014]

No. 274.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 2.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 6, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, forwarding copy of a letter addressed by him to the Sheikh of Mohammerah in pursuance of the instructions issued to him by Mr. Marling on the receipt of your despatch No. 135 of the 31st July, 1908.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 274.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 109.)

Sir,

*Bushire, December 2, 1908.*

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 1, Shiraz, dated the 22nd August last, and my *ad interim* reply No. 6 of the 16th September, 1908, I have the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the letter addressed by me to the Sheikh of Mohammerah in pursuance of the instructions received.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &amp;c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 274.

*Consul-General Cox to Sheikh of Mohammerah.*

(After compliments.)

*December 1, 1908.*

AFTER inquiry after your welfare and congratulations on the satisfactory conclusion of your business with the Arab tribes, I have the honour to inform you that I duly communicated to Government all that passed at the interview which I and our friend Mr. McDouall had with your Excellency on the 7th January last, and also placed before them the statement of Government expenditure subsequently received from you through Mr. McDouall. The reply of His Majesty's Government reached me through His Majesty's Legation in September last, but, in view of the importance of the subject and the insecurity of the post, I thought it best to delay addressing you until my return to head-quarters.

On arrival here I learnt of your own absence in Arabistan and have since waited for your return to Failya.

I am directed to repeat, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the assurances given to your Excellency in the letter of His Majesty's Minister, Sir Arthur Hardinge, dated the 7th December, 1902, which is in your possession, and the terms of which I repeated to you at our interview above referred to; and I am then to add that His Majesty's Government now extend those assurances to your successors.

I am further to point out that His Majesty's Government have engaged to respect the independence and integrity of Persia, and to explain that that undertaking involves the maintenance of the *status quo* in that country and includes the continuance of the state of autonomy which your Excellency at present enjoys.

It follows from the above that any external aggression upon your Excellency would constitute an infringement of Persian integrity, which is recognized by the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention.

Trusting to have an opportunity of repeating the foregoing assurances in person at an early date, I am, &c.

(Signed)

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &amp;c.

[6017]

No. 275.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 5.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 18, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on receipt of your telegram No. 19 of the 11th instant respecting the proposed lien on the Bushire customs receipts for the interest on the Imperial Bank of Persia's advances to the Persian Government.

I was not quite sure from your telegram as it reached me whether it was merely for my guidance that you informed me that the arrangement, the acceptance of which I had recommended, was only to be regarded as provisional, or whether you desired me to inform the Persian Government in this sense, but it seemed to me so likely to retard the bank's prospects of obtaining what they had originally asked for, viz., an arrangement in regard to the Bushire receipts similar to that formerly in force in regard to Kermanshah, that I decided to keep the provisional character of the arrangement to myself until the Persian Government had definitely accepted it.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *January 21.*—I am much pleased to see from your telegram of to-day that I need not for the moment make any allusion to the Persian Government to the further demands it will later be necessary to present.

G. B.

Inclosure in No. 275.

*Sir G. Barclay to Seyyid-ed-Dowleh.*

M. le Ministre,

*Tehran, January 13, 1909.*

IN your predecessor's note, received on the 23rd ultimo, regarding the interest on the Persian Government's debt to the Imperial Bank of Persia, it is stated that the Customs Administration will pay at Bushire from December last tomans 12,967 : 7 : 35 per month on account of the interest of the Loan of 1901, and from the 21st March next the Customs Administration will arrange to pay 30,000 tomans per month.

It will not escape your Excellency's notice that under this arrangement the Imperial Bank of Persia are compelled for the moment to forgo the interest for the current half-year on part of the debt, which interest will have to be added to the capital of the debt, thus still further increasing the Government's indebtedness to the bank.

I am, however, prepared to waive this objection, provided that it is clearly understood that from the 21st March next the sum of 30,000 tomans, or as much more as may be needed to meet the interest on the Government's debt, is to be paid monthly to the bank from the receipts of the Bushire customs.

I should be glad if your Excellency would be so kind as to send me an early answer, so that I can inform my Government, who are pressing for a settlement of this matter.

I avail, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[1629]

2 Q



[6018]

No. 276.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*(No. 6.)  
Sir,*Tehran, January 20, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 18 of the 6th instant, reporting the appointment of Saad-ed-Dowleh as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the place of His Highness Prince Ala-es-Sultaneh, I have the honour to draw your attention to the paragraph giving his record in the Tehran Yearly Report for 1907, and to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 219 of the 9th October, 1907, giving an account of the manner in which he was forced to resign the Foreign Ministry in October 1907 after holding it for a fortnight.

At the end of the year he took refuge at the Dutch Legation in consequence of the hostility of the popular party towards him, and he only left the Legation after the *coup d'état* of last summer, having enjoyed the Dutch Minister's hospitality for over six months.

In the middle of December last overtures were made to him [by the Shah, in consequence of which he placed himself in touch with the British and Russian Legations, as reported in my telegram No. 440 of the 17th December, 1908. In my immediately succeeding telegram of the same day I ventured to say that the stories spread about to his detriment were chiefly the work of his political enemies here, and that he was, in my opinion, perhaps the best man available to deal with the Shah at that juncture. He had adopted a favourable attitude towards reform of administration on a constitutional basis, and had, at various interviews which the dragomans of the two Legations had with him between the middle of December and the 5th January, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, convinced them that he was genuinely desirous of inaugurating a new régime. The two Legations therefore assured him of their friendly sentiments towards him, and we were glad to see him take office.

Though perhaps not so reliable as his predecessor, Ala-es-Sultaneh, he is distinctly a stronger man, and his personality carries some weight in the Shah's Councils. He is endeavouring by degrees to obtain that influence with His Majesty which will enable him to overrule the sinister influence at present exercised by the ignorant and old-fashioned Grand Vizier and the thoroughly corrupt and unscrupulous Minister of War.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6019]

No. 277.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*(No. 7.)  
Sir,*Tehran, January 20, 1909.*

M. BIZOT tells me that the Persian Government are now showing a real desire to help him in his investigations into the financial situation. They at last realize that whatever other conditions may be attached to the financial assistance of the two Powers, it is a *sine qua non* that the real situation should be made clear to M. Bizot. They have now told off two capable officials of the Ministry of Finance to assist him, and they meet three times a-week for their work. It was until recently M. Bizot's aim to secure the preparation of a general Budget, but the further he has gone in his investigations the more convinced he has become that it would be useless to attempt to put a Budget in force with the present machinery of the Finance Department, which suffers from the radical defect of an entire lack of centralization. What M. Bizot says is needed is that the local Treasurers, who are now at the mercy of the provincial Governors, should be completely withdrawn from their authority and placed solely under the orders of the Minister of Finance. This can only be done by the introduction of a non-Persian element in the administration, and M. Bizot thinks the best course would be to appoint two Europeans as Treasurer-General and Inspector of Finances respectively. No Persian could have enough authority to give the local Treasurers the backing required to enable them to withstand illicit demands from the Governors. With authority thus centralized in competent hands, and with a properly salaried staff—it is worthy of remark that in none of the statements given to M. Bizot, purporting to show items of expenditure, is there any reference to the payment of salaries of officials, except those

in the Diplomatic and Consular services, and these are notoriously in arrear—there would be every reason to hope that a Budget could be put in force.

M. Bizot tells me that he is now turning his attention to the question of the cost of the financial administration if thus reformed. In any case it would need but a small portion of the 400,000*l.* which it has been proposed that the two Governments should advance.

During the visit at which M. Bizot gave me the above information he asked me if there had been any change in the views of the two Governments as regards the financial assistance to be rendered to the Persian Government, as he knew that M. Ostrogradsky, the Russian Financial Agent, was in favour of a very far-reaching scheme involving the conversion and unification of the various categories of debt. I told M. Bizot that, so far as I knew, there had been no change in the attitude of His Majesty's Government, and that they were still only disposed to consider a joint advance of 400,000*l.* when adequate guarantees for the proper expenditure of the money were forthcoming. This could only be when a constitutional régime was in working order.

Since this conversation with M. Bizot I have seen M. Ostrogradsky, and inquired as to his views. He told me that he had a day or two ago recommended to the Russian Minister of Finance the conversion and unification of the debt as the best way of putting the Persian Government on its legs financially. He did not know whether such a course was feasible from the political standpoint of the two Powers, but it was his duty to report to his Ministry what was best in Persia's interests, even though for political or other reasons his recommendations should prove impracticable. He estimated the total indebtedness of Persia at something like 6,000,000*l.*, and thought that a loan of 8,000,000*l.*, for the service of which the Customs receipts would suffice, might be floated (I presume with the joint guarantee of England and Russia), so as to leave, after the conversion of the present debt, a substantial balance which could be used as required.

M. Ostrogradsky was in full agreement with M. Bizot as to the need for centralization of the financial administration in the hands of a competent European. It would, however, be some time, even with the reformed system, before equilibrium could be established, and the balance of the loan might be used to make good the annual deficits until this object could be attained. Persia had suffered in the past from financial assistance being given in dribbles; the time had come to leave her something in hand for the future.

It is impossible to say with any approach to accuracy what is the present annual deficit. According to figures, which both M. Bizot and M. Ostrogradsky think reliable, the revenue at the disposal of the Central Government, after meeting local expenditure, should, if the taxes were paid, amount for this year to some 5,612,000 tomans (1,100,000*l.*). No reliable statement has been furnished of the expenditure (it would probably be impossible to produce one), but M. Ostrogradsky thinks that it exceeds the revenue by not less than 500,000*l.*

I presume that a conversion scheme like that recommended by M. Ostrogradsky will hardly commend itself to the two Governments; indeed, I myself do not see that, even considering only Persia's interests. It is required, inasmuch as the greater part of the debt does not carry an excessive rate of interest, and there is at least a probability that if the finances were properly administered, the revenue would suffice for the needs of Government. The conversion of the floating debt, which bears interest at 12 per cent. or over, is another matter; and it is to be hoped that as time goes on the two Governments will see their way to facilitating it. The conversion of that part of the floating debt represented by the advances of the two banks into a 5 or 6 per cent. stock, part secured on the northern and part on the southern customs, would alone effect a saving of at least 70,000*l.* a-year.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6020]

No. 278.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*(No. 8.)  
Sir,*Tehran, January 22, 1909.*

HAVING seen from an entry in the Bushire diary (No. 2286) that Hajji Abdul Rahman, the French Consular Agent at Lingah, had been spreading the report that



the French had seized the Port of Kung, I mentioned this silly story to my French colleague.

M. Lecomte told me he had already had occasion to complain of Hajji Abdul Rahman, and that he had recommended his dismissal and the suppression of the Consular Agency at Lingah, where France had no need of such a post.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Bushire.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6021]

No. 279.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received February 15.)

(No. 9.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 47 and 50 of the 18th and 19th instant respectively, I have the honour to transmit a copy of the document furnished by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. de Sturler, late Dutch Minister at Tehran, granting him a two years' option from the 10th instant for an "exploitation concession at Ahwaz." I also transmit a copy of the note which I addressed to Saad-ed-Dowleh under the instructions contained in your telegram No. 28 of the 21st January, stating that His Majesty's Government reserved the right to oppose the concession.

The document granted to M. de Sturler is dated only two or three days after Saad-ed-Dowleh took office, and two months after M. de Sturler had left Tehran on transfer to Athens. My Russian colleague, who is in charge of Dutch interests, tells me that he knew nothing of any negotiations on the subject. It is not improbable, therefore, that the option was the result of some private arrangement between M. de Sturler and Saad-ed-Dowleh, by which the latter, in return for the protection afforded him by M. de Sturler when he took bast at the Dutch Legation in December 1907, remaining there until June 1908, undertook, if he ever came to office, to get him the concession which he had for so long been trying to secure. I should mention, however, that when I spoke to Saad-ed-Dowleh about it, he told me that it was owing to his influence that only an option had been given, for he had urged that no concession should be granted until a Syndicate was formed to take it up. Saad-ed-Dowleh, who laid stress on the fact that we had never opposed M. de Sturler's efforts to obtain the concession, promised to keep me informed of further developments, though I presume that for the moment these are more likely to occur at The Hague than here. Saad-ed-Dowleh denies that any money was paid for the option.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—I transmit a copy of the Persian Government's answer to my note.

G. B.

*Inclosure 1 in No. 279.*

*Note granting Right of Option to Dr. Sturler.*

SON Excellence Saad-ed-Dowleh, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, agissant sur les ordres et au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah, déclare par la présente que M. le Jonkheer Dr. J. E. de Sturler a acquis le droit d'option valable pendant la durée de deux années, à partir de la date de la signature du présent acte, pour une concession d'exploitation à Ahwaz.

Fait à Téhéran, le 10 janvier, 1909.

*Inclosure 2 in No. 279.*

*Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.*

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, January 22, 1909.*

IT was my duty to report to my Government the information which has reached me in regard to the grant by the Persian Government to M. de Sturler, until recently Netherland Minister in this capital, of two years' option for a concession of exploitation at Ahwaz, in connection with irrigation works in the Karun Valley.

It will be within the recollection of the Persian Government that Sir C. Spring-Rice, in his note to His Highness Ala-es-Sultaneh of the 24th October, 1906, expressed the confident hope of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that no definite step would be taken in the direction of granting privileges of the nature referred to above without previous communication with His Majesty's Government. I am now instructed to state that, in view of the fact that this warning has been disregarded by the Imperial Government, His Majesty's Government reserve to themselves the right to take objection to the present scheme should it prove injurious to their interests.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

*Inclosure 3 in No. 279.*

*Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.*

*Tehran, January 26, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 22nd instant respecting a two years' option for the exploitation of Ahwaz in connection with irrigation works in the Karun district. In reply, I have the honour to state that, in view of the conversation I had a few days ago with Abbas Kuli Khan, the dragoman of the British Legation, and other verbal messages sent to you on the subject, I did not think that any doubt would remain in your mind as to the fact that the option in question is only a period fixed for two years, and should a Company be formed during the stipulated period and a concession granted, your Excellency would have the right of objecting to anything which may be found in it to be contrary to the British interest, and the Persian Government will take suitable measures to remove such objections.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) JAVAD.

[6022]

No. 280.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received February 15.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 22, 1909.*

IN my despatch No. 316 of the 19th ultimo I reported that, finding myself unable to persuade the Persian Government to substitute a less objectionable note for that of the 9th April last, in which the Persian claim to sovereignty of Bahrein was reasserted, I had returned the latter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as inadmissible.

I now have the honour to inform you that on the 2nd instant Meftah-es-Sultaneh, late chief of the English section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, called on me on behalf of Ala-es-Sultaneh to say that if I would withdraw my note returning the objectionable communication the Persian Government would now send me in substitution for the latter an amended note in the sense desired. He said that if I did not see my way to accept this arrangement the Persian Government would be obliged to send a strong reply to my note. This would have raised the general question of

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Bahrein, for which the moment is clearly inopportune, and I therefore accepted the proposed arrangement.

I have the honour to transmit a translation of the amended note which I have now received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 280.

*Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Tehran, January 12, 1909.*

IN answer to the respected note of the 30th March, 1908, respecting a certain Bahreini at Lingah, I have the honour to state that by referring to previous notes of the Foreign Ministry regarding the Island of Bahrein and its inhabitants you will be quite enlightened as to the arguments of the Persian Government; but as every endeavour has always been made for the administration of justice and the inquiry into the claims of persons who are wronged, at that same time strong telegraphic instructions were issued, and it is evident that the Persian Government officials will not fail in the necessary endeavours for the administration of justice.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) SAAD-ED-DOWLEH.

[6023]

No. 281.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 11.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 25, 1909.*

AS reported in my telegram No 35 of the 11th instant, an attempt was made on the night of the 8th instant on the life of Sheikh Fazlullah, the prominent reactionary Mujtehid, who had been so active of late in condemning the re-establishment of the constitutional régime as opposed to the tenets of Islam.

The assailant, a certain Abdul Kerim, who used a revolver and shot the Sheikh in the thigh, inflicting a wound which is described as comparatively trivial, subsequently discharged his weapon at the Sheikh's Secretary, who tried to capture him, and eventually discharged a bullet in his own throat before being captured. He was taken to Bagh-i-Shah and treated for the wound in his throat, from which he has now practically recovered.

The same night a certain Hussein Khan who took refuge at Gulahek after the *coup d'Etat* of June last, and was subsequently arrested by the authorities but released again owing to the intervention of this Legation, was again arrested, together with a number of others, on suspicion of complicity in the crime.

His brother, Sheikh Hassan, called on Abbas Kuli Khan, of this Legation, at his house outside the Legation grounds, to tell him of the rearrest of Hussein Khan, and to invoke the assistance of the Legation on his behalf. On leaving Abbas Kuli Khan's house he discovered that he himself was about to be arrested, and he accordingly sought refuge in the Legation grounds. In view of the certainty that the authorities at Bagh-i-Shah would not give either of the two brothers a fair trial, but rather that they would proceed to vindictive measures, owing chiefly to the fact that one of them took refuge at Gulahek last summer, I thought it desirable to extend my protection to Sheikh Hassan, pending negotiations regarding his trial and that of his brother.

Saad-ed-Dowleh, who had taken office as Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days before these events, showed the greatest desire to bring about a satisfactory solution of the difficulty which had arisen, and arranged with me to have the trial conducted under his personal direction and at his own house, where both brothers would stay pending judgment. It was further agreed that a member of my staff should attend the proceedings, and that judgment should not be delivered unless my representative approved of it.

These arrangements having been concluded in writing, I delivered Sheikh Hassan to Saad-ed-Dowleh, to whom his brother, Hussein Khan, was also sent from Bagh-i-Shah.

The trial began on the 21st instant, Mr. Smart attending on behalf of His Majesty's Government. Abdul Kerim, the would-be assassin of Sheikh Fazlullah, began by declaring that Sheikh Hassan had aided and abetted him in the crime, and he even tried, though very indirectly, to implicate Hussein Kuli Khan, C.B., the brother of Abbas Kuli Khan, of this Legation, with whom he lives.

I would not have troubled you with so long a report of what after all would seem to be a question in which this Legation should have very little interest were it not for the above developments, which, of course, Mr. Smart is watching very carefully.

I am, however, glad to be able to say that Saad-ed-Dowleh appears, so far, to be guided in this matter by a sincere desire to see justice done, and I therefore am in hope that the underhand influence at work from Bagh-i-Shah, which chiefly emanates from the Minister of War (Amir Behadur), will eventually be counteracted.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6024]

No. 282.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 12.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 26, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note which, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 13 of the 8th instant, I have addressed to the Persian Government in regard to the further pledging of the resources of Persia.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 282.

*Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.*

M. le Ministre,

*Tehran, January 11, 1909.*

IN pursuance of instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to remind your Excellency that the interest on the British loan of 1903-4 is in arrear since April last, and to state that, if the resources of the Persian Government are pledged without the consent of His Majesty's Government so as to imperil the security of the British loans and advances which have from time to time been made to the Persian Government or to diminish the several revenues assigned to the service of their interest or sinking fund, His Majesty's Government will be compelled to consider what steps are necessary for safeguarding their interests.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6026]

No. 283.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 14.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 26, 1909.*

DURING the month of December considerable unrest became manifest amongst the population of Ispahan owing to the extortion practised by Moadil-el-Manalek, the Deputy Governor, and the generally oppressive methods of administration employed by Iqbal-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General. The agitation, which was encouraged and to some extent engineered by the clergy, culminated on the 28th December in an attempt made by a crowd of some 200 persons, mostly small shopkeepers, to take refuge in His Majesty's Consulate-General. Upon Mr. Grahame refusing to admit these malcontents, they retired to the Masjid-i-Shah (the chief mosque), after giving Mr. Grahame a telegram setting forth their grievances to be sent to me for transmission to the Shah. The crowd in the mosque increased during the following days, a large number of inhabitants from the neighbouring villages arriving to join in the movement. Early on the morning of the 31st some persons took refuge in the Russian Consulate-General. Negotiations between the Governor-General and the chief priests



for the restoration of order were in the meantime being conducted, and it is possible that a peaceful solution of the situation would have been found had not, on the morning of the 2nd instant, Zargham-es-Saltaneh with a force of some 100 Bakhtiari arrived in the town and proceeded to the mosque to join the people there. The Governor-General thereupon ordered his troops to fire on the crowd, and in the course of the fighting, which lasted during the greater part of the day, some twenty persons were killed and a good many wounded, most of whom were innocent spectators of events. Cannon were also fired by order of the Governor in the direction of the mosque, but no loss of life occurred, though a portion of the buildings of the mosque was damaged. Before evening the Zargham-es-Saltaneh had gained possession of the chief strategical points in the city, with the exception of the artillery barracks, and the Governor, desisting from further attempts to overpower the Bakhtiari, ordered his soldiers to loot the bazaars in the vicinity of the palace. Some 800 shops were looted, the amount of damage done being estimated at between 200,000*l.* and 500,000*l.* It may be noted that no British firm suffered any direct loss. The Governor-General, with the Karguzar and other local authorities, took refuge in His Majesty's Consulate-General on the same evening, a number of servants and soldiers of the Malairi Regiment also taking bast the next day. On the following day more Bakhtiari arrived under Muntazem-ed-Dowleh, and in the course of the day the Bakhtiari gained possession of the palace and artillery barracks, the soldiers, until then under the orders of the Governor-General, leaving the town or taking bast in the British Consulate-General.

On the morning of the 4th the Governor's palace was completely sacked, and in the afternoon Samsam-es-Saltaneh, followed by some 800 Bakhtiari, appeared in the town and was received with acclamations by crowds representing all classes of the population.

As the result of the telegraphic conversation which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires and I had with Mr. Grahame and the Russian Consul-General on the 3rd, we had urged the Shah to dismiss Iqbal-ed-Dowleh from the Governorship and to hand over provisionally to Samsam-es-Saltaneh the office of Governor, adding that the Persian Government would be held responsible for the lives and property of our nationals. This, in spite of representations which we renewed on the 5th, His Majesty refused to do, alleging that he had no confidence in Samsam-es-Saltaneh. On the following day Prince Farman Farma was appointed Governor, and it was arranged that pending His Highness' departure a deputy should leave, accompanied by 300 Bakhtiari, in a few days. These left on the 13th instant.

In reply to Prince Farman Farma, by whom my Russian colleague and I were approached in regard to our attitude in the situation, we replied that we only desired the maintenance of tranquillity, and that we had instructed our Consuls to tell Samsam-es-Saltaneh that we looked to him to keep order, and also to urge him to do nothing which would make a peaceful solution of the present difficulties impossible. Samsam-es-Saltaneh, in conversation with Mr. Grahame, has more than once expressed his loyal and conciliatory intentions, and has emphatically denied that he has made himself Governor of Ispahan. He protests that he is willing to retire upon receiving a guarantee for his personal safety, and after having secured for the people of Ispahan the constitutional rights to which they are entitled; but he adds that if armed forces are sent against him, or against the city, he will not abandon the people of Ispahan, nor will they him.

Since his arrival at Ispahan order has been kept, and guards for foreign firms have been provided from the Bakhtiari forces, which now number some 1,500 men.

A Provisional Assembly ("Anjuman-i-Muvaqqati") has been formed, which has held meetings to discuss proposals for holding elections; and a loan of 20,000 tomans, repayable within twenty days out of the "Maliat," on the guarantee of about forty leading personages, has been raised to meet the Bakhtiari expenditure.

Though at the beginning local grievances of the small tradespeople and inhabitants of the neighbouring districts, more especially in regard to land taxation—grievances which were shared by the Bakhtiari—may be said to have been the predominating feature of the movement, there is little doubt that the ease with which the town was gained encouraged Samsam-es-Saltaneh to turn to good advantage so favourable an opportunity for consolidating his position in the leadership of the tribe. It is more difficult to estimate the extent to which Nationalist sentiments have inspired the Bakhtiari leaders, though from the more recent information I have received it is evident that Samsam-es-Saltaneh has now thrown in his lot with that party, and there is reason to believe that in this he has the support of his influential kinsman in Paris, Sardar

Assad, as well as of the Chiefs who have been sent from Tehran by the Shah in the hope of sowing dissension among the tribesmen.

I may add that Mr. Grahame obtained for Iqbal-ed-Dowleh from the local Assembly a written safe-conduct, and a verbal promise from Samsam-es-Saltaneh of a Bakhtiari escort, and that, on condition that Mr. Grahame should accompany him one stage and should send a Consulate servant with him as far as the second, he had consented to leave His Majesty's Consulate-General on the 24th instant. In view, however, of the Governor's past record, and in order to limit as far as possible the responsibility of His Majesty's Government for his safety, I felt unable to sanction Mr. Grahame's proposal to accompany Iqbal-ed-Dowleh, and up to now the Governor has not left the Consulate-General. There are, in all, at present about 200 persons in refuge there. Mr. Grahame has succeeded in inducing a number to leave, there having been originally some 500 soldiers and others in refuge at the Consulate-General, who were with much difficulty kept under control.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6027]

No. 284.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 15.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, January 27, 1909.*

MAJOR KENNION, in the Seistan diary of the 9th December, 1908, reported that the annual repairs on the Khaf-Seistan line, which are usually effected in the autumn, were evidently not to be undertaken that year, and that the line would consequently be in thoroughly bad condition when handed over to us.

Mr. G. New, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, has recently returned here, after completing an inspection of the Meshed-Tehran line and effecting repairs where necessary, so that the line is now in good condition for another year.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6028]

No. 285.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 16.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, January 27, 1909.*

I RECENTLY received from the Tehran representative of Lynch Brothers a complaint against Hajji Rais, the agent of Moin-ut-Tujjar at Mohammerah and the right-hand man of Sheikh Khazzal, of obstructing their steamer traffic on the Karun by measures which were tantamount to a boycott by intimidation. I telegraphed to His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah to inform Hajji Rais that I regarded his action as most unfriendly and expected its immediate cessation; I also instructed Abbas Kuli Khan to interview Moin-ut-Tujjar with a view to his putting some restraint upon his agent. The latter denied that people had been intimidated into not using Lynch's steamers, and declared his readiness to come to an arrangement with Messrs. Lynch by which the takings on cargo by the two Companies would be pooled.

I accordingly arranged for an interview to take place between Mr. Malleson and Moin-ut-Tujjar, at which I authorized Abbas Kuli Khan to be present in order to discuss these proposals.

The meeting was held on the 24th instant, and it was agreed that Mr. Malleson should communicate to his principals in London the proposals which, if approved, should be put into execution by the local agents of the parties concerned in Arabistan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

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No. 286.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 17.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 27, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch No. 327 of the 30th December, that at the beginning of this month the Nationalist forces of Tabreez suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Governor of Maraga, and the majority returned to Tabreez. Skirmishing continued during the first fortnight of the month between the Nationalists and the troops of Ain-ed-Dowleh and those of the Governor of Maraga with no very definite result, and since the 16th instant, with the exception of an engagement which terminated successfully for the Nationalists, with the Maku tribe near Julfa about the 23rd instant, no hostilities have taken place and Satar Khan has ordered his men to remain within Tabreez. This is to be attributed to the extreme severity of the weather.

A more interesting development of the Nationalist policy, and one which might have had far-reaching effect, has been the demand of the local Assembly that the receipts for local traffic on the line of the Indo-European Telegraph Company should be handed over to them. Traffic was in consequence of this demand for some days suspended on the line, but the agent of the Company, under threat of the local Assembly that the line would be cut unless the receipts were handed over, obtained the consent of the London office to deal with local traffic, and the Director in Tehran applied to the Minister of Telegraphs for sanction to comply with the demand of the Assembly, failing which he would be forced to claim an indemnity from the Government of 500*l.* a-day if the line were cut, involving as this would have done an interruption of international traffic.

Though no written arrangement has been come to, the Minister of Telegraphs has agreed informally to the Company accepting the Nationalists' terms, and traffic was resumed early in the month.

With regard to the statement of the Russian Ambassador on the subject of the alleged demand of the Nationalists that the customs receipts should be paid to the local Assembly, I have reported in my telegram No. 57 of the 25th instant the reply which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General to the inquiry which I addressed to him on the receipt of your telegram, and I shall not fail to report any further developments which may occur.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6030]

No. 287.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 18.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 27, 1909.*

IT was with the conviction that every day the restoration of a constitutional régime was delayed lessened the probability of Persia's being able of herself and without some measure of foreign control to evolve order out of the increasing chaos that I despatched my telegram No. 24 of the 8th instant.

In that telegram I mentioned the possibility of other tribes, particularly the Kashgais and the Kakhors, following the example of Bakhtiari and making a *coup* on Shiraz and Kermanshah. Daood Khan, Chief of the Kakhors, seems for the moment to have patched up a peace with the Kermanshah authorities, and for the present Soulet-ed-Dowleh, the Ikhenah of the Kashgais, is reported by His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz to be disinclined to move, though Mr. Bill considers that he is master of the situation if he cares to exert himself, and should he elect to emulate the Bakhtiari by a raid upon Shiraz there is nothing whatever to prevent him. Although there has been nothing yet to realize my apprehensions as to the Bakhtiari finding imitators among their fellow-tribes, there have not been wanting developments which denote increasing danger for the Shah's authority. I refer not so much to the constantly increasing anarchy which exists throughout almost the whole country, rendering the principal roads to the capital from the south well-nigh impassable and threatening to bring trade to standstill, as to the nationalist movement.

In the Caspian provinces, apart from Azarbaijan, this movement seems, from information in the possession of the Russian Legation, to be making headway, and, as reported in my telegram No. 56 of the 25th instant, the Governor of Astarabad has even mooted to the Russian Consul the possibility of a coalition of the five Caspian provinces as an independent State. Hamadan and Kazvin have in the last few days been the scenes of nationalist movements, and in the former place the Governor has resigned and a local Anjuman has been established. In the south, according to reports from Shiraz, the great Mujtehid Seyid Hussein Lari, with his large following, is in open revolt in the Lar district. In Ispahan the local Administration is as completely independent of the Central Government as that of Tabreez. Farman Farma shows no inclination to proceed to his post, and though there is talk of the dispatch of troops it is doubtful if they will be got to start, and still more so whether they will reach Ispahan with any fight in them. The 300 or so Bakhtiari who left Tehran for Ispahan a fortnight ago do not appear to have got farther than Kum, where they are seeking to parley with their fellow-tribesmen at Ispahan. In the Tabreez district though the Shah's irregulars have had some successes of late, these can hardly be expected to have any result but to render reconciliation more difficult. Tehran itself remains quiet. Here the danger lies, perhaps, more in the unpaid troops who surround the Shah than in the nationalists, who lack cohesion and whose manifestations of discontent, though this discontent is undoubtedly very general, have been, so far, of a somewhat half-hearted character.

It would be rash to attempt to forecast the development of the present chaotic situation, but it is clear that every day that passes without the Shah's fulfilling his pledges will make it more difficult to repair it and will increase the danger to Mohammed Ali's throne and the integrity of his country. One may have misgivings as to the possibility of Parliamentary government working under the present Shah, but it is at least certain that without it, while Mohammed Ali is on the throne, Persia will not be able to work out her own salvation.

I see that M. Isvolsky doubts whether the mere grant of a Constitution can do much good. It is obvious that of itself it will not suffice to bring order out of chaos, but it still offers the best chance of an improvement in the situation. Any attempt to bolster up the present autocracy by financial assistance coupled with the imposition of reforms must prove abortive, unless it is accompanied by a large measure of foreign control. The rumour that an Assembly is not to be included among the forthcoming Anglo-Russian demands has given new life to the old suspicion that the Anglo-Russian Convention was only a step to Anglo-Russian control.

What is now urgently needed is that some satisfaction should be given to the nationalists. It may already be too late; but were the Shah to convoke a National Assembly and at the same time to proclaim a general amnesty, there would be at least a good chance of Tabreez and Ispahan returning to their allegiance, and other ambitious tribal Chiefs would be deprived of a pretext for emulating Samsam-es-Sultaneh. The situation would thus be relieved and a respite given for the introduction of such reforms as are most needed for combating the general anarchy, such as the reorganization of the financial Administration and the establishment of a proper gendarmerie and police. It would be vain to hope that such reforms could be effected without foreign assistance in men and money, for however true it may be that if order were restored and the finances properly administered the revenue would suffice for the needs of Government, it is certain that as things are to-day money for reforms is not to be found in Persia, and men capable of directing reforms are equally lacking.

If constitutional government is to have a fair chance, money must be found for Persia as soon as the new régime is working. The Shah has been persuaded to consent to the appointment of a European Treasurer-General and Inspector for the Ministry of Finance, a measure which should bear fruit if these officers receive the support of Parliament. Foreign instructors will be needed for the gendarmerie and police and foreign advisers for some of the Ministries. Indeed the possibility of reform without foreign control depends not only upon whether the Shah can be brought to work honestly with a Parliament, but also upon whether a Persian Parliament can bring itself to co-operate with and support foreign agents of reform. In neither respect was the experience of the last Medjliss promising; but I am given to understand by people better able to form an opinion than I am that the more enlightened among the nationalists now realize that foreign advisers will be necessary, for a time at least. This however is looking far ahead. For the moment the most pressing need in the interests of the country and in the interests of the principle of non-intervention is that the Shah should be brought promptly to fulfil his promises and at the same



time to grant a general amnesty. A slight departure from this principle now may avert the necessity of a more far-reaching one later.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6031]

No. 288.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 19.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, January 28, 1909.*

IN my telegram No. 15 of the 6th instant I was able to report that I had succeeded in obtaining the hypothecation of the Bushire customs receipts for the repayment of the Imperial Bank's money seized on various occasions by Ain-ed-Dowleh on its way to the Tabreez branch.

The total sum seized was close on 90,000 tomans, which, with interest and premium for cost of transfer added, will by the time it is paid off amount probably to 100,000 tomans. Mr. Wratislaw was able to recover 15,000 tomans from Ain-ed-Dowleh himself, and the bank has up to now received from the Bushire customs about 45,000 tomans, so that considerably more than half the stolen money has already been recovered.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[6032]

No. 289.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 20.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, January 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia during the past four weeks.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 289.

No. 1.—*Monthly Summary.*

*Tehran.*

*Ministerial Changes.*

ON the 5th January Saad-ed-Dowleh was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the place of Ala-es-Sultaneh.

The two brothers, Mushir-ed-Dowleh and Motamin-ul-Mulk, resigned the Ministries of Justice and Education respectively during the month. Nizam-ul-Mulk has been appointed Minister of Justice, and Mohandis-ul-Mamalek has taken over the Ministry of Education in addition to that of Public Works, &c., which he already held.

The Cabinet is therefore composed as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister of Interior..	Mushir-es-Sultaneh.
Minister for Foreign Affairs .. ..	Saad-ed-Dowleh.
Minister for War .. ..	Sepahsalar.
Minister for Justice .. ..	Nizam-ul-Mulk.
Minister for Education and Public Works	Mohandis-ul-Mamalek.
Minister for Telegraphs .. ..	Mukhber-ed-Dowleh.
Minister for Court .. ..	Sultan Ali Khan, Vazir Durbar.
Minister for Commerce .. ..	(Vacant).

On the 8th January Sheikh Fazlullah, the prominent reactionary Mujtehed was shot at by a Nationalist and wounded in the thigh. The assailant was arrested and is now being tried.

The refugees to the number of about 270 still remain at the Turkish Embassy.

Banquets were given, at which the Corps Diplomatique attended, on the 6th January by the Minister of War, and on the 8th January by the Grand Vizier.

The German and French Ministers had audiences of the Shah on the 9th January the former to thank the Shah for a decoration.

On the 15th January M. Sabline, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had an audience of the Shah to present M. Miller who had arrived from Astrabad to act as chief dragoman during the absence on leave of M. Baronowsky. M. Sabline mentioned to the Shah the reports which had reached him concerning the employment by the Persian Government of German military instructors. The Shah entirely denied the truth of the reports.

On the 12th January about 300 Bakhtiari left for Ispahan under the command of Serdar Zaffer, a younger brother of Semsam-es-Sultaneh. The Farman Farma's deputy, Serdar Motazid, also left for Ispahan at the same time.

Moharrem, the month of mourning, began on the 24th instant.

Mr. David Fraser, the "Times" special correspondent, arrived at Tehran on the 23rd instant. Mr. Moore, who represents the "Manchester Guardian," the "Daily News" and the "Daily Chronicle," is expected from Tabreez shortly.

(Signed) C. P. CHURCHILL.

*January 28, 1909.*

*Tabreez.*

The situation forms the subject of a separate despatch.

*Resht.*

1. On the 11th January there were still sixty refugees in the garden of the Turkish Consular Agent, who stated that he had orders from his Embassy at Tehran not to turn them out.

2. Since his defeat by the people of Talish Sirdar Amjad has been at Enzeli trying to borrow money to raise a fresh force but without success.

3. Sipahdar-i-Azem, who a few months ago was in command of the Shah's troops before Tabreez, has joined the Nationalists and has sent horsemen to Zangerud to establish a local Assembly there.

4. Copies of an order from the priests at Kerbela instructing the people of Persia not to pay taxes to the Shah have been circulated in Resht.

*Astrabad.*

According to recent reports from the Russian Consul at Astrabad the Nationalist movement there is very active and it is possible that the Turkomans may join it. The Governor asked him what Russia would think of a coalition of the Caspian provinces. He was instructed from St. Petersburg to reply that Russia would have no sympathy with it and to rebuke the Governor for having asked the question.

*Meshed.*

1. Major Sykes returned from tour on the 22nd December with Captain Watson. The latter left Meshed on the 31st and reached Turbat-i-Haidari on the 7th January.

2. Although the Nationalist movement proper is at an end, considerable disturbance has been caused by Nationalist irreconcilables. Many of these are Russian subjects (Turks and Caucasians) and the Russian Consul-General appears unwilling to take stringent measures against them. The Governor-General stated that Prince Dabija, far from assisting him when requested to do so, was actively hostile, had refused to restrain his subjects from participating in meetings, &c., and had replied in sympathetic terms to letters addressed to him by Nationalists. M. Courtin, the manager of the local branch of the Russian Bank, recently told Captain Smyth that

[1629]



he thought Prince Dabija would shortly lose any control he might have over many of his subjects.

3. The Russian Consul-General recently asked for the reappointment of the former Begler Beggi, who was dismissed by the Governor-General as one of the concessions to the Nationalists. Prince Dabija added that he had the power to make suggestions in the matter of minor official posts in this part of Persia.

4. Prince Dabija has been trying to discover who are the members of a secret society of Russian subjects of which he is much afraid. Two men were recently arrested and imprisoned. On their being examined it was found that they were the spies of the Governor-General of Transcaspia on Prince Dabija. This affair will not lessen the existing ill-feeling between these two officials.

5. The Afghan Agent has been instructed that more Turks will shortly reach Meshed on their way to Cabul.

6. M. Sabanski, formerly Manager of the Russian Bank at Meshed, has returned to open up an agency for Messrs. Nobel, the Petroleum Company. He is touring to Turbat and other places.

#### *Turbat-i-Hayderi.*

Captain Grey, His Majesty's Consul, arrived on the 7th January from India.

#### *Ispahan.*

The situation forms the subject of a separate despatch.

#### *Yezd.*

The roads to Yezd continue most unsafe and several fresh robberies are reported. The Kerman road is in this respect the worst: Parsees are frequently interfered with and appear generally never to be free from the fear of molestation.

#### *Seistan.*

The situation is normal.

#### *Kerman.*

1. The Kerman frontier, from the west ground to the north, is practically blockaded. The posts and any caravans trying to get through are regularly robbed. A large number of parcels from Bunder Abbas are being held up at Dowletabad, unable to get through to Rafsinjan. Writing on the 10th December, His Majesty's Consul stated that no posts had come through from Bunder Abbas for a fortnight.

2. At the end of November, seven Russian Cossacks of the Russian Consul's escort left for Meshed to meet their reliefs there.

#### *Kermanshah.*

1. Captain Haworth learns from our agent at Hamadan, that the Constitutional party there recently approached him with a view to taking refuge with him. A similar request was made to the Turkish Consular Agent. It seems that at Hamadan the people are in favour of the Constitution.

2. The Governor has collected some troops with the supposed intention of marching against Dacod Khan, but on the 12th January they were still at Kermanshah. Dacod Khan had requested the Governor to come out one stage from Kermanshah to interview him.

#### *Shiraz.*

1. There have been several more robberies on the roads and in the town. The Kavani brothers do not appear to have made much progress in their expedition against the Laris. His Majesty's Consul thinks that Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, the Kashgai Chief, is master of the situation if he cares to exert himself, and that there is no one to stop him should he decide to make a raid on Shiraz.

2. Serdar Firouz returned to Shiraz early in January.

### PERSIAN GULF.

#### *Bushire.*

1. Muleteers who left Bushire towards the end of November for Shiraz, returned to Bushire and reported that, as the road was unsafe between Kazeroon and Shiraz, they had left the packages at the former place and returned to Bushire for fresh ones.

2. The Deputy Governor is reported to have received a telegram from Tehran instructing him to establish a Court of Justice in lieu of the former Town Council. He accordingly proposes to summon the representatives of the different sections of the inhabitants, with a view to selecting members for the Court.

3. The Darya Beggi, late Governor of the Gulf Ports, has written to his friends that he is trying to get himself reinstated, and that, if he failed, he would ask for permission to settle permanently at Mohammerah.

#### *Bunder Abbas.*

1. M. Rosenfeld, mentioned in last Summary, returned to Lingeh on the 18th November.

2. M. Akers, of the Board of Trade, arrived on the 2nd December.

#### *Lingah.*

The Sadid-es-Sultaneh, Russian Consular Agent, left for Bunder Abbas by the Russian steamer "Tigre" on the 8th December. It is reported that, until a new Consul arrives at Bunder Abbas, the Sadid-es-Sultaneh will visit Lingah once a month or once in two months.

#### *Mohammerah.*

1. The Serdar Arfa returned to Mohammerah on the 6th December. He appeared satisfied with the arrangements he had made with the Beni Truf and anticipated no trouble in future.

2. Mr. Reynolds, Engineer of the Oil Syndicate, who has been re-engaged, returned from England on the 10th December.

(Signed) C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché.

[6055]

No. 290.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received February 15.)

[Extender of Telegram No. 59 of the 7th February.]

(No. 90.)  
Sir,

*St. Petersburg, February 7, 1909.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch No. 46 of the 3rd instant, inclosing a Memorandum in reply to that which the Russian Government drew up respecting the situation in Persia. M. Isvolsky has always been strongly of opinion that while the two Governments should insist on the Shah fulfilling his promises to establish a constitutional régime in Persia, it was almost essential at the same time to furnish the Government of Persia with some financial assistance which would enable them to execute some of the most urgent reforms and to meet some of the most pressing needs. M. Isvolsky has always contended that when the Treasury is depleted and the salaries of the officials and troops many months in arrears, it is of little use for the Shah to decree a Constitution and a reorganization of the Administration. He was at the same time quite ready to admit that a supply of funds to the Shah at the present moment would be most inadvisable, and would doubtless be misconstrued and misapplied; but he considers that, as soon as there is undoubted proof that the Shah has taken steps to carry out his engagements, it would be permissible and also advisable to furnish such pecuniary aid to the Persian Government, under proper guarantees as to its expenditure, as would permit them to pay some arrears and to start the machinery. I think then that the Russian Government would be disappointed if they discovered in the British reply no indication of any willingness to supply a



certain modest sum such as 200,000*l.* or 300,000*l.*, when both Governments were assured that the Shah had in reality taken measures in the sense in which he has been advised.

I ventured therefore to suggest by telegraph that I might be authorized to add a sentence at the end of the British Memorandum which would hold out some hope of the two Governments being willing to examine the question of a moderate advance under the necessary guarantees, when they had satisfied themselves that the Shah had actually taken steps towards fulfilling his promises.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[6062]

No. 291.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 97.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, February 10, 1909.*

I COMMUNICATED yesterday to M. Isvolsky the Memorandum which was inclosed in your despatch No. 46 of the 3rd instant, and which was drawn up in reply to that transmitted by the Russian Government.

At an interview which I had with M. Isvolsky this afternoon, he alluded to the Memorandum which I had sent to him, and said that, although he had not yet had time to study it carefully, he would like to make one or two preliminary observations.

He observed that His Majesty's Government stated that they were disposed to think that the best course to take would be to allow the existing chaos to endure till whatever element in the country is strongest gains the day. He thought that such a course of abstention would inevitably lead eventually to armed intervention. There was no single element in sight among those who were warring against the Government who would gain the upper hand throughout Persia. A process, and a rapid process, of disintegration was going on, and in all probability we should, if no efforts were made to strengthen the Administration, see established throughout Persia various autonomous or independent local Governments with no cohesion and powerless to maintain order. The Memorandum further states that His Majesty's Government are assured, from reliable sources, that if a Constitution were granted tranquillity would be immediately restored over the whole of Persia. This he considered to be a very large assumption; and was it likely that Sattar Khan and his Russian revolutionary abettors would lay down their arms and become peaceful citizens, and be satisfied with the grant of a Constitution? He was sure that they would not; their aims were far other. Look at Resht, Astrabad, and other places; could it be assumed with absolute certainty that the grant of a Constitution would calm all agitation there? He was strongly of opinion that means should be found to strengthen the Administration, as he was convinced that, if the Government were left in their present helpless condition, such anarchy would ensue as would absolutely compel both Governments to intervene. When chaos had arisen in the South—and there were signs that before long a situation similar to that in the North would be produced in the South of Persia—he thought that His Majesty's Government would find that it was impossible to wait to see which party gained the upper hand. He was most desirous that the Shah should fulfil his promises and decree a Constitution, but he thought that the two Governments must really give him some assistance to set the machine going. He noticed, further, that the British Memorandum stated that His Majesty's Government could not consent to make any advance until an elected Assembly had approved of the transaction. But if this were to be the case, the Government would be without money for an indefinite time. These were, M. Isvolsky said, merely a few preliminary observations which had occurred to him on a first reading of the Memorandum. He earnestly hoped that His Majesty's Government would find it possible to meet the Russian Government half way, and that the two Governments would be able to take a common ground. He would study the Memorandum carefully and give a reply later.

I told M. Isvolsky that I had, just before coming to see him, read a despatch from Sir George Barclay, which stated very positively that the grant of a Constitution would go very far in appeasing the people. There could, in any case, be no possible harm in insisting on the Shah fulfilling his promises, but I was quite sure that my Government were immovable on the question of giving an advance to the Shah unless

they were perfectly assured that an Assembly would in reality be convoked. Public opinion in England would never permit any financial assistance to be granted to the Persian Government at the present juncture. My Government were not so "doctrinaires" (his Excellency had repeated this phrase more than once) as he imagined, and were most desirous of co-operating with Russia. I admitted that there was a good deal of force in some of his observations, and he could be quite sure that my Government would examine with every consideration any suggestions which he made. I would, I said, repeat to you the substance of what he had said to me; and I would explain that his observations were merely preliminary, and that later he would give a fuller exposition of his views.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[6113]

No. 292.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

[By Post.]

(No. 29.)

Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Paris, February 13, 1909.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 89 [of the 12th February].

Sirdar Assad is identical with the Chieftain with whom I had the interview, reported in my despatch No. 29 of the 14th January. I have ascertained that he is now staying at Hotel Astoria, in Paris.

Sir G. Barclay informed.

[6257]

No. 293.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, February 15, 1909.*

PROPOSAL for settlement of debts of Amin-es-Zarb.

Russian Bank are being told by Russian Minister of Finance that they are not to accept the arrangement proposed. M. Kokovtsoff is communicating with the Russian Legation at Tehran with a view to finding some other method of arriving at a settlement.

[6191]

No. 294.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 15, 1909.*

RUSSIAN Consulate-General at Tabreez.

M. Pokhitonow, the Russian Consul-General at Tabreez, is shortly going on leave. He will be replaced by M. Miller, who was formerly Consul at Seistan, and afterwards at Liverpool. He used to be Anglophobe, but M. Sabline tells me that he is now in sympathy with the new order of things in Persia.

[6192]

No. 295.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 15, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tabreez. My telegram No. 85 of the 11th instant.

The grain reserves at Tabreez will, in Mr. Wratislaw's opinion, be sufficient to feed the town two months longer.



[6229]

No. 296.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)*

(No. 9)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, February 15, 1909.

Mr. Wratislaw reports that the negotiations between Ain-ed-Dowleh and the Nationalists, reported in my telegram No. 85 of the 11th instant, have been dropped.

It is possible that the correspondent of the "Daily News" will report the presence of two Russian officers with Ain-ed-Dowleh at Basmineh. I am assured by M. Sabline that there is no truth whatever in this story.

[5989]

No. 297.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 15, 1909.

It is impossible, under the circumstances described in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 94 of the 14th instant, for Ismail Khan or Mustapha Gholi to be provided with letters of protection from His Majesty's Government. They should be acquainted with this decision.

[5987]

No. 298.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 15, 1909.

AMIN-ES ZARB'S-debts (see your telegram No. 92 of the 14th instant).

It is our intention to inform the Imperial Bank of Persia that if the prospective Persian Assembly were to repudiate the obligation involved on taking over the Amin-es-Zarb's debts, which they would certainly have a right to do, a claim against the personal property of the Shah would be the only method of obtaining repayment which we could support the bank in adopting.

[6269]

No. 299.

*Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received February 15.)*

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, February 15, 1909.

I BEG to acknowledge your letter of the 13th instant, advising the receipt of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, that he has received a declaration with numerous signatures, purporting to come from the Nationalist party in Tehran, to the effect that no Concessions or loans, either direct or indirect, will be recognized unless the Assembly has approved them.

The above information caused us to dispatch a telegram to Tehran to-day, a copy of which I inclose.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed)

T. JACKSON,

Chairman.

Inclosure in No. 299.

*Imperial Bank of Persia to Mr. Wood, Tehran.*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

[February 15, 1909.]

REFERRING to our telegram of the 9th February, in view of declaration of Nationalist party, communicated to us by Foreign Office, against advances to Shah's Government, suspend all proposed arrangements and await events. Keep us well advised respecting. Referring to your confidential semi-official letter of the 27th January; security, get as much as you can.

[6394]

No. 300.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)*

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 16, 1909.

TURBAT-I-HAIDARI Consulate. My private telegram of the 9th instant to Sir C. Hardinge.

I am aware that it is intended that the question of Consular establishments in Persia should be treated as a whole, but I venture to suggest that a good opportunity is afforded to ask for the abolition or reduction of the Russian Consulate in Seistan by the suppression of our Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari.

I learn from His Majesty's Consul in Seistan that the repairs are about to be carried out at the Russian Consulate, and that the Russian Acting Consul considers that it is in consequence of the dispatch of a new British Consul to Turbat-i-Haidari that sanction for them has been granted.

[6382]

No. 301.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)*

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 16, 1909.

GENERAL situation.

The gravity of the present situation is, I consider, increasing every day that our instructions are delayed, and the chances of reconciling the Shah with his people are becoming more remote.

I received a private visit from the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, who asked for my advice, and urged the necessity for making further joint representations to the Shah immediately. In reply to his Excellency, I said that, before giving further counsels, M. Sabline and I were awaiting instructions, but that personally I thought, and I knew M. Sabline agreed, that it was imperative for the Shah, in view of his increasing unpopularity, immediately to take steps to prove to the nation that he was in earnest in his repeated assurances that he desired a Constitution. No time should be lost in dismissing his reactionary advisers, and he should proclaim an amnesty, and should summon from Europe those Persians who were competent to help in elaborating a constitutional system such as the needs of the country required.

Saad-ed-Dowleh begged me, on leaving, to do my best to hasten the dispatch of instructions to the two Representatives. He evinced great anxiety as to the situation.

[6391]

No. 302.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)*

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 16, 1909.

GENERAL situation.

My Russian colleague is sending a telegram to the Russian Government, of which the following is the substance:—

R. "In view of the grave situation in the country the Shah himself realizes that it is impossible for him to continue his present disastrous policy. His Majesty has asked my advice, but I cannot give him any which would have a practical result.

"Situation is complicated by the Shah's insincerity, by which he is forfeiting the people's confidence and his popularity. He is surrounded by counsellors who have made him odious to the people, and who have brought their country to the verge of a catastrophe.

"The delay in granting reforms has created a situation where it will be difficult for the Shah to calm his people by half measures. Nor would a moderate Constitution, which might have sufficed four months ago, now satisfy Tabreez, Ispahan, and Resht. The people know the feebleness of the Shah too well to yield, and it is only due to the concentration of troops in the capital that the Shah remains on the throne.

"I think the Shah's hesitation is in great measure due to his uncertainty as to the reforms to be proposed by the two Cabinets, and if the two Representatives had positive



and formal instructions they could more easily bring the Shah to grant a Constitution by friendly advice, which he would have to follow rather than lose the much-prized sympathy of the two Powers, and possibly his throne."

I concur in M. Sabline's opinion, and I consider that the Shah is in grave danger of losing his throne unless he can be brought to dissociate himself from the reactionary party, and place himself at the head of the Nationalist movement. I fear that now he is in danger whatever he does, but in this certainly lies his best chance of safety.

[6395]

No. 303.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)*

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 16, 1909.

GOVERNOR of Resht.

I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the people of Resht have elected Sipahdar as Governor.

He should prove an excellent Governor. He is pressing the Shah to comply with the will of the people, and not to send troops to Resht.

M. Sabline and I had been urging the Shah to appoint him, but without success.

[6269]

No. 304.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 191.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 16, 1909.

AMIN-ES-ZARB'S debts.

Please refer to your telegram No. 73 of the 15th instant.

Telegraphic instructions were sent yesterday by the Imperial Bank of Persia to Bank Manager in Tehran to the effect that he was to await events, and that all the arrangements that have been proposed were meanwhile to be suspended.

[6508]

No. 305.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, February 17, 1909.

PERSIA.

I read to M. Isvolsky Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 99 and 100. He had not yet received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires' telegram. I urged him to agree to the steps proposed: that we should press the Shah to proclaim a Constitution at once, to dismiss certain of his entourage and to recall from Europe competent men, &c. M. Isvolsky repeated to me some of the arguments which he had used on previous occasions, and said that he would do nothing until he had received M. Sabline's telegram, when he would think the matter over.

[6444]

No. 306.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)*

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 17, 1909.

GUARANTEES for the Shah. Your telegram No. 25 of the 14th ultimo.

I was again approached yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the guarantees we should be willing to give the Shah. I replied in the same sense as on the former occasion.

When we make our representations the Shah will probably ask for some assurances, as His Majesty is no doubt genuinely afraid of the consequences of a Constitution for his throne and person.

We should be glad to receive instructions as to what reply we should give His Majesty.

[6513]

No. 307.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)*

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 17, 1909.

ARABISTAN telegraphs. Your telegram No. 36 of the 27th ultimo.

The Persian Government have sent me a note to the effect that by command of the Shah the Minister of telegraphs has been instructed to make the necessary arrangements with the Indo-European Telegraph Department for carrying out as soon as possible the repair of the Arabistan telegraph line.

Mr. Barker has been asked for a report on the condition of the line by the Minister of Telegraphs.

I hope that Kirk will not delay sending final instructions to Barker, as we are now in a position to discuss details.

[6382]

No. 308.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 196.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 17, 1909.

SITUATION in Persia.

See Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 99 of yesterday's date.

In my opinion the Shah will take no notice of any advice unaccompanied by a threat. We wish to avoid active intervention, and thus such a threat would have to be of a negative character, and to the effect that neither Government will afford him support of a financial or other nature until he redeems his promise to his people by proclaiming a Constitution, and so pacifies the country. A hint from the Russian Government to the effect that the Russian officers will be withdrawn would probably be more efficacious than anything else. I do not think that strong and decided action on the part of Russia would cause the Shah to seek the support of some other foreign nation, though I understand that this is what the Russian Government are afraid of. My opinion is based on the belief that Germany will not make any offer at present, and on the consideration that if it were discovered that the Shah was carrying on intrigues with any other nation, or if it seemed at all likely that officers of any other nation would replace the Russian officers, the seizure of the northern customs by Russia would soon bring him to reason, and if Russia did this to enforce the obligations due to her, we could, since those due to us are very much in arrear, similarly seize the southern customs. It seems to me that the only means of saving the country from internal disaster is to make it clear to the Shah that he will be left to his own devices, but in any case we desire to do nothing to which the Russian Government do not entirely agree. If there were any risk—and under the present circumstances I do not believe that any such risk does exist—of such action leading to interference on the part of any other foreign Power, Russia would have our support in the measures suggested above for the prevention of any alteration in the situation should such as would adversely affect either our own interests or those of Russia.

[6766]

No. 309.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 17, 1909.

OXIDE Concessions in the Persian Gulf.

Is there any one whom you could suggest as a possible agent for Strick at Tehran? You will have no responsibility in the matter; I have made this quite clear.

We do not wish to lose our influence with Strick, or he may come to some agreement with the Hamburg-America line with regard to the Gulf by which British trade would suffer. For this reason we are anxious to assist him if possible.

The last paragraph of the above is confidential.

[1629]

2 X



[6542]

No. 310.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 107.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, February 13, 1909.*

THE Persian Minister called on me yesterday, and expressed an earnest hope that the British and Russian Governments would come as soon as possible to an understanding as to the steps which they proposed to take in order to ameliorate the deplorable condition into which his country had fallen. He feared that if Great Britain and Russia did not speedily take some action with the Persian Government the whole country would be plunged into a state of anarchy. He was firmly of opinion that if the Shah were to promulgate an Electoral Law and announce the dates of elections and of the convocation of an Assembly a great improvement would be immediately effected. At the same time, he thought it would be most desirable that the two Powers should endeavour to procure the removal of those about the Shah who were hindering His Majesty from giving effect to his desire to establish a constitutional régime; and he also considered it to be absolutely essential that some financial aid should be given to the Persian Government to emerge from their present critical financial position. Arrears of long standing were due not only to the troops but to all the branches of the Administration, and even to Diplomatic and Consular Agents, and it was impossible that the Government could effect any reforms in the Administration unless they had the wherewithal to do so. The people looked to Great Britain and to Russia to aid in re-establishing order and tranquillity.

I told the Minister that he knew well that both Great Britain and Russia desired to see Persia peaceful, prosperous, and independent, and that both Governments were extremely anxious that the Shah should, without loss of time, introduce a constitutional régime and a thorough reform of the Administration. I must, however, tell him candidly that my Government would be unable to afford any financial aid until a Constitution was actually in being, as public opinion in England would view with much distrust any pecuniary advance to the Persian Government while the struggle between the latter and the nationalists was still proceeding. Any pecuniary aid would be regarded as giving one side an advantage over the other and as, in a measure, taking sides in the conflict, while, as he knew, both Governments were desirous of abstaining from all intervention.

The Minister said that he perfectly understood that point of view, but he should have thought that if proper guarantees were taken for the advance being disbursed for perfectly legitimate purposes there could be no objection to making it. His chief anxiety was in regard to the Bakhtiariis, and he feared that their movement, if unchecked, might go so far as to endanger the dynasty; and if the dynasty were to disappear we should be face to face with chaos.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[6670]

No. 311.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, February 18, 1909.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 100 of the 16th instant: Persia.

The telegram from M. Sabline to his Government, referred to in Sir G. Barclay's above-mentioned telegram, has now reached M. Isvolsky, who says that the two Representatives must clearly be furnished with instructions without further delay. I pointed out that I had fully explained to him the views of His Majesty's Government, and begged him to furnish me with those of the Russian Government as soon as possible. His Excellency promised to communicate to me some points on which he trusted that the two Governments might be found to be in agreement.



[6676]

No. 312\*.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 18, 1909.*

ALLEGED loan negotiations between the Bakhtiari and Messrs. Lynch.

I have received a visit from a Bakhtiari chief, who has returned here from Kum, where his kinsmen are still parleying with Samsam-es-Sultaneh. He says that he hears that a loan on the security of the Bakhtiari road is being negotiated by Sardar Assad with Messrs. Lynch in London. He says that before the loan can be recognized the consent of the other concessionnaires will have to be obtained.

[6605]

No. 312.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 104.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, Februar,*

FINANCES. My telegram No. 74 of the 1st instant.

M. Bizot promises me his Report, at the latest, in a fortnight.

[6676]

No. 313.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 106.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 18, 1909.*

SITUATION at Resht.

Sipahdar has sent telegrams to M. Sabline and myself for communication to the Shah urging His Majesty to send no troops to Resht. We have replied declining to act as intermediaries for communications from him to the Shah.

Troops to the number of some hundreds have left Tehran *en route* for Resht, but it is doubtful whether they will get beyond Kaswin. In the event of their doing so it might be well for the two Representatives to address a note on the lines of your telegram No. 17 of the 10th January as the position of Resht makes it especially desirable to prevent, if possible, fighting in the neighbourhood; but to do this it might be necessary to obtain special instructions for M. Sabline (see my private telegram of the 11th January).

Revolutionaries, who, I believe, are Caucasians, have kidnapped Shoa-es-Sultaneh, the Shah's brother, who has arrived at Resht for Europe. They are demanding a ransom of 5,000 tomans.

[6444]

No. 314.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 18, 1909.*

ASSURANCES to the Shah.

The reply which you gave to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in your telegram No. 102, meets with my approval.

The verbal assurances given to the Shah by the two dragomans in December 1908, which you reported to me in your telegram No. 446, dated the 22nd December, 1908, represent the furthest point to which we can go.

[6729]

No. 315.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 18, 1909.*

I HAVE received a request from the Russian Government to give my support to their representations at the Porte on the following points:—

1. Neutral Turco-Persian frontier district; the establishment of a Turkish custom-house at Belkendi, near the Urumia Lake, and the occupation by Ottoman troops of new positions in this neutral district, reported in your telegram No. 21 of the 8th instant.

2. "Bastis" at the Turkish Legation: The action of the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, who has allowed agitation of a political nature to take place among the "bastis" at his Legation.

I should be glad of information as to the facts in connection with the reported establishment of the customs-house and of your opinion upon No. 2.



I should also be glad of your opinion as to the proposal of the Russian Government, in connection with the matter of the Turkish guards who have been sent to Urumia and Khoi, that we should remind the Shah that it is the exclusive right of Russia and Great Britain to dispatch guards in such cases.

[6726]

No. 316.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)*

Sir,

*India Office, February 17, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, asking for the views of the Secretary of State for India on the question of demanding from the Persian Government the resumption of payments for the service of the Anglo-Indian Loan of 290,000*l.* The suspension of the sinking fund for three years was agreed to by His Majesty's Government in August 1907 on certain conditions, which cannot be held to have been fulfilled. The last payment received was the payment in February 1908 of a sum of 13,601*l.* for interest due on the 4th April, 1907, together with a sum of 596*l.*, being interest on the amount in default for the period April 1907–February 1908.

Viscount Morley agrees in the view of Secretary Sir E. Grey that it would be inopportune at the present moment to take any steps with a view to the collection by or on behalf of His Majesty's Government of the Gulf customs, which a demand for repayment, to be effective, would probably entail. He is of opinion that it would be better not to press the demand for payment in a definite form till the question of the constitutional and financial régime to be established in Persia has further developed. The matter could be raised, if necessary, when the provisional arrangement for securing the debt of the Imperial Bank on the Bushire customs expires. As regards this arrangement Lord Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to instruct His Majesty's Minister that he need do nothing more in the matter for the present.

With regard to the suggestion that the agency of the Indo-European Telegraph Department should be employed to impound the telegraph revenues of the Persian Government, which form part of the security of the Anglo-Indian Loan, I am to inclose copy of a note of the Director-in-chief of the Department. Apart from the comparative smallness of the amount (some 3,500*l.* a-year) which could thus be realized, Lord Morley considers it out of the question, for the reasons of policy indicated by Mr. Kirk, to take any action of a kind to disturb the existing relations between the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the Persian Telegraph Department.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 316.

*Note by Mr. Kirk on the Fourth Paragraph of Foreign Office Letter No. 3836/09, dated February 2, 1909.*

THE Indo-European Telegraph Department prepares annual accounts of its international telegraph traffic transactions with the Persian Administration of Telegraphs, and pays in one sum the balance due to that Administration. This account is usually sent out from this Office to Tehran in July for the previous official year, and is paid in August. For the last three official years for which settlements have been made, the balances paid to the Persian Administration have been as follows:—

	Fr.
1905-6 .. .. .	83,277 (3,331 <i>l.</i> )
1906-7 .. .. .	86,073 (3,443 <i>l.</i> )
1907-8 .. .. .	93,029 (3,721 <i>l.</i> )

In Persia itself there is an unofficial arrangement between the Persian and Indo-European Telegraph Departments that the latter Department should carry over its wires messages that may be handed in at its offices for transmission to some other office in Persia. The revenue obtained from these telegrams is paid in full to the Persian Telegraph Administration, and no account of it appears in the accounts of the Indo-European Telegraph Department. The arrangement assists the Persian Government, and also the public, more especially mercantile firms, who would find it difficult

to send telegrams in Persian written in Persian characters. If the question was raised of impounding the revenue obtained from these local messages carried by the Indo-European Telegraph Department, the Persian Department would only require to order the traffic to be retained on its own wires, and the receipts in its own offices.

It will be seen therefore that the only telegraph revenue that could readily be impounded would be about 3,500*l.* a-year, which the Persian Department obtains from international traffic through the Indo-European Telegraph Department. The withdrawal of the payment of this comparatively small sum would undoubtedly bring about more difficulties in the negotiations for obtaining a renewal of the British Telegraph Concessions, and the control of the Arabistan lines. If the Persian Government obtained no revenue from the telegraph service of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, it would naturally be a matter of small importance to it what happened to the Department's telegraph lines, which at present it does its best to protect. These lines are for international traffic, so that any action which might contribute in the end to affect their general efficiency would have very far-reaching results.

(Signed) H. A. KIRK.

February 3, 1909.

[6706]

No. 317.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)*

Sir,

*India Office, February 17, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 11th instant, as to the Karun irrigation scheme, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the note which Secretary Sir E. Grey proposes to address to the Netherland Government on the subject.

He also agrees that, pending their reply, no further communication need be made to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Copy of a telegram sent to the Government of India is inclosed.\*

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[6722]

No. 318.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)*

Sir,

*Treasury Chambers, February 18, 1909.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 1st instant and its inclosures in regard to the retention of the Indian guard stationed in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz, in connection with the operations of the Burmah Oil Syndicate.

In reply, I am to say that, as the Oil Syndicate has now agreed to bear the entire cost of maintaining the guard from the 18th ultimo, their Lordships sanction the charge to Imperial funds, in addition to the expenses already sanctioned, of 67*l.* 2*s.*—being one moiety of 134*l.* 4*s.*—as additional salary to Lieutenants Ranking and Wilson for six months from the 17th December, 1907, to the 17th June, 1908, as well as half the cost of the guard, at the total rate of 174*l.* 8*s.* a-month, for seven months from the 17th June, 1908, to the 17th January, 1909.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) T. L. HEATH.

\* Not printed.

[1629]

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[6804]

No. 319.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)*

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*St. Petersburg, February 19, 1909.*

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me the following proposals. He says they are his personal views, which he will submit to his colleagues in the Cabinet. He hopes that they may form basis for an Agreement between the two Governments:—

1. To require immediate dismissal by the Shah of the Sadr Azam and of Amir Bahadur Jang. Latter might at the same time retain office as chief of his personal guard.
2. To obtain from the Shah re-establishment of the constitutional régime by means of immediate reforms enumerated below.
3. The constitution of a Cabinet composed of persons to be recommended to him by Russian and British Legations.
4. Inclusion in Council of Empire without delay of enlightened persons belonging to different parties, of whom some could be recommended to him by two Legations. This Council would be intrusted with elaboration and promulgation of a new electoral law.
5. General amnesty for all those who have taken up arms against Shah.
6. Date to be fixed at once for the Parliamentary elections and for convocation of the Assembly. These dates to be made known without delay to the entire country.
7. In view of fact that the complete lack of money in the Persian Treasury forms an insurmountable obstacle to realization of reforms recommended to the Shah by the two Governments, there shall be paid over to the Persian Government, as soon as preparatory measures enumerated above have been carried out by that Government, a certain sum by way of advance on a loan to be made at a later date. Method of expenditure of this sum will be controlled by Mixed Commission\* mentioned in Russian Memorandum of the 16th January last. Thus the two Governments may be perfectly sure that the money in question will be utilized for purpose of carrying out reforms which we consider urgent and indispensable for averting the danger of yet graver complications, and not for restoration of Shah's absolute power.
8. A French Treasurer-General with two assistants of the same nationality will assure regular receipt of taxes, and give to Persian Treasury a stable and normal organization.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[6805]

No. 320.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)*

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 19, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tabreez.

I have addressed the following telegram, No. 15, to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"It is asserted in royalist circles that Ain-ed-Dowleh has some 10,000 men under him and that he is about to take the offensive. The imminence of the capture of Tabreez is very confidently talked of.

"I should be glad of your observations on these rumours."

[5705]

No. 321.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 207.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 19, 1909.*

PERSIAN telegraph lines.

With reference to Memorandum by M. Isvolsky inclosed in your despatch No. 71 of 30th ultimo.

\* Composed of the Directors of the Russian and English Banks at Tehran and of Persian Delegates.

You may now communicate the view of His Majesty's Government as to the order in which the respective questions should be considered.

We quite agree with Russian Government that it is important that the exchange of control on the Khaf-Nasratabad and Tehran-Meshed lines should be speedily settled, but in our opinion there will be a better chance of overcoming the objections of the Persian Government to this exchange if they have been previously favourably impressed by the economic advantages which the transfer to England of the control over the Arabistan line will entail. As regards the Arabistan line and the prolongation of Concessions, instructions are being given to the Indo-European Department to expedite a settlement of those questions, and in our opinion we should merely frustrate our own object by attempting to hasten a settlement in the case of the exchange of the Khaf-Nasratabad and Tehran-Meshed lines.

Matter contained in last paragraph but two of letter of 10th instant from India Office may be communicated at the same time.

[6965]

No. 322.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)*

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 20, 1909.*

REFUGEES at the Turkish Embassy and Turco-Persian frontier. Your telegram No. 61 of the 18th instant.

I visited the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires on behalf of the two Legations on hearing ten days ago that the bastis at the Turkish Embassy were using it as a centre for political agitation. I gave Sadeddin Bey a friendly warning, and he replied that he knew what was going on and was doing his best to prevent it. This, I believe, is true, but it could do no harm if he were requested by the Turkish Government to continue to keep a watch over their doings.

M. Sabline, who had the story from the Russian Consul at Urumia, has told me of the establishment of a Turkish custom-house at Jebel Kend. This is all I know of it. Though I have reminded the Persian Government, they have not sent me the report on these incidents which they promised, but when I questioned Saad-ed-Dowleh about Jebel Kend he replied that the Turks had established a number of custom-houses on Persian territory.

I am disposed to think that the theory of "exclusive prerogative" in regard to Consular guards is a fond invention of M. de Hartwig, and I doubt if it would bear examination. Still it is very desirable that our *de facto* privileged position in this respect should be maintained, and to confirm it we might inform the Persian Government that we should strongly object to any change in the *status quo* such as the sending of Consular guards to the two Turkish Consulates would involve. Saad-ed-Dowleh says, however, that a strong protest has already been entered by the Persian Government themselves.

[6966]

No. 323.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)*

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 20, 1909.*

ARABISTAN telegraphs. Your telegram No. 63 of yesterday. If there is no change in the Government, we hope to obtain a satisfactory arrangement shortly. The communication of terms on the lines indicated in your telegram No. 36 of the 27th January made very favourable impression on the Minister of Telegraphs.

[6804]

No. 324.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 216.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 20, 1909.*

SHAH and Constitution.

You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs to wait till he has received the opinion of His Majesty's Government upon the proposals set forth in your Excellency's telegram



No. 87 of yesterday before consulting rest of Russian Cabinet about them. I understand that proposals embody his own personal views. His Majesty's Government will take them at once into consideration, but I fear that there are objections which may prove insuperable to the financial proposals contained in No. 7. There seems, however, to be no reason why the Shah should not meanwhile be urged to proclaim an amnesty and to establish a Constitution. Such a Proclamation will immediately produce a relaxation in the situation throughout Persia, although I agree with M. Isvolsky in thinking that it will not put an end of itself to the present unfortunate state of affairs in Persia.

[1153]

No. 325.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 20, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, respecting the possibility of a reduction in expenditure on Consular establishments in Persia.

It is observed that the Government of India, whose despatch forms the inclosure in your letter, confine themselves to deprecating a reduction in the existing number of establishments, and do not discuss revision of the charges of each individual post, and that their attention has been called to this omission, a tabular statement being forwarded, setting forth the striking contrast in cost between the appointments filled from the Levant Service and the Indian Departments respectively.

I am to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that Sir E. Grey is profoundly impressed by the comparative charges as between the two services, and by the marked increase in recent years of the cost of the Indian appointments, particularly Seistan.

Apart from the expenditure connected with the Legation at Tehran, it appears that nine posts are filled from the Indian Departments at a yearly cost of 52,500L,\* as against 6,300L. spent upon six posts filled from Levant Service.

Sir E. Grey has taken the state of affairs, as evidenced by these figures, into serious consideration; he has arrived at the conclusion that a revision should be made, both of the distribution of posts, as between the two services, and of the existing scale of charges.

In arriving at this conclusion, the Secretary of State has been influenced by two principal considerations—

(a.) The efficient conduct of the business of the important posts at Tabreez and Ispahan, during the recent period of crisis and unusual difficulty, and

(b.) The change in the diplomatic situation, following on the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention.

Tabreez and Ispahan have, with the exception of Tehran, been the centres of the most important events in Persia during recent months; the officers at these posts, where the expenditure is on a very moderate scale, have, as Lord Morley will no doubt concede, satisfactorily discharged their duties not only in regard to Imperial interests, but also in regard to those matters which may be deemed to affect more closely Indian affairs; and, under the existing arrangements, the Government of India have been kept fully informed as to the progress of events in the places in question.

With the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention, the diplomatic aspects of the Persian problem must necessarily assume essential and increasing modifications. Whereas formerly Persia was the centre of continual rivalry in the local interests of Great Britain and Russia, the aim and object of the Anglo-Russian Convention is, above all, to define and safeguard the respective interests, especially political, of the two countries, thus putting a period to the friction in Persia, which has exercised so harmful an influence on our general relations with Russia in the past, whatever justification therefore may hitherto have existed for the expenditure of large sums on Consular establishments in Persia, Sir E. Grey cannot but feel that, in view both of the clear definition of the British and Russian spheres of interest, and of the aim that, in future, Persian problems should constitute a subsidiary, as distinct from a cardinal factor in British policy towards Russia, no further reason exists for maintaining, in the

\* This excludes expenditure on buildings in both services.

majority of the Persian Consular posts, a scale which is both sumptuous and exceptional.

In these circumstances, while Sir E. Grey is strongly of opinion that it would be advisable for the establishment at Seistan (as constituting, in a certain measure, an administrative outpost of the Indian Government) and for the posts on the littoral of the Persian Gulf to continue to be officered from the Indian Departments, I am to invite Lord Morley's observations on the view of the Secretary of State that the remaining inland posts, now filled by Indian officers, might suitably be transferred to officers of the Levant Service.

In the event of the arrangement outlined meeting with his Lordship's concurrence, the only Indian officer whose retention at Meshed would appear to be called for would be the Military Attaché, unless, indeed, it should be desired, for purposes of quarantine, to continue the medical appointment.

The arrangements proposed could, however, only come gradually into force in the course of two or three years, as the supply of officers of the Levant Service would not sooner correspond to the demand.

In the meantime, however, I am to express Sir E. Grey's view that no useful purpose will be served by the upkeep of the post, costing 6,200L. a-year, at Turbat-i-Haidari, which, as you are aware, is within the Russian sphere.

The circumstances under which this post was created in 1903 are well known to the Secretary of State for India; and, with the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, Sir E. Grey considers that the conditions have materially altered, and he would no longer feel justified in recommending the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to bear a moiety of the cost involved. He accordingly is of opinion that a native agency, as advocated by Captain Keyes, and as raised formerly, would fully meet the requirements of the situation.

With regard to the establishment at Seistan, the Secretary of State considers that the existing charges are extravagant, and I am to submit, for Lord Morley's earnest consideration, a proposal that the existing expenditure should be reduced by one-half forthwith.

If it is held to be indispensable to station a medical officer at Birjand, I am to suggest that the occupant of the post should be dependent upon Seistan, be provided with a limited travelling allowance, and be in charge of any medical work connected with the latter place. His Majesty's Minister is, however, of opinion that a Vice-Consulate at Birjand to be filled by a telegraph officer would meet all requirements.

Finally, I am to express the view of Sir E. Grey that the Consulate-General at Bagdad should be transferred to the Levant Service. The cost of this establishment was included in the arrangement of 1900, being fixed at 7,800L., of which half was to be contributed from Imperial funds. It is estimated that the cost to the Indian and British Exchequers could, if the post were transferred as proposed, be very materially reduced, without detriment to the public service.

Indian interests, both commercial and political, as well as such duties as the administration of the Oudh Bequest, would, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, not suffer from the adoption of this proposal; while, in view of the increasing importance of Mesopotamia from the political point of view, there would be advantage if the Consul-General at Bagdad were under the sole control of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

In submitting these views to the Secretary of State for India, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that a saving of some thousands a year to the British and Indian Exchequers may be effected by the adoption of the proposals which he has suggested without any sacrifice of efficiency, and he ventures, therefore, to recommend them to Lord Morley's favourable consideration.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

[6987]

No. 326.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 110.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 21, 1909.*

TABREEZ situation. My telegram No. 107 of the 19th instant.

In reply to my inquiry Mr. Wratislaw reports that the number of troops reported to be under Ain-ed-Dowleh is certainly exaggerated. That he cannot tell what

[1629]

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Ain-ed-Dowleh really intends to do, nor whether the town could be taken by assault. The Nationalists do not appear despondent.

Mr. Wratislaw says that if the town falls there will certainly be pillage, and probably massacre, and he asks for instructions in regard to refugees who would certainly come to the Consulate in large numbers.

In reply I have instructed Mr. Wratislaw not to refuse asylum to persons in imminent danger, and to warn Ain-ed-Dowleh that the most stringent orders must be given to respect His Majesty's Consulate-General in the event of any attack on the town, and that if British subjects or their interests suffer any injury he will be held responsible.

I am addressing a reminder in the same sense to the Persian Government.

[6988]

No. 327.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 111.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 21, 1909.

SHAH and Constitution. Telegram No. 87 from Sir A. Nicolson containing the Russian proposals.

1. Amir Bahadur Jang must not hold any post at the palace, as his evil influence would always be felt. We ought also to advise the removal of Sheikh Zazhulla from Tehran, who, though not a Minister, has a most baneful influence, if this suggestion does not involve delay by further discussion with the Russian Government.

The idea contained in No. 3 is good, but it would entail more responsibility than is desirable. Could we not require that the Cabinet should be one to which the two Governments raise no objection? M. Sabline and I already have in mind some suitable persons, and we could help privately in their selection.

The Council proposed in No. 4 is unwieldy. We ought to ask for the inclusion of a number of persons to be recommended by the two Legations, to whom should be added a certain number of the Shah's selection. A Committee, specially for the purpose mentioned, should be formed by these persons.

7. So far we have only advised the Shah to grant a Constitution and an Amnesty, and I do not know what are the reforms which we are said to have demanded and to which want of money is an insuperable obstacle. The reorganization of the police and gendarmerie, and the finances, will no doubt require money, but they could be undertaken with more advantage when the Assembly is working. I do not believe that any attempt would be made to use the money for these reforms if it were given now with the proposed conditions. The payment of arrears to the troops would be the only use made of it if it were used for any proper purpose at all. This would, I think, encourage the Shah. The fresh strength thus acquired would probably be used by him to hinder the Nationalists in their labours in connexion with the elaboration of the electoral law and the elections. These will present him with abundant opportunities for doing so. Until the new regime is working the Shah must be starved. There is besides this always the chance that such an advance would be repudiated by the Assembly. I cannot concur in the Russian proposal much as I regret the delay involved by holding out on this point, especially in view of the position of Tabreez, which is somewhat precarious.

The Shah having already consented to the appointment of a Treasurer-General, No. 8 should, I think, be omitted. The difficult task of the Treasurer-General would be made still harder if we now included his appointment among our demands as he would be regarded as imposed by foreign pressure. His appointment might be hastened privately.

(Very confidential.)

M. Sabline agrees with my observations on all the points except No. 7. On this point he cannot see his way to express concurrence in my objections.

A threat on the lines of your telegram No. 56 of the 17th instant is all the more desirable as the Shah is stiffened by the confident talk at the Palace about the approaching fall of Tabreez.

[7262]

No. 328.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)*

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, February 22, 1909.

SITUATION in Persia. Your telegram No. 216 of the 20th instant.

M. Isvolsky hopes that you will favour him with your observations as soon as possible. He will take no action until he has received them. His Excellency asked me what objections I anticipated your offering to his proposals. I said that I fancied that point 7 would be found to constitute the chief difficulty. He repeated once more that the Persian Government, unless provided with funds, would find it utterly impossible to take any steps whatsoever towards the establishment of a workable Administration of any kind. The proposed advance would not be made to the Shah, there would be strict control of its expenditure, and it was only after the promulgation of an Electoral Law and a Constitution that it would be given. If the refusal of His Majesty's Government to make any advance whatsoever, even an advance under proper control and contingent on the acceptance and fulfilment of the conditions enumerated in points 1 to 6 of his Memorandum, were persisted in, then the result, in his opinion, would probably be that the Shah would be left in a defenceless position; he might even be deposed, and in that case who was there that we could set in his place? I argued that the advance might be repudiated by the Assembly, but M. Isvolsky did not attach importance to this argument. His Excellency said that it began to look as if no agreement would ever be arrived at by the two Governments, and as if each might eventually have to follow its own separate line of policy in Persia. I observed that we must at all costs avoid such an eventuality.

M. Isvolsky will take no further action until he has received your observations on his proposals.

[7244]

No. 329.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)*

(No. 112.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 22, 1909.

IMPERIAL Bank of Persia at Tabreez.

The General Manager of the Imperial Bank is anxious to dispatch money from here to the branch of the bank at Tabreez, whose operations require immediate funds. The town is at present closely invested, and the Royalists would certainly seize the money, even if it were accompanied by an escort. I am, therefore, advising Mr. Wood not to send the money, and I am holding the Government responsible for all consequences.

The Imperial Bank in London can give you any explanations you may wish.

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No. 330.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)*

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 22, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Mr. Wratislaw, in a telegram, No. 32, dated to-day, reports that yesterday an attack was made by a strong force of Nationalists on the Karadaghlihs at Alvar, a place on the Julfa road 8 miles from Tabreez. The Nationalists were unable entirely to dislodge the Karadaghlihs, though they succeeded in driving them from one position. Fighting is to be resumed to-day. The Nationalists' losses were several killed and wounded, and the Royalists' losses are believed to have been considerable.



[7332]

No. 331.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 23.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 21st January relative to the extension of telegraphic communication in the Persian Gulf in connection with the improvement of British trade.

*India Office, February 20, 1909.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 331.

*Major Cox to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)

*Bushire, December 27, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to revert to my letter dated the 29th March, 1908, on the subject of the extension of telegraphic communication in the Persian Gulf, with particular reference to the ports of Bahrein and Koweit.

2. In that communication I expressed the view that the extension was extremely desirable alike from the commercial, political, naval, and quarantine point of view, and in connection with the suppression of the arms traffic.

It is possible, however, that Government may have been deterred from proceeding with the project at the time by the question of cost.

In case this may be so, I venture to lay before Government a copy of a communication addressed to me by Mr. Charles Akers, of the Colonial Office, now on a Mission on behalf of His Majesty's Government to study the question of sample rooms and other points of British commercial interest in the Persian Gulf. It will be seen that his investigations have brought him to the conclusion, with which I am fully in accord, that trade conditions would be greatly facilitated by the extension of telegraphic communication among the Gulf ports, and that the need can be best met by the establishment of wireless stations at Bushire, Bahrein, Koweit, Debai, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas.

Moreover, with practical experience of the installation of the wireless system in East Africa, Mr. Akers estimates the cost of establishing the stations recommended at figures much below those given me by the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs (*vide* paragraph 3 of my letter above quoted).

3. I very much hope that the conclusions arrived at by Mr. Akers, and the more favourable aspect in which his estimates place the question of cost, may enable the Government of India to give renewed consideration to the question, and to press it upon the lively attention of His Majesty's Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 331.

*Mr. Akers to Major Cox.**December 25, 1908.*

I TRUST you will not consider it amiss if I call your attention to the need of an extension of telegraphic communication in the Persian Gulf in connection with the expansion of British trade on the Persian littoral and the Pirate Coast.

From the observations I have made during my visits to Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Debai, and Bahrein, I am convinced that trade conditions would be facilitated to a large extent by the installation of telegraphic stations, bringing these places into touch with the cable, and so with the outside world.

It is unnecessary for me to enter into the details of the trade of the districts referred to, as you are much better informed than myself on that heading.

I am of opinion that the establishment of a system of wireless telegraphy would be the most satisfactory way to meet the situation. It is very much cheaper to instal and maintain than a deep-sea cable or any combination of land-lines and cable.

In 1907, under the aegis of the Foreign Office, I erected a wireless station at

Zanzibar and another one at Pemba, thus establishing communication between the two islands. The wave-link was guaranteed to carry 200 miles, although the actual distance as the crow flies is only 70 miles.

The Lodge Muirhead system was employed, and the cost of the whole installation, including dynamos and engines, was approximately 900*l.* f.o.b. London. The cost of erection for the two stations was approximately 300*l.*, bringing the total cost to 1,200*l.* The cost of maintenance was 1,000 rupees monthly after the stations were opened for the public service. The precise figures for cost of the installation can be obtained from the African Department of the Foreign Office. The Eastern Telegraph Company refused to undertake to lay a cable between Zanzibar and Pemba for less than 25,000*l.*, and demanded an annual subsidy for the subsequent maintenance.

In the circumstances, I would beg to submit, for your consideration, the establishment of wireless stations at Bushire, Bahrein, Koweit, Debai, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas. I believe that the total cost of the installation of the six stations would be less than 10,000*l.*, and the recurring annual expense should not exceed 36,000 rupees, or 6,000 rupees for each station. Against this recurring expenditure would be deducted the receipts obtained from the public; so far as I can judge, these receipts should be sufficient to cover the recurring annual expense, provided that credit be allowed for the value of official messages transmitted from the several stations.

[7384]

No. 332.

*Messrs. Bose and Moore to Foreign Office.—(Received February 23.)*

Sir,

*London, February 22, 1909.*

REFERRING to the conversation we had with your Representative at the Foreign Office on the 22nd ultimo on the subject of the rumoured loan or financial assistance to the Persian Government, we beg leave to address you thereon, as well as on other cognate points, in accordance with the suggestion we understood that that gentleman was then good enough to make to us.

In the first place, as then explained, we (but more particularly the first signatory) represent a considerable number of Stock Exchange members who have sustained serious loss through the action of that Government, and who wish to take this opportunity of respectfully entering a timely caveat in connection with such loan, in case the English and the Russian Governments are considering the question of helping Persia in the direction indicated. Our desire so to act is accounted for, and we venture to say is justified, by the following facts and circumstances:—

In 1889 His Majesty the late Shah of Persia, while in this country, granted a Concession for lottery loans, and it was acquired with the usual formalities by an English Company for a large sum of money, which was entirely lost, in consequence of the subsequent cancellation of the Concession.

The full details of the transaction are set forth in the Memorial presented by the Anglo-Asiatic Syndicate (Limited) in January 1891 to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and we crave reference thereto accordingly. In the meantime our position has been somewhat strengthened, inasmuch as (*inter alia*) the authenticity of the Concession itself, upon which doubt was thrown for some time by parties inimical to us, has been abundantly proved, while admission has been made that the Shah personally received from Prince Malcom Khan 4,000*l.* for that document.

In the light of the important developments which have taken place more or less recently in Persia, and in view of possible contingencies in connection therewith, we feel we are justified in again approaching you and in pressing our claim for compensation.

We desire specially to emphasize the proved fact that Prince Malcom Khan, the Shah's Representative of the time in London, having received official notice on the 8th December, 1889, of the withdrawal of the Concession, not only refrained from communicating the important information to the party most interested, namely, the Anglo-Asiatic Syndicate, but a week later actually accepted from that Company a further 20,000*l.* on account of the purchase money. We do not wish to make any comment on this conduct, especially as Mr. Justice Chitty, in open Court on the 14th March, 1893, in the case of the Persian Investment Corporation *v.* Prince Malcom Khan, dealt with it in severe terms.

[1629]

3 A



We desire also to refer to the letter dated the 3rd July, 1893, from the Syndicate to Sir Philip Currie.

We may mention that, on the 23rd June, 1896, the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared before the Stock Exchange Committee in support of an application for a quotation for a Persian Government Loan for 500,000*l.*, and that a statement prepared by Mr. B. F. Hawksley, of Messrs. Hollams, Solicitors, was read to that body by Mr. (now Sir) Walpole Greenwell, while we and another member (since deceased) of the Stock Exchange opposed the application. The question was fully examined and considered by the Committee, who unanimously rejected the application, and thus virtually decided that our case was thoroughly substantiated.

In the year 1898, as is doubtless within your knowledge, the Persian Government went so far as to apply to financial circles in London for a loan of 1,200,000*l.* on certain security, and the amount was fully underwritten, but at the last moment Russia stepped in and provided the money without any security. On that occasion the Imperial Bank of Persia practically desired the co-operation of the group of Stock Exchange members whom we represent (sixty or seventy in number), and not only recognized the justice as well as the moderation of our claim, but also agreed by letter to satisfy it out of the proceeds of the loan in question when floated. In fact, we were then given to understand that the arrangement with us was entered into after consultation with your Department. Unfortunately, as above related, the loan fell through, and our claim in consequence has remained unsettled to this day.

It may not be out of place to mention that many of the shareholders in the Anglo-Asiatic Syndicate are members of the Stock Exchange, and are of such standing and influence that their support of any Persian loan would be of the greatest value. Moreover, they are more or less in direct touch with financiers in a position and prepared to deal with Persian Concessions of a commercial nature when the time arrives for action in that direction. These financiers inform us that, in existing circumstances, such as the revocation of our Concession without redress, and the attitude of the Stock Exchange Committee, the public cannot be induced to embark in schemes, however well considered, for the development of the resources of that State—a condition of affairs which it is to be hoped may be remedied at no distant date, to the benefit of both countries.

In conclusion, we beg leave to say that we place ourselves at your disposal if you should desire at any time to see us to discuss matters, and that we shall be glad meanwhile to furnish any additional information you may require.

We are, &c.

(Signed) W. BOSE, 2, Copthall Buildings, E.C.  
EDWD. MOORE, 19, Cumberland Terrace, N.W.

[7402]

No. 333.

*Mr. J. Preece to Foreign Office.—(Received February 23.)*

Sir,

1, *St. James' Place, London, February 23, 1909.*

I AM instructed by the Directors of the Oil Syndicate to ask you to be good enough to help them to acquire a site on the Island of Abadan, near to Mohammerah, on which to build their projected refinery. They would esteem it a very great favour if you would cause the following telegram to be sent to the Acting Consul-General at Bushire:—

“Kindly assist Reynolds on his request in regard to land negotiations.”

In my conversation yesterday with Mr. Oliphant I briefly explained why this request was made and why the assistance of the Acting Consul-General was deemed necessary, so that I need not recapitulate it here.

Mr. Reynolds is in possession of full instructions, which he will explain to the Acting Consul-General if you can see your way to accede to our request.

I must most respectfully point out that the matter is of some considerable urgency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. PREECE.



[7959]

No. 334 A.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 73 of the 15th February].

(No. 112.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, February 16, 1909.*

M. TCHARYKOFF informed me yesterday that the Minister of Finance, after carefully considering the matter, had decided not to permit the Russian Bank to accept the arrangement proposed by the Persian Government for the settlement of the affairs of Amin-es-Zarb. M. Kokovtsoff was in communication with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran as to some other means whereby the liabilities of the above individual could be arranged; but as M. Sabline would doubtless discuss the question with Sir G. Barclay, M. Tcharykoff said he would not explain it to me, as it was perhaps a little complicated and technical.

I had kept M. Tcharykoff privately informed of the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to any loan or advance to the Persian Government in connection with the affairs of Amin-es-Zarb, and I also explained to him the light in which Sir G. Barclay regarded the arrangement which had been proposed. I expressed the hope that the Imperial Bank of Persia would also abstain from falling in with the arrangement suggested by the Persian Government, though my Government had not the same authority over that establishment as could be exercised by the Ministry of Finance over the Russian Bank.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[7962]

No. 334 B.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 79 of the 17th February.]

(No. 116.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, February 17, 1909.*

AT an interview which I had with M. Isvolsky this afternoon, I asked him if he had received from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran a telegram in regard to the precarious position of the Shah and to the necessity of His Majesty immediately granting a Constitution. M. Isvolsky replied in the negative, and I therefore read to him what I said I understood to be a summary of a telegram which M. Sabline was about to dispatch, and I also read to him Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 99. I observed to his Excellency that he would notice that both Representatives regard the situation as exceedingly serious, and were also anxious to receive with as little delay as possible instructions as to the course which they should pursue. It seemed to me that, apart from every other consideration, it was essential that the Shah should be pressed to carry out the measures which the two Representatives mentioned in their telegrams. Other questions might be left for subsequent discussion, but it was clearly necessary that the Shah should announce his intention of carrying out the measures which Sir G. Barclay and M. Sabline considered as urgent.

M. Isvolsky, I am sorry to say, repeated his former arguments with which I have had the honour to acquaint you in previous despatches, and was still of opinion that the mere proclamation of a Constitution, of an amnesty, &c., would be of no avail, and were empty words unless some steps were simultaneously taken to reform the Administration, and for this purpose funds were necessary. I endeavoured to persuade his Excellency that in any case what I suggested and what the two Representatives proposed could possibly do no harm, and would probably exercise a tranquillizing effect on the populace. M. Isvolsky said that he must receive the telegram from M. Sabline and think the matter over before he could be in a position to give me a reply.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[1629]

3 A°

[6706]

No. 334.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 23, 1909.*

DUTCH scheme for irrigation by Karun River (see my telegram No. 48 of the 11th instant.

His Majesty's Government are addressing note to Dutch Legation inquiring the nature and extent of the negotiations which are reported to be on foot. At the same time we are reminding them that no scheme which prejudices in any way the interests of His Majesty's Government or is viewed unfavourably by the Sheikh of Mohammerah can receive our support.

[7437]

No. 335.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

[Extends telegram No. 87 of February 19.]

(No. 124.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, February 20, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 87 of yesterday's date, to transmit herewith copy of a letter I have received from M. Isvolsky respecting the steps to be taken by the two Governments at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 335.

*M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 6 (19) février, 1909.*

VOICI, en quelques mots, ce que je pense au sujet des moyens qui seraient propres à tirer la Perse de la crise dangereuse où elle se débat actuellement. Ce ne sont que mes impressions personnelles que je vais exposer aux membres du Gouvernement. J'aime à espérer qu'il y a là les éléments d'une bonne et complète entente entre nos deux Cabinets, dont l'urgence se fait sentir chaque jour davantage.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,  
(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 335.

*Note by M. Isvolsky respecting Crisis in Persia.*

EXIGER de suite du Schah la démission du Sadr-Azam, ainsi que de l'Emir Bahadour Djeng, auquel le Schah pourrait toutefois conserver les fonctions de chef de sa garde personnelle.

2. Obtenir du Schah le rétablissement du régime constitutionnel au moyen de réformes immédiates, énumérées ci-dessous.

3. La constitution d'un Cabinet composé de personnes à lui recommander par les Légations de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne.

4. L'adjonction au Conseil de l'Empire, sans retard, de personnalités éclairées appartenant à divers partis, dont quelques-unes pourraient lui être recommandées par nos deux Légations. Ce Conseil serait chargé de l'élaboration et de la promulgation d'une nouvelle loi électorale.

5. L'amnistie générale pour tous ceux qui ont pris les armes contre le Schah.

6. La fixation immédiate de la date des élections parlementaires, ainsi que de celle de la convocation du Medjliss. Ces dates doivent être portées sans retard à la connaissance du pays entier.

7. Vu que l'absence complète d'argent au Trésor persan forme un obstacle insurmontable pour la réalisation des réformes recommandées au Schah par les deux



Gouvernements, il sera versé au Gouvernement persan aussitôt que les mesures préparatoires énumérées ci-dessus auront été prises par lui, une certaine somme à titre d'avance d'un emprunt à conclure ultérieurement. La manière dont cette somme sera dépensée sera contrôlée par la Commission Mixte mentionnée dans notre aide-mémoire du 3 (16) juillet dernier. Ainsi les deux Gouvernements pourront être tout à fait sûrs que l'argent en question servira à réaliser les réformes que nous considérons urgentes et indispensables pour éviter le danger de complications plus graves, et non pas à rétablir le pouvoir absolu du Schah.

8. Un Trésorier-Général français, avec deux Adjoints de la même nationalité, assurera la rentrée régulière des impôts et donnera au Trésor persan une organisation stable et normale.

[7553]

No. 336.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, February 24, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 207 of the 19th instant.

Persian telegraph arrangements. I venture to submit that the proposal that British signallers should be stationed on the lines from Meshed and Shahrud to the frontier will probably give rise to objections on the part of the Russian Government, on the ground that, while the Arabistan lines are situated in the neutral zone, those mentioned above fall within the Russian sphere. The fact that the Arabistan lines are in the neutral zone was put forward by M. Tcharykoff as a reason why Russian signallers might, if necessary, be employed upon them. If the Arabistan lines had been inside the British sphere I do not think the Russian Government would have asked that Russian signallers might be stationed on them.

As regards the transfer of control over the Khaf-Seistan and Tehran-Meshed lines, I would suggest that I should propose to the Russian Government that the two Representatives at Tehran should take the first favourable opportunity to lay the matter before the Persian Government. Sir G. Barclay would thereby be enabled to take the matter up whenever he thought it desirable to do so, whereas, if I suggested to the Russian Government that the transfer of these lines had better be made dependent on the conclusion of the Arabistan arrangement, the Russian Government might reply that the question of the Arabistan lines is a new one which chiefly interests the British Government, while the exchange of the Khaf-Seistan and Tehran-Meshed lines forms practically a part of the Convention which the two Governments concluded a year and a-half ago, and that His Majesty's Government have pressed from time to time for the settlement of the question.

I regret that I have not been able to submit these observations sooner, owing to pressure of work.

[7567]

No. 337.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 24, 1909.*

TABREEZ situation.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports in a telegram, No. 34, that the expedition which, as reported in his telegram No. 32, attacked the Karadaghliis at Alvar, returned on the evening of the 22nd without having accomplished its objects, which were to bring away the garrison of Marand and to open the Julfa road. The loss of the expedition was small. There is no change in the situation.

[7568]

No. 338.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

(No. 116.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 24, 1909.*

OXIDE. Your telegram No. 57 of the 17th instant.

If Lynch would allow their agent to act for Strick he would be a suitable man. Strick should apply to them. Moin's hostility to Lynch's interests may, however, be increased if the latter's agent assists Strick, and Lynch ought, therefore, to know that Moin will oppose the Concession.

[7569]

No. 339.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

(No. 117.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 24, 1909.*

THE Shah and Constitution. Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 94 of the 22nd February repeated to me in your telegram No. 67 of the 23rd instant.

I adhere to the view which I have expressed as to the results which an advance to the Shah as proposed by M. Isvolsky would have.

Still it cannot be denied that there is some reason for M. Isvolsky's apprehensions in regard to the position of the Shah if he is given no money. Apart from the rebellious condition of the provinces there is intense disloyalty in Tehran, though combined action against the Shah is unlikely in view of the force at His Majesty's disposal. For the last ten days the bazaars have been closed, and the summary execution of a man on what is believed by the people to be a trumped-up charge has recently increased the hatred for the Shah.

Would it not be possible, so as to keep the Shah on his good behaviour, to reserve the right to the two Representatives to cut off supplies at any moment, if you find it necessary to agree to the proposed advance in order to come to an understanding with Russia?

[7570]

No. 340.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)*

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 24, 1909.*

SUMMARY execution of a former refugee at His Majesty's Legation.

One of the men who in June last was in bast at His Majesty's Legation was seized on the 22nd instant and summarily executed on the charge of being about to throw a bomb. There were two men with him, one of whom had also been in refuge at the Legation. They were also seized, and it was announced that they would be executed on the following day. I protested against the summary execution of the one man, and demanded that the other refugee should be given a proper trial. The Persian Government agreed, and have promised to keep me informed of the progress of the case.

Much excitement has been aroused by this incident, and it is popularly believed that the man who was executed was condemned on a trumped-up charge merely because he had been in refuge at the Legation formerly.

I shall not take further action without instructions, as I do not share this view, though summary procedure was not justifiable, even if the man was guilty.

The town is still under martial law, and our guarantees in June only covered past offences.

[6706]

No. 341.

*Sir Edward Grey to Baron Gericke.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 24, 1909.*

ON the 9th April, 1907, I had the honour to address a note to M. van Roijen on the subject of a proposal to utilize the waters of the Karun River in Persia for

[1629]

3 B



purposes of irrigation, in which I stated that I had been informed by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the Sheikh of Mohammerah had no desire for the formation of a foreign Company for the purpose in question, and would prefer a continuance of the situation as then existing.

It is, therefore, not without concern that I have now learnt from Sir G. Barclay, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, that a two years' option for the Concession for the Karun irrigation has been given to a Dutch Syndicate.

In view of the fact that important British interests, more particularly of a political nature, would be involved in this undertaking, His Majesty's Government must remind the Netherland Government that they can support no scheme which is not favourably viewed by the Sheikh of Mohammerah, or which is in any way prejudicial to their interests.

I should therefore be glad if you would be so good as to inform me of the nature and scope of the negotiations which are reported to be in progress on this subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[7661]

No. 342.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)*

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 25, 1909.*

THE Shah and Constitution. My private telegram of last night and last paragraph of my telegram No. 117 of yesterday.

My proposal is that the money advanced should be put in one or both banks to the joint account of the British and Russian Representatives. These would then pay it out in instalments to the Mixed Commission. Such payments would only be made so long as the Shah did not interfere with the preparatory measures for the introduction of a Parliamentary system.

The objections to the advance on the conditions proposed by M. Isvolsky would in this way be in great measure removed.

I fear that the Shah in any case runs considerable risk, but money used for the payment of the troops would lessen his danger.

[7668]

No. 343.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)*

(No. 120.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 25, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tabreez.

According to a telegram from Mr. Wratislaw, Sofian has been occupied by the Karadaghliis.

Mr. Wratislaw thinks that Tabreez can hold out for another month, unless it is taken by assault, which he considers unlikely.

[6804]

No. 344.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 247.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, February 25, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 87 [of 19th February: Situation in Persia].

We have carefully considered the personal proposals which M. Isvolsky has submitted as a basis for agreement between the two Governments, and we are ready to accept them, subject to the following modifications:—

1. Amir Jang, after dismissal, should not be allowed to hold any post at the Palace. His baneful influence would always be felt. It would also be desirable to advise removal of Sheikh Fazullah from Tehran.

2. Can be accepted.

3. This would imply intervention, and would entail an undesirable responsibility.

4. We can accept this proposal, provided that the recommendation is only given at the Shah's request.

5 and 6. Can be accepted.

7. We are unable to accept this proposal in its present form, but we are ready to do so if the sentence "as soon as preparatory measures enumerated above have been carried out by that Government" is omitted, and if after the words "later date" the following sentence is inserted: "as soon as the Shah has constituted a constitutional Government the personnel of which inspires confidence, and an elected Assembly has approved of the transaction."

This would indirectly meet M. Isvolsky's view as set out in proposal No. 3.

Money will no doubt be wanted for reforms in the police, finances, &c., but these can be taken in hand with more advantage when the Assembly is working. If money were advanced now it would not be utilized for reforms, and the only proper purpose for which it might be used would be the payment of arrears to the troops. This would probably encourage the Shah in his reactionary tendencies.

8. As the Shah has already consented to the appointment of a Treasurer-General it would be better to avoid mention of it, since it might be regarded as due to foreign pressure.

You will notice that in these suggested amendments to M. Isvolsky's proposals we have done our utmost to meet his views, more especially in proposal No. 7, and we earnestly hope that they may obtain his approval, and firmly consolidate the joint action of the two Powers in Persia.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 72.)

[7568]

No. 345.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, February 25, 1909.*

AGENT for Messrs. Strick at Tehran.

As it seems improbable that the person whom you suggest in your telegram No. 116 of yesterday will be approved by Messrs. Lynch, can you not recommend someone else?

[6019]

No. 346.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 23.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 25, 1909.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 7 of the 20th ultimo reporting the views of M. Bizot and of M. Ostrogradsky on the present financial situation in Persia, as expressed in recent conversations which you had with those gentlemen.

I approve your language to M. Bizot.

With reference to the last paragraph of your despatch, I am of opinion that the consideration of loans or conversion schemes must wait until the financial administration has been reformed under a constitutional Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[7763]

No. 347.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)*

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, February 26, 1909.*

KARUN irrigation Concession. Your telegram No. 69 of the 23rd instant.

I hear that the Sheikh of Mohammerah, as he learns from a Dutch merchant at Ahwaz that a Concession for the Karun irrigation has been granted, again wishes to telegraph to the Persian Government in the sense previously suggested (please see my telegram No. 76 of the 4th instant).



In replying to His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, I said that, as far as I can learn, there is no foundation for the assertion on the part of the Dutch merchant that the matter is being closely watched by His Majesty's Government, and I shall keep him informed, and that the communication which the Sheikh of Mohammerah proposes to make to the Persian Government appears unnecessary.

[7744]

No. 348.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)*

(No. 122.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, February 26, 1909.

Mr. Wratislaw, in a telegram dated yesterday, reports that that day a determined assault on the western defences of the town was made by the Maraga forces. These were pursued a considerable distance after being repulsed with heavy loss.

The Basminch force made a feeble attack at the same time on the southern defences. They had two guns in action, and nothing was effected.

[7821]

No. 349.

*Consul McDouall to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)*

(No. 1. Commercial.)

Sir,

Mohammerah, February 6, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Sardar Arfa, Sheikh of Mohammerah, has asked me if any British Company would lease land from him on the Karun or Shat-el-Arab, which would both increase British interests in his district and bring into cultivation land now lying waste or partly so. Although not allowed to sell land he knows of no law against giving a lease of it, and would give a lease of thirty to fifty years, signed by the tribal headmen as well as by himself.

If such a scheme were arranged it would supply an object lesson in the use of pumps and agricultural machinery. Cotton, cereals, linseed, and sesame seed could be grown.

If the Persian Government heard of this before the lease was signed, it is possible that they would endeavour to prevent it.

A copy of this despatch is forwarded to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) W. McDouall.

[7917]

No. 350.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)*

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Tehran, February 27, 1909.

Mr. Wratislaw reports that the Governor of Julfa has telegraphed to the Anjuman of Tabreez stating that ten Cossacks have crossed the frontier into Persia, in spite of his protests, their object being to guard the road. He hears that more will cross.

M. Sabline, to whom I referred this story, doubts its truth.

[7934]

No. 351.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)*

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

OXIDE. Your telegram No. 71 of the 25th instant.

Tehran, February 28, 1909.

I know of no one else whom I consider suitable to act as Strick's agent unless one of the men in the Imperial Bank of Persia is chosen. Mr. Brown would be the best. The Board might consent to his acting, and it should not take up much of his time.

[7969]

No. 352.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 94 of February 22.]

(No. 126.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, February 23, 1909.

I ASKED M. Isvolsky, on your behalf, to kindly defer communicating to the Council of Ministers his proposals respecting the situation in Persia until he was in possession of the observations which His Majesty's Government might desire to make in regard to them, and he would then be able to submit to his colleagues both his own views and those of my Government. I added that you would lose no time in communicating to him your observations.

M. Isvolsky said that he hoped that no delay would occur, as it was necessary to lose no further time in furnishing the British and Russian Representatives with instructions. He asked me if I could tell him what would be the nature of your observations.

I said that I was not in a position to do so, but that I expected that they would chiefly refer to point No. 7 in his programme.

He replied that this was what he anticipated, but he could not understand the strong objections which His Majesty's Government took to providing any means which would enable the Persian Government to start a fairly workable Administration. It was of no use to insist on the Shah enacting an electoral law and summoning an Assembly and leaving the Government in an absolutely penniless condition. He himself desired to propose something practical, and in no country in the world could any useful results be expected if there were not the wherewithal to make a beginning.

I told M. Isvolsky, I have told him over and over again, that my Government could not furnish the Shah with means so long as there was no certainty that he would in reality establish a constitutional régime. It would simply be strengthening his hands to resist the Nationalist movement.

M. Isvolsky said that he did not wish to give the Shah any funds. He had gone as far as he could in meeting the wishes of His Majesty's Government. What he proposed was in brief the following: to insist on the Shah dismissing reactionary advisers and calling to his councils competent and liberal men; to grant an amnesty; to proclaim an electoral law and to fix dates for the elections and for the convocation of the Assembly. When all this was accomplished, then, but not till then, a moderate advance should be made—not to the Shah, but to the reformed Persian Government—to meet the immediate needs of the moment. The disbursement of this advance was to be carefully controlled and supervised, and to be solely devoted to the legitimate purpose of setting the administrative machinery going. Surely the above were reasonable and practical proposals. When the above concessions were wrung from the Shah, and there was some prospect of introducing a better administration, surely the whole proceeding was not to be blocked owing to the want of funds; and yet His Majesty's Government declined to assist in giving these funds until an Assembly had accorded its approbation. The Shah was to be urged to grant concessions which he considered dangerous, and no hope was to be held out to him that if he were reasonable the Governments would see that assistance was rendered so as to give some stability to the Administration. If His Majesty's Government were to maintain their present attitude the Shah would in all probability be deposed, and there was nothing to set up in his place. Chaos first and armed intervention later. His Majesty's Government had not experienced, as the Russian Government had experienced, the serious inconvenience and danger of the present situation. British interests had comparatively little suffered, but the Russian Government could not permanently endure a continuation of the general unrest and disorder in the north. They were anxious to see liberal institutions introduced and established, and his proposals were sufficient evidence of that desire; but they were firmly convinced that it was imprudent in the highest degree to have an Administration with an empty Treasury and unpaid troops and employes.

I told M. Isvolsky that the desire of His Majesty's Government to make no advance until it was sanctioned by an Assembly was based on the very prudent foresight that an Assembly might repudiate such an advance and decline to recognize it. In fact some such intimation to that effect had been very clearly made.

[1629]



M. Isvolsky said, "By whom?"

I replied, "By members of the Nationalist party."

His Excellency made a gesture of impatience, and remarked that an Assembly could equally well repudiate all former loans. He did not think that that argument was of much force.

I pressed the point, but he paid little heed.

He said that he had endeavoured to meet His Majesty's Government on all points. He had hoped that they would have fallen in with his last proposals; but of course, if the two Governments could not come to an agreement there was nothing to be done but to part company, and each to look after his own interests.

I said that such an eventuality must not be allowed to arise. We had better wait for the observations which would shortly be communicated.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[8167]

No. 353.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

(No. 126.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 1, 1909.*

DISPATCH of money of Imperial Bank to Tabreez. My telegram No. 112 of the 22nd ultimo.

An escort for the money is offered by the Persian Government. This would, however, be no protection against Ain-ed-Dowleh. If he commandeered the money it would mean a serious blow to the Nationalist, and I doubt, in view of past experience, whether any warning or threat to the Persian Government or to him would deter him from doing so.

The offer of the escort relieves the Persian Government of responsibility in the matter, and I am doubtful how to reply to them. I might accept their offer of an escort, at the same time warning them that if Ain-ed-Dowleh seizes the money I shall demand the mortgage of the smaller southern ports for reimbursement, and threatening Ain-ed-Dowleh that his house in Tehran will be attacked, or I might inform them that the previous acts of spoliation of Ain-ed-Dowleh deter the Imperial Bank from again running similar risks, and repeat that I hold them responsible.

I should be glad to receive instructions after you have consulted the Imperial Bank of Persia in London.

[8144]

No. 354.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)*

(No. 127.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 1, 1909.*

SITUATION at Resht.

A copy of a telegram which has been addressed by the Council of Ministers to the Notables of Resht has been communicated to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The telegram repudiates Sipahdar, and warns the Notables that, if he is recognized by them as Governor, forces from all directions will be sent to Gilan by the Government, and then not only the guilty but also the innocent will suffer.

The part played by foreigners in the movement is alluded to in the telegram, and M. Sabline hears that there are, besides Caucasians, some Germans and a Bulgarian komitaji, whom he formerly deported from Tehran. He says that the revolutionaries are fortifying the road north of Menjil, and that last week they stopped his courier, but allowed him to proceed after examination.

Shoa-es-Sultaneh has arrived here from Resht (see my telegram No. 106 of the 18th ultimo).

[8273]

No. 355.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 2.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 1, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 25th ultimo, forwarding copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, as to the control of telegraph lines in Persia, I am directed by Viscount Morley to transmit herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a note on the subject by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department.

Lord Morley agrees that in the circumstances it would be advisable not to raise the question of the employment of British signallers on the lines from Shahrud and Meshed to the Russian frontier, and he concurs in Sir A. Nicolson's suggestion as to the procedure to be adopted in regard to the question of the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Seistan lines. If the Russian Government press the point, Sir A. Nicolson might be authorized to make the necessary explanations on the lines indicated in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 207 of the 19th ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

*Inclosure in No. 355.*

*Note by the Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.*

IN my note of the 4th instant I wrote that, if the employment of Russian signallers is agreed to on the Arabistan lines, it was a matter for consideration whether the Russian Government should not be asked to agree to the employment of British signallers on the lines from Shahrud and Meshed to the Russian frontier. Sir A. Nicolson thinks the Russian Government will object to the British signallers on their lines to the frontier, and gives his reasons for expecting them to do so. In these circumstances it may perhaps be advisable not to raise the question with the Russian Government. It will then remain an open one, seeing that the Russian Government reserve to themselves the right to induce the Persian Government to make over to them the control of the lines on similar conditions to those now existing on the Meshed-Seistan line, and one of the existing conditions on that line is the employment of British signallers.

As regards bringing about the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Seistan lines, the proposal as to the method of action put forward in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram seems to point to the best way to move in the matter.

(Signed) H. A. KIRK.

*February 25, 1909.*

[7934]

No. 356.

*Foreign Office to Mr. F. Strick.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 2, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran stating that the only further suggestion he can make as to a suitable person to hold the position of your agent at that place would be one of the employés of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and of these he would suggest Mr. Brown.

I am to inquire whether you would like this Department to enter into communication with the Imperial Bank on the subject?

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.



[8464]

No. 357.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)*

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, March 3, 1909.*

SITUATION in Persia.

I gathered in conversation to-day with M. Isvolsky that he is still much perplexed and embarrassed in regard to the form which our joint action in Persia should take. I had previously formed the opinion that his Excellency would agree to the steps proposed by His Majesty's Government, although I realized that it would have been against his better judgment; but he says that, without some financial assistance, there would be no results, and that no competent men in Persia would consent to take office unless they were given the means to start the machinery in motion.

I said I was sure His Majesty's Government would not make a pecuniary advance unless it were sanctioned by the Assembly, and I begged him to give our proposals a trial. He said it would be too late if we waited for the sanction of an Assembly. He is distressed that we did not give way on point 7, but he has no intention of not maintaining our co-operation. He tells me present difficulty is being utilized to make capital by people here who are hostile to the Agreement.

Russian Government are moving a few troops to Baku and to the frontier at Julfa, and the situation at Resht is so threatening and dangerous that fifty Cossacks are being sent for the protection of the Russian Consulate. He is much disappointed that His Majesty's Government did not accept his eight points as they stood, and he is continually impressing on me that Russia is suffering far more from the present situation than is Great Britain.

He is still meditating what reply to send to your proposals.

[8463]

No. 358.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)*

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 3, 1909.*

KARUN Irrigation Concession. My despatch No. 9 of the 22nd January.

I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs the draft of the Concession for which M. de Sturler has been asking. Do you wish me to telegraph a summary of the document? I am sending a copy by post.

Saad-ed-Dowleh has read me a letter from M. de Sturler, in which he complains that the option which the Persian Government have granted is of no use.

[8399]

No. 359.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)*

(No. 129.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 3, 1909.*

CONCESSION for Kuh Malek Siah-Nasratabad road.

I learn from M. Edward Kitabji, who has come to Tehran, that he is seeking a Concession for a road from Nasratabad to Kuh Malek Siah. As far as I can ascertain, he does not represent any group in England. He says that he is about to become a British subject, and that he will form an English Company to work the Concession.

I am asking His Majesty's Consul in Seistan for his views on the scheme. Kitabji wishes to negotiate privately, and has not invoked my assistance, but I should be glad to know what my attitude should be in view of his doubtful antecedents.

[8521]

No. 360.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 3, 1909*

WITH reference to the letter of this office, dated the 10th July, 1901, inclosing copy of correspondence as to the condition of the British Government buildings at

Bassidu, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to inclose copy of a letter from the Government of India, suggesting that certain works should be undertaken at Bassidu, at an estimated cost of 3,903 rupees, to be equally defrayed from British and Indian revenues.

As regards (a.) the repairing of the landing pier and of tombstones in the cemetery at a cost of 891 rupees, Viscount Morley is prepared to approve the proposals on the condition that half of the expenditure will be borne by the British Exchequer.

As regards (b.) the demolition of the ruins round the British flagstaff, and the construction of a rest-house in their stead for the use of His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas, at an estimated cost of 3,012 rupees, Lord Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's opinion on the proposal of the Government of India, with special reference to the political considerations involved in the persistent and peaceful maintenance of all rights belonging to the British Government in Bassidu. Apart from these, it would appear to be not unreasonable to provide the Consul with a rest-house on the Island of Kishm, for use during the hottest months of the year, and, if Sir E. Grey favours the proposal, Lord Morley would consent to defray a moiety of the cost, on the condition mentioned above.

It is not proposed that any expenditure should fall upon British revenues on account of the erection of a monument to the officers and men buried at Bassidu.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 360.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

My Lord,

*Fort William, December 24, 1908.*

WE have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's consideration, a copy of a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, applying for grants aggregating 3,903 rupees towards the cost of:—

- (a.) Repairing the landing pier and some of the tombstones in the cemetery at Bassidu, on Kishm Island, and
- (b.) Demolishing the ruins round the British flagstaff at that place, and constructing in their stead a rest-house for the use of His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas.

2. We agree with Major Cox as to the desirability of undertaking these works, and we propose, with your concurrence, to sanction the necessary expenditure, which would be divisible between the Home and Indian revenues.

3. The cost of the monument which it is proposed to erect to the memory of the officers and men buried at Bassidu, will be met entirely from Indian revenues.

We have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

MINTO.

KITCHENER.

H. ERLE RICHARDS.

C. H. SCOTT.

H. ADAMSON.

J. O. MILLER.

W. L. HARVEY.

G. F. WILSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 360.

*Major Cox to the Government of India.**Bushire, August 4, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to invite the attention of Government to the correspondence terminating with Foreign Department, dated the 29th April, 1901, on the subject of the abandoned buildings at Bassidu.

2. The landing pier at that place having been damaged by recent gales, I

[1629]

3 D



requested Mr. Laffere, the Assistant Engineer lately appointed to the Residency, to proceed there at the earliest opportunity and furnish me with an estimate for the necessary repairs both to the pier and to certain of the tombstones in the cemetery, and I venture to ask for sanction for special grant of 891 rupees for these two purposes. The repairs to the pier are urgently necessary, as the breaches are widened by each succeeding gale, and any postponement of the necessary expenditure must involve an increase in the amount applied for. As regards the tombstones, their inscriptions are rapidly becoming illegible. I may note that the expenditure sanctioned in Foreign Department, dated the 23rd February, 1903, in this connection, was devoted to the repair of the wall and to plastering the graves. The repairs shown in the present estimate will, I hope, obviate the necessity of any further expenditure for many years to come.

3. Mr. Laffere's report also includes an estimate, inclosed, amounting to 3,012 rupees, for the demolition of the old buildings and construction of a small cottage, near the flagstaff, to take their place. I have not included this amount in the special grant applied for, as it is not a matter of urgency, but I hope that Government will be pleased to sanction its inclusion in the next budget of this Residency, together with a small recurring sum for annual repairs. This recommendation is based on considerations both of practical utility and national sentiment.

More than any other spot, Bassidu is inseparably associated with the most honourable chapters of the history of British enterprise and predominance in the Gulf. Up to a few years ago the long since deserted buildings were regularly kept in some sort of presentable repair, but it was decided, with good reason, in my predecessor's time, that the money thus expended might be more usefully applied elsewhere, and the buildings have since fallen into absolute decay, with the result that, at the present time, the scattered and ragged ruins give a most depressing aspect to the station, quite inconsistent with the dignity of the Union Jack which flies over it. On these grounds I ask for their demolition.

4. The erection of a small cottage close to the flagstaff is recommended both as an accompaniment to the flag, as an emblem of occupation, as well as for the accommodation of His Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas on his periodical visits.

On the present occasion Lieutenant Gabriel accompanied Mr. Laffere, during the latter's sojourn there, at almost the hottest time of the year, and found by comparison of recorded temperatures that it was very much cooler on the dates in question than at Bunder Abbas, and he considers that if provided with such a cottage as that under recommendation Bassidu will prove a most convenient change of scene and air, as well as a base for visiting Lingah and other points within his jurisdiction. It will, I think, be conceded that his observations, from a practical point of view, give strong indorsement to my recommendations, and I trust that the Government of India will be pleased to approve of them. The estimates, so far as I am able to judge, have been prepared with due care and moderation.

5. Reverting for a moment to the sentimental aspect of the question, I beg to state that whereas the cemetery contains about 50 English graves, containing the remains of officers and men of the Royal Navy and Indian Navy and their wives or children, a large majority of them are without inscription and unidentifiable. It would, I venture to think, be a fitting tribute to the memory of these named and unnamed dead, who have died at this far off outpost in the service of their country, if a simple stone column were erected and inscribed to their memory, lest the past be forgotten.

I hesitate, however, to include any estimate for such a monument without knowing the views of the Government of India, as to the expediency of its erection, and as to whether, if they do not see their way to allot the necessary funds from the exchequer they would see any objection to my inviting public subscription for the purpose, in the Anglo-Indian papers.

Inclosure 3 in No. 360.

Major Cox to Mr. Laffere.

April 23, 1907.

If you can find time while at Bunder Abbas I shall be glad if you will visit British Bassidu. Firstly, the jetty there has been damaged and requires repair. Secondly,

the headstones of certain of the tombs require repair or renewal, especially those of Richard Marsh and James Andrews. Thirdly, I am anxious to replace present ruins by small new cottage, near flagstaff, containing single room and bathroom.

Kindly estimate for all these.

No. of 1907.

District.

Public Works Department, July 2, 1907

(Service Head.)

(Sub-Head)

ESTIMATE framed by R. L. Laffere, Esq., Assistant Engineer, Persian Gulf Sub-Division, of the probable expenses that will be incurred in 3,012 rupees.

(Call or authority) Resident in the Persian Gulf's wire, dated the 24th April, 1907.

#### GENERAL DESCRIPTION.

The estimate provides for constructing a cottage at British Bassidu. The building consists of the following:—

One room, 16' × 16'; one bathroom, 8' × 8'; one verandah, 10' × 20'.

*Foundation.*—To be 2' below ground level of uncovered rubble masonry. Floor to be raised 2' above ground level, filling in with ballast and plastered over with Gutch, 1" thick.

*Superstructure.*—Inner and outer walls to be of uncoursed rubble masonry (undressed) set in Gutch mortar, and Gutch plastered on both sides.

*Roofing.*—To consist of wooden beam, 12" × 9"; Zanzibar rafters, 4" diameter, placed 12" apart; date battens; matting and mud plaster, 4½" thick, with 1" Gutch plastering.

*Staircase.*—To be built of rubble masonry, covered with Gutch plaster.

*Doors and windows.*—All doors and windows, except the front door, to be of katcha teak planked and ledged with katcha teak frames. The front door to be of katcha teak, wholly panelled, and to be painted in two coats with chocolate paint throughout.

#### Abstract.

Quantity.	Items.	Rate.	Per.	Amount.
		R. a. p.		Rupees.
804.5 c. ft.	Excavation .. .. .	4 0 0	100	32.16
804.5 "	Masonry in foundation .. .. .	40 0 0	..	321.60
3,220.625 "	Superstructure .. .. .	40 0 0	..	1,288.40
952.0 "	Filling in floor .. .. .	2 0 0	..	19.04
529.075 sq. ft.	Plastering floor with Gutch .. .. .	12 0 0	..	63.48
36.0 ft. run	Wooden beam, 12" × 9" .. .. .	2 0 0	1	72.00
18.0 "	Ditto, 8-inch diameter .. .. .	1 0 0	1	18.00
555.0 sq. ft.	Roofing of Zanzibar rafters, 4-inch diameter date batten, and matting with 4-inch mud plaster	40 0 0	100	222.00
154.5 ft. run	Cornice .. .. .	0 8 0	1	77.00
1 No. ..	Sink, 4' × 4' .. .. .	Job	..	15.00
87.0 sq. ft.	Doors and windows .. .. .	2 0 0	1	174.00
17.75 c. ft.	Katcha teak lintels .. .. .	4 8 0	1	81.00
1 No. ..	Drain pipes for sink .. .. .	3 0 0	1	3.00
8 "	Wooden drains for roof .. .. .	Job	..	3.00
1 "	Hand rail for stair, 3-inch diameter, 19 feet long	Job	..	4.00
4,780.73 sq. ft.	Plastering walls .. .. .	12 0 0	100	573.72
	Demolishing ruined buildings .. .. .	Job	..	45.00
	Total .. .. .	..	..	3,012.40

RICHARD L. LAFFERE, Assistant Engineer,  
Persian Gulf Sub-Division.



## Measurement.

	No.	Length.	Breadth.	Depth.	Quantity.	Total.
Excavation—						
Room, long walls ..	3	30.5	2.5	2.0	457.5	
" short walls ..	3	15.5	2.5	2.0	232.5	
Bath-room, long walls ..	2	10.0	2.5	2.0	100.0	
" short wall ..	1	7.5	2.5	2.0	37.5	
Steps ..	3	3.0	1.0	0.5	4.5	
Verandah at staircase ..	1	1.0	2.5	2.0	5.0	
Total ..					837.0	
Deduction—						
Arches under stairs ..	1	6.5	2.5	2.0	32.5	
Net total ..					804.5	804.5
Masonry in foundation—						
Same as excavation ..					804.5	804.5
Superstructure—						
Rooms, long walls ..	2	20.0	2.0	14.75	1,180.0	
" short walls ..	2	16.0	2.0	14.75	944.0	
Verandah pillars ..	3	2.0	2.0	9.75	177.0	
" plinth sides ..	2	10.0	2.0	2.0	80.0	
" front ..	1	19.5	2.0	2.0	78.0	
Bath-room, long walls ..	2	10.0	2.0	9.75	390.0	
Mason for staircase ..	1				458.0	
Parapet wall for room ..	1	73.0	1.0	1.25	91.25	
" " bath-room ..	1	30.0	1.0	1.25	37.50	
" " verandah ..	1	38.0	1.0	1.25	47.50	
" " stair standing ..	1	6.75	0.75	2.0	10.125	
Staircase pillars ..	1	1.0	1.0	3.6	3.6	
" " ..	1	1.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	
" " ..	1	1.0	1.0	0.75	0.75	
Steps ..	3	3.0	1.0	1.0	9.0	
Deduct—						
Doors, 6½' x 3' ..	1	7.0	3.5	2.0	49.0	
" 6½' x 2½' ..	2	7.0	3.0	2.0	84.0	
Windows, 2½' x 3½' ..	4	4.0	3.0	2.0	96.0	
Total deductions ..					229.0	
Net total ..					3,220.325	3,220.625
Filling in floor—						
Room ..	1	16.0	16.0	2.0	572.0	
Bath-room ..	1	8.0	8.0	2.0	128.0	
Verandah ..	1	19.5	8.0	2.0	312.0	
Total ..					952.952	
Plastering floor with Gutch—						
Room ..	1	16.0	16.0		256.0	
Bath-room ..	1	8.0	8.0		64.0	
Verandah ..	1	23.5	8.0		188.0	
Spans between pillars ..	2	7.0	2.0		28.0	
Corner of verandah at step ..	1	3.5	2.0		7.0	
" " stairs ..	1	2.5	0.83		2.075	
Total ..					545.075	
Deduct—						
Sink, 4' x 4' ..	1	4.0	4.0		16.0	
Net total ..					529.075	529.075
Wooden beams, 12' x 9' ..	2	18.0			36.36	
" 8-inch diameter ..	2	9.0			18.18	

	No.	Length.	Breadth.	Depth.	Quantity.	Total.
Roofing [of Zanzibar rafter, 4-inch diameter. Date batten and matting with 4-inch mud—						
Room ..	1	17.0	17.0		289.0	
Bath-room ..	1	10.0	9.5		95.0	
Verandah ..	1	18.0	9.5		171.0	
Total ..					555.0	555.0
Cornice ..	1	154.5			154.5	154.5
Sink, 4' x 4' ..						Job.
Doors and windows—						
Door ..	1	6½	3		19.5	
" ..	2	6½	2½		32.5	
Windows ..	4	3½	2½		35.0	
Total ..					87.0	87.0
Katcha teak lintels—						
Katcha teak lintels ..	1	5.5	2.0	0.25	2.75	
" " " ..	2	5.0	2.0	0.25	5.0	
" " " ..	4	5.0	2.0	0.25	10.0	
Total ..					17.75	17.75
Drain pipe for sink ..	1				1.0	1.0
Wooden drains for roof ..	8				8.0	8.0
Hand rail for stair, 3-inch diameter, 19 feet long	1				1.0	1.0
Plastering walls—						
(Inside.)						
Room ..	1	64.0	12.25		784.0	
Bath-room ..	1	32.0	9.25		296.0	
Total ..					1,080.0	1,080.0
(Outside.)						
Back of house ..	1	23.5	16.0		376.0	
Staircase, end of house and front of house ..	2	20.0	16.0		640.0	
Staircase ..	1	27.0	3.5		945.0	
Bath-room, end of house ..	1	8.0	16.0		128.0	
Above bath-room ..	1	2.0	12.0		24.0	
Bath-room, front and back ..	2	10.0	13.0		260.0	
End of bath-room ..	1	12.0	13.0		156.0	
Verandah pillars ..	3	8.0	9.25		222.0	
Portion above verandah pillars ..	1	40.0	1.75		70.0	
Plaster on roof of room ..	1	17.0	17.0		289.0	
" " bath-room ..	1	10.0	9.5		95.0	
" " verandah ..	1	18.0	9.5		171.0	
Staircase landing ..	1	4½	2½		11.68	
Top and inside of parapet wall—						
Room ..	1	68.0	2' 3"		153.0	
Bath-room ..	1	28.0	2' 3"		63.0	
Verandah ..	1	36.0	2' 3"		81.0	
Staircase landing ..	1	6.0	2' 9"		16.5	
Total ..					4,780.73	4,780.73

[8526]

No. 361.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received March 4.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, March 3, 1909.

I BEG to acknowledge your letter of the 2nd instant, pointing out the extreme probability of any treasure we might send from Tehran to Tabreez falling into the hands of the Shah's Commander-in-chief, even if sent under escort, and asking if the

[1629]

3 E



transfer of specie is essential to the conduct of business at our Tabreez branch. In reply, I wish to say that the transfer of coin to Tabreez is essential, but, in view of the extraordinary danger which Sir George Barclay points out, we do not feel justified in incurring the risk.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) T. JACKSON, *Chairman.*

[8544]

No. 362.

*Mr. F. Strick to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

*Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,  
March 3, 1909.*

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, from which I note that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran states that the only person suitable to act as agent for my firm at Tehran, other than the individual previously named by him, would be one of the employes of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and of these he suggests Mr. Brown.

I thank you for this information, and, in reply to the latter paragraph of your letter, I should be very much obliged if you would kindly arrange for communication to be entered into with the Imperial Bank of Persia at Tehran, with a view of arranging for the above gentleman to act as agent for my firm at that city.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK.

[8571]

No. 363.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, March 4, 1909.*

I LEARN from M. Isvolsky that Samsam Khan has ordered several thousand rifles, a battery of guns, and a certain quantity of ammunition through his brother in Paris. It is possible that the consignment, which is to be dispatched to a port in the Persian Gulf, has already left France.

[8579]

No. 364.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, March 4, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 107.

I have had a letter from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs saying that sixty or seventy soldiers, with two mitrailleuses, are to be sent to Enzeli and Resht. Vessel conveying the contingent will be escorted by war-vessel, with orders to Captain to lend armed assistance for the disembarkation in case revolutionaries oppose landing. In case this contingent proves insufficient to protect Europeans at Enzeli and Resht, larger detachment will be held in reserve at Baku.

News having reached Russian Government of an approaching conflict between the Shah's troops and the revolutionaries at Julfa on the Persian bank of the Araxes, and as Russian Julfa is exactly opposite that point, in order to be ready for any eventuality a detachment will be sent to the spot and encamped in Russian village.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[8570]

No. 365.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 4, 1909.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier. My telegram No. 81 of the 8th ultimo.

I have received a complaint from the Persian Government to the effect that some Turkish gendarmes have been sent to Miadek, a place near Urmia. The Persian Government state that they have been sent to distribute among the inhabitants Turkish passports.

[8526]

No. 366.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 4, 1909.*

TRANSFER of specie by Imperial Bank to Tabreez.

In reply to your telegram No. 126 of the 1st instant, the transfer is considered by the bank to be essential for the conduct of business, but they do not consider themselves justified in running the risk of seizure in view of your apprehensions.

Would it be possible for you to obtain a promise in advance from the Persian Government that they will give a mortgage for reimbursement on one of the southern ports in the event of the specie being stolen?

[8765]

No. 367.

*Memorandum communicated by Russian Chargé d'Affaires, March 4, 1909.*

EN présence de la situation inquiétante à Recht et à Enzeli, le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé de renforcer sans retard la garde du Consulat de Recht, composée actuellement de neuf Cosaques, par une demi-sotnia (demi-escadron) de Cosaques, avec deux mitrailleuses.

Ensuite, pour l'éventualité d'une nécessité possible, on se propose de préparer à Bakou un détachement plus considérable pour le cas où les renforts actuels se trouveraient insuffisants pour la protection du Consulat, des banques, et autres institutions, comme aussi pour la défense de la vie et des propriétés des sujets russes et autres Européens à Enzeli et à Recht.

Le bâtiment marchand sur lequel s'effectuera le passage des Cosaques sera escorté d'un navire de guerre, dont le Commandant aura ordre d'assurer par tous les moyens en son pouvoir le débarquement des Cosaques au cas où des révolutionnaires caucasiens ou indigènes tentaient d'y mettre obstacle.

Indépendamment de ceci et en présence des nouvelles reçues sur l'imminence d'une rencontre des troupes du Schah avec celles du parti révolutionnaire à Djulfa persane, ce qui placerait Djulfa russe dans le rayon du feu, le Ministre de la Guerre a pris des dispositions pour faire avancer vers ce dernier point une force armée destinée à la sauvegarde de notre frontière.

[8671]

No. 368.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)*

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 5, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

Mr. Consul-General Wratislaw telegraphed yesterday to report that the telegraph line of the Indo-European Telegraph Company was cut on the 3rd instant between Tabreez and Julfa. The employes of the Company fear the Royalists' savages on the road, and cannot go out to repair it.

Mr. Wratislaw adds that distress is increasing in Tabreez, and bread is scarce.



[8579]

No. 369.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 274.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 5, 1909.*

IF the Russian troops which, according to your telegram No. 119 of the 4th instant, have been dispatched to Enzeli and Resht, become involved in any action in Persia which might be interpreted as being taking sides in the conflict of parties, it would be most regrettable. It is most desirable that, in the event of questions being asked here, that I should be able to give precise explanations with regard to the instructions given to the force as well as the purpose of its dispatch, although of course there can be no objection to any step having for its object the protection of Russians and other Europeans. Apparently Caucasian revolutionaries are the cause of danger at Resht, and these may be a menace to Russian interests. Also it seems that danger is apprehended from brigands who, while outwardly declaring their allegiance to the Shah, may seize the opportunity to pillage and murder indiscriminately.

[8273]

No. 370.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 277.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 5, 1909.*

YOU should be guided by my telegram No. 207 of the 19th ultimo in the event of the Russian Government pressing the point of the method of procedure to be adopted at Tehran with regard to the exchange of control of Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Seistan telegraph lines. In reply to your telegram No. 96 of the 24th ultimo, suggesting that Russian Government will probably raise objections to the employment of British signallers on the telegraph lines from Sharud and Meshed to the frontier, there is no need for you to raise the question at all.

[8671]

No. 371.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 5, 1909.*

PERSIAN Government must be given clearly to understand that if any damage occurs to His Majesty's Consulate at Tabreez in consequence of the action of Shah's troops in the present disturbances His Majesty's Government will consider them answerable.

[8802]

No. 372.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 132.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 6, 1909.*

RUSSIAN troops for Resht.

Telegram No. 119 from Sir A. Nicolson to you of the 1th instant.

I questioned M. Sabline when I heard on the 3rd March from the British Acting Vice-Consul at Resht that fifty Russian Cossacks as a guard for the Russian Consulate were expected to arrive there. M. Sabline denied the story, and said that except in case of imminent danger which did not then exist at Resht, no such step would be taken.

The situation, which was calm on the 3rd March, has not, so far as I know, altered, but danger might arise from the presence of so many Caucasian revolutionaries.

[8691]

No. 371\*.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)*

(Private.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 5, 1909.*

SHALL I ask for promise indicated in your telegram No. 77 of yesterday. The Persian Government would, I do not doubt, give it, because the dispatch of 280,000 tomans would enable Ain-ed-Dowleh to commandeer what he requires for the operations against Tabreez. If, however, the proposed arrangement became known here, it would be open to misconstruction, and might appear inconsistent with the attitude of His Majesty's Government as regards M. Isvolsky's seventh proposal.

I might perhaps as an alternative inform the Persian Government that dispatch of the money cannot take place unless I receive an assurance from them that if the Ain-ed-Dowleh takes any of it, he will be dismissed. Such an assurance would of course be difficult to obtain, and failing it the Persian Government should be held responsible.



[8786]

No. 373.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 6, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

Mr. Wratishaw telegraphs that a vigorously pressed attack by the Royalists on the town was completely repulsed with considerable loss.

The Basminch artillery bombarded the town without effect simultaneously with this attack from the Maraga force.

[8843]

No. 374.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 6, 1909.*

KARUN Irrigation Concession. Your telegram No. 74 of the 26th February.

According to a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah the Sheikh accepts my advice, but he claims the right to the option of any concession, and will not be satisfied unless I guarantee that no concession will be granted without previous reference to him.

The Sheikh will clearly not be happy until he has put in his protest if he does not obtain the desired guarantee, which would involve undesirable responsibility. If you approve I propose to instruct His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah to inform him that I see no objection to his telegraphing a courteous reservation of his rights to the Persian Government in view of the report which has just reached me of his conversation with Mr. MacDonall.

[8844]

No. 375.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 135.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 6, 1909.*

RUSSIAN troops for Resht. My telegram No. 132 of to-day.

I received a visit this morning from M. Sabline. He came to inform me of the dispatch to Resht of the Russian troops. Though the revolutionaries talk of reprisals on foreigners if the Shah sends troops, I do not think M. Sabline anticipates disorders.

M. Sabline says that 5,000,000 cartridges and a large number of rifles have been seized at Baku. They were intended for Resht.

[8691]

No. 376.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(Private.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 6, 1909.*

IN present circumstances I think it advisable to postpone the transfer of specie from Tehran to Tabreez for the Imperial Bank (see your private telegram of yesterday).

[8399]

No. 377.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 6, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin,\* from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran respecting an application by M. E. Kitabji for a Road Concession from Kuh-i-Malik-Siah to Nasratabad.

As you are aware, the condition of this road formed the subject of a despatch

\* No. 359.



addressed by Sir A. Hardinge, then His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to the Government of India on the 19th December, 1902. A copy of this paper is inclosed for convenience of reference.

With regard to M. E. Kitabji, I am to inclose, for the confidential information of Lord Morley, a copy of a letter from Mr. Preece, the representative of the D'Arcy Oil Syndicate.\* From recent correspondence with the Home Office it appears that M. Kitabji has been informed that his application for naturalization cannot be entertained until he is in a position to show that he has resided for five years in the United Kingdom, and that he intends to continue to reside here.

Sir E. Grey proposes to inform Sir G. Barclay of the attitude of the Home Office on the subject, but he would be glad to be furnished first with Lord Morley's views generally in regard to the Concession, and in particular as to whether his Lordship considers that it would be expedient to oppose the granting of the Concession in question to M. E. Kitabji.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[8854]

No. 378.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)*

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, March 6, 1909.*

PERSIA.

Dispatch of Russian troops. Your telegram No. 274 of the 5th instant.

I am informed by M. Isvolsky that the troops are being sent to Resht for the sole purpose of protecting the Russian Consulate (which up to the present has had a guard of only nine men) and protecting the lives of Russians and Europeans in case of necessity. M. Isvolsky agreed to my suggestion that I should address a letter to him containing my inquiry, and that he should send me a reply containing the information asked for.

M. Isvolsky said that it was found that there were already enough men at Julfa, and that the garrison there would therefore not be increased. He hears that the Indo-European telegraph line has been cut by Ain-ed-Dowlah, and that the Persian Government is being held responsible by M. Sabline for the losses incurred daily in consequence of the interruption.

[9096]

No. 379.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*St. Petersburg, March 8, 1909.*

MY telegram No. 124 [of 6th March: Dispatch of Russian troops].

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Cossacks who are being sent to Resht are to reinforce Cossack guard there, and will conform to the orders of the Consul with a view to protection of lives and properties of Russian subjects and other foreigners at Resht and Enzeli. Consul will, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs adds, naturally continue to abstain from all intervention in the struggle between the revolutionaries and the partisans of the Shah.

[9081]

No. 380.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 136.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 8, 1909.*

PROPOSED road from Kuli Malek Siah to Nasratabad.

My telegram No. 129 of the 3rd instant.

In reply to my inquiry, His Majesty's Consul in Seistan reports that the road proposed by Mr. Kitabji would not pay if it were dependent on tolls, which, moreover, would be contrary to British trade interests.

\* Mr. Preece, April 15, 1907.

[9097]

No. 381.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 137.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 8, 1909.*

PERSIAN Telegraphs. Your despatch No. 20 of the 17th February.

We have ventured to insert in the draft Agreement a stipulation, in addition to those mentioned by the Director-in-Chief, for the right of co-operation in the construction and maintenance of any extension of the Arabistan lines. An extension of the line from Mohammerah to Bussorah is of course what we contemplate.

We will drop this addition if we find that it is likely to cause delay.

I presume that no objection would be raised by the Russian Government if it is made clear to them that, in the case of an extension into their sphere, the right would be waived.

[9106]

No. 382.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 138.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 8, 1909.*

THE policy of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Major Cox, in a telegram from Bushire, states that while he was away the Sheikh of Mohammerah intimated through His Majesty's Consul that while the Tehran authorities were pressing for his co-operation in subduing Samsam-es-Sultaneh the High Priests of Najaf were urging him to cease payment of revenue to the Shah and seize the Customs and to support the Constitution. He asked that Major Cox on his return should give him some advice as to what he ought to do. Major Cox asks me whether I have any special reply to give the Sheikh.

I have told Major Cox, in reply, that it would be better to ignore the Sheikh's request for advice, but that if it is repeated he should decline to give any, adding that he is precluded from advising on such questions by the policy of His Majesty's Government of not interfering in the present difference between the Shah and his people.

[9107]

No. 383.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 139.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 8, 1909.*

TURKISH aggressions on Persian frontier.

Mr. Consul-General Wratislaw reports that Turkish aggressions have recommenced. Some Young Turks are helping the Nationalists of Khoi against the Makulis, and a body of them have entered Lahuas with arms and ammunition for the Nationalists there.

[9108]

No. 384.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 8, 1909.*

SITUATION in Agerbaijan.

Mr. Consul-General Wratislaw telegraphs that the Royalists have captured Marand. As anticipated by the Russian Government they are now threatening Julfa.



[8765]

No. 385.

*Sir Edward Grey to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to the Memorandum communicated by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on the 4th instant, respecting the increase of the Russian Consular guard at Resht and the military dispositions adopted at Baku and at the Russian village of Julfa, Sir E. Grey has the honour to state that, information of a similar character having been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a telegram has been dispatched to Sir A. Nicolson to the following effect:—

No objection can, of course, be taken to steps taken to protect Russian subjects and other Europeans, but it would be very desirable that His Majesty's Government should be able, in the event of Parliamentary questions, to explain precisely what is the object of the steps taken, and what instructions are being given to the force sent.

It would be most unfortunate if these troops were drawn into any action likely to favour one party in Persia as against the other.

His Majesty's Government understand that at Resht the danger arises from the presence of Caucasian revolutionaries, who may be hostile to Russian interests, and from the action of brigands, who may, while professing to support the Shah, take advantage of the situation for indiscriminate pillage and murder.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

[8843]

No. 386.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the Karun Irrigation Concession, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin, respecting the attitude of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the apprehensions of the Sheikh might not improbably be overcome by His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, and he would accordingly suggest, for the consideration of Lord Morley, that it might be expedient to instruct this officer to proceed to Mohammerah forthwith.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with an early reply.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[9231]

No. 387.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)*

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 9, 1909.*

SITUATION at Meshed.

Major Sykes telegraphs the outbreak of troubles at Meshed. The bazaars are closed and an Anjuman has been formed. The telegraph office has been seized by revolutionaries.

[9232]

No. 388.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)*

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 9, 1909.*

THE Shah and Constitution.

Yesterday the Russian dragoman had occasion to converse with the Shah. His Majesty gave the impression that he had decided to yield.\* He appeared very despondent and was anxiously awaiting our representations.

[9236]

No. 389.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)*

(No. 143.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 9, 1909.*

PERSIAN telegraphs.

It would be well that Barker should be authorized, should the Minister of Telegraphs press for the construction of second line to Shahrud, to undertake the preliminary work. When the Arabistan telegraph negotiations are completed this could then be abandoned.

The Arabistan negotiations are being hastened as much as possible in Persia and a direct refusal to comply with the Minister's request would jeopardize their success.

[9323]

No. 390.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)*

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, March 10, 1909.*

PERSIA.

Information similar to that contained in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 142 of the 9th instant has reached M. Isvolsky. On my pressing M. Isvolsky to give a reply as to what advice the two Governments should tender to the Shah, his Excellency said that a Council was to have been held this evening at which the matter would have been discussed, but that the meeting of the Council had been postponed owing to the sudden illness of M. Stolypin. On his remarking that the two Governments were not in agreement with regard to point No. 3 of the Russian programme, I suggested that we might drop this point.

[9327]

No. 391.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)*

(No. 144.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 10, 1909.*

KARUN Irrigation Concession. My telegram No. 134 of the 6th instant.

According to a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz, Van Roggen has written to Ter Meulen from The Hague asserting that M. de Sturler received news at The Hague on the 11th January of the signature of a Concession for ninety-nine years for a Syndicate to be formed within two years, and that the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs had promised Van Roggen all help.

Van Roggen begs that Ter Meulen will pay a visit to the Sheikh of Mohammerah and tell him quietly of the grant of the Concession, that the British, Russian, and German Governments have approved it, and that he must not treat it lightly. A payment in cash and shares will be made to him in recognition of his claims.

I am replying to His Majesty's Consul, instructing him to inform Ter Meulen in the sense of your telegram No. 69 of the 23rd ultimo. I am adding that inquiries are being made at The Hague by His Majesty's Government, and I leave it to his discretion to judge how far he can discourage Ter Meulen from making any communication to the Sheikh until the situation becomes clearer.



[9398]

No. 392.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 11.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 9, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 25th ultimo, as to the assisting of the Oil Syndicate in their desire to acquire a site for an oil refinery on Abadan Island, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley sees no objection to the dispatch, through His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, of the amended telegram proposed in your letter.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[9323]

No. 393.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 296.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 11, 1909.*

M. ISVOLSKY'S proposal. As regards the omission of point 3, suggested in your telegram No. 131 of yesterday, and the report that Shah shows signs of yielding.

Our suggestion was that no loan should be made until Shah had appointed a Ministry composed of men deserving of confidence. This would answer the purpose of point 3, although besides this we should make the loan conditional upon the approval of an Assembly.

[9327]

No. 394.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 11, 1909.*

HIS Majesty's Government are considering whether Cox should at once visit Sheikh of Mohammerah.

His Majesty's Consul there should be kept well informed of situation as regards Karun irrigation scheme, referred to in your telegram No. 144 of yesterday, and you should give him instructions to advise Sheikh not to attend to Ter Meulen should latter approach him on the matter.

[9398]

No. 395.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 90.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 11, 1909.*

ABADAN Island.

Unless there is any reason for not doing so, you may instruct Consul-General Cox to assist Reynolds, should latter ask for assistance, in connection with the negotiations concerning land on the island (see telegram from Viceroy of the 27th July, 1908, respecting Oil Syndicate).

[9236]

No. 396.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with your letter of the 20th January, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin,\* respecting the erection of a second wire on the telegraph line from Tehran to Sharud.

\* No. 389.

In view of the information contained in this telegram, Sir E. Grey now proposes, subject to the concurrence of Lord Morley, to instruct Sir A. Nicolson to explain the situation to the Russian Government, and to ask if they wish the Indo-European Department to undertake the preliminary work.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[9327]

No. 397.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copies of telegraphic correspondence, as marked in the margin,\* respecting the Karun irrigation project.

I am to state that, in view of the information reported by Sir G. Barclay, Sir E. Grey considers it is clearly of importance that Major Cox should visit the Sheikh of Mohammerah without delay.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[9547]

No. 398.

*Baron Gericke to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)*

M. le Baron,

*Légation Néerlandaise, Londres, le 11 mars, 1909.*

EN réponse à la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 24 février dernier, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire part, d'après les instructions reçues, que la communication de M. le Ministre de Sa Majesté britannique, d'après laquelle le Gouvernement persan aurait accordé à un Syndicat néerlandais une option de deux ans pour la Concession en vue de l'entreprise de travaux d'irrigation dans le voisinage de la Rivière Karun, n'est pas absolument exacte.

Il est vrai que le Gouvernement persan a fait parvenir une déclaration à l'ancien Ministre des Pays-Bas à Téhéran, lui accordant une option de deux ans en vue d'une Concession non précisée ni décrite au sujet d'une exploitation à Ahwaz, mais cette pièce n'a pas donné lieu à des démarches ultérieures de la part de mon Gouvernement, ni à Téhéran, ni aux Pays-Bas.

Si le Gouvernement persan accordait une Concession à un Syndicat néerlandais en vue de l'exécution de travaux près de la Rivière Karun, Syndicat qui n'existe pas pour le moment, mon Gouvernement ne manquerait pas de l'avertir préalablement qu'il ne peut rien entreprendre sans s'être assuré de l'appui du Gouvernement britannique et de la coopération du Cheikh de Mohammerah.

Veillez, &c.  
(Signé) GERICKE.

[9590]

No. 399.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)*

(No. 145.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 12, 1909.*

KARUN Irrigation Concession. Your telegram No. 88 of the 11th instant.

I am keeping His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah fully informed.

Sir W. Willcocks will probably visit Mohammerah shortly in order to study the Karun waters in connection with the Turkish irrigation scheme. Cox, to whom I have sent the draft Concession, hopes to go to Mohammerah to meet Willcocks.

\* Nos. 391 and 394.



[9470]

No. 400.

*Foreign Office to Mr. F. Strick.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 12, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant asking him to communicate with the Imperial Bank of Persia with a view of arranging that one of their employes at Tehran should act as agent for your firm at that capital.

I am to inform you in reply that the Imperial Bank have readily agreed to the suggestion, and are instructing Mr. Brown, a member of their staff at Tehran, by telegram to act in that capacity for your firm. The name of O'Connor was given in my letter of the 2nd instant owing to a mistake in the decyphering of a telegram.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[9666]

No. 401.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 13.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 12, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 28th ultimo, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley agrees that no further objection need be taken to the acceptance of the amended note now received from the Persian Government on the question of the protection of Bahreini subjects in Persian territory. But, in view of the circumstances, Lord Morley considers it would be desirable to accompany the acceptance of the note with a statement that His Majesty's Government in no way depart from their original attitude, and that they will be guided by their own views of the position should any action of the Persian authorities make it necessary.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[9662]

No. 402.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 13.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy of the 11th instant in regard to Karun irrigation.

*India Office, March 12, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 402.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, March 11, 1909.*

KARUN irrigation.

Please refer to telegram of the 6th instant from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

With a view to overcoming Sheikh's apprehensions, Foreign Office propose that Resident, Persian Gulf, should proceed at once to Mohammerah. Please issue instructions accordingly, if this can be arranged.

[9723]

No. 402<sup>o</sup>.*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)*

(No. 143.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, March 14, 1909.*

PERSIA.

I saw M. Isvolsky to-day, and his Excellency stated that a reply would very shortly be sent to me with regard to the steps to be taken by the two Governments at Tehran. He read me a draft of this reply, which seemed satisfactory on the whole, but I will not go into details since the draft may yet undergo revision.

Opinion in the Cabinet is divided on the question of whether Russia should make her share of the advance, and the point is therefore to be submitted for the decision of the Emperor.

[1629]

3 G\*



[9724]

No. 403.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)*

(No. 147.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 14, 1909.*

MESHED situation.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports that, though dissensions are dividing the parties, the city is controlled by the Assembly, who are preparing to raise a strong force. There is no sign of improvement in the situation.

[9725]

No. 404.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)*

(No. 148.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 14, 1909.*

SITUATION at Resht and in Tehran.

The Tehran-Resht road is now controlled to within 40 miles north of Kasvin by revolutionaries, or Nationalists. Barricades have been erected at intervals on the road.

A very alarmist statement regarding Tehran in the "Novoe Vremya" is reported by Reuter.

It is true that there is some anxiety here, but, if there is danger, it will not be from the Nationalists, but from the Royalist troops getting out of hand.

[9796]

No. 405.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 24.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 11, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 15 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I yesterday drew the attention of my Russian colleague to the information which had reached me that the usual repairs to the Khaf-Nasratabad telegraph line had not been executed during the past year. I also informed him that the Tehran-Meshed line, the control of which it was intended should be handed over to Russia in exchange for that of the Khaf-Nasratabad line, had been repaired as usual.

M. Sabline said that he believed it was the case that the Khaf-Nasratabad line had not been repaired, and promised to inform the responsible authorities at Tiflis that I had drawn his attention to the omission.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[9797]

No. 406.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 25.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 13, 1909.*

I NOTICE from your despatch No. 8 of the 15th ultimo that in a Memorandum on the situation in Persia addressed to Sir Francis Bertie by Ala-el-Mulk (Mahmoud Khan), late Special Ambassador to St. Petersburg, in which that gentleman has thought fit to question the wisdom of my Russian colleague and myself in assisting at the banquet given by Emir Bahadur Jang on the 6th ultimo.

When I received the invitation to this banquet I consulted with my Russian colleague as to the advisability of attending it, and we came to the conclusion that if we declined it would be construed as a demonstration against the Bagh-i-Shah party, which would have the result of increasing the effervescence prevailing among the Nationalists in Tehran, and we accordingly decided to accept.

As things turned out, my acceptance cost the reactionary party dear. Shortly after I had accepted I received news of the third robbery of the Imperial Bank's money by Ain-ed-Dowleh, which brought the total amount seized to something like 18,000*l.* Had I refused Emir Jang's invitation I should not have had the powerful



leverage which, as reported in my telegram No. 8 of the 4th ultimo, enabled me to secure the hypothecation of the Bushire customs, an arrangement by which the bank has already secured the restitution of the greater part of the money stolen, and is reasonably sure to recover the rest, together with full interest to date before the end of the current quarter.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[9798]

No. 407.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 26.)

*Tehran, February 13, 1909.*

Sir,

IN reply to your telegram No. 31 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to state that I concur rather in Captain Keyes' view than in that of Major Sykes regarding the question of the maintenance or suppression of the Consulate at Turbat. Since the creation of the Turbat Consulate the situation has greatly changed, and it seems unnecessary to maintain a costly establishment whose principal reason for existence was to maintain that struggle with Russia for influence and prestige the necessity for which has been removed by the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

As regards Mr. Marling's particular reason for supporting Major Sykes' view, I should state that, so far as my brief experience of Persians would enable me to judge, their erroneous conception of the objects of the Anglo-Russian Convention is not likely to be removed by the maintenance of the Consulate in question, nor so long as we maintain several Consulates-General and Consulates within the Russian sphere can the suppression of one Consulate be reasonably held to confirm it.

In my opinion, a Vice-Consulate or a Consular Agency to be filled by the Indo-European Telegraph Department officer after the exchange of the telegraph lines is all that is needed at Turbat. But, in view of the saving thus effected, I venture to recommend the creation of a Vice-Consulate at Birjand, one of the principal trade centres in Eastern Persia, and within our sphere, the post to be held for the present by either a doctor or the Indian Telegraph Department officer; the latter would doubtless be the cheaper. When the exchange of telegraphs is effected, the Indian telegraph officer would naturally be replaced by the Indo-European Telegraph Department officer. Mr. Barker tells me that in the ordinary course the Indo-European Telegraph Department would station Armenians at Turbat and Birjand for economy's sake. It should, however, be easy to arrange to supplement the salaries of the two telegraph officers so as to make them sufficient for the appointment of British subjects.

I did not reply at once to your telegram, as I thought it right to inquire of Major Sykes whether he had any additional arguments to bring forward for the maintenance of the Consulate. I telegraphed to him that I proposed, if he had nothing further to say, to concur in your suggestion that the Consulate should be reduced to a Consular Agency.

Major Sykes replied reiterating his opinion as to the inadvisability of the suppression of the Consulate, and adding that he was writing fully. His letter, which I have now received, contains no new arguments.

I had originally intended to recommend that if a Vice-Consulate were established at Birjand it should be filled by a Levant service officer, but Major Sykes gives reasons, to which I am disposed to defer, against this course, and in making my recommendations above I have indorsed his suggestion that the post should be occupied either by a doctor or the telegraph officer. Should this arrangement prove unsatisfactory as time goes on, a Levant service officer might be appointed later.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[9799]

No. 408

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 27.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 13, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a day or two ago the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me, in the course of conversation, why the two Powers had warned the Zil-es-Sultan that their guarantees would be cancelled if His Imperial Highness returned to Persia. I replied that these guarantees had only been given on the understanding that the Zil-es-Sultan left Persia, and that they therefore must naturally cease to be held good if he returned. Saad-ed-Dowleh, who seems for some reason to desire the return of His Imperial Highness, told me that he had secured from the Shah guarantees for his security should he come back, and had transmitted a message to this effect to the Zil-es-Sultan through His Imperial Highness' agent in Tehran.

My Russian colleague, whom I have informed of this conversation, tells me that Saad-ed-Dowleh has not mentioned the matter to him.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[9800]

No. 409.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 28.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 17, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to Mr. Marling's despatches Nos. 214 and 246 of the 13th August and the 8th September respectively and to my No. 289 of the 4th November last, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire in which is inclosed a report by His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz on his recent interview with the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh, on the subject of the opening up of communications through Luristan.

I prefer to withhold comment on Captain Lorimer's interesting despatch until I have had an opportunity of discussing the whole question with Major Cox, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in your despatch No. 9 (1812) of the 26th January.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 409.

*Captain Trevor to Sir G. Barclay.*

Sir,

*Bushire, January 20, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information, which Captain D. L. Lorimer, His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz, has addressed to the Resident on the subject of opening up communications in Luristan.

Captain Lorimer has sent a copy of this despatch to Major Cox at Calcutta; no doubt the latter will consult the Government of India on the subject, and communicate his views to you later.

I transmit this letter without delay, in case there should be any telegraphic correspondence on the subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. TREVOR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 409.

*Consul Lorimer to Consul-General Cox.*

Sir,

*Ahwaz, January 12, 1909.*

IN continuation of the correspondence ending with this office No. 42 camp, dated the 19th August, 1908, I have the honour to invite reference to the subject of the Luristan road.



2. In the beginning of October it was decided that I should travel down to Arabistan by way of Pusht-i-Kuh in order to acquire fuller information bearing on the question of opening up Luristan, and on that of establishing a trade route from Dizful to Kermanshah raised by Captain Haworth, His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah in October 1907.

3. The latter proposal has, I understand, already been withdrawn by Captain Haworth, who, when making it, was not aware of the existence of the Concession for a road through Luristan. I would only add here that Hamadan, as the chief trade centre, being taken as objective, the route from Ahwaz via Ispahan and Khonsar practically as short as that via Pusht-i-Kuh and has the advantage of already being in use.

4. Leaving Kermanshah on the 19th November I reached the Wali's camp on the 29th. After several meetings I had a private interview with him on the 1st December, in which I introduced the subject of the road. I laid stress on our right to bring pressure on the Persian Government to open up Luristan, which might probably result in their endeavouring to impose the task on him. I was unwilling to suggest a course which might directly compromise his affairs until I had learned what his private feelings and opinions in the matter might be.

5. The Wali in replying showed that his ideas were well defined, and a little discussion elicited the following conditions as those which would be considered essential by him:—

(1.) The Governorship of all Luristan to be made over to him by the Persian Government without limit of time.

(2.) The revenue to be demanded in accordance with the old revenue books, recent impositions being cancelled (the old assessment, I gather, being about 50,000 tomans, raised in recent times to about 80,000 tomans.)

(3.) The expenses of guards, and a personal allowance to cover charges of compensation for property stolen, &c., to be granted to him.

(4.) Arms and ammunition to be supplied him.

(5.) The bestowal of a personal decoration by the British Government (to secure his life and property?).

6. The Wali was quite clear that he could not take over the road, or that portion of Luristan, alone, arguing that the remaining tribes and especially the combination controlled by Nazar Ali Khan Amari (Fath-us-Sulian) would be able to make the position untenable unless he had direct control over them.

He further added that he was ready to afford protection to any traffic, &c., in his own territory, adequate built posts and payment for guards being allowed.

He asserted that he was endeavouring to be frank and straight with me particularly by not mentioning easy terms which he would afterwards have to repudiate, and I gained the impression that this was probably the case.

7. I explained to him very clearly that the road would not be able to bear any charges for protection, &c., as these fell properly on the Persian Government, and in any case the road would be taxed to its utmost to furnish the interest on its own cost of construction. In consequence, in discussing terms with the Persian Government he would have to arrange for the satisfaction by them of all his claims for expenses of guards and allowance to meet compensation claims, as well as for the provision of arms and ammunition. These could be made charges on the revenue of the province. The Wali appeared to accept this and added that he could supply arms himself, but seemed to distrust the ability of the Persian Government to supply cartridges. I rejoined that apart from the cost the importation of ammunition by us would be attended by many difficulties which would make it impossible.

8. On the request for an Order or Decoration, which he said he could easily get from Germany or Russia, I made no comment. The Wali has since reverted to this point in a letter recently received from him, in which he makes it plain that he practically wants a guarantee from the British Government for his safety and that of his heirs. I think he made a demand of the same nature from Captain Gough some years ago and received an unfavourable reply from Government. To make such demands at any time would probably be futile, and in the present state of our relations shows a deplorable want of appreciation of the actualities of life, or of our intelligence, to which I shall try to open his eyes.

9. I should remark that I have heard from outside sources that negotiations for the bestowal of the Governorship of Luristan on the Wali had reached an advanced stage in May or June 1908, and that they broke down owing to the disturbances caused

by the extinction of the Medjliss in Tehran. The Wali, however, informed me that the breakdown occurred on the financial question by his refusal to pay certain revenue in kind, and revenue in cash exceeding 50,000 tomans.

10. The Wali's terms in regard to Luristan represent of course what he wants and not necessarily the minimum he would accept, though as they seem fairly justified by circumstances I imagine the marginal difference would not be great and would be confined solely to the question of money.

11. Time did not permit of entering fully into the question of the methods by which the Wali would propose to establish and maintain the requisite degree of security in Luristan, but he appeared to contemplate bringing the Dirakwand themselves into the service by a judicious course of rewards and punishments.

12. Granted his conditions, the Wali, I think, ought to be equal to the demands of the situation, his footing being much stronger and more secure than that of any other power in this part of the country. The Fath-us-Sultan would be under his orders and he would be strong enough to keep him under control.

The Dirakwand are the only people who would be directly affected by the road, and he could, if necessary, deal with them summarily; but they are afraid of him, remembering their disciplining by his father.

The Sagwand and Bairawand would only be indirectly affected, if at all, and it is improbable that either could even now, if so disposed, set up any effective opposition to the Wali, still less were Luristan in his hands.

The same remarks apply in a still greater degree to other tribes.

13. No one is better qualified than the Wali to estimate his own strength in comparison with the various forces of Luristan, and it is unlikely that he would care to jeopardize the position he now holds in security, as he would by taking over charge of Luristan, without having first counted the cost and assured himself of his ability to meet it. He would be equally averse to affording the Persian Government a possible means of increasing its power to interfere with himself or his affairs, a danger to which he is quite alive.

14. The present Wali seems to have always been, and at the present time to be favourably disposed towards the British, but he appears to believe, or is astute enough to simulate the belief that both the Germans and the Russians would be glad to establish themselves in a position of superior influence with him. The ambitions of the Germans, and the potentially important position occupied politically and geographically by Pusht-i-Kuh, present affinities which, if German policy is as ambitious as it is credited with being, it would appear dangerous to British interests to leave in immediate juxtaposition.

To bring the Wali into relations which would guarantee the localization of his interests in the service of the British Government would in these circumstances be an object worthy of consideration on its own merits, though it is at the same time to be borne in mind that, on general principles, the creation of intimate relations and the allying of valuable interests, with semi-civilized and more than semi-independent tribes, without the accompaniment of the means of forcible coercion, is a policy to be regarded with distrust and adopted with reluctance.

In the present case, however, were this policy calculated to secure us the realization of our aims in Luristan, and the position of influence postulated by them, it would be difficult to oppose any valid argument to its adoption.

It is to be recollected that, whatever decision may be arrived at on the question underlying the hypothesis at present under our consideration, it is not improbable that the interests of the Oil Syndicate may in the near future compel us to enter into relations of a close and practical nature with the Ruler and people of Pusht-i-Kuh.

15. The position now reached in the question of the road appears to be this, that admitting my premises, that the Persian Government if sufficiently pressed can through the instrumentality of the Wali open Luristan to our enterprise, there is no reason to be found in the state of mind of the Wali, or in the local political situation, to dissuade us from exerting such pressure if means and opportunity permit.

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. LORIMER.



[9801]

No. 410.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*(No. 29.)  
Sir,*Tehran, February 18, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 105 of to-day, I have the honour to report that I received a visit a day or two ago from Salar Ashraf, one of the Bakhtiari Chiefs who recently left Tehran for Ispahan, under orders from the Shah. He told me he had come from Kum, where the other Tehran Bakhtiaris were still engaged in parleying with Samsam-es-Sultaneh, in Ispahan, and he asked me to send a message from them, through His Majesty's Consul-General, to Samsam-es-Sultaneh, asking him to listen to the wishes of the Bakhtiari at Kum. I could not elicit exactly what these wishes were, but I gathered that Salar Ashraf and his friends desired that Samsam-es-Sultaneh should get rid of Zargham-es-Sultaneh, his cousin, who is with him at Ispahan. I told Salar Ashraf that I could not see my way to act as intermediary between his party and Samsam-es-Sultaneh. Salar Ashraf then asked for advice as to the course he and his brother Chiefs in Kum should follow. I replied that I could not advise him, but that I trusted that nothing would be done to disturb public order at Ispahan. I asked him what he and his party intended to do, and gathered from his reply that they would remain for the present at Kum and await developments.

Before leaving, Salar Ashraf told me that he heard that Sardar Assad was endeavouring to negotiate a loan in London with Messrs. Lynch on the security of the Aliwaz-Ispahan road, and he said that the consent of the other concessionnaires would have to be obtained to any such arrangement.

Messrs. Lynch's agent in Tehran knows nothing of the alleged negotiations.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[9803]

No. 411.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*(No. 31.)  
Sir,*Tehran, February 23, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Gardner, now in charge of the Vice-Consulate at Resht in Mr. Rabino's absence, reporting on recent events in that town, which, after the assassination of the Governor, Sardar Afkham and two minor officials, have resulted in its detachment from the Shah's authority.

As reported in my telegram No. 101 of the 16th instant, Sipahdar, who arrived at Enzeli just before the outbreak at Resht, was detained by the dominant faction in the latter town and accepted from them the governorship.

On the 20th February the local Assembly addressed to the five principal foreign Representatives in Tehran a telegram protesting that they had no quarrel with the Shah, and declaring their determination to put an end to the present situation, which they attributed to the evil policy of His Majesty's entourage, and to recover their national rights. The telegram concluded with a warning that in executing the necessary measures for their own protection damage might be caused to the Resht-Tehran road and traffic along it impeded, but that in that event the Shah himself and his advisers would be responsible.

A "gholam" of the Russian Legation who recently travelled by the Resht road reports that the Nationalists were fortifying places along the road, but there has been no interference with traffic, nor is there likely to be if only the Shah will be guided by the advice which has been given him by the Sipahdar not to attempt to subdue the town.

Some hundreds of troops have left Tehran, but have not yet got beyond Kazvin.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 411.

*Acting Vice-Consul Gardner to Sir G. Barclay.*

Sir,

*Resht, February 9, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday, the 8th instant, towards 4 P.M. an armed gang, composed chiefly of Caucasians, set out from the house of Mois-es-Sultan, brother-in-law of Sardar Mansur, and, making for the Governor's house, at once proceeded to open fire on the soldiers and guards. Some of these replied and a fight ensued. The regulars were, however, soon bested, and the revolutionaries, taking possession of the two cannons, turned them against the Government House. At the same time they set fire to some outhouses and the "anderun" at the back, and some of the party went along the main streets, firing in the air to intimidate people and disarming all soldiers on patrol duty.

Whilst the foregoing was taking place another section of the rebels proceeded to the Mudirieh garden, where the Governor (Sardar Afkham), the Sardar Mohtamed, and the Sardar Homayun had gone to lunch. The insurgents announced their arrival by exploding a bomb and then entered the house.

Accounts as to what followed vary to such an extent that it is impossible to get at the truth, but the fact remains that the Governor was shot dead whilst the other two were taken home by their attendants more dead than alive.

The killed are said to be about twenty and include two rebels. On the other side the chief names are those of Mosteshar Daftar, Government Supervisor of the Gililan revenues, and Azaz-el-Mamalek, sent recently from Tehran as Government Mamoor for 20,000 tomans. I also regret having to report the death of one Kass Agha, "ferrash" of this Vice-Consulate, but I have so far been unable to discover under what circumstances.

The ringleaders of the movement are Mois-es-Sultan and his brother, Karim Khan. The latter returned to Resht unknown to any one some two days ago, and with him came a lot of Caucasians, principally Georgians from Tiflis.

The telegraph wire was cut, and I was therefore unable to avail myself of this means of communication.

This morning the town was quiet and no disturbance took place throughout the day. The National Guards patrol the streets. A temporary Anjuman has been formed to look after town matters, and has elected Sardar Homayun and Sardar Mohtamed joint temporary Governors. They have further issued a manifesto telling the people they have nothing to fear, the movement being solely aimed at the authorities.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. E. HAYRES GARDNER.

[9804]

No. 412.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*(No. 32.)  
Sir,*Tehran, February 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 64 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the note which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs pledging the Customs receipts of Bushire to the service of the debts of the Government to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

As already reported, I have refrained from pressing for the arrears of interest on the British and Indian Loan, but it seems worth considering whether in April, when the current financial year's interest falls due, the moment will not have come for urging the matter.

The two years' interest then owing would, with the 30,000 tomans a-month for the interest on the bank's advances to the Persian Government, go far towards exhausting the Bushire Customs receipts for the year, and should these receipts continue to fall off, they might not in 1910-11 be able to bear a third year's accumulation of arrears.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.



Inclosure in No. 412.

*Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.**Le 25 janvier, 1909.*

M. le Ministre,

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note en date du 20 Zilhadjeh, 1326, par laquelle votre Excellence a bien voulu exprimer le désir qu'il soit stipulé clairement qu'à partir du 21 mars prochain, la somme de 30,000 tomans, pour les intérêts des diverses avances à courtes échéances consenties au Gouvernement persan par la Banque Impériale, sera payée mensuellement au moyen des recettes de la Douane de Bouchir.

Je me permets de faire remarquer à votre Excellence que la note de mon prédécesseur disait assez clairement déjà que c'est l'Administration des Douanes qui est chargée comme précédemment d'effectuer le paiement des intérêts dus à la Banque. Comme celle-ci a maintes fois manifesté le désir de recevoir ces fonds de préférence du Bureau des Douanes de Bouchir, le Gouvernement ne voit pas d'inconvénient à ce qu'il en soit ainsi, pour autant, bien entendu, que la Banque, encaissant l'argent à Bouchir même, n'exige qu'une légère commission pour le transport à Téhéran, soit, par exemple, 1 pour cent. Dans le cas contraire le Gouvernement se réserverait le droit de transférer les fonds de Bouchir à la Banque Impériale à Téhéran par les moyens les plus avantageux et les moins coûteux.

Le Gouvernement vient d'adresser des instructions dans ce sens à l'Administration des Douanes, qui est chargée de faire avec la Banque Impériale des arrangements en conséquence.

Veuillez, &c.  
(Signé) DJEVAD.

[9805]

No. 413.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 33.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 90 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Declaration of the Nationalist party in Tehran in regard to the question of foreign loans and Concessions. I also inclose copy of a similar document from the Nationalists of Astrabad, in which special mention is made of the Karun Irrigation Concession.

As reported in my telegram No. 60 of the 26th ultimo, a communication of like nature from the Nationalists of Tabreez was made to the Consuls at that place, and the Nationalists at Ispahan have also protested against any loan contracted by the Shah without the sanction of the Assembly.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 413.

*Declaration by Nationalist Party of Tehran (made to Sir G. Barclay).*

COMME suite aux Circulaires qui ont été soumises précédemment par le Conseil Général de l'Azerbaïdjan et récemment par celui d'Ispahan à votre Excellence, pour être transmises à votre Gouvernement, nous Soussignés, représentants du parti constitutionnel de la capitale, avons l'honneur de faire observer à votre Excellence que la Perse ayant été reconnue comme Puissance constitutionnelle et que, conformément aux Articles 23, 24, et 25 de la première partie de la Constitution, tout projet d'emprunt et de Concession doit être préalablement soumis au vote du Medjliss, par conséquent nous avons l'honneur de rappeler encore une fois à votre Excellence que la nation ne se reconnaît point débitrice et n'assumera point la moindre responsabilité de tout emprunt ou subvention financière, soit direct, soit indirect, accordé par un Gouvernement étranger, un établissement financier ou commercial, ou des particuliers au Gouvernement Impérial, et ne se trouvera pas obligée à remplir les conditions stipulées de toute Concession accordée pendant la dissolution du Parlement.

Nous prions donc votre Excellence de bien vouloir prendre en considération les Articles précités de la Constitution et de porter le contenu de la présente le plus tôt

possible à la connaissance de votre Gouvernement et des établissements intéressés de votre pays, afin que des actes illégaux ne puissent entraver dans l'avenir les bons rapports nationaux et commerciaux des deux pays.

En vous remerciant d'avance pour les démarches que vous aurez l'obligeance de faire, nous prions votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer, &c.

(Suivent les 31 signatures.)

Téhéran, le 15 Moharrem, 1327  
(7 février, 1909).

Inclosure 2 in No. 413.

*Telegraphic Declaration by Nationalists of Astrabad (made to the Russian, English, Ottoman, and German Representatives).*

(Translation.)

IT is very evident that at this moment the enemies of the people of this kingdom, who for years have conducted themselves according to despotic principles as much as possible, will not allow men who are well-wishers of the Government and the people to look after the administration of the country and the condition of the people. The Persian people, up to the present, for various considerations, has done nothing violent against them. The blessing of constitutionalism was granted to this people two years ago, and the Government itself proclaimed it to the nations. There is no doubt about this. But the Government officials will not give up the despotism, and, according to persistent rumours, in these days the Government officials are taking certain steps which are contrary to constitutional rules. Therefore the people of Astrabad submit and proclaim:—

Firstly, lending money to the Persian Government, which is a constitutional Monarchy, without the signature of the people, is not valid, and the people will not accept it.

Secondly, with regard to the Karun Irrigation Concession given to Dutch merchants, the people will not subscribe to it, and in all such cases the Persian people will not be responsible. We beg the foreign Representatives to consider these points very carefully, and not to allow the Government officials to take steps contrary to the Constitution with a view to strengthening the despotism. Such a favour (on your part) will place generally the whole people of Persia, and especially the people of Astrabad, under great obligation.

(All the merchants and people of Astrabad.)

[9806]

No. 414.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 34.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 25, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia during the past four weeks.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 414.

No. 2.—*Monthly Summary.**Tehran.*

THE Cabinet, which remains unchanged, is composed as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister of Interior ..	Mushir-es-Sultaneh.
Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	Saad-ed-Dowleh.
„ War ..	Sipahsalar.
„ Justice ..	Nizam-ul-Mulk.
„ Education and Public Works ..	Mohandis-ul-Mamalik.

[1629]

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Minister for Telegraphs	..	..	Mukhber-ed-Dowleh.
" Court	..	..	Sultan Ali Khan (Vazir-i-Durbar).
" Commerce	..	..	Mufakher-ul-Mulk.
" Finance	..	..	Kawam-ed-Dowleh.

The main interest of the Ministerial situation has centred in the struggle between Saad-ed-Dowleh and the Sipahsalar, which may be considered as the struggle between the frankly reactionary and the mildly liberal influences around the Shah. Neither side has yet scored any definite success.

The customary Moharrem ceremonies were much curtailed this year owing to the scarcity of money and the fear of disorders. The usual passion plays were not performed in the Royal Theatre, but were represented on a much smaller scale in Bagh-i-Shah.

The revolution in Resht has greatly encouraged the Nationalists at Tehran and since the 13th February the bazaars have been more or less closed. The number of refugees in the Turkish Embassy and at Shah Abdulazim has largely increased and the agitation has become much more general. It is believed that a certain number of Caucasians have arrived at the capital and a general feeling of uneasiness pervades the town. The disloyalty of the population has undoubtedly increased, and the Nationalists are beginning to hint at the necessity of a change of Sovereign even if the Constitution is granted.

Since the closing of the bazaars the Government has taken extraordinary police measures. Cossack patrols are much in evidence while soldiers and gendarmes are stationed in the bazaars and principal streets. With a view to frightening the people into opening their shops four traders were publicly bastinadoed, but this severity only resulted in more shops being closed. On the 22nd February, three men were arrested on the charge of being about to throw a bomb. One of them was summarily executed and his corpse hung up near the Bagh-i-Shah Gate as a warning to the populace. The other two are now being tried and an attempt is being made to implicate other persons. The man who was executed and one of his companions having been in "bast" at His Majesty's Legation last June, representations were made to the Persian Government, as reported by telegram. This incident has greatly exasperated the people who believe that the man was executed on a trumped up charge.

On the 24th February, a murderer was publicly executed evidently with the object of still further frightening the people.

The reactionaries are spreading all sorts of rumours of Nationalist disasters at Tabreez, the fall of which they believe to be imminent. However, they are undoubtedly very uneasy as to the possibility of disorders in the capital and the general precariousness of their position, although the military force at the disposal of the Shah should suffice to prevent any successful rising here without help from outside. The Shah shows no sign of granting the Constitution and is evidently hoping for the speedy fall of Tabreez, which, he believes, will cause the collapse of the Nationalist movement.

The trial of the persons accused of complicity in the attempt on Sheikh Fazlullah has resulted in the release of all the prisoners except one, whose trial is still proceeding.

Firman Firna is still at Tehran, and he informed a member of His Majesty's Legation that he had definitely decided not to proceed to Ispahan. His deputy, Serdar Motezid, returned to Tehran on the 4th February, but left again two days later to rejoin the expeditionary force at Kum.

Salar Ashraf, one of the Bakhtiari Khans sent against Ispahan, also returned to Tehran, but left again for Kum. He is probably trying to effect a reconciliation between the Samsan-es-Saltaneh and the Shah.

Some 400 men of the Hamadan Regiment sent against Tabreez have returned to Tehran, apparently being unwilling to endure the hardships of the expedition.

Two correspondents, Messrs. Dickenson and Hone, have arrived in Tehran. They do not appear to be special correspondents, but are writing articles for various magazines and papers, more especially "The Manchester Guardian."

The German Minister has been much annoyed by Colonel Liakhoff's action in withdrawing Cossacks from the German Legation without due notice, and has hinted that he may replace the Cossacks by a guard of the sowars of the Sipahsalar, with whom he is at present on very good terms. He appears to be much alarmed at the

present state of affairs, and has been recommending somewhat exaggerated measures of precaution to his countrymen and dependents.

Mr. Miller, who was to have filled the post of First Dragoman to the Russian Legation during M. Baranowski's absence on leave, apparently refused to accept the post, which he dislikes very much, preferring the more independent position of a Russian Consul in the provinces. He has now left for Tabreez to act for M. Pohitonof, who is going on leave. M. Lissovski, who was only Acting Second Dragoman, is now acting as First Dragoman until M. Baranowski's return.

(Signed) W. A. SMART.

Tehran, February 24, 1909.

#### Tabreez.

The situation forms the subject of a separate despatch.

#### Resht.

The situation forms the subject of a separate despatch.

#### Meshed.

1. Major Sykes learns that the spies mentioned in last month's summary have sent in reports most unfavourable to Prince Dabija, who is accused of bullying not only Persians, but also his own staff.

2. Prince Dabija has been telling every one that the division of Persia is about to begin. He is rather alarmed at the action of his subjects, who have imported all that is necessary for the manufacture of bombs. He has informed the Governor-General that Russia and Great Britain are to assume control of affairs in Persia. Major Sykes informed his Highness and other Persians that some control of the finances appears to be intended. It appears that intervention would be welcomed by a large class of the inhabitants, who are utterly weary of the present chronic state of disorder. At the same time there would be much opposition to any such scheme, inasmuch as perquisites would be lessened.

3. Prince Dabija informed Major Sykes that Saad-ul-Dowleh had given orders for the release of an inhabitant of Subzawar who owes the Russian Bank a large sum and declines to pay. In reply, Prince Dabija informed the Legation and also the Karguzar that, if necessary, he would send Cossacks to seize the man and would keep him in his own prison. His statement is confirmed by the Karguzar, who sent his son to the Attaché to complain of this and other high-handed proceedings of Prince Dabija. Major Sykes declined to intervene in any way.

4. Prince Dabija has been pressing the Governor-General with open threats to reinstate Yusuf Khan as Begler Begi. The dismissal of this individual was the signal for the recent riots to cease. The Governor-General has declined, but has made the Salar Mukarram, the Commander-in-chief, Acting Begler Begi.

5. Three Russian spies, said to be an officer with two Armenians, were recently killed near the Darra Gaz frontier. Their bodies have now been found. The whole affair is somewhat mysterious, as the men are termed "scouts" by the Russian newspapers.

6. Telegraphing on the 17th February, Major Sykes reported that a large body of raiders from Fars had crossed the desert, and were threatening Tabas. The Governor-General was sending some troops to that place. The Yezd road was blocked.

#### Turbat-i-Haidari.

Captain Grey, who arrived on the 7th January and took over the duties of Consul the next day, was accorded a very good reception by the Governor on his arrival. Captain Lyass sent some Cossacks out to meet him.

#### Seistan.

1. His Majesty's Consul left Seistan on the 29th December, and after visiting Kuh-i-Malik Siah returned by the Palang Kuh, reaching Seistan on the 11th January.



Major Kennion found that since his last visit to Kuli-Malik Siah the Customs Department had built some warehouses and a rest-house for traders. They were well and soundly built, and of a suitable kind and size.

2. M. Bravine recently informed Major Kennion that the complete renovation of the Russian Consulate had been sanctioned. He seemed to look on this as an indication that there was no intention at present of abolishing the Consulate. The sanction was evidently connected in his mind with the despatch of a new British Consul to Turbat-i-Haidari.

#### *Kerman.*

1. Mr. Pearson, of the Chicago Magnetic Institute, arrived on the 30th December, and left for Bampur on the 4th January.

2. A band of robbers assembled early in January at Kermanshahan on the Yezd road, intending to waylay caravans bringing ammunition and bank specie. A force was sent out which compelled them to withdraw, and the caravans came through safely.

3. Telegraphing on the 16th February, His Majesty's Consul reported that the popular party was becoming active and trouble was brewing, that the Governor was afraid of the people, who would break out as soon as they realized that this was the case.

#### *Yezd.*

1. The new Governor, Adl-ud-Dowleh, arrived on the 23rd January.

2. Throughout January the roads leading to Yezd have remained in the hands of robbers, and though occasionally a caravan, if escorted, got through; this was not always the case. The bands of robbers sometimes number as much as 100 men. Complete insecurity prevails, and the Parsi community remains in constant fear of molestation. On the 11th February some 100 Parsi men, women, and children, inhabitants of hamlets round Taft, rushed the British telegraph-office demanding sanctuary. The Governor, on being addressed on the matter, arranged for the removal of the Parsis to the Parsi quarter of the town. A party of 200 Bakhtiari was reported to have arrived about the 20th January, some 30 miles south-east of Yezd. On the 7th February the party was 6 miles from Yezd and sent in to the telegraph-office, for transmission to Samsam-us-Sultaneh, Bakhtiari, at Ispahan, a message signed Khusro Kham, saying that the party had arrived and was awaiting orders. The message was not telegraphed. It appears that the Governor sent out a force to coerce the Taftis, against whom the Parsis had complained, but a skirmish resulted in favour of the Taftis. When asked what they wanted the latter replied "the establishment of the Constitution." The news of this answer seems to have thrown the Governor and the townspeople into a panic. The Governor and Notables armed their followers, barricades were erected, and obsolete guns mounted. Even the guards at European premises were withdrawn, but, as the result of His Majesty's Vice-Consul's remonstrances, subsequently sent back. The Taftis were said to be acting on orders from Najaf.

#### *Kermanshah.*

1. His Majesty's Consul and the Consular Surgeon returned from tour on the 1st February.

2. Slight earthquake shocks were reported from Kermanshah and Hamadan on the 23rd January, and a sharper shock from Sultanabad. It is stated that some villages between Sultanabad and Burujird have suffered, but no details are given.

3. On the 20th February Captain Haworth reported that the Chief Priest of Hamadan had informed him that he had received instructions from the Chief Priests at Kerbela to request all Consuls to inform their Legations that news of the two Powers giving a loan to the Shah had reached them, that the Shah had no right to receive a loan, authority for which rested with the National Assembly, which was now represented by the local Assembly at Tabreez, and that the people could not be responsible for any money given to the Shah. The anti-Nationalists of Hamadan, hearing of the disturbances at Resht and of the Chief Priest's action, went to the latter and informed him that they too desired the Constitution. The Chief Priest has told the Acting Governor that if he is not able to come to the town to govern it he is prepared to assume the government himself of those who demand the Constitution. It is probable that a local Assembly will be formed shortly.

#### *Shiraz.*

1. The operations undertaken by the Kawam-ul-Mulk against the Lari Seyyid have not yet led to any definite result. On the 9th January the Kawam was at Darab with 5,000 men and said to be intending to march against Lar. He was joined a few days later by his brother, Nasr-ud-Dowleh, and on the 19th received 60,000 rounds of rifle ammunition from Shiraz. The Kawam telegraphed to his Tehran agent directing him to inform the Prime Minister that he had not to contend with the Seyyid alone, but with Soulat-ud-Dowleh, who was supporting him with men and money. About the 20th January the Kawam advanced one stage from Darab towards Lar. The Seyyid was said to have issued a Proclamation, in which he gave himself the title of "Majesty" and forbade any one to pay revenue or customs duties to the Shah. Towards the end of January some fighting took place resulting in favour of the Kawamis. On the 1st February the Kawam and his brother telegraphed to their agent at Tehran that the Governor-General was supporting Soulat-ud-Dowleh, who wants the governorship of Luristan for himself, that they had paid 14,000% to the Governor-General for the revenue alone and had recovered nothing, but had incurred large additional expenses. On the 19th February Nasr-ud-Dowleh returned unexpectedly to Shiraz.

2. From a telegram from His Majesty's Consul, dated the 20th February, it appears that Samsam-us-Sultaneh, Bakhtiari, telegraphed on the 17th February to the Kawam saying he had received his message through his Tehran agent and would give him every assistance possible. On the 19th February the Kawam telegraphed to the Prime Minister repudiating his Tehran agent, who had gone to Ispahan. On the same date Samsam-us-Sultaneh telegraphed to Soulat-ud-Dowleh saying he was astonished at his inaction after all his promises, and hoped he would act at once.

3. The Governor-General, Asaf-ud-Dowleh, appears to have little or no power, the administration being mostly in the hands of Sirdar Firouz. There have been repeated rumours of an intention to get up a riot against the Governor-General. The latter, in an interview with Mr. Bill, asserted that he was doing his best to settle British claims, but Mr. Bill thinks that British merchants have no chance of recovering any of their lost merchandize except by direct compensation from the Fars Government, an idea the Governor-General refuses to entertain.

#### *PERSIAN GULF.*

##### *Bushire.*

1. Mr. Akers, of the Board of Trade, arrived on the 23rd December, 1908.

2. The Darya Begi, late Governor of Bushire, is reported to have written to the Khans of Dashti and Tagistan asking them to refuse payment of revenue and to create as much disturbance as they can in their districts.

3. Seyyid Abdul Hussein, of Lar, has written to a leading Mullah at Bushire intimating that he has fought against the Kawam whom he has totally defeated, and saying that he has strictly prohibited the payment of revenue at Lar.

4. It is reported that the Turkish Government contemplate deputing an officer on a tour of inspection to Bahrein, Lingah, and the Oman ports. Arrangements are being made to watch his movements if he arrives.

5. The Resident left for Calcutta on the 7th January.

##### *Bunder Abbas.*

1. The Sadeed-us-Sultaneh, Russian Agent, returned from Lingah on the 9th January.

2. Mr. Akers, of the Board of Trade, left for Lingah on the 13th December, 1908.

3. Work on the telegraph line to place Bunder Abbas in communication with the Indo-European station at Henjam was commenced on the 24th December, 1908, by Mr. Gumbley, who arrived on the 23rd.

##### *Lingah.*

1. Mr. Akers, of the Board of Trade, arrived on the 14th December, 1908, and left the next day.



2. It is reported that Mr. Brown, of the German firm of Wönekhaus and Co., was advised from Bussorah to either accept the post of Turkish Consular Agent at Lingah or to select an inhabitant of Lingah for the post, but he has refused the offer.

Mohammerah.

Mr. Akers arrived on the 30th December, 1908, and left for Bussorah on the 2nd January.

(Signed) C. B. STOKES, Major,  
Military Attaché.

[9808]

No. 415.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 36.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 25, 1909.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my despatch No. 17 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, inclosing copy of the letter from the Acting Director of Customs to the Russian Bank in regard to the alleged claim of the Tabreez Anjuman to the Customs receipts.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 415.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 3.)

Sir,

Tabreez, January 25, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 21 of yesterday, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of the letter addressed by the Acting Director of Customs here to the Russian Bank, to which no reply has hitherto been returned.

Your Excellency will observe that this letter affords no ground whatever for the Russian Ambassador's assertion that the Acting Director has asked the bank to comply with the request of the Anjuman that the receipts of the Customs should be paid over to them, nor have the Anjuman ever put forward any such demand. Their desire was that the receipts should remain on deposit in a Tabreez bank, and not be forwarded to Tehran, as they suspected that the Shah diverted them to his own purposes.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 415.

*Acting Director of Customs, Tabreez, to Manager of Russian Bank.*

Monsieur,

Le 9 janvier, 1909.

PAR suite d'un arrangement provisoire avec l'Anjuman provincial de l'Azerbaïdjan, il a été décidé que les fonds de la Douane seraient versés dans une banque et y resteraient à la disposition de la Douane, sans pouvoir être transférés à Téhéran.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir me faire savoir si vous consentirez à me verser le montant des chèques que je pourrais émettre dans la suite pour les besoins de mon service. Il est bien entendu que je ne ferais jamais de retraits de fonds supérieurs au crédit du compte courant.

Si donc vous me donnez l'engagement écrit de payer les chèques émis, j'effectuerai aujourd'hui même un versement de fonds. Dans le cas contraire, je me verrais forcé de me servir d'un autre intermédiaire.

Veillez, &c.  
(Signé) LOQUIFER.

[9809]

No. 416.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 37.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 25, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 14 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the situation at Ispahan remains unchanged. The town is quiet, and order is being maintained satisfactorily.

The negotiations between Samsam-es-Sultaneh and the Bakhtiari Chiefs from Tehran, who are now at Kum, continue, and it is fairly certain, though the reports are conflicting, that no clear understanding has as yet been reached between them. The troops sent by the Shah have none of them proceeded beyond Kum. Prince Farman Farma remains in Tehran, and, now that the proposed arrangement for the settlement of Amin-es-Zarb's debts to the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Russian Bank has been abandoned, it is unlikely that the Shah will or can grant the various requirements reported in my telegram No. 88 of the 12th instant, upon which His Highness makes conditional his departure from Ispahan.

I learn that Samsam-es-Sultaneh has been in communication with Soulet-ed-Dowleh, Ilkhaneh of the Kashgais at Shiraz, but so far no move has been made by the latter. A few days ago Samsam, suspecting that messages were passing between Tehran and Shiraz without, as usual, going through the Persian office at Ispahan, threatened to cut the telegraph line, and I have instructed His Majesty's Consul-General to warn him unofficially against such an act. In reply to Mr. Grahame's message, Samsam stated that he wished to have control for the next few days over all messages passing to Shiraz, with power to suppress any which he found distasteful. He added that if this were not conceded, he declined all responsibility if the line were cut. After consulting with Mr. Barker, it was decided that if the Persian Government asked for the unusual facilities for communicating with Shiraz to which Samsam objected, they should be refused, and Samsam-es-Sultaneh has been informed accordingly.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—Since writing the above I learn that Samsam-es-Sultaneh is not satisfied with the above assurance, and has informed His Majesty's Consul-General that his delegate must be permitted by the Indo-European Telegraph Department to inspect all telegrams passing between Tehran and Shiraz through the British office in Ispahan. After consultation with Mr. Barker, I am informing the Persian Government that I have found myself compelled to advise the Department to accede to Samsam's demands.

G. B.

[9810]

No. 417.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 38.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 25, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 17 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that at the beginning of this month Ain-ed-Dowleh offered to negotiate for peace with delegates of the local Assembly of Tabreez. Nothing, however, came of these overtures, as both parties, fearing treachery, were unwilling to send delegates.

An engagement of some importance took place on the 6th instant outside the town, in which the Nationalists lost six men, and the Royalists, who were eventually driven back, fourteen.

During the month the Royalist troops have succeeded in completely investing Tabreez, the three roads to Julfa, Hamadan, and Kazvin being blocked respectively by the Karadaghis, by the forces of Samad Khan, Governor of Maragha, and by Ain-ed-Dowleh. Consequently provisions in the town are becoming scarce, and the store of grain is not expected to last more than six weeks. A determined attempt was made on the 22nd instant by a strong force of Nationalists to open the Julfa road and to release the garrison of Marand, but after an attack on the Karadaghis at Alvar the expedition returned to Tabreez unsuccessful.

The Court party at Bagh-i-Shah has been lately very confident that the fall of



Tabreez would be only a matter of days, but from all the information I have received from Mr. Wratislaw it is evident that the estimate of the forces at Ain-ed-Dowleh's disposal is much exaggerated, and Mr. Wratislaw thinks it impossible for them to take the town by assault. It may be starved into surrender, but it will be pretty certain to hold out so long as provisions last, for the Nationalists know that they can hope for no mercy from Rahim Khan if he once enters the town.

Fighting is also reported from the districts round Urumia, and an advance has been made by small Turkish detachments in Baranduz, Dool, and Solduz, Turkish officers declaring that they will occupy Urumia in the spring.

On the other hand, the Nationalists continue to receive private assurances of support from Constantinople, and it is reported that they have been promised that the Soujboulak Kurds will be ordered to create a diversion in Samad Khan's rear.

The position of traders in Tabreez is very bad, and British merchants have complained to Mr. Wratislaw of the grave injury to their affairs occasioned by the closing of the Julfa road for the European post and merchandize.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S., February 26.—I inclose copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, which has just reached me.

G. B.

Inclosure in No. 417.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 5.)

Sir,

*Tabreez, February 7, 1909.*

THE loss on the Nationalist side in the engagement of the 5th February, reported in my telegram No. 26, turns out to have been rather more serious than at first believed. Exact figures are difficult to obtain, but I believe that the total casualties amounted to quite fifty men killed, wounded, and missing. The skirmish led to no result beyond the retirement of the Royalists to their camp at Sarderud, which they would have been obliged to regain at nightfall in any case. It illustrates the lack of discipline and competent control on the Nationalist side, and their poor fighting qualities in any enterprise outside their barricades.

Some of Ain-ed-Dowleh's troops from Basminch took part in this engagement, and I understand that a number of them are now permanently attached to Samad Khan's force.

It is uncertain whether Rahim Khan has himself arrived on the scene of action, but his son, with a force of Karadaghis, is in the neighbourhood to the east of the Julfa road, and Samad Khan's men who are extending westward from Sarderud are in touch with him and render the road unsafe.

In fact, Tabreez is now practically beleaguered. No provisions can enter the town, the fruit-trees in the gardens are being cut down for fuel, and though there is at present a sufficient supply of corn for the food of the population the pinch is being severely felt in various ways. There is considerable discontent among the mercantile community, who do no business, and yet are continually called on for contributions to the cause which they dare not refuse so long as their means last.

The finances of the Nationalists are not very prosperous, and it is a question how long they will be able to continue paying their troops. Their share of the receipts of the Indo-European Telegraph office for January only amounted to 12,000 krans, while no contributions from their friends at Constantinople and elsewhere have come in lately. At the same time, very little money goes out of the town, and I do not think that there is any immediate prospect of a collapse for lack of it.

The general opinion is that the Royalists will shortly try to take the town by assault, but it is doubtful if they could succeed; and a blockade, if maintained for two or three months, would, in all probability, force the Nationalists to surrender. On the other hand, the Shah is hardly in a position to keep his men together for so long.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

[9811]

No. 418.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 39.)

Sir,

*Tehran, February 25, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 118 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, copy of the note which I addressed to the Persian Government and of the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of the summary execution of one of those persons who were in bast at this Legation in June last.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 418.

*Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.*

M. le Ministre,

*Tehran, February 23, 1909.*

I UNDERSTAND that the man who was publicly hanged yesterday, without trial, was a certain Ismail Khan who was in bast last summer at this Legation and whose safety the Shah guaranteed to His Majesty's Government. Had this man been properly tried and convicted I should not have addressed your Excellency respecting the matter. But the circumstances of the case are such as to compel me to enter an energetic protest against what has occurred.

I am telegraphing to my Government, and shall doubtless have occasion to address their Excellencies again on the subject. In the meanwhile, I must most earnestly impress upon your Excellency the necessity of preventing the execution of one of the two companions of Ismail Khan, whom it is understood that it is intended to put to death to-day. This man, Mirza Bagher Khan was, I am told, also in bast at the Legation last summer, and I should consider his execution without proper trial, now that I have brought the matter to your notice, an outrage on the Legation, for which I should recommend my Government to demand reparation.

I request that your Excellency will submit this note immediately to His Majesty the Shah.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 418.

*Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*February 23, 1909.*

I HAVE acquainted myself with the contents of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, regarding Ismail Khan who, you state, received guarantees of security through the Legation last summer. In reply I have the honour to inform your Excellency that several days ago it was reported to the police that he had committed serious crimes, and his arrest was effected at a moment when he was about throw a bomb. According to the opinion of the police, if he were not at once arrested and if he were given opportunity to put into execution his pernicious intentions, serious disorders accompanied by much bloodshed and slaughter would have broken out, the suppression of which would have been difficult, almost impossible. Nevertheless, although the town is still under martial law and this man also had the bomb with him, still as I informed Mr. Smart, he was examined and confessed his crime. Therefore, the Government considering the immediate execution of his punishment essential in order to check further mischief which might occur, issued the order for his execution. But as regards Mirza Bagher Khan and that other person, who were Ismail Khan's companions, it has been arranged that a tribunal, composed of civil and military members, shall be constituted and the necessary inquiry held. The result of the examination of Mirza Bagher Khan, whatever it is, will be communicated to your Excellency. While on this subject, I do not think it superfluous to point out to your Excellency's sense of fairness that the guarantees of safety which, in accordance with



the request of the Legation, were given to certain people, apply to occasions when they complain of injustice done to them. It is obvious that when they commit crimes or participate in seditious measures, those guarantees do not possess their former validity.

I avail, &c.

[9812]

No. 419.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 40.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, February 25, 1909.*

I NOTICE from Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 94 of the 22nd instant that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is taking a very decided line on the question of strengthening the Shah with financial assistance.

The fact is that the Shah's unpopularity is now so great that, whatever he does, he must run considerable risk. He himself is convinced that his greatest risk lies in granting the Constitution. Whether this is a correct view or not, it cannot be denied that, even if he reverses his present policy and frankly throws in his lot with the constitutional movement, there will still be danger for him until he succeeds in proving his sincerity. No doubt if he is given money his risk will be less, as this will enable him to pay his troops, which would be his best chance of insuring their loyalty, and if one could have confidence in his sincerity, I should not hesitate to recommend making an advance on the terms proposed by M. Isvolsky. Unfortunately past experience does not justify any such confidence, and there is every reason to fear that the Shah would use his newly acquired strength to hamper and render fruitless the preparatory work for the restoration of Parliamentary government. Consequently, believing as I do that the re-establishment of the constitutional régime, while it will not of itself cure existing evils, nevertheless offers the only chance, with Mohammed Ali on the throne, for Persia to work out her own salvation, I should be loath to agree to M. Isvolsky's proposal.

This proposal, however, could be amended so as to remove in great part the principal objection to which, as it now stands, I believe it is open, and in view of the paramount necessity for the two Governments to act in unison, His Majesty's Government may see their way to consent to the proposed advance, should the Russian Government accept the additional condition indicated in my telegram No. 117 of the 24th instant.

In making this suggestion, my idea was that, over and above the supervision exercised by the proposed Mixed Commission over the employment of the money, there should be a general control exercised by the two Representatives, who should have the right at any moment to stop further expenditure. A joint account might be opened in their names at one or both banks, and the money might be placed by the two Representatives at the disposal of the Mixed Commission in small instalments, which should cease on any attempt on the part of the Shah to thwart the preparatory work for the establishment of Parliamentary government. The knowledge that his source of supply might be stopped at any moment by the two Representatives would go far to keep the Shah on his good behaviour during the period intervening between the fulfilment of the conditions on which the advance is to be made and the meeting of Parliament.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[9813]

No. 420.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 41.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, February 26, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 37 of the 25th instant respecting the situation in Ispahan, I have the honour to report that I learn from the Indo-European Telegraph Department that Samsam-es-Sultaneh has dispatched a telegram to the Persian Anjuman in Constantinople, informing them that the conquest of Shiraz is close at hand, and asking them to "fix the advance on Tehran."

It is difficult to gauge the significance of this telegram; it may only have been

sent in the hope that it would come to the knowledge of the Shah, and with the intention of frightening him. If, on the other hand, it means what it says, it may denote that the Anjuman at Constantinople is the intermediary of communication between Ispahan and the other storm-centres, with which Samsam-es-Sultaneh cannot communicate directly.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[9755]

No. 421.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 107 of February 27.]

(No. 137.)  
Sir,

*St. Petersburg, February 28, 1909.*

I COMMUNICATED to M. Isvolsky yesterday morning by letter the modifications which you suggested in the personal proposals which he had transmitted for dealing with the present situation in Persia. I explained to his Excellency that His Majesty's Government had given his proposals their most careful consideration, and that they had gone as far as they could in meeting his wishes, especially as regards the proposal respecting pecuniary assistance. I added that you earnestly trusted that your amendments would meet with his approval, and that a close accord would continue to exist between the two Governments in dealing with the Persian situation.

His Excellency referred to the matter in conversation with me yesterday afternoon. He said, good humouredly, that he did not see that His Majesty's Government had gone very far in meeting his wishes as regards pecuniary assistance, as they maintained their standpoint that none should be granted until sanctioned by an Assembly. I repeated what I had said on previous occasions, that His Majesty's Government could not grant financial aid which might be utilized in strengthening the hands of the Shah in resisting the popular movement; and, moreover, if an advance were made without the sanction of an Assembly the latter might repudiate the transaction. We went over the ground so frequently traversed before, and I need hardly repeat the arguments which were employed on both sides. M. Isvolsky finally said that further discussion was useless. I said that I was of the same opinion. I had submitted all his arguments faithfully to my Government, and I now gave him their final conclusions. His Excellency said that he was decided to maintain our joint action, though he was sure that we were embarking on a course which could lead to no satisfactory results, and which would probably, even if followed by the Shah, of which he had doubts, lead to a most serious situation. However, we were responsible; and if, notwithstanding his objections and warnings, we still wished to follow the mode of procedure we advocated, and would not afford the Persian Government the funds necessary to meet the most urgent needs, the attempt must nevertheless be tried. I told him that I thought the Shah might now be more amenable, as his attempts to capture Tabreez appeared to have failed, and the occurrences at Resht must also have made him reflect. Moreover, the situation could not well be worse, even if our attempts were to fail, and I had every hope that if the Shah were to carry out our proposals there would be an immediate and marked improvement. M. Isvolsky was not to be convinced; and observed that at Resht there were many Caucasus revolutionaries, and that a certain Panoff, "un homme de sac et de corde," was directing the movement, and had caused the bridge to Enzeli to be mined. His Excellency said that it was always feared that some attack on Russian subjects might occur at any moment. He said he understood—in fact, some people here held the same views—our proposal to let the chaos endure till something came to the top. He did not agree with this view, as if the chaos were to endure it was impossible to say what might not occur. Still he understood that view; but he confessed that he did not see the logic of our present position, by which we wished to extract from the Shah all kinds of concessions and then leave him and his Government perfectly without the means of even setting the administrative machinery going pending the convocation of an Assembly. He doubted if the Nazr-ul-Mulk and others would return to Persia, or that the Saad-ed-Dowleh would remain in office, if they were to find a Treasury without a sixpence, and a crowd of needy and unpaid troopers and employés. However, he said his say, and it was no use arguing further. His Excellency was quite good



tempered, and he left on me the impression that he would, though reluctantly and against his own better judgment, agree to the amendments which His Majesty's Government had proposed.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[8994]

No. 422.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 145.)

*St. Petersburg, March 4, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from M. Isvolsky respecting the dispatch of Russian troops to Enzeli, Resht, and Russian Julfa. The substance of this note has been conveyed to you in my telegram No. 119 of to-day's date.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

*Inclosure in No. 422.*

*M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 19 février (4 mars), 1909.*

JE crois devoir vous communiquer que les dernières nouvelles de Ghilan ayant un caractère fort inquiétant, le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé de prendre quelques mesures indispensables afin de garantir la sécurité des institutions et de la colonie européennes à Enzeli et Recht. Dans ce but l'escorte de notre Consulat dans cette dernière ville sera renforcée d'un certain nombre d'hommes—de soixante à soixante-dix à peu près—et de deux mitrailleuses. Le bateau qui transportera ces hommes de Bakou à Enzeli sera escorté par un vaisseau de guerre, dont le Commandant a ordre d'appuyer de force la descente de ces hommes, si cette dernière rencontre des obstacles de la part des révolutionnaires. Pour le cas où cette mesure serait insuffisante pour assurer la sauvegarde des Européens à Recht et Enzeli, un contingent d'hommes plus considérable sera tenu en réserve à Bakou.

Nous avons reçu en outre des nouvelles annonçant une rencontre prochaine entre les troupes du Schah et les révolutionnaires à Djoulfa sur la rive persane de l'Arax. Comme ce point est situé en face du village russe qui porte le même nom et auprès duquel se trouve la station de chemin de fer et les maisons de la douane russe, une bataille sur la rive persane présenterait un danger notable pour les habitants de cet endroit, qui n'est pas à l'abri de coups de feu partant du côté persan. Afin de parer à toute éventualité, les autorités militaires ont ordonné qu'un détachement se rende sur les lieux et soit campé dans le village russe en question.

L'Ambassade Impériale à Londres a été également informée de ce qui précède.

J'ai, &c.  
(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

[9763]

No. 423.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 146.)

*St. Petersburg, March 5, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE had two conversations with Rifaat Pasha since his arrival in St. Petersburg yesterday. His Excellency is awaiting the arrival of M. Auboyneau from Paris, who is expected to-day, and who will, it is to be hoped, assist Rifaat Pasha in formulating a concrete proposal for the liquidation of the war indemnity. M. Isvolsky is awaiting such a proposal before entering fully into the discussion. He has explained to Rifaat Pasha that he is desirous of effacing all memories of the war and of coming to a satisfactory arrangement, but that the arrangement must be one which does not entail a serious loss to the Russian Treasury, and also be one which he could justify before the Duma. Rifaat Pasha tells me that the Minister of Finance pays little heed to the opinion of the Duma so long as the arrangement is satisfactory from a financial

point of view. But M. Kokovtsoff is not a convinced Constitutionalist, and M. Isvolsky informs me that, as regards the financial side of the question, he and his colleague are of one mind. I have told M. Isvolsky that His Majesty's Government earnestly trust that an arrangement will be reached, and that the Turkish proposal offers a good solution. When the discussions have advanced a little further I will renew my recommendations. At present the first impressions which the two statesmen have conceived of each other are not very favourable. M. Isvolsky considers that Rifaat Pasha does not show as yet a conciliatory disposition, and is evidently distrustful of Russia. He thinks, further, that Rifaat Pasha has been influenced at Vienna against him. Rifaat Pasha, on the other hand, seems to consider that M. Isvolsky is inclined to drive a hard bargain, and is not really desirous of settling the matter. These are merely first impressions on either side, which may be dispelled. Rifaat Pasha is evidently impressed with the Austrian views as to Serbia, both as to the alleged provocations by the latter and her disinclination to renounce definitely her aspirations. This attitude on the part of Rifaat Pasha is intelligible, but as it does not immediately affect the question on which he is to treat with M. Isvolsky it is not of paramount importance.

M. Isvolsky informed me that he had stated to Rifaat Pasha that he was most anxious to establish a thoroughly stable understanding with Turkey, and also to secure peace in the Balkans. He thought therefore it would be of assistance to both the above objects if Turkey were to facilitate the desire of Serbia to obtain commercial access to the Adriatic by means of a railway. Rifaat Pasha replied that the question of a railway must be examined and decided solely from the point of view of the economic interests of Turkey, and without regard to any political interests of other countries. M. Isvolsky then observed that it was most desirable that the Turco-Persian frontier difficulty should be arranged, and that perhaps Turkey would be disposed to call in the good offices of Great Britain and Russia. Rifaat Pasha had replied that the frontier question would be settled on a legal basis, and that if the joint efforts of the two countries directly interested led to no results, the question of asking for the good offices of Great Britain and Russia might then be considered. M. Isvolsky remarked that Turkey and Persia had been endeavouring for fifty years to come to a settlement without success. He then let the matter drop.

M. Isvolsky said that the attitude assumed by Rifaat Pasha was stiff, and that he had hoped to find him more conciliatory.

Rifaat Pasha has asked me if I have given a help to the discussions as to the indemnity, and I have told him that I have, on behalf of my Government, expressed their hope that the Russian Government will see their way to settling the matter on the lines proposed by Turkey. I said that I trusted that he would be able to supply M. Isvolsky with some detailed suggestions on which he could work. He replied that he hoped to be able to do so very shortly.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[9765]

No. 424.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 128 of same date.]

(No. 149.)

*St. Petersburg, March 8, 1909.*

Sir,

I WROTE to M. Isvolsky to ask if he would kindly inform me of the exact object of the dispatch of a Cossack detachment to Resht and of the orders which would be given to them. I have the honour to transmit a copy of the reply which I have received from his Excellency.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.



Inclosure in No. 424.

*M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Saint-Petersbourg, le 22 février (7 mars), 1909.*  
 EN réponse à votre lettre du 21 courant et pour faire suite à ma lettre du 19 courant, je m'empresse de vous informer que la demi-sotnia de Cosaques, expédiée à Recht, constitue un renfort de l'escorte de notre Consulat dans cette ville et se conformera, en cette qualité, aux ordres qui lui seront donnés par le Consul en vue de protéger la vie et la propriété des sujets russes et autres étrangers à Recht et Enzeli. Il va sans dire que le Consul continuera à s'abstenir de toute intervention dans la lutte des révolutionnaires et des partisans du Schah dans ces parages.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,  
 (Signé) ISVOLSKY.

[9766]

No. 425.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 150.)

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 207 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have addressed to the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting various questions awaiting settlement in connection with the Persian telegraphs.

I have, &c.  
 (Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 425.

*Aide-mémoire.*

HIS Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the *aide-mémoire* of the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 16th (29th) January last respecting the various questions awaiting settlement in connection with the Persian telegraphs. As regards the wish expressed by the Russian Government that provision should be made for the employment of Russian signallers on the Arabistan lines in the event of the future development of Russian trade in the south making it desirable, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that this wish could be met by the conclusion of a Secret Agreement to the desired effect between the British and Russian Governments, while the proposed Agreement with the Persian Government should stipulate that, without the concurrence of the British Government, no others than Persian subjects and the members of the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department should be employed in the offices or on the lines of the system.

With regard to the Tehran-Khanikin line, it appears to His Majesty's Government that the exchange of the Memoranda of the 10th (23rd) June and 11th (24th) August, 1907, constitutes sufficient record of the Agreement arrived at between the British and Russian Governments. Should any further Agreement on the subject with the Imperial Government be necessary, it would be preferable that it should be deferred until the consent of the Persian Government has been obtained to the proposed Arrangement in regard to the Arabistan system.

*St. Petersburg, February 21  
 (March 6), 1909.*

[10015]

No. 426.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 149.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 15, 1909.*

OIL Syndicate. Payment of Bakhtiari guards.

Please see Mr. Marling's telegram of the 27th February, 1908, No. 59.



[10028]

No. 426\*.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)*

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bushire, March 15, 1909.*

SHEIKH of Mohammerah.

I have received orders to proceed without delay to Mohammerah with the object of reassuring the Sheikh. These orders would appear to be the result of Sir G. Barclay's telegram to the Foreign Office which was repeated to me as No. 32 on the 6th instant.

My intention was to go by mail steamer leaving on the 17th instant, the "Lawrence" not being available, but in the meantime His Majesty's Consul has communicated to me representations from the Sheikh of which following is substance. The Sheikh requests me to bring an authoritative reply on these points to Mohammerah as soon as possible:—

1. Can the Sheikh now make the proposed protest to the Persian Government concerning the reported Concession for the Karun irrigation? He is impatient of delay.

2. He complains, with reference to the guarantees which I conveyed to him from His Majesty's Government on the 1st December, 1908, of the wording of the penultimate and anti-penultimate paragraphs. He declares that they only safeguard him as long as Persia remains a Sovereign State. He wishes the guarantee to be extended in such a manner as would make it effective in the eventuality of Persia being occupied by foreign Powers or ceasing to be an independent State as a result of intervention. Above all, he desires to obtain an assurance to the effect that, provided he and his heirs and his tribesmen continue to show themselves amenable to British advice and faithful to British interests, their possessions shall be guaranteed to them.

3. He wishes us to advise him whether to side with the Nationalists or the Royalists, both of which parties are calling upon him in the name of the country to throw in his lot with them. Our having so far neglected or refused to advise him has caused him some annoyance. He declares that he must inevitably take one side or the other, and he is afraid that if he decided without our advice we might withdraw our guarantee, on the grounds that his decision was unsatisfactory to us.

4. Lastly, he repeats his former request for an advance of ready money, of which he has immediate need, for improvements. If we can do nothing for him, he says we must not object to his applying elsewhere for a loan.

I have just received following telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz, dated the 10th instant:—

"Affairs of Oil Syndicate.

"I have been approached, through the intermediary of the Syndicate's physician, by Sardar Mohtashen and Sardar Bahadur with the object of making arrangements whereby the management and payment of the guards should be taken over by the Syndicate to whom would be allotted for their expenses a part of money payable to the Khans in respect of guards. I have made arrangements for the Manager and the physician to go and see the Khans, as I am myself unable to do so, in order that an Agreement may be drawn up. I would point out the desirability of the Syndicate beginning to learn to stand on its own legs. For the time being the Khans are anxious to stand well with us, but I am inclined to doubt their ultimate sincerity as also the probability of an arrangement satisfactory from the financial point of view being made. I am further sceptical as to the Syndicate's practical competency to manage the guard.

"It is possible that Sardar Assad, whose arrival here from France is shortly expected, may determine the issue of the proposal.

"I thought it well to recall to the Manager that until assented to by all of the four original signatories no fresh Agreement can be regarded as final or technically valid, and that the Khans now conducting the negotiations must accept in writing the responsibility for temporarily disregarding this point.

"I have also received privately a request from Sardar Mohtashem that the British Government should guarantee the safety of his property and person. I have for the present contented myself with replying that note has been taken of his request. The demand is of course absurd."

I have sent the following reply to Captain Lorimer:—

"Your action as reported in your telegram No. 14 is approved.

"It is in my opinion desirable that Syndicate should realize that upon their own efforts will depend the success of the experiment, and that the prompt inception on a thorough and efficient basis of the new system would go far to diminish the risk of subsequent interference with the guards by the Khans. Syndicate would probably be grateful for your advice in this connection, but of course you would incur no responsibility in giving it.

"A telegram in this sense is being sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."

[9398]

No. 427.

*Foreign Office to Mr. J. R. Preece.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 15, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd ultimo, respecting the desire of your Syndicate to acquire a site on Abadan Island.

I am to inform you, in reply, that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been authorized, if he sees no objection, to instruct His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire to assist Mr. Reynolds, on his request, in regard to this matter.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[10068]

No. 428.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 16.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 15, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 11th instant, as to the erection of a second wire on the telegraph line from Tehran to Shahrud, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of Secretary Sir E. Grey to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to approach the Russian Government on the subject.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.



[10146]

No. 429.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)*

(No. 150.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 16, 1909.*

SITUATION at Resht.

Mr. Churchill, who has just arrived from Resht, states that Caucasians from Russia are continually arriving. On the steamer on which he came there were thirty.

The Tehran-Resht road for about 100 miles from Resht is controlled by about sixty of them.

[10157]

No. 430.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)*

(No. 151.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 16, 1909.*

BAR silver at Imperial Bank at Enzeli.

50,000*l.* worth of bar silver, the property of the Imperial Bank of Persia, is lying in the custom house at Enzeli. It cannot be conveyed to Tehran without running a serious risk of being seized by the revolutionaries. The bank is in need of this silver, with more which is to follow, in order to fulfil its engagements with the Mint here.

I would suggest that the bank should claim from the underwriters on the ground that the detention of the silver at Enzeli is in their interests, as I am doubtful whether loss of interest can properly be claimed from the Persian Government.

The Imperial Bank will communicate with you.

[10155]

No. 431.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)*

(No. 152.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 16, 1909.*

PERSIAN financial situation.

In view of the advanced state of the Anglo-Russian *pourparlers*, I venture, after studying M. Bizot's conclusions, to submit to you my opinion as to the financial requirements of the country.

No money should be given until an Assembly is working, and until the Departments which the money is designed to help, are assisted by a foreign element in their composition. This is of course on the assumption that His Majesty's Government are not concerned with the increased risk which the Shah runs owing to the troops being unpaid.

The reorganization of the finances, of the gendarmerie, and of the police, are the reforms most urgently needed.

The French Government have not replied to M. Bizot in regard to the Treasurer-General and the Inspector, but I trust that their appointment may not be delayed, so that they may already be at their posts when the Needjiss assembles. M. Bizot might, if necessary, draft instructions for the Treasurer-General at once.

The reorganization of the Financial Administration would only require a trifling advance, which, as soon as the Assembly has approved it, could be placed at the disposal of the Treasurer-General.

Without the help of foreign instructors there is little hope of reforming the gendarmerie, &c. It is to be hoped that the Assembly will not delay the appointment of such instructors, so that the two Governments would be warranted in making a further advance.

A loan of at least 2,500,000*l.* will eventually be needed in order to put the finances of the country on a sound basis. It should be employed for the conversion of the advances made by the two banks, for the payment of claims of holders of "havades" (orders for payment)—such claims to be submitted to the examination of a Commission with a European member—and possibly for the settlement of foreign claims filed by the Legations.

[10159]

No. 432.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)*

(No. 153.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 16, 1909.*

THE Shah and Constitution.

The Shah summoned M. Sabline yesterday to the Palace. His Majesty expressed his concern that our representations were being delayed. He appeared to hope that these would offer him a means of escaping from the difficult position in which he now is.

In reply to a request for advice which His Majesty made, M. Sabline said that if His Majesty agreed to a meeting of representatives of the different parties and classes in Tehran being convened to consider the situation—a proposal submitted to His Majesty by the Minister of Foreign Affairs—this would tend to relieve the present tension. His Majesty promised to consent to this suggestion.

I am informed by Saad-ed-Dowleh that he made this proposal to the Shah in the hope that an authoritative pronouncement in favour of a Constitution might be obtained from the meeting. If the composition of the meeting is not like that of the farical Council of December, and the Nationalists consent to attend, some useful results may be hoped for. Saad-ed-Dowleh tells me that he is alive to the importance of the composition of the meeting.

[10158]

No. 433.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)*

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 16, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

His Majesty's Consul-General Wratislaw telegraphs that the Royalists have occupied Persian Julfa. It is reported that the inhabitants have crossed into Russian territory.

[9547]

No. 434.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 93.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 16, 1909.*

STRESS is laid by Dutch Government, in connection with Karun irrigation scheme (see your despatch No. 9 of the 22nd January), of the ill-defined nature of the option with regard to a concession at Ahwaz which has been granted to their late Minister here, and they also say that any Dutch Syndicate which might receive Concessions from Persian Government for works in the vicinity of Karun River would receive a warning at once from them that, unless the support of His Majesty's Government is assured and the Sheikh of Mohammedali agrees to co-operate, no work could be undertaken.

[10321]

No. 435.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 103.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 16, 1909.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires spoke to me to-day about the state of Persia with much apprehension lest Russian intervention on the frontier might be forced.

He feared that an unfavourable impression might be produced by intervention, but as the brigands, acting under the orders of the Shah, were murdering women and children under the eyes of the Russians close to Julfa, it might be very difficult to avoid intervention.

I said that I realized the difficulty, but I was afraid Russian intervention might be construed as intervention on behalf of the Shah, under present circumstances. I feared that the Shah was still anxious to provoke Russian intervention, believing that it would be favourable to him. If only the Russian Government would impress upon the Shah that he had nothing to hope from Russian intervention,

[1629]



that if intervention took place it would be because the state of Persia showed that he and his Ministers were absolutely incapable of governing, and that the end of the intervention would be his dethronement and the appointment of a more capable Government, I believed he would proclaim the Constitution. If he did this, and summoned the Medjliss, there would be an immediate *détente* all over Persia.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires asked whether any representations had been made at Tehran.

I told him none had yet been made. I heard that M. Isvolsky was hesitating about subsidiary points, such as the conditions on which money should be lent and whether we should dictate to the Shah who his Ministers should be. Meanwhile, all representations were in suspense. I had suggested a way of meeting both these points. If Russia thought it both safe and essential she might lend her 200,000*l.* When an Assembly had met and consented to the whole loan of 400,000*l.* we could lend the other 200,000*l.*, our share. I did not recommend this course, but it was a possible one, if M. Isvolsky thought some immediate loan essential. With regard to the Shah's Ministers, I was averse to our designating them, as that would make us responsible for the Shah's Government. But we might attain our object by making it a condition of the loan that we should change his Ministers for others who would inspire confidence, and by telling him that until he did so we would not give him any money. He could then suggest his own list of Ministers and ask whether they fulfilled the necessary condition.

I gathered from M. Poklevski that he personally entirely agreed with these views.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

[10256]

No. 436.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)*

(No. 155.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 17, 1909.

SITUATION at Turbat-i-Haidari.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports troubles at Turbat-i-Haidari. The revolutionaries, headed by Beluchis, have killed the Deputy-Governor.

[10311]

No. 437.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)*

(No. 157.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 17, 1909.

SHEIKH of Mohammerah: Telegram No. 170 of the 15th instant from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.

As regards point 1 Major Cox should be able to satisfy the Sheikh of Mohammerah with the substance of your telegram No. 93 of the 16th instant, which I am repeating to him.

Point 3. We cannot, I presume, advise the Sheikh to rebel. Should he insist on having our advice we might tell him that as the situation will probably come to a head before long he had better take no action for the present.

Nos. 2 and 4. Major Cox suggests that should His Majesty's Government grant a loan to the Sheikh or extend the assurances already given him His Majesty's Government or the Oil Syndicate should take the opportunity of acquiring on easy terms the land on Abadan Island which the Syndicate requires as the Sheikh may otherwise demand an exorbitant price.

Unless the Sheikh specifies from what quarter he anticipates aggression I do not see, as regards point 2, how we can go beyond the general assurances given by Sir A. Hardinge and Major Cox. If the aggression which he fears is Turkish, Major Cox might inform him of the substance of your despatch No. 75 of the 25th February, 1908, to Constantinople (see Mr. Marling's despatch, No. 166 of the 11th July, 1908).

Referring to your telegram No. 91 of the 11th March, I have authorized Major Cox to assist negotiations for land on Abadan Island if the Syndicate drops the suggestion of their local Manager to negotiate through some firm in the hope of getting better terms and deals direct with the Sheikh.



[10321]

No. 439\*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 328.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1909*

SHAH and Constitution.

I had a conversation yesterday with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who expressed himself as apprehensive that, if the Royalist brigands at Julfa were to massacre women and children under the very eyes of the Russians, the intervention of Russia in the affairs of Persia might possibly become inevitable.

In reply, I expressed the fear that the Shah still desired to see the intervention of Russia, which would be considered to be in his favour. It was my firm conviction that His Majesty would lose no time in proclaiming a Constitution, the immediate result of which would be to alleviate the situation all over Persia, if once it was made clear to him by the Russian Government that intervention would not be of the slightest advantage to him, but would in all probability result in his being dethroned on account of his inability to govern his country.

Meanwhile, however, the joint representations at Tehran were suspended. Without recommending such a course, I had already proposed that if, in the opinion of M. Isvolsky, it was safe and if circumstances rendered it absolutely necessary, the Russian advance of 200,000*l.* could be made at once, and that our share of the advance should be made subsequently when the whole loan had been sanctioned by an Assembly. In regard to the designation of the Shah's Ministers, I was adverse to incurring the responsibility which such a course would involve; but it would be possible to make the loan conditional upon a change of Ministry, and the nomination of Ministers in whom confidence could be reposed. We could decide whether the condition had been satisfactorily carried out after learning whom the Shah had selected as his new Ministers.

[10069]

No. 438.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 323.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1909.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 137 [of the 8th March: Persian telegraphs]: Arabistan line.

You should ascertain whether Russian Government would agree if assured as proposed in last paragraph.

[10068]

No. 439.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 326.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1909.*

PERSIAN telegraphs.

Please refer to telegram No. 143 of the 9th instant from Tehran and my despatch No. 28 of the 20th January.

The situation should be made clear to the Russian Government, and you should ask them whether it is their desire that the preliminary work in the construction of a second telegraph line to Sharna should be undertaken by the Indo-European Department.

[10069]

No. 440.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 137 [of the 8th March: Persian telegraphs]: Arabistan.

We are consulting Russian Government on the subject.

[9547]

No. 441.

*Sir Edward Grey to the Dutch Minister.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which you were so good as to address to me on the 11th instant, to the effect that, if the Persian Government granted a Concession for works on the Karun River to a Dutch Syndicate, which has not been formed as yet, the Netherland Government would not fail to point out that it could undertake nothing without having secured the support of the British Government and of the co-operation of the Sheikh of Mohammerah. I have to thank you for this communication.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

[9666]

No. 442.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 32.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 10 of the 22nd January, transmitting copy of an amended note which you had received from Saad-ed-Dowleh on the subject of the Bahrein claim, I have to inform you that your action in accepting the arrangement reported in your above-mentioned despatch is approved.

At the same time you should impress upon the Persian Government that His



Majesty's Government cannot consider this arrangement as final, that they maintain their original attitude on the subject, and that they will be guided entirely by their own views of the position should any action of the Persian authorities make it necessary.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GREY.

[10440] No. 443.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 158.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, March 18, 1909.*

SITUATION at Bunder Abbas.

In a telegram No. 43/192 dated yesterday, His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that under pressure from the Mujtehids of Najaf and Seyyids of Laristan the Nationalists at Bunder Abbas have assumed control of the Government, and have taken over the Customs. I have requested the senior naval officer to send a ship of war to Bunder Abbas for the protection of British interests. Major Cox thinks it probable that a Nationalist movement of a similar nature will follow at Bushire and other Gulf ports.

[10441] No. 444.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 159.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, March 18, 1909.*

SITUATION in the Persian Gulf.

Following telegram No. 50 sent to His Majesty's Consul-General, Bushire.

Referring to your telegram No. 43/192 of yesterday's date you should countermand the gunboat sending further instructions unless you have good reason to believe that there is danger to British subjects.

Foreign subjects have hitherto been scrupulously respected by the Nationalists.

Russian subjects in the north have long been exposed to similar risks, and anything like interference by us in the south is, if possible, to be avoided, as it would give Russia a pretext for intervention in those parts where her interests are most affected.

[10443] No. 445.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 160.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, March 18, 1909.*

SITUATION in Tehran.

Following telegram No. 51 sent to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire in reply to an inquiry from him:—

"There is great discontent and some anxiety in Tehran, and the bazaars have been closed for more than a month. So far the Shah's authority is maintained and there are no fresh developments.

"Defection of the Shah's troops or help to the Nationalists from outside seem the only things which might cause an outbreak.

"The Russian Chargé d'Affaires and I hope shortly to make further representations under instructions from our Governments to the Persian Government with a view to constitutional government being restored.

"It is hoped that the Shah will yield to our representations."

[10445] No. 446.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 161.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, March 18, 1909.*

SITUATION at Bunder Abbas.

Telegraphing to-day (telegram No. 48/200) His Majesty's Consul-General at

[10476]

No. 442\*.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 152.)  
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburg, March 18, 1909.*

PERSIA.

Following is a summary of Memorandum which I received from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs dealing with observations of His Majesty's Government on the eight points which he formerly communicated:—

Point 1. Russian Government agree in principle to removal of the Amir from all functions, but if the Shah presses very hard they think that two Governments should be content to have him removed from posts of Minister of War and Member of Council. They think that his influence, and even that of the Shah himself, would be limited under a reformed Cabinet. Russian Government think that it would be more prudent not to ask for the removal of the Sheikh from Tehran.

Point 3. Russian Government still consider that it would be risky to leave to the Shah exclusively choice of members of the Cabinet. They think that it would be extremely desirable, without expressly recommending to Shah members of his future Cabinet, to influence His Majesty in his choice as far as can be done without encroaching on his supreme power and his free judgment. It might therefore be stated: "the constitution of a Cabinet composed of persons who will be suggested to him by the Legations of Great Britain and Russia."

Point 4. Russian Government think that composition of Council is as important as that of the Cabinet. They maintain their view that the members should be recommended to the Shah in the form of friendly advice, and that there should be no express condition that the recommendations are only given at the Shah's request.

Point 5. Amnesty to include only those who have taken up arms against Shah and who have committed political crimes, and not to extend to those who have committed offences against common law. As regards these, and those who have committed acts of brigandage, guarantees to be obtained from Persian Government that they should have an impartial trial.

Point 7. Russian Government will make their share of advance when the Shah has carried out measures indicated in Points 1 to 6.

Point 8. Russian Government drop it.

I will send copy of Memorandum by post.  
(Sent to Tehran.)



Bushire reports that he learns from His Majesty's Consul that His Majesty's ship arrived yesterday at Bunder Abbas.

The Nationalists gave the Belgian Customs Director the choice of staying in the Nationalist service and handing over the receipts to the Nationalists or of leaving the place. Customs Director thereupon withdrew. Everybody is armed and armed bands from the interior continue to arrive. The Nationalist Governor is maintaining order effectively at present.

[10446]

No. 447.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 162.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 18, 1909.

SITUATION at Bunder Abbas.

Following telegram No. 52 sent to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire with reference to his telegram No. 48/200 of the 17th March.

The gun-boat should only stay at Bunder Abbas if His Majesty's Consul considers that British subjects are in danger.

Bluejackets will, of course, only be landed in case of extreme necessity.

[10448]

No. 448.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 164.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 18, 1909.

SHEIKH of Mohammerah.

Please refer to my telegram No. 157 of yesterday.

Following received in regard to point 3 from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire telegraphing yesterday, No. 46/198.

"The position of the Sheikh will become still more anxious and difficult as soon as news arrives at Mohammerah of to-day's events at Bunder Abbas. Would it not be possible to give him a hint as to his cause of action?"

In a further telegram, No. 47/199 of to-day, Major Cox says as regards point 2:—

"There is no doubt that the Sheikh's mind would be relieved were we to give him an assurance that, without his consent, we would not, in any circumstances, ourselves change his status. Further, that so long as he fulfilled his obligations toward us, any attempt to do so on the part of another Power would be opposed by us."

[10477]

No. 449.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 165.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 18, 1909.

SITUATION at Bunder Abbas.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, in a telegram, No. 44/193 of yesterday reports that the Karguzar of Bunder Abbas has been elected Governor by the Nationalists. Major Cox presumes that *de facto* Governor should be recognized by His Majesty's Consul pending instructions, and British traders clearing merchandize from the custom-house should pay duty to those in a position to enforce it.

[10478]

No. 450.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 166.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 18, 1909.*

SITUATION in the Gulf.

I have received following telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"In view of to-day's news from Bunder Abbas I have discussed with my Russian colleague the situation here. The populace have hitherto hesitated to follow the dictates of Nationalist Mullahs, but they will now probably follow the lead given them by the Nationalists at Bunder Abbas. The Governor is a nonentity and is at present absent. The garrison consists of 200 Persian soldiers from Ispahan, and it is not to be expected that they will give the Customs Department or the local authorities any serious support against the National Party. In view of possibility of general lawlessness we consider that it would be prudent to have a ship here or within easy call to protect our interests, though at present there is no reason to apprehend deliberate molestation of foreigners.

"You will no doubt consider whether any special measures are desirable in view of fact that Bushire Customs receipts are at present pledged to us."

I doubt whether a gun-boat is required judging from the behaviour of the Nationalists elsewhere. But as the situation is quiet at Bushire, and especially as the Russian Consul has agreed to its desirability the arrival of a gun-boat there does not present the same objections as at Bunder Abbas.

Indian Government has been informed.

I have not replied to Major Cox.

[10479]

No. 451.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 167.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 18, 1909.*

SITUATION at Bunder Abbas.

I have sent the following telegram No. 53 to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire in reply to his telegram No. 193:—

"His Majesty's Consul is already in relations with *de facto* Governor at Karguzar. He can deal with him therefore, but there should be no official recognition."

The Nationalists should be informed by His Majesty's Consul that the Customs receipts of the Gulf are pledged to His Majesty's Government, and they should be asked to pay over the revenues of Bunder Abbas custom-house to the Consulate, who will see that they are used for the payment of interest on the British loan exclusively. It might be pointed out that when the Nationalists of Tabreez learned that the Customs receipts there were pledged to Russia they did not interfere with them.

I am informing the Persian Government that I am claiming the proceeds of the Customs on account of interest on our loan and I shall consider duties paid by British merchants to the Nationalists as fully acquitted.

[10488]

No. 452.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bushire, March 18, 1909.*

SITUATION at Bunder Abbas.

The instructions contained in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 52 to me (see his telegram No. 162 of to-day to Foreign Office) will be carried out.

The request for the dispatch of a gun-boat to Bunder Abbas was made in consequence of an urgent application received from His Majesty's Consul, who believed that an outbreak likely to endanger the lives and properties of British subjects was imminent.

[10540]

No. 453.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 19.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 17th instant, relative to the Robat garrison.

*India Office, March 19, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 453.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*March 17, 1909.*

GARRISON at Robat (see your telegram of the 6th January).

We are prepared, on reconsideration, to agree to double company at Robat being withdrawn, without Seistan Consular escort being increased. Accordingly, at the close of the current arms traffic season (see correspondence ending with your telegram of the 15th January), detachment will be withdrawn. As a reservation, we desire to add that it will not be possible to furnish from the present Seistan escort the additional men required for escort duty at Birjand, should a Consulate or Vice-Consulate hereafter be established at the latter place (see correspondence ending with India Office letter of the 7th November, 1907, to Foreign Office).

[10619]

No. 454.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)*

(No. 155.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*St. Petersburg, March 19, 1909.*

SITUATION in Persia.

It would be opportune, in M. Isvolsky's opinion, if the Representatives at Tehran, in making the proposals to the Shah, were to take the opportunity of suggesting that Nasr-ul-Mulk, who is now in Paris, should be recalled to Tehran.

M. Isvolsky in a private letter puts the amount of the Russian share of the advance at 100,000*l.* I was under the impression that 200,000*l.* was the amount of the Russian share, but the smaller the sum advanced the better it will be, and so I have made no remark. It is possible that, in stating the figure, the expenses of the Cossack brigade may have been deducted (see my despatch No. 262 of the 15th May, 1907), though I notice that 100,000*l.* is given in that despatch as the amount of the Russian share.

[10605]

No. 455.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)*

(No. 168. Very Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 19, 1909.*

REPORTS in "Novoye Vremya."

Colonel Liakhoff is, I gather from M. Sabline, largely responsible for the very alarmist news regarding the situation in Tehran which has been appearing in the "Novoye Vremya."



[10699]

No. 456.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)*

(No. 169.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 19, 1909.

ACCIDENT to the Shah.

By the accidental discharge of his own revolver, His Majesty was slightly wounded in the hand yesterday.

[10619]

No. 457.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 361.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 19, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK.

Please refer to the first paragraph of your telegram No. 155 of to-day's date. I agree that the recall of Nasr-ul-Mulk to Persia is advisable.

[10479]

No. 458.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 19, 1909.

I APPROVE your instructions to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, as reported in your telegrams Nos. 159, 162, and 167 of the 18th instant.

[10015]

No. 459.

*Foreign Office to Mr. J. R. Preece.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 19, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz has telegraphed as follows in regard to your Syndicate taking over the management and payment of the proposed Bakhtiari guards to their Concession in Persia.

Sirdar Mohtasham and Sirdar Bahadur have approached him through the Syndicate's doctor with a view to arranging for the Syndicate to take over management and payment of the guards, a portion of the guard money payable to the Khans being allotted to the Syndicate for a loan. Captain Lorimer being unable to do so, he has arranged for the Manager and doctor to visit the Khans with a view to drawing up an Agreement. Captain Lorimer questions the ultimate sincerity of the Khans, who seem to be temporarily desirous of British good-will, and also the likelihood of satisfactory final arrangement; moreover, he doubts whether the Syndicate will be able to undertake the management of the guard.

The issue of the proposal probably may be determined by the Sirdar Assad, who is expected on the spot shortly from France.

Captain Lorimer has reminded the Manager that no arrangement can be considered final or technically valid until assented to by all the four original signatories, and that responsibility for temporarily disregarding this fact must be accepted in writing by the Khans now negotiating.

His Majesty's Minister has approved the action taken by Captain Lorimer, and expressed the hope that the Syndicate will understand that the success of the experiment would depend on their own efforts, and that the risk of Khans subsequently interfering with the guards would be greatly diminished if the new system be promptly introduced on a thoroughly efficient basis, in regard to which the Syndicate would probably be glad of Captain Lorimer's advice, in giving which he would of course incur no responsibility.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[9547]

No. 460.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 19, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 17th ultimo, respecting the report that a two years' option for the Concession for the Karun irrigation had been given to a Dutch Syndicate, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit herewith, to be laid before Viscount Morley, copy of a note from the Netherland Minister on the subject.\*

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the note may be considered as fairly satisfactory, and I am to request that he may be favoured with Lord Morley's views on the matter.

I am to take this opportunity to inclose a copy of a telegram which has been addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and repeated to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.†

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[10698]

No. 461.

*The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)*

Dear Mr. Mallet,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, March 19, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter to me of the 15th instant, the Concessions Syndicate write to the Bank to-day stating that Mr. Reynolds, the agent of the Syndicate in Persia, will be glad if Messrs. Gray, Paul, & Co., in Bushire, will act as purchasers of the land on Abadan Island, and we have communicated with Messrs. Gray, Dawes, & Co. on the subject. Sir George Mackenzie promised that his firm would be pleased to do anything to assist the Syndicate, and I think this arrangement will be more satisfactory, as the Bank could not, under the terms of its Concession, allow the land to be purchased in its name. I hope this will be agreeable to you.

Yours, &amp;c.

(Signed) T. JACKSON.

[10754]

No. 462.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 20, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire: My telegram No. 166 of the 18th instant.

Following telegram No. 52/215 received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.

"Referring to your telegram No. 54 of the 18th, I think that for the present it will suffice if the squadron in the Gulf is kept at sufficient strength to enable a ship to come up from Muskat or Mekran after filling up with coal if the outlook becomes more serious; the stock of coal at Bushire is practically exhausted, but more is on the way."

[10764]

No. 463.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 171.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 20, 1909.

SHEIKH of Mohammerah: Sir F. Bertie's telegram of the 3rd instant, and your telegram No. 98 of yesterday.

It may be expected that Sirdar Assad, who must now be arriving at Mohammerah, will press the Sheikh to lend assistance to the cause of the Nationalists.

\* No. 398.

† No. 434.

[10770]

No. 464.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 172.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 20, 1909.

SHAH and Constitution: Telegram No. 152 of the 18th instant from Sir A. Nicolson to you.

I adhere to the view which I expressed in my telegram No. 152 of the 16th instant, as to how we can most usefully assist Persia financially.

Time presses, however, and in order to prevent, if possible, bloodshed at Tabreez, I submit that, as the Russian Government will not yield, it would benefit the country more if His Majesty's Government joined them subject to the condition which I indicated in my telegram No. 119 of the 25th February than if the money without that condition were advanced by Russia alone. The latter course would leave His Majesty's Government very little voice in the manner in which the money was used and the effect of our joint representations would be much weakened by the contemplated divergence of action.

It would mitigate the objection to an advance being made before it was approved by the Assembly if the advance could also be made conditional not only on our approving of the personnel of the new Government but also on Nasr-ul-Mulk being appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (see Sir A. Nicolson's telegram to you, No. 17 of the 17th January.)

Neither Power will, I presume, make an advance in any case until a reconciliation has been effected between the Shah and his people. It is quite possible that the fulfilment of the conditions 1 to 6 will not pacify the rebellious provinces in view of the length to which things have gone.

In regard to points 3 and 4 I concur with M. Isvolsky.

The decision of the Russian Government in regard to Sheikh Zazlulla and Emir Jang is to be regretted, but it is not worth while fighting the point.

[10478]

No. 465.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 363.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 20, 1909.

DISTURBANCES in Persian Gulf.

On receipt of telegram No. 166 of the 18th instant from Tehran, I asked the Admiralty that a gun-boat might be sent to Bushire with instructions, in the event of disturbances arising, to give protection to all foreigners. I have also requested that similar instructions may be sent to the gun-boat at Bunder Abbas.

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs should be informed of above.

[10478]

No. 466.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 20, 1909.

DISTURBANCES in Persian Gulf. With reference to your telegram No. 100 of the 18th instant.

I have asked the Admiralty that a gun-boat may be sent to Bushire with instructions, in the event of disturbances arising, to give protection to all foreigners. I have also requested that similar instructions may be sent to the gun-boat at Bunder Abbas.

[10776]

No. 467.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 21, 1909.

SHAH and Constitution: My telegram No. 172 of yesterday.

I omitted to comment on point 5, as regards which I concur with the Resident Governor.

In regard to point 3, I consider that the choice of members to form the Cabinet is an important factor in the work of bringing about a reconciliation between the Shah and his people. The present situation will be prolonged if the Shah appoints men who will not make for reconciliation; this he is sure to do if we have no voice in the matter beyond that indicated in the formula of His Majesty's Government. To let the Shah know whom he should appoint is only giving him a fair chance, and our suggestions might be made quite privately. It should at any rate be made quite clear to him that the appointment of Nasr-el-Mulk is a *sine quâ non* of financial assistance from either Power. Nasr-ul-Mulk would, I believe, be willing to take office if he received a hint from us.

[10777]

No. 468.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 175.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 21, 1909.

SARDAR ASSAD: My telegram No. 171 of yesterday.

Sardar Assad's arrival at Mohammerah is reported by His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire. It is said that he is endeavouring to stir up the Nationalists to take action.

[10778]

No. 469.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)*

(No. 176.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 21, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

I have sent, together with the substance of your telegram No. 100 of yesterday, the following telegram No. 60 to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"The Secretary of State has approved the instructions sent to you in my telegrams Nos. 50 and 52. I presume these ships have been placed at your disposal subject to them."

[10935]

No. 470.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)*

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 152 of March 18.]

(No. 172.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, March 18, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 152 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Memorandum which I have received from the Russian Government on the subject of proposed joint action at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 471.

*Aide-mémoire.*

L'ÉTUDE détaillée de l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade britannique du 13 (26) février, année courante, au sujet d'un plan d'action commune de la Russie et de l'Angleterre en Perse, suggère au Gouvernement Impérial les considérations suivantes:—

Ad p. 1. Dans ses contre-propositions le Gouvernement britannique émet l'opinion que, d'une part, il ne faut pas permettre que l'Émir Bohadour Djeng conserve des fonctions quelconques dans le Palais du Schah après sa démission, et que, d'autre part, il est désirable de conseiller à Sa Majesté d'éloigner le Scheikh Fazl-oullah de Téhéran. En ce qui concerne la première de ces deux personnes, le Gouvernement russe n'a



pas, en principe d'objections à la proposition anglaise, mais il prévoit une forte opposition de la part du Schah, qui a toujours été particulièrement bienveillant envers l'Émir et qui l'honore de sa confiance personnelle illimitée. Lorsque le Medjliss et les Enjoumens exigeaient du Schah la démission de Bohadour Djeng, ils se heurtaient invariablement à un refus catégorique de la part de Sa Majesté. Il est plus que probable qu'actuellement aussi Mohammed Ali ne consentira pas à se séparer complètement de ce serviteur dévoué, que les instances des deux Gouvernements ne seront point couronnées de succès et que tout leur plan de réformes extrêmement urgent échouera. Or, le Gouvernement russe est d'avis que, du moment où l'Émir n'occupera plus les postes de Ministre de la Guerre et de membre du Conseil, il sera privé de la possibilité d'exercer son influence défavorable sur l'action réformatrice, d'autant plus que le travail des réformes se trouvera dans les mains d'un nouveau Cabinet et que l'influence que le Schah lui-même pourra avoir sur la marche de ce travail sera considérablement limitée. Dans ces conditions le Gouvernement russe estime qu'en cas d'opposition énergique de la part du Schah, la Russie et l'Angleterre pourraient se borner à exiger la démission de l'Émir Bohadour Djeng en qualité de Ministre de la Guerre et de membre du Conseil, sans demander qu'il soit absolument éloigné de la Cour.

Quant au Scheikh Fazl-oullah, il est à noter que ce Moudjtéhid jouit d'une grande influence, non seulement dans les cercles conservateurs, mais aussi parmi les éléments modérés de la population, dont la collaboration est indispensable au succès des réformes projetées. Des démarches quelconques des deux Gouvernements dirigées contre ce Scheikh pourraient provoquer le mécontentement des masses populaires, surtout à Téhéran, où il a de nombreux adeptes parmi les oullabs, ou étudiants, des écoles religieuses. En conséquence, le Gouvernement Impérial pense qu'il serait plus prudent de ne pas toucher à la personne du Scheikh Fazl-oullah, d'autant plus qu'il n'occupe aucune position officielle dont on pourrait le priver.

*Ad p. 3.* Le Cabinet de Londres objecte que le fait de recommander au Schah les personnes dont un nouveau Cabinet doit être constitué serait équivalent à une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du pays. Le Gouvernement Impérial apprécie à sa juste valeur l'importance de cette objection. Néanmoins, il serait fort risqué d'abandonner à l'appréciation exclusive du Schah le choix des membres d'un Cabinet appelé à un travail aussi sérieux que celui qu'en attendent la Russie et l'Angleterre. En outre, il faut prendre en considération que plusieurs personnes qu'il est désirable de voir participer au nouveau Cabinet ne consentiront à assumer cette tâche ardue que si elles se sentent soutenues par ces deux Puissances. Le Gouvernement Impérial continue à penser dès lors qu'il est extrêmement désirable, sans expressément recommander au Schah les membres du futur Cabinet, d'influer sur Sa Majesté dans le choix de ces membres, autant que cela pourra se faire sans porter atteinte à son pouvoir suprême et son libre jugement.

Dans ce but le p. 3 de nos propositions du 6 février pourrait être rédigé comme suit :—

"La constitution d'un Cabinet composé de personnes qui lui seraient suggérées par les Légations de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne."

*Ad p. 4.* Le Cabinet de Londres consent à recommander au Schah quelques personnalités éclairées qui entreraient dans le Conseil de l'Empire, mais à condition que cette recommandation soit donnée sur une demande expresse de Mohammed Ali. Le Gouvernement russe considère, de son côté, qu'il n'y a pas lieu à espérer que le Schah nomme de son propre gré un nombre suffisant de constitutionnalistes au Conseil de l'Empire. D'autre part le choix de personnes qui entreraient dans cette institution a une importance tout aussi grande que le choix des membres du Cabinet, car ce Conseil ne pourra jouir d'une autorité suffisante aux yeux de la population qu'à la condition que des personnalités marquantes du groupe constitutionnaliste en fassent partie. Ces considérations portent le Gouvernement Impérial à croire qu'il serait nécessaire tout de même d'adopter dans cette question le mode d'agir indiqué au p. 3, tout en revêtant les recommandations des personnes dont il s'agit dans une forme de conseils amicaux à donner au Schah, mais sans y mettre la condition expresse d'une demande formelle de sa part à ce sujet.

*Ad p. 5.* Il va de soi que l'amnistie que les deux Gouvernements conseilleraient au Schah de proclamer comprendra tous ceux qui ont pris les armes contre lui et se sont rendus coupables de crimes politiques; cette mesure ne s'étendra pas, bien entendu, à ceux des révolutionnaires qui ont commis en outre des crimes de droit commun. Quant aux individus convaincus de brigandage et à d'autres malfaiteurs qui auraient commis des crimes de droit commun en abusant du mouvement constitutionnaliste, il

suffirait d'obtenir du Gouvernement de Schah la garantie de ce qu'aucune peine ne leur sera infligée autrement que par jugement d'un Tribunal impartial, ainsi que cela a été fait en son temps par rapport aux personnes qui avaient pris "best" dans la Légation d'Angleterre à Téhéran.

*Ad p. 7.* Afin de concilier les points de vue des Gouvernements russe et britannique sur la question du moment quand une avance de 5,000,000 de francs pourrait être mise à la disposition du Gouvernement persan, le Gouvernement Impérial serait prêt, de son côté, à verser au Gouvernement persan sa part de l'avance en question aussitôt que les mesures préparatoires exposées aux pp. 1 à 6 du programme auront été prises par le Schah. Quant au Gouvernement britannique, il se réservait de verser sa part de l'avance susmentionnée lorsque le Schah aura rempli la totalité des conditions indiquées au p. 7 de l'aide-mémoire britannique.

*Ad p. 8.* Le Gouvernement Impérial n'insiste pas sur l'introduction dans le programme d'un point spécial concernant le Trésorier-Général français et ses deux adjoints, vu que de fait le Gouvernement persan a déjà pris des mesures pour mettre à exécution le désir qu'il avait formulé spontanément à ce sujet.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 4 (17) mars, 1909.*

[11051]

No. 471.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction by Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of the papers relative to the appointment of Major Redl as Military Attaché at Meshed.

*India Office, March 20, 1909.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 471.

*Major Redl to India Office.*

Sir,

16, *Charing Cross, London, March 2, 1909.*

WITH reference to my appointment as Military Attaché at Meshed, I have the honour to bring to your notice the fact that Military Attachés are usually granted one step of "local" rank. I am aware that the Meshed appointment is not technically on all fours with that of a Military Attaché to an Embassy or Legation; at the same time, from previous experience when officiating as Military Attaché at Meshed, I venture to think that such a step of local rank would materially facilitate one's relations both with the Persian officials and representatives of foreign Consulates.

The present situation is also to this extent anomalous that the Vice-Consul at Meshed and the Military Attaché at Tehran, both Captains many years junior in army rank to either the present Military Attaché at Meshed or myself, rank as Majors, the one in virtue of his vice-consulship, and the other as a local Major, from the dates of their respective appointments, and are therefore senior to any substantive Major promoted subsequently to these dates.

As such local rank carries no increment of pay, I have the honour to request that it may be sanctioned in the present instance.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

E. A. F. REDL, Major,

113th Infantry, Indian Army.

[1629]

3 R

Inclosure 2 in No. 471.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, March 11, 1909.*

YOUR appointment of Major Redl to Meshed Consulate to discharge duties of Military Attaché should be officially reported. Technically, he will not be Military Attaché (see my despatch of the 18th December, 1908). I shall be glad to have your views as to grant to Redl of step of local rank for which he asks. Please reply early by telegraph.

[11052]

No. 472.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 17th instant, relative to the oil guard at Ahwaz.

*India Office, March 20, 1909.*

Inclosure in No. 472.

*Viscount Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*India Office, March 17, 1909.*

FOREIGN Office report that half charges of oil guard at Ahwaz are accepted by Treasury, as proposed in last paragraph of letter of 1st ultimo from Foreign Office to Treasury, forwarded with letter of 26th ultimo from Secretary, Political Department, India Office. You may therefore issue pay, as proposed in your Foreign Department letter of the 8th October, to Lieutenants Wilson and Ranking.

[10956]

No. 473.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 179.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 22, 1909.*

SITUATION at Julfa: Your telegram No. 97 of the 17th instant.

According to a telegram from his Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, Julfa is still held by the Nationalists, but the Royalist troops have pillaged and burnt all the villages in the neighbourhood. It is reported that owing to the refusal of the Russians to grant asylum, 1,000 persons, the majority women and children, have taken refuge on an island in the river. If the water rises their position will be precarious.

[10957]

No. 474.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 180.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 22, 1909.*

RUSSIAN Consular guard at Resht.

According to a telegram from the Acting British Vice-Consul at Resht, the Russian Cossacks for the reinforcement of the Consular guard have arrived.

[11048]

No. 472\*.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Admiralty, March 22, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 22nd instant which has been sent in cypher to the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, relative to possible disturbances at Bushire.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 472\*.

*Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Sir G. Warrender.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Admiralty, March 22, 1909.*

IN the event of the situation at Bushire becoming unsettled, the dispatch of a vessel to that port has been requested by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with a view to protecting all foreigners there. Unless, however, it is unavoidable, the landing of men should not be allowed, it being borne in mind that any suggestion of intervention is undesirable. You are to take the necessary steps, and should a ship have to be kept also at Bunder Abbas corresponding directions should be issued to her.



[11037]

No. 475.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 181.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 22, 1909.*

PERSIAN Minister to London.

I have been asked by the Persian Government whether Momtaz-ul-Mulk would be acceptable as Persian Minister to London. He is a brother of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and is Minister at Washington.

I believe that Momtaz-ul-Mulk is respected at Washington, and I hear nothing but good of him here.

Saad-ed-Dowleh tells me that he would send him his credentials to Washington, and that he would return to Tehran for a month or two after presenting them in London.

[11040]

No. 476.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 182.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 22, 1909.*

SITUATION at Julfa: My telegram No. 179 of to-day's date.

On the ground of humanity M. Sabline and I are addressing a strong note to the Persian Government urging that direct and precise orders may be sent by the Shah to Rahim Khan to desist from making war by these uncivilized methods.

[11070]

No. 477.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 183.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 22, 1909.*

SARDAR ASSAD: My telegram No. 171 of the 20th instant.

His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, in a telegram dated to-day, reports that Sardar Assad has arrived at Mohammerah. He proposes, unless a Constitution is granted, to join Samsam-es-Sultaneh and march upon Tehran. He is endeavouring to extract a declaration in favour of the Constitution from the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who is, however, anxious to avoid an explicit announcement.

Major Cox has reported to me by telegraph that he intended to leave Bushire on the 21st instant to visit the Sheikh.

[11135]

No. 478.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 23, 1909.*

ACCIDENT to the Shah: My telegram No. 169 of the 19th instant.

The Emperor has commanded the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to express to the Shah His Majesty's condolences, though the injury is of a most trivial nature.

I think that in present circumstances nothing more is required than the enquiries after His Majesty's health demanded by bare courtesy, which I duly made.

Should, however, the King desire that any message should be sent from His Majesty it should be one of congratulation that the wound was not more serious.

[11181]

No. 479.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)*

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 23, 1909.*

SITUATION at Bushire.

I have received the following telegram No. 60/234 from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bushire:—

"To-day Seyyid Murtaga Abrenir peacefully took over, on behalf of the Nationalists' control of the Government. He had with this purpose introduced into the town a number of riflemen from Tangistan. The question of taking over the customs is being discussed, but, so far, they have not been interfered with. I am informing Seyyid that they are pledged to us. The Governor is still absent. The principal local officials have resigned."

Our interest will probably be paid more regularly by the Nationalists than by the officials of the Government, and I have therefore told Captain Trevor privately and confidentially that I have no objection to their taking over the customs on condition that the Imperial Bank receives our monthly instalment regularly. This instalment I have stated to be 40,000 tomans, so as to cover interest on our Government loans.

[11037]

No. 480.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce.*

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 23, 1909.*

THE Persian Government have inquired whether we should be disposed to accept nomination of their Minister at Washington to be Persian Minister here.

I understand from your despatch No. 83 of the 6th instant that he does not enjoy a very high reputation, but I should like to know whether it is sufficiently bad to render it inadvisable for us to accept his nomination to London.

[10698]

No. 481.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 23, 1909.*

PURCHASE of a site on Abadan Island for the Oil Syndicate.

Reference is to last paragraph of your telegram No. 157 of the 17th instant.

It is the desire of the Oil Syndicate that Gray, Dawes, and Co. should act as purchasers of the site of land. Of what nature is the objection to the nominal purchase being effected through the intermediary of a third party?

[11181]

No. 482.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 23, 1909.*

SITUATION in Bushire.

Your action as reported in your telegram No. 185 of to-day's date is approved. But would it not be more prudent, in view of possible objections being raised, that it should be left more to the discretion of the Consuls whether to demand the whole of the customs at Bunder Abbas, and a higher sum than 30,000 tomans at Bushire?

[7332]

No. 483.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 23, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th ultimo inclosing correspondence on the subject of the extension of wireless telegraphy in the Persian Gulf.

With reference to the ante-penultimate and penultimate paragraphs of the inclosure in Major Cox's despatch, I am to state that the figures officially furnished to this Department bear out Mr. Aker's statement as to the cost of the installation at Zanzibar, which is quite successful.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[11338]

No. 484.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)*

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 24, 1909.*

SITUATION in the Persian Gulf.

According to reports from His Majesty's Consuls at Bushire and Bunder Abbas, order is being well maintained.

[11339]

No. 485.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)*

(No. 187.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 24, 1909.*

LAND on Abadan Island. Your telegram No. 102 of yesterday's date.

Land purchased by a British firm for the use of another British Company would hardly come under Article 5 of the Treaty of Turcomanchai.

I doubt whether, apart from this, the Syndicate would benefit by conducting the negotiations as proposed. When the Sheikh of Mohammerah discovered that the Syndicate had used another firm as a stalking-horse for the sake of getting better terms he would certainly resent it.

I entirely concur in the reply which Major Cox has already made that he could not identify himself with a secret or indirect purchase.

[11348]

No. 486.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)*

(No. 189.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 24, 1909.*

BUSHIRE and Bunder Abbas customs. Your telegram No. 105 of yesterday's date.

Apart from the interest on the loan of His Majesty's Government, the last four months' instalments of 13,000 tomans each are overdue (see my despatch No. 326 of the 30th December, 1908), the Bushire receipts having been lately absorbed for Ain-ed-Dowleh's robberies. We therefore want as much as we can get.

His Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas, whom I have already authorized to get the best terms he can, will probably obtain half the receipts. The telegram I sent to Major Cox was private. Officially I have explained our requirements, and have left it to his discretion how far he can go in demanding their fulfilment.



[11352]

No. 487.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)*

(No. 190.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 24, 1909.*

SHAH and Constitution. My telegram No. 153 of the 16th instant.

It is clear that the Shah is as insincere as ever from the composition of the meeting proposed by His Majesty. It will without doubt pronounce against a Constitution if it is ever held.

Saad-ed-Dowleh says he will not attend the meeting. He is much discouraged.

My Russian colleague and I have presented a joint note in which we express our disapproval of the selection made of persons invited to attend.

[11361]

No. 488.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)*

(No. 191.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 24, 1909.*

MURDER of bastis at Shah Abdul Azim.

Some of the Shah's roughs—there is reason to believe, with the knowledge of the Shah—murdered four of the bastis at Shah Abdul Azim yesterday evening.

M. Sabline and I have presented a joint note urging that the culprits may be punished, and pointing out the responsibility which would fall on the Persian Government should general disorders, which might well follow such crimes, cause prejudice to British or Russian subjects.

[11454]

No. 489.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 25.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 24, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, requesting Viscount Morley's observations on the desire expressed to His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah by the Sheikh of Mohammerah to lease land to a British Company on the Karun or Shat-el-Arab.

In reply, I am directed to say that Lord Morley is of opinion that encouragement might be given to any British capitalists of repute who may desire to lease lands from the Sheikh for the purposes of *bona fide* commercial enterprise, as in the case of the assistance that is being given to the Oil Syndicate to acquire a site for a refinery on the Island of Abadan. But, as indicated in Mr. Campbell's letter of the 16th April, 1908, Lord Morley would not be in favour of the British Government taking steps to secure preferential rights of lease or purchase over lands belonging to the Sheikh, in anticipation of a possible demand hereafter for their use.

The wishes of the Sheikh might be made known to the Oil Syndicate, and any other suitable persons likely to be interested in an enterprise of the kind.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[11441]

No. 490.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 25.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 24, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 19th March, 1909, inclosing copy of a note from the Netherland Minister as to the two years' option granted to the late Netherland Minister at Tehran in connection with the Karun irrigation, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley agrees that no exception need be taken to the explanation furnished by the Netherland Government.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[11339]

No. 489°.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, March 24, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 187 of 24th March. Purchase of land on Abadan Island for the Oil Syndicate.

I concur.

[1629]

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[11455]

No. 491.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 25.)*

Sir,

*India Office, March 25, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 19th instant, as to the representations received from the Sheikh of Mohammerah regarding certain pending questions, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the telegram which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject.

I am at the same time to inclose copy of a telegram that has been received from the Viceroy, dated the 19th instant, urging the grant of a loan to the Sheikh. Lord Morley sees no reason to doubt the soundness of the policy laid down in the draft telegram to Sir G. Barclay of holding out to the Sheikh no hope of a loan from His Majesty's Government, and leaving him to make his own terms with the Syndicate for any Concessions they may require. In this connection I am to refer to the views expressed by Lord Morley, in my letter of the 24th instant, as to the line to be taken in respect of the wish expressed to His Majesty's Consul by the Sheikh to lease lands on the Karun and the Shat-el-Arab.

In the circumstances no question of the incidence of the cost of the loan contemplated by the Government of India arises. But I am to say that Lord Morley is not prepared to accept the view that any charge should be placed on Indian revenues in respect of expenditure of this kind outside India.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

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Inclosure in No. 491.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*March 19, 1909.*

SEE telegram of the 16th instant from Resident, Persian Gulf.

Urgent necessity of giving advice and support to Sheikh of Mohammerah is so impressed upon us that we should be prepared to share in the loan he asks for, and which he hints already at getting from other sources, Germany, no doubt, being meant.

(Repeated to Tehran and Bushire.)

[11439]

No. 492.

*Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received March 25.)*

Sir,

*Treasury Chambers, March 25, 1909.*

IN reply to Mr. Mallet's letters of the 25th ultimo and the 20th instant, respecting the Anglo-Indian loan to Persia, I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to state, for the information of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, that they concur in the instructions which it is proposed to address to Sir G. Barclay.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. MURRAY.

[11446]

No. 493.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 25, 1909.*

SITUATION.

The Nationalist revolt has now spread to Hamadan and Shiraz.



[11465]

No. 494.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 25, 1909.*

GENERAL situation.

The Shah's feeling of personal insecurity has probably been increased by the recent extension of the Nationalist movement. It is possible that he will endeavour to cow the population of Tehran by further acts against his subjects similar to the murders reported in my telegram No. 191 of yesterday.

The possibility also exists, remote but not entirely to be excluded, that an outrage on a foreign subject may be instigated by the Shah in order to provoke intervention. A man in the Shah's service assaulted the Duffodar of our escort the other day, and I only obtained his punishment with great difficulty. It is believed that the same man was one of the murderers of the Shah Abdul Azim bastis.

I think it would reduce to a minimum the danger indicated in the preceding paragraph if the Russian Chargé d'Affaires and I were authorized, in the event of further assassinations, to make a communication in the sense of the second paragraph of your telegram No. 328 to Sir A. Nicolson of the 17th instant.

[11458]

No. 495.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 194.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 25, 1909.*

SITUATION in the Persian Gulf.

Major Cox reports that the Nationalists have taken over the Jask customs.

[11459]

No. 496.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 195.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 25, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tabreez.

According to a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez there is very great suffering among the poorer classes of the town.

Mr. Wratislaw doubts whether resistance can be prolonged very much.

[11466]

No. 497.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 196.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 25, 1909.*

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

In a telegram No. 52 His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports that the two last mails from Europe have been stopped and, it is believed, destroyed by Rahim Khan. He has told the employés of the post office that the next man who brings the mail will be shot.

Such proceedings are causing very great injury to British commercial interests. A large amount of foreign imports have also been plundered by Rahim Khan.

[11455]

No. 498.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 25, 1909.*

MOHAMMERAH.

Your telegrams Nos. 157 and 164 of the 17th and 18th instant.

[11348]

No. 497\*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 24, 1909.*

[BUSHIRE and Bunder Abbas Customs.]

I concur in terms of your telegram No. 189 of to-day's date.

[11352]

No. 498\*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 110.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, March 25, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 190 [of the 24th instant: Persian Constitution].

Action approved.

[1629]

3 S\*

Your instructions to Cox as to Syndicate's negotiations and your views as to the replies to be given to the Sheikh are concurred in by His Majesty's Government.

It is impossible for us to admit possibility of Persia being occupied by foreign Powers or ceasing to be a Sovereign State, as Russia and Great Britain have promised to respect her integrity. Should the eventuality contemplated by the Sheikh arise, the assurances which we have given would be more binding than ever. Sheikh should not overlook the fact that by engaging in connections of a political and party character he would incur the danger of losing the strong and unhampered position which he at present enjoys.

You should hold out no hope to the Sheikh of our providing a loan, as we are under no obligation to him to do so. We must leave him to make his own terms as to the lease to the Syndicate of land at Abadan and other facilities which may be required by them.

Cox should endeavour to smooth down the Sheikh's susceptibilities and to leave him in a well-disposed frame of mind, but this task may prove difficult.

If Sheikh shows signs of seizing Persian Customs in imitation of Nationalists at Bunder Abbas he should be dissuaded from such action.

[12115]

No. 499.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 42.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 2, 1909.

I TRANSMITTED copy of your despatch No. 195 of the 29th October, 1908, to His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz requesting an expression of his views as to the line to be taken in regard to the difficulty which has arisen on the subject of the repairs to the Godar Bridge on the Ahwaz-Ispahan road. I now have the honour to transmit copy of Captain Lorimer's reply and of a further despatch from him, of a very confidential nature, examining the attitude taken up by the Persian Transport Company in regard to this question.

With reference to the latter despatch, I do not feel it necessary to add anything to the expression of views contained in Mr. Marling's telegram No. 299 of the 7th September and my despatch No. 267 of the 2nd October, 1908.

As regards the former, I am of opinion that unless the Persian Transport Company come forward with some fresh and specific proposals for dealing with the difficulty, proposals, moreover, which shall be approved by His Majesty's Government, it is undesirable for His Majesty's Consul to make any further move in the matter.

I venture to request that a pronouncement be made and communicated to me on the question of the incidence of responsibility for the repairs on the Godar Bridge raised by Captain Lorimer in his accompanying despatch.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 499.

*Consul Lorimer to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 1/31. Confidential.)

Sir,

Ahwaz, January 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 15, dated the 18th December, 1908, forwarding a copy of a letter from the Persian Transport Company, dated the 19th October, 1908, referring to the repairs required on the Godar Bridge, and asking for my views as to the line of action to be pursued.

2. I would, in the first place, venture to invite your attention to the full text of the reports of the Consulting Engineer, Mr. Howard Humphreys, which I have received from the Persian Transport Company's agent here, and of which I attach copies herewith. Examination of these will reveal that the "outline" of the Consulting Engineer's opinion, annexed to the Company's letter of the 19th October, 1908, does not give a fair presentation of the Engineer's opinion.

3. The full text of his report, dated the 30th March, 1908, shows that he attributes the defects which have made their appearance in the bridge to an obvious



unsuitability in the original design, dismissing the fact of the misuse of the bridge by unequal loading as merely a contributory aggravation; and in his covering letter of the same date he reaffirms that he has "not the slightest doubt as to the real cause of the trouble."

Proceeding to the question of remedial measures, he makes most definite and precise recommendations, though misnaming them "suggestions."

It will therefore be seen that the written opinion of the Engineer in no way supports, and is, indeed, in direct opposition to, the statement of the case put forward in the Company's letter above referred to.

4. Mr. Humphreys does not mention the fact of his having been in consultation with Mr. Sotham, and the statement that "these gentlemen expressed their opinion that certain structural alterations were in all probability required, but that they could make no statement of the absolute necessity for structural alteration unless supported by advice given by an engineer on the spot" appears to find no counterpart in his report.

The Company's conclusion that the inspection of the bridge by an engineer was required to justify their recommending the Khans to undertake the increased expenditure on the bridge is therefore, however well-judged it may be, apparently not attributable to the Consulting Engineer.

The second report, or communication, of the latter appears to be a direct sequel to his first, with which it is in entire conformity. It is, in fact, merely a list of parts and tools required for the execution of his recommendations. This report is dated the 22nd June, and it follows that up to that date his views had not altered so as to accord with those attributed to him by the Persian Transport Company in their letter of the 19th October, and there is nothing to show that they have subsequently undergone any such modification.

5. Assuming the correctness of the Consulting Engineer's opinions, and noting that they are apparently assented to by the Company, the case now appears to stand as follows: That it is "essential" that certain structural alterations be carried out on the bridge, and that the necessity for these is due to an obvious unsuitability in the design of the bridge.

6. The question then presents itself as to who is responsible for this unsuitability of design, and who is chargeable with the expense of rectifying, or attempting to rectify it.

Morally considered, I have little hesitation in expressing my opinion that the Persian Transport Company are so responsible and chargeable. The bridge was erected by Messrs. Lynch Brothers on a species of contract for the Khans, and the responsibility for suitability of design rested on them as being the only persons concerned in a position to judge of such matters; and the responsibilities incurred by Messrs. Lynch Brothers in regard to the construction of the road have since been taken over by the Persian Transport Company.

7. Legally considered, I do not feel myself qualified to express an opinion.

The bridge was, in the first instance, built by Messrs. Lynch Brothers at their own expense, and up to the present only a portion of its cost has been recovered by them from the Khans.

The Khans do not appear, either at the time when the bridge was completed or subsequently, to have taken any objection to its design.

The responsibility of Messrs. Lynch Brothers, now borne by the Persian Transport Company, may have lapsed under the English law of limitation, and this, if a fact, may, or may not, have a bearing on the case.

If these and similar considerations raise any doubt as to the Persian Transport Company's liability, I would suggest that legal opinion be taken on the question.

8. Pending or failing a decision in favour of the Company, I am of opinion that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to press on the Khans the necessity of their agreeing to bear the cost of the repair of the bridge, whether on the extended scale now proposed, or on the lesser one previously suggested.

Under the circumstances, I question even whether Government would be justified in accepting from the Khans the 1,000 tomans which they expressed their willingness to provide in autumn, were the Company now to express a desire to avail themselves of that offer, at any rate, unless it were shown that this money was to be expended on repairs, as apart from structural alterations.

9. It then only remains to suggest to Messrs. the Persian Transport Company that they should themselves take such steps as they see fit in order to arrive at an understanding in the matter with the Khans. Were the negotiations direct between the

Khans and the Company, if the Khans raised no difficulty on the score of responsibility for the design of the bridge, there would be no moral obligation on Government to invite them to do so, or to interfere with any arrangement which, as free agents, they might see fit to enter into with the Company.

It is always to be remembered that they are enjoying the fruits of 3,000*l.* expended by Messrs. Lynch Brothers on the construction of the road, and that they have consistently refused to recognize the moral obligation to make it good which undoubtedly attaches to them. It is also undesirable, in the interests of our general relations with the Khans, that Government should take the initiative of declaring themselves unable to support the Company.

10. Thus far we have been dealing with the case on the supposition that responsibility for the state of the bridge devolves on the Persian Transport Company. Turning now to the complementary supposition, were the legal issue to be decided in favour of the Company, and negotiations reopened with the Khans with a view to obtaining their consent to meet the expense of the alterations, it will be remarked that the old difficulty in regard to the amount to be demanded will again be encountered. The Company apparently persist in refusing to submit a definite estimate of cost for the acceptance of the Khans, and the impossibility of inducing the latter to accord the Company *carte blanche* remains unmodified.

With regard to this difficulty, I can only invite reference to my letter No. 28, Camp, dated the 7th August, 1908, and state that I have found no reason to alter my views as expressed therein.

I fail to see why the Company should be averse to offering to contract for the work for a specific sum.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) D. L. R. LORIMER, Captain, Indian Army,  
His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz.

Inclosure 2 in No. 499.

Consul Lorimer to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 3/34. Confidential.)

Sir,

Ahwaz, January 20, 1909.

IN continuation of my letter No. 1/31 dated the 18th January, 1909, I have the honour to address you further regarding the question of the repair of the Godar Bridge.

2. There is a phase of the subject to which it may not be considered out of place or unnecessary to refer, and that is the attitude which the Persian Transport Company have seen fit to adopt towards His Majesty's Government, as displayed in their correspondence during the past year. This attitude can only be described as being characterized by a serious lack of candour, which I will here proceed to illustrate.

3. The state of the bridge must have become known to the Company early in October 1907, but they apparently first adverted to it in their letter to the Foreign Office dated the 13th March, 1908, when they spoke of the necessity of supplying "iron bands" for the masonry, which they said "would cost little."

On the 30th March they must have had in their hands the Consulting Engineer's Report, which I have dealt with in my previous letter, and the extensive nature of the alterations, to which they now subscribe, became known to them then. They did not, however, inform Government of the new aspect of the case, and allowed their previous letter to stand unmodified, and it was on this basis that negotiations were opened by me with the Khans in the end of June.

Telegraphic reference to the Company's agent at Ahwaz received an answer dated the 6th August giving the sum of 180*l.* as a rough estimate of the cost of the repair of the bridge.

In a letter dated the 7th August (received on the 3rd September) the agent wrote as follows:—

"You will of course understand that the repairs to be effected are of so unusual a nature that any estimate given beforehand can only be pure guess-work. The only information that we have at present to work on is that given by our head office, to the effect that the cost of the necessary gear to be sent out would probably amount to 120*l.*, to which figures we have added 60*l.* to represent freight, &c., and cost of erection."



From this it is by no means clear that even the agent had been admitted into the confidence of his principals, and that he did not still believe that it was still only a question of "iron bands."

4. The Company appear to have addressed a letter to the Foreign Office, dated the 24th August, of which I have received no copy, but in a subsequent one, dated the 31st August, they state that—

"The estimate made in Ahwaz of the sum required for repairs, recommended by the Consulting Engineer here, is obviously defective. We placed his drawings and specifications before manufacturers, who offered to supply the material for 160*l.* Tools and appliances for executing the work and freight will make the total about 200*l.*, as we have already stated" (*query*, in their letter of the 24th August?).

Again, they take exception to my describing the offer of 1,000 tomans by the Khans as generous, ignoring that this was to be referred to an inclusive estimate of 180*l.*, and that I could not possibly have known when I made use of the expression of the altered scale of their proposed operations.

5. Their next letter is that of the 19th October, which I have elsewhere dealt with in some of its aspects.

In this they admit the point just referred to, saying, "as the structural alterations would have meant an expenditure largely exceeding the estimate given by our agent to His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Ahwaz . . ."

Again, they say that—

"The action which followed the return of Mr. Sotham to England, and the discussions with the expert in London, took time, and it was only on the 24th August last that we were in a position to inform His Majesty's Government of the changed aspect of the case."

A circumstance which they properly characterize as "unfortunate." Why this should have been the case is not clear.

The Engineer's recommendations are dated the 30th March, and from the moment they were received it was obvious that, whatever action was decided on, the original proposals for the iron bands had been finally disposed of.

Why was His Majesty's Government not informed when matters reached this stage? Apparently only to conceal the disconcerting fact that an opinion only arrived at after five months' consideration had to be cancelled, and that action on it "might not be only useless but positively dangerous."

If it be argued that Mr. Sotham's views were being awaited, it may be pointed out that the only new proposal raised subsequently to his arrival, whenever that occurred, was that he should travel up the road and examine the bridge personally. There is, however, no indication that this was considered necessary by the Consulting Engineer, as it was not originally mentioned in his Report, and does not appear to have been added to it.

6. Thus, until at least the 24th August, Government was allowed to go on in ignorance of the known position of affairs, it can only be presumed in the hope that the assent of the Khans to the Company's having *carte blanche* in the matter of expense might be obtained by the Vice-Consul, and the necessity of revealing the radical change in the counsels of the firm avoided.

Sight was, however, lost apparently of the fact that I had been in communication with the Khans since June, and that as a matter of fact I had informed them about the "iron bands."

Had the Company succeeded in adhering to their secretive policy, and had the elaborate contrivances now proposed made their appearance unexplained in place of the iron bands, how would I, and Government as represented by me, have stood in the eyes of the Khans?

7. The Company expresses a very reasonable fear that, had they carried out the futile repairs originally proposed, and then represented the urgent necessity for further operations, the Khans might have thought that they were acting in bad faith.

In concealing from His Majesty's Government for five months the fact that their original proposals were ill-judged and inexpedient, did they experience no qualms as to how Government would view their reticence when suddenly called on to inform the Khans that the negotiations with them had had no relation to facts, and were merely a form of pleasantry?

It is due, however, to the Company to admit that, having at the eleventh hour decided to show their hand, they had done so in the most complete and ingenuous manner.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) D. L. R. LORIMER, *Captain, Indian Army,*  
*His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul, Ahwaz.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 499.

*Mr. Humphreys to the Persian Transport Company.*

Gentlemen, 28, Victoria Street, London, March 30, 1908.

I INCLOSE herewith my report on the Godar Bridge. I am sorry to have been so long in considering this matter, but I have waited until the makers have afforded me sufficient information to come to definite conclusion.

Although the question appears to be such a simple one, it is not so in reality, and it is always difficult to advise upon questions of this kind when one is unable to visit the *locus in quo*. I have not the slightest doubt as to the real cause of trouble.

I am returning the papers, plans, and photographs which you were good enough to lend me.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) H. HOWARD HUMPHREYS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 499.

*Mr. Humphreys to the Persian Transport Company.*

Gentlemen, 28, Victoria Street, London, March 30, 1908.

I HAVE carefully considered the various reports, correspondence, plans and photographs herein, and am now in a position to report on the opinion upon causes of failure in piers of Godar-i-Balutak Bridge, Persia.

#### *Possible Causes of Failure.*

Two theories of failure have been put forward, viz. :—

1. *By Mr. Barlow* (see his Report on Inspection of Bakhtiyari Bridges, 1907), who is of opinion that "the roadway not being kept at an uniform level all over the bridge, and the ropes which leave the pier to where they enter the ground being very long, increases the vibration which, in my opinion, is the direct cause of the cracks in the masonry."

2. *By Messrs. de Bergue*, who say (*vide* letter 4th January, 1908) that "We are therefore inclined to think that the dislocation of the masonry has been caused by the pressure of the material forming the arch."

There appears to be no suggestion that there has been any giving way of foundation, as there is a pencil note on letter from Messrs. de Bergue, which states that "Barlow says he found no sign of damage to piers below the level of the archway." This could hardly have been said had there been trouble with the foundations.

Considering now the two theories of failure which have been put forward, I am of opinion that Mr. Barlow's suggestion is partially correct, but that vibration and unequal loading are not in themselves the origin of the trouble, although undoubtedly they aggravate the mischief.

As to Messrs. de Bergue's theory that the cracks which have developed are the result of thrust due to the arch and its superincumbent load, I can only say that I absolutely disagree with the idea, as I have satisfied myself that if no cables had passed over the piers, the latter would never have been cracked by thrust from the arch, &c., even if the work in the interior of the piers is of a poor character.

I would remind you that had the failure arisen from such a cause as Messrs. de Bergue suggest, it would have shown as soon as ever the arch centres were struck, i.e., when the masonry was "green."



### The Real Causes of Failure.

The prime cause of failure appear to me to be due to the fact that the cables are carried by saddles which have neither rollers nor rockers under them. I have obtained from Messrs. de Bergue a large scale detail of the saddles (copy inclosed), and from it you will see that they sit down on a bed plate with a bearing area of 18 inches by 15 inches. How such an arrangement could ever be expected to work for any length of time I fail to see, as the plates will bind themselves with rust, and no horizontal movement will take place, as the tail cable expands and contracts. Even when nests of rollers or rockers are used, it is needful to give them attention from time to time, otherwise there is always trouble.

The expansion of the tail cable within the temperature given me will be from  $\frac{1}{8}$ -inch to  $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch, and this must mean that the piers are being pulled to and fro at their tops by this amount, and since the expansion will not take place equally or simultaneously on the north or south sides of the bridge, it follows that the piers are being subjected to a torsional movement which has shown itself in the masonry at the point of least resistance, i.e., at the junction of the spandril walls over the arch with the piers proper, the fact that the saddles are so close to the edge of the piers, accentuates the trouble of course.

I do not know whether the lattice girder is built in to the masonry without expansion joint (as shown on Messrs. de Bergue's drawings), but if so, it in its turn must exercise some horizontal thrust on the base of the piers, and though the force it would exert by itself would be insufficient to do much damage, yet when coupled with other forces, and weakened piers, it would assist in the process of disruption.

Unequal dead loading is (as Mr. Barlow points out) a source of trouble and more so on a suspension bridge than upon any other type, as it alters and unbalances the catenary curve which suspension cables naturally take, and it is especially troublesome if the traffic is of such a nature as to set up rhythmic movements of the bridge platform.

I suspect one other cause of trouble. Upon the examinations of the designs of the platform or floor it appears that the same, though it is stiffened in the vertical plane of the two lattice girders, is not stiffened appreciably in a lateral way so as to resist the pressure of wind which must be very great (*vide* remark by Mr. Berlowon effect of hailstones on paint work). It is true that there are floor plates and at first sight these seem to supply the needful lateral strength, but bearing in mind that the plates are cambered and are very thin they appear to be of little use against horizontal pressure, usually the floor of suspension bridges are wind braced throughout.

### Suggestions as to Remedy for Defects.

In the first place it is essential to fix some type of joint under the saddles which will allow of expansion in the tail cables without bringing strain on the tops of the piers. In the second place the bridge should be guyed back to the rock faces with steel ropes, such guys being fixed to three points on each side of the structure. Expansion will occur in the guy ropes, but even if this happens (and is not taken up between the seasons by union screws) the amount of expansion will be small and the ropes though relatively slack will still arrest undue movements which may be caused by sudden gusts of wind.

With regard to the proposal to put rockers under the bed plates I am satisfied that this will be the most simple and effectual way of striking at the root of the trouble, unless it is done the trouble must recur and eventually the piers will be ruined.

The operation of fixing the saddles will require great care as it must be done without unduly disturbing masonry or closing the bridge to traffic. If you decide to adopt my suggestion I will furnish with the sketch of the method which should be employed in carrying out the work.

After the rockers are in position the cracked masonry should be rebuilt or grouted up with thin cement as native gutch is not suitable for this kind of work of special repair.

The unequal loading of the floor should be put right at once.

### Generally.

It is impossible for me to give an approximate estimate of the cost of carrying out my suggestions, but in making them I have had due regard to the fact that skilled labour is scarce and that engineering appliances are not plentiful in Persia, for these reasons I have kept my suggestions as to alterations to a minimum.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) H. HOWARD HUMPHREYS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 499.

Mr. Humphreys to the Persian Transport Company.

Gentlemen, 28, Victoria Street, London, June 22, 1908.  
I SEND herewith two sheets of drawings showing detail of additional steel work required *re* Godar-i-Balutak Bridges.

1. To enable expansion to take place in tail cable of the bridge without raking piers, and
2. To windbrace the structure as suggested in my report.

I append a nett list of parts required, but I should advise you to send a few spares, as some of the details may be lost.

In the case of the cables, I have already added 100 feet to the nett length. Perhaps you will be good enough to look at the photograph you have in order to see whether the face of the rock (where I suggest the new anchorages shall be fixed) is flush with the face of the piers, or behind or beyond the same. The bridge is very light, but in spite of this fact it strains the abutments by means of excessive vibrations vertically and variable wind pressure laterally.

The various parts I have designed should be made with great care and should be of first quality. If you wish the parts to be made under my inspection it would perhaps be well if the work could be done by a reliable firm of general engineers in town.

The heaviest single piece will be the temporary girders, each of these will be roughly 17 feet long, and will 4½ cwt.

I do not know what appliances you already have in Persia in the way of loose tools for erecting purposes, should you have none it will, of course, be needful to send some out such as ratchet drills, rock drills, hammers, caulking tools, hemp ropes, &c. Upon hearing from you I will prepare a schedule if needful.

Awaiting your instructions, I am, &c.,  
(Signed) H. HOWARD HUMPHREYS.

P.S.—I am sending these plans by one of my assistants, Mr. F. P. Spiller, who has had this matter in hand and who will, I am sure, be pleased to answer any questions which may require clearing up.

H. H. H.

### Schedule of Material required.

#### (A.)—Additional Anchorage.

- 1 cable, 468 feet, 1½ inch diameter Laings lay.
- 16 thimbles.
- 8 union screws.
- 8 rag bolts with shackles.
- 48 clips.
- 14 packings bulb iron (send thin packings) with rivetted and loose bolt angles.
- 12 gusset pieces.
- 8 cranked shackles with bolts.
- 1½ cwt. lead wool.

#### (B.)—For Rockers.

- ½ ton cement.
- 2 joists 17 feet long 8 inches × 5 inches, 28 lbs. (temporary).
- 2 sets rocker pedestals with bolts and studs.
- 12 pairs folding wedges.



[11552]

No. 500.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)*

(No. 43.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 4, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, with reference to my telegram No. 103 of the 17th February, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bushire inclosing a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz respecting the desire of the local Manager of the D'Arcy Oil Syndicate for telegraphic communication between the oil works and a point on the Shatt-el-Arab.

Upon receipt of Captain Trevor's despatch, I inquired of the Director of the Indo-European Telegraph Department whether it would not be possible for the Inspector, who had, at the request of the Persian Government, been sent to report upon the state of the Arabistan telegraph lines, to place himself in communication with Captain Lorimer in regard to the points raised.

Mr. Barker is forwarding copies of the correspondence to Mr. Kirk, and, in the event of the latter's regarding Mr. Reynolds' proposal as a feasible one, proposes to instruct his Inspector as suggested by me.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 500.

*Acting Consul-General Trevor to Sir G. Barclay.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, January , 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence regarding the Ahwaz-Borasjun telegraph line, I have the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz on the subject.

2. I have informed Captain Lorimer unofficially that I am forwarding his letter to the Government of India, and that no doubt, if they think there is anything in Mr. Reynolds' proposal, they will take action. I also pointed out that Mr. Reynolds is in error in thinking that the Indo-European Telegraph Company have anything to do with the matter, and that if the Directors of the Concessions Syndicate wish to approach any one in London on the subject, they had better address themselves to the India Office or to the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

3. The constant failure of telegraphic communication with Ahwaz is a serious obstacle to British trade, and the nuisance becomes aggravated the more British interests increase there. Perhaps your Excellency will see your way to pressing the requirements of the Syndicate on the Persian Government, as suggested in paragraph 4 of Captain Lorimer's letter.

I have, &c.  
(In the absence of the Consul-General),  
(Signed) A. P. TREVOR, Captain,  
First Assistant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 500.

*Consul Lorimer to Consul-General Cox.*

Sir,

Ahwaz, January 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter recently addressed by Mr. G. B. Reynolds,\* local Manager of the Concessions Syndicate (Limited), to his principals on the subject of the means of telegraphic communication which will become necessary in connection with the construction and maintenance of a pipe line from the oil works to the coast.

2. I am not sure that I quite follow Mr. Reynolds' drift, but it would of course be quite impossible for the Indo-European Telegraph Department to enter into

\* Not printed.

combination with the Syndicate in regard to the stretch of line between Ahwaz and Mohammerah, unless they had previously brought to a successful conclusion their negotiations with the Persian Telegraph Department for taking over the management of the line between Mohammerah, Ahwaz, and Borazjun.

3. With regard to the question of alignment, it is doubtful in any case whether the Indo-European Telegraph Department would be ready to accept that required by the Syndicate. The "short distance" referred to at the Ahwaz end would be of no significance, but at Mohammerah the line would be on the opposite side of the river from the town, and to carry the wire across the river, which would necessitate a wide span at a sufficient height to clear the river steamers' masts, would probably involve some trouble and expense. It is, however, well that Government should know what is being talked of.

4. The general question of telegraph communication is becoming more and more important, and the failure of the Persian line proportionately injurious. The line between here and Mohammerah has now been continuously out of work since November, while the line to Borazjun, which gives communication with the rest of Persia and Europe, has only been working on the 25th December and the 3rd January since my return here on the 17th December. As the operations of the Syndicate increase, the necessity for direct means of communication with Europe and the inconvenience of its absence are steadily growing. If circumstances are adapted to the employment of this form of argument, might it not be possible to press the requirement of the Syndicate on the Persian Government in such a way as to aid the Indo-European Telegraph Department in their negotiations with the Persian Telegraph Department?

5. The question of the Syndicate's local requirements should not be referred to in any discussion with the Persian Government. They seem fairly entitled to build a telegraph line in immediate connection with their work and their doing so will probably not be questioned. But were the matter to be forced on the notice of the Persian Government, or any statement made which could be misconstrued into a request for permission to build such a line, the Persian Government would doubtless, following its best traditions, become obstructive—witness the removal of the rocks in the Karun at Kut Abdullah.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) D. LORIMER.

[11532]

No. 501.

*Mr. Preece to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)*

Sir,

1, St. James' Place, March 22, 1909.

I AM instructed by the Oil Syndicate to bring the following to your notice and ask you to be good enough to afford us your kind assistance.

For the due development of the oil discovered in Arabistan it is necessary to build a pipe line from the wells to the refinery. For the proper maintenance of this pipe line a telephone line is absolutely essential. The pipe line has to be inspected daily along its whole length, so that any leakages or breaks may at once be discovered, and with a minimum amount of delay information be given to the pumping station to stop pumping. To enable this to be done a telephone line is necessary.

Article 2 of the Concession, which gives the right to make the pipe line, concludes as follows:—

"It shall also comprise the right of constructing and maintaining all and any wells, reservoirs, stations, and pump services, accumulation services, and distribution services, workshops, and other works of arrangement that may be necessary."

The Syndicate contend that the words "and other works of arrangement that may be necessary" give them the right to build a telegraph and telephone line at the same time as they build the pipe line without further reference to the Persian Government, they being absolutely an adjunct to the other, and without the telephone the maintenance of the pipe line would be an impossibility.

The Syndicate would be obliged by your advising them on this point, and if you are of the same opinion, would you give them your support? If not, and you deem it necessary that the Persian Government be moved for the necessary permission to erect

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these lines, and, if there is no objection to such a course, would you most kindly allow His Majesty's Legation to arrange the matter in Tehran for the Syndicate?

I understand that an arrangement is under consideration for the Indo-European Telegraph Department to put in order and maintain the lines of the Persian Government from Borasjoon to Ahwaz, and thence to Mohammerah and Shuster, &c. The Syndicate would have no objection to allowing the use of their poles for a wire to be used for the above service as far as they could be utilized by the Department.

With reference to this communication, I had a conversation with Mr. Oliphant on the various points raised early in the month.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

[11531]

No. 502.

*Mr. Preece to Foreign Office.—(Received March 26.)*

Sir,

1, St. James Place, London, March 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 19th instant, with reference to the Concessions Syndicate taking over the management of the Bakhtiari guard, and to thank you for the same.

I beg to inform you that we received yesterday a telegram from Mr. Reynolds, giving the information that the Agreement with the Chiefs had been signed, and that he was sending home the papers.

The Syndicate will gladly avail themselves of any advice which Captain Lorimer may give them for the due working of this arrangement, and naturally will in no way hold him responsible for it. They are more than obliged to him for all the assistance he has given them in this and various other questions which have arisen during the last two years.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

[11497]

No. 503.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 26.)*

Sir,

India Office, March 24, 1909.

WITH reference to the correspondence forwarded with the letter of this Department dated the 19th January last, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to inclose copy of a letter from the Government of India as to the proposed improvement and extension of the rough shelters in which the detachment at Robat is at present accommodated at an expenditure not exceeding 6,500 rupees (433l. 6s. 8d.).

By the Secretary of State's telegram of the 15th January last the temporary retention of the troops at Robat was authorized, but the present proposal is, it will be seen, submitted on its own merits, apart from the question of the maintenance of the Robat post as a permanent arrangement. Viscount Morley is of opinion that the proposal is deserving of sanction. If Sir E. Grey concurs, he would propose to address the Army Council with a view to their acceptance of a moiety of the expenditure involved as a charge to army funds.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 503.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.*

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Fort William.

WE have the honour to refer to our Secret despatch dated the 22nd October, 1908, in which we stated that we were prepared, with certain reservations, to withdraw the double company of native infantry which was posted at Robat in 1906.

2. The military authorities have now drawn our attention to the unsatisfactory

nature of the accommodation provided for the troops at that post, and have recommended that the existing quarters should be improved and extended, and that summer quarters should be constructed for the detachment in the hills at Kacha.

3. In view of the possibility of the Robat detachment being withdrawn, we do not consider that, in present circumstances, any expenditure on the construction of summer quarters would be justifiable. The question of the improvement of the existing lines is, however, on a different footing. Whether it is decided to abolish the Robat post as a permanent arrangement or not, it seems probable that contingencies arising from political conditions in Persia, or measures connected with the suppression of the arms traffic, will periodically demand the presence of troops at that station. The experience of the past year has shown that in the unhealthy climate of Robat it is impossible to maintain the health and morale of the detachment with the accommodation now available, and we agree with the military authorities that it is desirable that alterations to the quarters should be carried out without delay.

4. It is estimated that the rough shelters in which the detachment is at present accommodated, and which were constructed with our sanction in 1906 at a cost of 1,000 rupees approximately, can be improved and extended, so as to provide adequate and sanitary lines for the troops which may from time to time be posted at Robat at an expenditure not exceeding 6,500 rupees.

5. We therefore propose, with your Lordship's approval, to convey sanction to this expenditure, which is not, in our opinion, excessive, and which we assume should, in accordance with the decision contained in your Lordship's despatch dated the 5th July, 1907, be borne in equal proportions by the Indian and Imperial Exchequers.

We have, &c.  
(Signed) MINTO.  
KITCHENER.  
H. ERLE RICHARDS.  
C. H. SCOTT.  
H. ADAMSON.  
J. O. MILLER.  
W. L. HARVEY.  
G. F. WILSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 503.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

My Lord,

India Office, July 5, 1907.

WITH reference to your letter in the Foreign Department dated the 27th December last, regarding the incidence of the cost of the double company of native infantry now stationed at Robat, I forward a copy of correspondence with the Foreign and War Offices, from which it will be seen (1) that His Majesty's Government have agreed to your proposal that the extra expenditure shall be borne in equal proportions by the Imperial and Indian Exchequers, and (2) that the Imperial share will be charged to army votes. I have accepted as reasonable the stipulation expressed in the first paragraph of the letter from the War Office of the 29th May, that charges for furlough pay of the troops after their return to Quetta, and for pension in respect of the period of service at Robat, &c., shall not be included in the amount divisible between the two Governments.

2. With a view to meeting the desire of the War Office that as much as possible of the Imperial share of the extra expenditure incurred up to the end of 1906-7 should be adjusted in the army accounts for that year, the inclosed telegram was sent to your Excellency on the 4th June. Monthly accounts, supported by the necessary vouchers, of expenditure subsequent to that included in the detailed statement requested in the telegram should be sent to the Financial Secretary at this Office in anticipation of the debits in the Schedules of the Account Current.

3. I shall be glad to be informed at an early date what reply should be given to the second paragraph of the letter from the War Office.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.



Inclosure 3 in No. 503.

*Mr. Morley to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.)

*India Office, June 4, 1907.*

YOUR despatch of the 27th December.

Native infantry at Robat. His Majesty's Government agree half extra expenditure should be paid by War Office. War Office request that detailed statement of amount due to the end of 1906-7 may be sent as soon as possible for reasons given in paragraph 3 of my despatch dated the 17th May. Detailed statement and vouchers, as far as possible, should be sent to Financial Secretary at the India Office in anticipation of entries in Account Current.

Despatch follows.

Inclosure 4 in No. 503.

*India Office to Foreign Office.*

Sir,

*India Office, February 6, 1907.*

WITH reference to Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 30th January, 1906, regarding the measures to be taken in connection with the outbreak of plague in Seistan, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to inclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from the Government of India regarding the incidence of the cost of the double company of native infantry now stationed at Robat.

The Government of India, it will be seen, takes the view, in which the Secretary of State for India in Council concurs, that, the object of the dispatch of these troops to Robat being to secure the lives and property of British officers and subjects in Eastern Persia, the extra cost incurred should be divided between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers in the same manner as other charges connected with the Diplomatic and Consular establishments in Persia.

The total extra charge up to the end of 1906 was 1,25,000 rupees (8,333l. 6s. 8d.), and a monthly expenditure of 10,500 rupees (700l.) will continue to be incurred until the troops are withdrawn to India.

I am to express the hope of the Secretary of State in Council that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will submit the claim of the Government of India for the favourable consideration of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, as he finds it impossible to justify the incidence of the whole charge upon the revenues of India.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 5 in No. 503.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of a paper on the plague in Seistan.

*Foreign Office, February 15, 1907.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 503.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 14, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copy of a letter from the India Office regarding the incidence of the cost of a double company of native infantry of the Indian army now stationed at Robat, on the Perso-Baluch frontier.

At the commencement of last year the state of unrest and the anti-foreign feeling that prevailed in Persia, and especially in the north and eastern provinces, gave rise to apprehensions for the safety of British residents. As the Lords Commissioners will observe from the correspondence now inclosed, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran was instructed to concert with the Government of India and the Consul-General at Bushire the best means of insuring that a force should be available, in case of necessity, for dispatch to Tehran, or any other part of Persia with the least possible delay for the protection of the lives and property of British subjects. Owing to disturbances at Meshed, and in anticipation of similar disorders in Seistan, the double company of native infantry was moved from Quetta to Robat in February 1906, and has since been retained there as a precautionary measure.

The Secretary of State for India and the Indian Government are of opinion that, the object of the dispatch of these troops to Robat being to secure the lives and property of British officers and subjects in Eastern Persia, the extra cost incurred, viz., 8,333l. 6s. 8d., up to the end of 1906, and a recurrent monthly expenditure of 700l. until the force is withdrawn, should be divided between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers in the same manner as the charges connected with the Diplomatic and Consular establishments in Persia.

Sir E. Grey hopes that their Lordships will give their favourable consideration to the claim now advanced by the Government of India, and in the event of the liability being accepted by the Imperial Government, I am to inquire from what vote such expenditure should be met, as it cannot properly be charged to Diplomatic and Consular funds.

I am, &c.

Inclosure 7 in No. 503.

*War Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*War Office, May 29, 1907.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acquaint you that they have been informed by the Treasury that it is proposed to charge to Army funds half the extra expenditure involved in the movement of a double company of Indian native infantry to Robat on the Perso-Baluch frontier. The Council, to whose knowledge this matter is now brought for the first time, have agreed, with the sanction of the Treasury, to accept liability for half the out-of-pocket extra expenditure incurred in consequence of the troops being temporarily stationed at Robat, on the understanding that the amounts to be thus shared shall not include any charges for furlough of troops after returning to India, pension in respect of the period of service on the frontier, or other "constructive" items of cost.

It is understood that about 10,000l. extra was so spent up to the end of the financial year 1906-7, and that extra expenditure is continuing at the rate of about 700l. a-month. The latter figure would appear *prima facie* to approximate rather to the whole normal cost of a double company of Indian native infantry, but the Government of India will be able to state whether these figures are correct, and if so how they are arrived at.

It is important for financial reasons that the War Office share of the amounts spent to the end of 1906-7 should be repaid to Indian revenues and brought to account in this Department before the 30th September next, and I am therefore to request that the Government of India may be urged by cable to render an account of as much of the expenditure as practicable at the earliest possible date.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. W. D. WARD

[11577]

No. 504.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)*

(No. 197.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 26, 1909.*

TEHRAN situation.

My telegram No. 191 of the 24th instant.

My Russian colleague and I have received visits from the Turkish Chargé

[1629]

3 Y



d'Affaires who came to tell us that he is applying to the Porte for a guard as he has reason to believe that an attack on his bastis similar to the recent murders at Shahabdulazim is in contemplation. Sadreddin Bey urges that we should demand that the Vice-Governor of Tehran should be dismissed. The recent murders may almost certainly be directly ascribed to him. Sadreddin Bey says that he will feel reassured and will not need a guard if we obtain this.

M. Sabline and I have approached the Persian Government in this sense urging that the measure we demand is in the interest of the Shah and his Government whom we shall hold responsible for any harm to our nationals which may result from the disorders, which, if the Vice-Governor is not dismissed, we foresee may occur.

[11465]

No. 505.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 406.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 26, 1909.*

PROPOSED warning to the Shah.

If the Russian Government agree to the suggestion contained in the last paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 193 of the 25th instant, we shall be prepared to adopt it and act accordingly. You should ascertain their views on the subject, if possible.

It should be made clear to the Shah that if he persists in his present policy he will endanger his own position, and in view of the information contained in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 196 of the 25th instant, you should impress upon the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is high time that this was pointed out to His Majesty. Representations on the part of the Russian Government are the only really effective means of bringing home to the Shah the actual facts of his position.

[11466]

No. 506.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 111.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 26, 1909.*

SEIZURE of mails by Rahim Khan. See your telegram No. 196 of yesterday's date.

If you think fit, you may, in concert with your Russian colleague, if possible, represent to the Persian Government that they will be called upon to pay compensation for British mails destroyed, and that His Majesty's Government will hold them responsible in the event of any action on the part of the Shah's officers causing injury to British trade.

You may also press for the immediate recall of Rahim Khan, and for the prevention of such objectionable proceedings in future.

[11439]

No. 507.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 112.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 26, 1909.*

ANGLO-INDIAN loan. See your telegram No. 64 of the 28th January.

His Majesty's Government have already concurred in the arrangements detailed in your telegram No. 189 of the 24th instant. Apart, however, from these arrangements they think it advisable to await a further development of the question of the establishment of a constitutional régime in Persia and the reorganization of Persian finances before pressing demand for payment in definite form. At the expiration of the provisional arrangement for securing the debt of the Imperial Bank on the Bushire customs, with which the bank are for the present satisfied, we might if necessary raise the question, but not before then.

[8521]

No. 508.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, a copy of a letter from the India Office,\* respecting a proposal to undertake certain works at Bassidu, on Kishm Island, in the Persian Gulf, at an estimated cost of 3,903 rupees, to be equally defrayed from British and Indian revenues.

A short account of Bassidu is inclosed, together with copies of the correspondence referred to by the India Office in their present letter.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the observations of the Secretary of State for India as to advisability of undertaking the works in question, and recommends for the Lords Commissioners' favourable recommendation the proposal that half the cost should be borne out of Imperial funds.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[11722]

No. 509.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, March 26, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of two Reports dated 18th and 19th ultimo, which have been received through the Commander-in-chief, East Indies Station, from the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf (His Majesty's ship "Perseus"), relative to the state of affairs at Bunder Abbas and in the Persian Gulf generally.

Copies have also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 509.

*Commander Bird to Rear-Admiral Sir G. Warrender.*

Sir,

*"Perseus," at Sea, February 18, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that at 9 A.M. on Monday, the 15th February, as I was weighing to proceed to Jask, Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E., His Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, came on board with the attached telegram, which he had just received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas; he informed me that it was necessary that he himself should proceed to Lingah, and he requested me to proceed to Bunder Abbas and see the Consul and support him if necessary.

2. I accordingly at once proceeded for Bunder Abbas, and increased speed to 10 knots as soon as it was ready. I arrived at Bunder Abbas at 11.45 A.M. on Tuesday, the 16th February.

3. After obtaining pratique I landed and saw His Britannic Majesty's Consul, and found that the situation was as follows:—

The Mullah Sayyid-abdul-Hussain, Chief Priest of Lars, having made himself master of Lars† and obtained a following said to be of 14,000 men sent in several threatening letters to the merchants and notables of Bunder Abbas, ordering them to stop paying customs duties and to remove their goods, by force if necessary, from the customs house, and to drive out the customs officials, threatening if they did not do so that he would come himself and do it for them; about twenty men apparently accompanied this latter letter, and these robbed some huts and injured some women, causing a panic amongst the people on the night of the 14th February.

\* See No. 360.

† Inland, about 100 miles from Bunder Abbas to the West.



4. As Lars is only four or five days' march distant and the country all round is in a very disturbed state, the merchants, realizing that owing to the presence of many British Indians, &c., that this kind of disturbance would not be permitted with impunity, appealed to the British Consul, who sent the attached telegram.

5. Since our arrival the Mullah's emissaries have been very well behaved, and the local Mullah and notables have written to him, pointing out that it would be a false move on his part to embroil himself with the foreigners, and begging him not to approach Bunder Abbas.

6. Yesterday forenoon at 10:30, I called officially on the Persian Governor who seemed very glad to see a British officer, and at 4 P.M. he returned my visit in full dress on board, and talked freely on all subjects; he told me he did not think the Mullah would act.

7. The same evening Major Cox arrived in "Lawrence" from Lingah where the same description of letters had been received. He did not consider my presence any longer necessary, though he was of opinion that our visit had been beneficial, as he had no doubt that word of our arrival (on trouble threatening) would have at once gone on to Lars, and so would act as a deterrent to any movement on this place. I told the Resident that a ship would for the present be at Jask on arms traffic work, and would be ordered to proceed at once to Bunder Abbas on receipt of telegram from Consul, an arrangement he thought quite satisfactory.

8. The origin of these disturbances, so far as I could learn, was that this Mullah Sayyid-abdul-Hussain adopted the popular cause, and, as he preached the doctrine of paying no taxes and looting when possible, he soon obtained a following. In his first attack on Lars he was beaten by the Governor, but on raising further recruits the Governor was wounded and fled, whereupon the Mullah proceeded to kill every woman and child connected with his family and distribute all the Governor possessed among his own adherents. He now imagines that his word is law throughout the province, and undoubtedly as far as any force is present to keep him in check this is the case.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERIC G. BIRD,

Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division.

Inclosure 2 in No. 509.

Consul Shakespear to Consul-General Cox.

(Telegraphic.)

Bunder Abbas, February 14, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 73 of the 14th February. Considering that situation here becoming serious as small parties already commenced to arrive and as Sayyid's chief object is stop payment of customs duties payable to State Treasury, strenuous efforts first of all will be made at Bunder Abbas rather than Lingah as more likely to produce desired effect owing to relative importance. Mercantile communities, foreseeing what probable consequences will be, are practically unanimous for endeavouring to prevent arrival of Sayyid's rabble. If present, His Majesty's ship should give point [ing] to arguments that local disturbances will not be permitted, and therefore projected descent from Lar [will] would be only without profit. Will telegraph as soon as again if present position becomes worse than.

Repeated verbatim to Resident; repeated Trevor.

Inclosure 3 in No. 509.

Commander Bird to Rear-Admiral Sir G. Warrender.

Sir,

"Perseus," at Muscat, February 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my general letter of the 1st February, that after my arrival at Henjam on the 1st February I received a telegram from His Majesty's ship "Redbreast" at Muscat, reporting engine defects which it was necessary to repair before proceeding to sea and that she had no engine-room artificer to do the work, both of those belonging to her being sick. I ordered her by telegraph to remain at Muscat till my arrival.

2 On the 2nd February at 1 P.M. two weeks' mails arrived by boat from Bunder Abbas, and at 2:30 P.M. I left for Jask, carrying out long-range firing on the way.

3. On the 3rd February at 9 A.M. I arrived at Jask, and after examining work on rifle range left for Muscat at 1:30 P.M. I carried out night firing with watch at torpedo defence stations at 9 P.M.

4. On the 4th February at 8:30 A.M. I arrived at Muscat and coaled, receiving 285 tons. The "Redbreast's" defects were commenced and were made good on the 6th February.

5. I sent on the 8th February a party with boats to assist at the exhumation of the body of the late French Consul and a funeral escort to pay honours on landing body at Consulate.

6. On the 10th February I sent boats and party to assist at the funeral service and embarkation of the body of the French Consul in mail-boat. All available officers attended.

7. On the 11th February at 9:15 A.M. Royal Indian mail-steamer "Lawrence" arrived flying the flag of Major Cox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. I saluted with thirteen guns and visited Resident. At 11:15 A.M. Resident visited ship. At 4 P.M. "Redbreast" left for Jask, His Majesty's ship "Perseus" having lent her one chief engine-room artificer.

8. On the 14th February the Resident received instructions from Tehran that the interior telegraph operators were safe and that we should resume arms operations.

9. On the 15th February I was on the point of sailing for Jask to resume arms operations when I was requested to go to Bunder Abbas, as reported in my special letter of the 18th February.

10. On my arrival at Bunder Abbas on the 16th February I ordered "Redbreast" by telegraph to resume arms operations, working from Jask.

11. On the 17th February at 10:30 A.M. I visited the Persian Governor, and at noon saluted the Persian flag. At 3:15 P.M. Royal Indian mail-steamer "Lawrence" and Resident arrived, and at 3:45 P.M. British Consul visited the ship. At 4:15 P.M. the Persian Governor returned my visit. I saluted him with five guns and the British Consul with seven guns.

12. On the 18th February at 5:30 A.M., after consultation with Resident, as reported in my special letter of the 18th February, I sailed for Muscat, having embarked on the previous evening a British Indian, Dawood-bin-Esa, who has been deported from Lingah to Muscat by order of the Bushire Consular Court.

13. At 6:45 P.M. I stopped at sea and communicated with "Redbreast," whom I had ordered by telegraph to meet me, gave her her mails and sailing orders (copy attached), and explained to Lieutenant and Commander Shuter the situation at Bunder Abbas. At 7:30 P.M. I proceeded for Muscat, where I arrived at 12:20 to meet His Majesty's ship "Fox," and hand over the duties of Senior Naval Officer to Captain A. T. Hunt on the 21st February.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERIC G. BIRD,

Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division.

Inclosure 4 in No. 509.

Sailing Orders.

(Memo.)

"Perseus," at Sea, February 18, 1909.

YOU will make Jask your head-quarters until further orders, acting as vigorously as possible against arms traffic.

Should you receive a telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas asking for assistance, you will proceed to that port at once, informing the Senior Naval Officer at Muscat of your movements and repeating to him the wire you may have received.

I am proceeding to Muscat to hand over the duties of Senior Naval Officer to Captain A. T. Hunt, of His Majesty's ship "Fox," who is due there at daylight on the 20th February.

(Signed) FREDERIC G. BIRD,

Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division.

The Commanding Officer,

His Majesty's Ship "Redbreast."



[11680]

No. 510.

*The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)*

Dear Mr. Mallet,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, March 26, 1909.

I AM much obliged for your letter of the 25th instant, and note the contents. I quite agree with Sir George Barclay's views in reference to the purchase of land on Abadan Island.

I inclose, for your information, translation of a telegram sent by the Board to our Bushire office on the 24th instant, at the request of Mr. J. R. Preece, for the Concessions Syndicate (Limited).

Yours very truly,  
(Signed) T. JACKSON.

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Inclosure in No. 510.

*Imperial Bank of Persia, London, to its Bushire Office (at request of Mr. Preece).*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

March 24, 1909.

AT the request of Concessions Syndicate, communicate the following to British Consul-General, Bushire:—

"Foreign Office instructed British Minister, Tehran, authorize you to assist land acquisition if requested by Reynolds. When may we expect your assistance?"

P.S.—You will bear in mind that the above is Mr. Preece's telegram, not ours—we merely wired the message at his request.

[11754]

No. 511.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 173.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, March 27, 1909.

TEHRAN telegram No. 193 [of the 25th March: Situation in Persia].

I have addressed a Memorandum to Minister asking him to agree to instructions being sent to the two Representatives to give the Shah fully to understand that if there be a Russian intervention he would gain nothing by it, and that it may lead to his dethronement if he persists in his present policy, which exposes his personal position to grave risks. I also added in a private letter that it would be well if the Russian Chargé d'Affaires were instructed to associate himself with His Majesty's Minister in asking for recall of Rahim Khan and to hold Persian Government responsible for all losses caused by that Chief and his adherents to Russian and British interests in North Persia.

[11728]

No. 512.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 198.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, March 27, 1909.

IN view of delay in our representations and of precarious situation at Tabreez, and in order, if possible, to prevent a massacre should it surrender, I propose, with your approval, in concert with my Russian colleague, who is also requesting authorization, to urge upon the Shah the advisability in his own interest of treating Tabreez with moderation, pointing out that any excesses will exasperate his people and destroy all hope of reconciliation.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

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[11454]

No. 513\*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 114.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, March 27, 1909.*

PLEASE transmit the following by telegraph to His Majesty's Resident at Bushire:—

"With reference to the despatch from Consul MacDouall No. 1, Commercial, of the 6th February, His Majesty's Government are favourably disposed in principle towards giving encouragement to British capitalists of good standing who may desire, for *bona fide* commercial purposes, to lease lands; but they are not in favour of endeavouring, in anticipation of a possible demand arising in the future for the use of the Sheikh's land, to secure preferential rights of purchase or lease over them.

"I shall be glad, before proceeding further in the matter, to be furnished with any suggestions which, after consulting Sir G. Barclay, you may wish to offer."

[11577]

No. 513.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, March 27, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 197 [of 26th March: "Bastis" in Turkish Embassy].  
Action approved.

[11759]

No. 514.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 199.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 28, 1909.*

SHEIKH of Mohammerah.

Major Cox had already gone back to Bushire before I received your telegram No. 109 of the 25th instant. His reason for returning was that he wished to avoid being out of touch with the other parts of the Gulf, and he found that the Sheikh was on the point of leaving Mohammerah for Ahwaz.

The results of his visit are shown in the following extracts from his telegram No. 66/251, which I received yesterday:—

The Sheikh was much worried when Major Cox saw him, as he is being pressed very strongly to embrace the Nationalist cause from Nejef and elsewhere, and the fact that he is unable to telegraph to the Shah or the Government without his messages being censored at Ispahan increases the difficulty of his position.

According to the Sheikh, the recent events at Bushire and Bunder Abbas had rendered the situation at Mohammerah very much more difficult, and he feared that his outlying ports, such as Dilam, Himdeam, &c., might now suffer at the hands of unruly Nationalist levies.

The Sheikh continued that he could not remain inactive very much longer, and that he must soon do something in order to save his face both with the Shah's Government and the Nationalist party, unless Major Cox could give him an assurance of His Majesty's Government's effective support in resisting the Nationalists, and would protect him from the results of his action in so doing.

Major Cox, in reply, said that it was not in his power to give such a guarantee as he asked for. The Sheikh then explained that the resentment of the Nationalists would be unrestrainable if the receipts of the customs continued to be forwarded to Tehran; that, as he was the head of the Mohammerah Customs, he would be held responsible for the receipts; and that, unless we could give him definite advice or intervene on his behalf, he would be forced to request the Belgian Director of Customs to hold back the receipts in the custom-house premises under an adequate guard until the situation had improved.

*Part II.*—The assurances which the Sheikh hopes to obtain from His Majesty's Government are—

1. That His Majesty's Government will not allow the *status quo* in regard to himself or his successors to be disturbed by any Persian régime, whether absolute or constitutional;

2. That, as long as he fulfils his obligations to us, we ourselves will not disturb it; and

3. That any attempt on the part of any one else to do so will be opposed by His Majesty's Government.

As the Sheikh realized from Major Cox's replies that he could not expect a dynastic guarantee, he earnestly begged that the assurances given him might be made to include his immediate offspring, on the condition, of course, of their giving us satisfaction. He stated he was prepared to answer for the tribal Sheikh's concurrence.

*Part III.*—The Sheikh's apprehensions have been allayed in regard to the question of the Karun irrigation. Sir W. Willecocks, with whom I discussed the scheme fully, is preparing a Memorandum for me embodying his conclusions. *Prima facie*, he thinks that the Sheikh's date gardens on Abadan Island and the Shat-el-Arab will be injuriously affected by the project.

*Part IV.*—Loan to the Sheikh. For the present the Sheikh will be satisfied with



an assurance from His Majesty's Government that they will be prepared to grant him a loan on suitable terms, and that he will not be obliged to turn to any one else. He is now searching for the old Firmans on which his tenure is based, and until they are found the nature of the security or *quid pro quo* to be given by him cannot be determined. It is suggested that a lien on the works as they progressed would be a possible form of security should the Sheikh undertake with our assistance an irrigation or other utilitarian scheme.

I am informed privately by Major Cox that for the moment the Sheikh feels reassured and is reasonable.

I am repeating your telegram No. 109 to Major Cox, and am asking him whether, having regard to its terms, he considers it desirable to make any further communication to the Sheikh. I see no objection to the Sheikh's proposed action in regard to the customs receipts, and I am informing Major Cox of my view.

[11760] No. 515.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 28, 1909.*

SANI-ED-DOWLEH.

Sani-ed-Dowleh, a prominent Nationalist, and late Minister of Finance, who believed that his life was in imminent danger, has taken refuge here. I have accepted him, as I think he had good reason to fear for his life.

I shall get him out of the country as soon as possible, and I am obtaining the necessary assurances for him.

I have duly informed my Russian colleague.

[11761] No. 516.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 201.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 28, 1909.*

COSSACK Brigade.

My Russian colleague tells me that, according to a Russian newspaper, Colonel Liakhoff is no longer in the Russian service. M. Sabline has no official confirmation of this statement, but he says that a private telegram has been received by Liakhoff, which may be the forerunner of an official intimation of his removal.

M. Sabline appears to think that the Russian Government intend by this step to place Liakhoff exclusively in the service of the Shah, but he doubts whether, under these conditions, Liakhoff would remain in Tehran.

[11762] No. 517.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 202.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 28, 1909.*

AIN-ED-DOWLEH'S seizure of money remitted to Tabreez.

Ain-ed-Dowleh has seized 7,000 tomans of money which Messrs. Ziegler and Stevens were imprudent enough to send to Tabreez. Another 5,000 tomans now on the way will probably also be seized.

I am reminding Ain-ed-Dowleh of my threat to attack his house, and I am using the strongest language to the Persian Government in the dim hope of saving the latter sum.

Messrs. Ziegler and Stevens must have been fully alive to the rashness of their action, and I have suitably admonished them.

[11763]

No. 518.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 203.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 28, 1909.*

NATIONALIST movement.

My telegram No. 199 of to-day's date.

A joint telegram to the Shah, professing loyalty, but urging him to grant a Constitution, has been sent by the Sheikh of Mohammerah, the Governor of Arabistan, and Sardar Assad.

[11764]

No. 519.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 204.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 28, 1909.*

MESHED situation.

His Majesty's Consul-General reported by telegraph yesterday that Russian subjects and the inhabitants of Meshed were engaged in street-fighting. Casualties occurred. The Russian Consul-General declined to state in writing that these men were not his subjects or to allow the authorities to deal with them themselves. Major Sykes thought that he was waiting for an excuse to call in troops from Russia.

Major Sykes' reports make it clear that the Russian Consul-General has no hold over these men.

M. Sabline, whom I have just seen, tells me that his Consul-General has not reported these disorders.

[11765]

No. 520.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 205.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 28, 1909.*

SITUATION at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram No. 55 from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez.

"I am informed by a prominent Nationalist that in three weeks at the most the provisions in Tabreez will be completely exhausted.

"Further, he states that, in order to force on intervention, a project to attack a foreign Consulate is on foot. Bagher Khan supports this plan.

"It is hardly likely that this will be put into execution, but for a mob of desperate and starving men who fear the worst from surrender it is not impossible.

"Should negotiations for a capitulation on terms be opened, do you wish me take part if I am invited to do so? If so, it is essential for their success that the Russian Consul-General should leave, and that Mr. Miller should do the Russian part. M. Pokhitonow is still in charge, and has not yet said when he is leaving."

Following is my reply to Mr. Wratislaw:—

"There is no objection that I can see to your taking part in the negotiations if in concert with the Russian Consul, but of course, should any question of guarantees arise, you should ask for instructions. A day or two ago I was told by M. Sabline that he was urging that M. Pokhitonow should leave immediately. I shall ask him to press St. Petersburg again for his departure."

[11728]

No. 521.

[Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 28, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 198 [of 27th March: Tabreez].

Proposed action approved.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[11794]

No. 522.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 178.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, March 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire*, which I have addressed to the Russian Government, respecting telegraph lines in Persia, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 323 of the 17th instant.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 522.

*Aide-mémoire.*

HIS Majesty's Embassy would wish to inform the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs that it was thought desirable in the negotiations which are proceeding between the Persian Government and the Indo-European Telegraph Department to seek to acquire the right for the latter to co-operate in the construction and maintenance of any extension of the Arabistan telegraph lines. His Majesty's Embassy would desire to inquire of the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs if it has any objection to the step which the Indo-European Telegraph Department has taken, it being, of course, clearly understood that the right above mentioned would be waived in the event of the telegraph lines being extended into the Russian sphere.

In connection with the question of Persian telegraphs, His Majesty's Embassy would further wish to inform the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it is quite possible that the Persian Minister of Telegraphs will urge on the Indo-European Telegraph Department to proceed to the construction of a second line to Shahrud. It might be undesirable in the present stage of the negotiations regarding the Arabistan telegraph lines to meet this request, if it were made, by a direct refusal, as thereby the negotiations might be jeopardized. His Majesty's Embassy would therefore be glad to know if the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs would wish the Indo-European Telegraph Department to undertake preliminary work, which could be abandoned when the negotiations as to the Arabistan telegraph lines were completed.

His Majesty's Embassy would be grateful if the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs would kindly give a reply at its earliest convenience.

St. Petersburg, March 5 (18), 1909.

[11795]

No. 523.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 180.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, March 20, 1909.

M. ISVOLSKY informed me yesterday that Colonel Liakhoff and the other Russian officers in the Persian service had been placed on the retired list of the Russian army.

The Minister of War had, he said, contemplated this step for some time past, as it was undesirable that Russian officers in the service of a foreign country should continue on the active list.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[11849]

No. 524.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 206.)

Sir,

Constantinople, March 23, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van respecting affairs on the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 524.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2.)

Sir,

Van, February 24, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency some information on the affairs over the Persian frontier.

Owing to petty jealousies between the Ferik, the Commandant of Hamidieh, and the Vali, the order to disarm the Hamidieh had not been carried out. Profiting by this show of weakness on the part of the Government, the bands of Hamidieh of the Milan, Shekifti, and Mukuri asshirets, on three separate occasions have crossed into Persia, aiding the reactionaries and pillaging the villages in the Salmas district. Most of these villages appear to be in a pitiable condition, alternately oppressed by the revolutionaries of Khoi and Dilliman, and pillaged and massacred by the reactionaries of the Khan of Maku and his lieutenant, Simco Agha.

Accurate information as to what has passed there is impossible to obtain here, but it would appear that the reactionaries have been very active lately, and have killed a large number of the villagers round Khoi and Salmas. What is certain is that the three bands of Turkish Kurds returned with large quantities of loot in each case. This fact—of the Turkish Hamidieh Kurds helping the Persian reactionaries—seems to have woken up the Young Turks. The result is that the disarmament is being proceeded with in haste, and large numbers of the marauding Kurd Aghas and men have been arrested and are now in prison.

I have strong reasons for believing that this change of policy towards the Kurds has been brought about by the action of the Ittihat of Constantinople with a view to helping the revolutionists in Azerbaijan.

In October last, a certain Young Turk, Nedji Bey, a Delegate of the Ittihat, and a Persian revolutionist, Said, passed through Van, coming from Tabreez on their way to Constantinople. These two, accompanied by some others, returned to Van some three weeks ago, coming via Erzeroum. Two days ago they left here, it was said, to go to Mossul. However, they have gone to Serai, travelling by night, with ten loads of the best rifles captured from the Armenian "fedai" this time last year. These arms, which were in the magazine here, were handed over to Nedji Bey on his authority as Delegate of the Ittihat. Nedji Bey, Said, and a certain Halil Eff are to be met at Serai by another party of young officers and adventurers coming from Erzeroum; altogether they will form a party of some fifty, of whom, I understand, some twenty come from Constantinople, some twelve from Erzeroum, and some three from Van. I understand that Nedji Bey has orders, or at least permission from the Ittihat, to organize aid for the Persian revolutionaries. Everything that has been done so far has been entirely in secret, and although the Vali and Ferik may know about it, it is unofficially.

Nedji Bey's object is to combine with Samson and his band of Tashmak "fedai" already in Salmas, to protect the Khoi Salmas district, and to pay special attention to Simco.

Here at Van there was some question of sending Hamidieh Kurds, with a padding of Turkish troops and officers disguised as Kurds, to make a raid on the Khan of Maku. This, however, was rejected.

The Vali and the civil employes are in no way connected with this affair, and for this reason I do not connect it with the other intrigues of the Government to obtain the Salmas district; however, it is probable that if the reactionaries get the upper hand in Salmas, there will be a serious massacre there, as the feeling between the parties is bitter, the Kurd reactionaries are brutal savages, and the revolutionists are weak and badly armed. In the event of this, it is possible that the Turks will feel obliged to



occupy the district out of common humanity. They have already sent small detachments of troops to Khoi Salmas and Urmi, at the request of residents of these places, as a protection for Turkish subjects, and I am told that many of the townspeople of these towns are buying passports so as to pose as Turkish subjects. I understand that there is a good deal of dissension among the Persian revolutionists in these districts. They have no strong leader or able men among them, and the people say their rule is just as corrupt as the Shah's.

In the last few days a great blow has been struck at the Kurds in this vilayet.

Under the old régime, all complaints against Hamidieh Kurds were dealt with by the military authorities, where they were regularly pigeon-holed. Last October the Hamidieh were brought under the authority of the Civil Courts for civil offences. A fortnight ago the order arrived from Constantinople that all complaints against Hamidieh Kurds were to be dealt with by the Public Prosecutor. On this the Commandant of Hamidieh sent the accumulated complaints of fifteen years to the Public Prosecutor, who is now busy sorting them and having the Kurds inculpated arrested. Every day Kurds arrive under arrest, and the barracks have had to be turned into a prison for them. The Chiefs of practically every asshiret will soon be in prison. At present Hussein Pasha, Ali Bey, Mehmed Bey, Mustafa Bey, all of the Haideranli, Hussein Bey of the Mukuri, Negib Bey of the Takuri, Mehmed Bey of the Milan, and Sadun Bey of the Shemsiki, are all in prison. All these men are Colonels of Hamidieh regiments. Beside them there is a crowd of other Aghas, Majors, Captains, and other smaller fry.

The idea at present is that their cases are to be dealt with by the Civil Courts here. Many are for assassinations, murders, burning villages, brigandage, &c., some being fifteen or more years old. The effect on the Kurds so far is wholesome, but as the Aghas are all bringing large sums of money to Van things may change. It seems unreasonable that after the amnesty of last summer the Kurds should be prosecuted for ancient crimes, and I shall be astonished if some order to release them does not soon arrive.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,  
Captain, R.H.A.

[11988] No. 525.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)*

(No. 203.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, March 29, 1909.*  
RUSSIAN Consul-General at Tabreez.  
M. Pokhitonow has been instructed to leave Tabreez by M. Sabline.

[11989] No. 526.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)*

(No. 207.)  
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, March 29, 1909.*  
REVOLUTIONARY movement.  
M. Sabline informs me that Mashad-i-sar and Astrabad have been seized by the Caucasians under Panoff, the Bulgarian ex-Komitaji, mentioned in my telegram No. 127 of the 1st instant.

[13337] No. 527.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)*

(No. 45.)  
Sir, *Tehran, March 4, 1909.*  
WITH reference to my despatch No. 266 of the 2nd October, 1908, I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz regarding the Shellilieh property leased to Messrs. Lynch Brothers by Sheikh Morteza. The despatch incloses a clear statement by Messrs. Lynch's agent of the cases respectively

of Sheikh Morteza and Muin-et-Tujjar, based on documents in the possession of the former, and certified copies of documents communicated to this Legation by Muin-et-Tujjar. Although these papers on examination show Muin-et-Tujjar's case to be very weak, I do not see my way to taking action in Tehran as desired by Messrs. Lynch. Representations with a view to compelling the Muin to drop his claim would naturally be met with the reply that the Legation has no *locus standi* in the case of disputed property between two Persian subjects, the settlement of which belongs properly to the Shari Courts. At the most our action could only be unofficial, and this would certainly not achieve the desired result.

A few weeks ago Muin-et-Tujjar called on me in connection with this case, and expressed his desire to arrive at a settlement. After some discussion it was agreed that Muin-et-Tujjar should appoint an agent with full powers locally to represent his interests in this matter; that Sheikh Morteza should, if returned from the Haj within a reasonable time, say two months, be urged by Captain Lorimer himself to bring his case before a competent Tribunal, or should his absence be prolonged, likewise to appoint an agent with full powers; that the case should be heard at Ahwaz; that Messrs. Lynch should be enjoined by Captain Lorimer to take no part in the proceedings in any manner whatsoever. Finally, and after considerable hesitation, Muin-et-Tujjar agreed that a Representative from His Majesty's Consulate at Ahwaz should be deputed to attend the proceedings on the express stipulation that he held a watching brief only and had no voice in them.

Muin-et-Tujjar expressed indifference as to the character of the Court before which the case would be heard, and left the choice between a Committee of Arbitrators or a Shari Court to the other party.

I duly informed Captain Lorimer of this arrangement, and asked him to take the necessary steps to accelerate the hearing of the case.

Captain Lorimer's despatch of the 19th January was written before he received these instructions, and he has since telegraphed to me stating that no means of forming a Shari Court nor trustworthy arbitrators exist in Ahwaz. I could hardly retreat from my agreement with the Muin on this bare statement, but I have explained to Captain Lorimer that should Sheikh Morteza, on his return from the pilgrimage which he is performing, and Muin-et-Tujjar's agent, after discussing the two alternative methods of local settlement, decide that it is impossible to constitute a Shari Court at Ahwaz and find it impossible to agree upon arbitrators, I shall be prepared to reconsider the question of the locality in which the inquiry is to be held.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 527.

*Consul Lorimer to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 2/33. Confidential.)  
Sir,

*Ahwaz, January 1, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 266, dated the 2nd October, 1908, to His Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, referring to the question of the construction of a store at Shalaili by Messrs. Lynch Brothers, of which I received a copy through His Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, Bushire, I have the honour to report that Mr. Parry, Messrs. Lynch Brothers' Agent at Bussorah, had an interview with me on the subject on the 28th December last.

2. Sheikh Murtaza is at present absent on the Haj, and Mr. Parry appeared to entertain no hopes of his being able to take any useful action if he were here. Mr. Parry was further of opinion that there would be practically no chance of obtaining a fair judgment from any local Court, and Sheikh Murtaza's party, I understand, declare that there is no one in Arabistan competent to constitute a Shari Court, and that it would be necessary to have the cause heard at Najaf.

3. Mr. Parry was obviously anxious that the case should be finally settled in Tehran, and not locally, and he suggested that I should personally collect independent local evidence as to the ownership of the site. To this I demurred, on the ground that having no position as arbitrator, whatever evidence I might collect could only be treated as of an *ex parte* character, in which case it would be better collected by himself, and that in the circumstances the evidence which I might collect was just as likely to be adverse as favourable to Messrs. Lynch's contentions. To this he assented.

[1629]

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After further discussion he left, promising to address me in writing, which he has now done in the letter, a copy of which I attach herewith.

4. His letter appears to me to state the case clearly and correctly as it stands at present, and the logical conclusion is that the Muin-ut-Tujjar, in the documents which he has submitted, has failed to show that he has any *prima facie* case.

His claims repose merely on the suppositious ownership of the land by three individuals, whose heirs appear as disposing in one way or another of the property, but whose title to its ownership is in no way established.

Messrs. Lynch's claims, on the other hand, are based on a Firman of the Shah, confirming the possession of the Shalaili lands on three Saiyas, grandsons of Haji Sheikh J'afar, and on the subsequent disposal of the property of these individuals. These facts will be found to be confirmed by a perusal of the documents put in by the Muin and Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers' contention is that on this showing it should be possible in Tehran to compel the Muin to drop his claims and withdraw his opposition, or to secure the support of the Persian Government against them.

5. The probability of reaching a successful issue locally is small, as it is difficult to conceive of any locally assembled Court where the Muin would not be able to dictate the Decree, and a decision once given, I presume that in the absence of any system of appeal the position would have to be regarded as final.

I think, therefore, that if there is any hope of being able to push the matter through in Tehran, it would be well that action should be taken there; and the Muin-ut-Tujjar's case, as presented, appears to afford sound ground on which to base a very strong demand that Messrs. Lynch Brothers should be relieved of the consequences of this factitious and indefensible opposition on the part of the Muin.

In any case it would scarcely appear reasonable to oblige Messrs. Lynch to fight a cause where no Court exists, and where no *prima facie* case has been shown against them, in circumstances where there is every prospect of the abuse of justice by whoever may be appointed arbitrators.

Should, however, Messrs. Lynch Brothers attempt to obtain a judgment locally, if that judgment were adverse, would His Majesty's Legation be prepared to demand redress for them on the grounds of a patent miscarriage of justice?

It would be adding insult to injury were the Muin to carry the day on the strength of a purely baseless case. If he is to win, it is better that he should do so on some semblance of the principles of justice, such as might conceivably be provided by some improvement on his claims as at present submitted.

6. The importance of obtaining a satisfactory settlement of this matter has received an extraneous addition by the strong tone which was earlier adopted in regard to it by His Majesty's Legation, in illustration of which I would cite the written assurance in vernacular given by it to Sheikh Murtaza, and shown by him to me in May, and the letter from His Majesty's Consul at Muhammerah to Messrs. Lynch Brothers, dated the 10th February, copy attached, in view of which I made very strong representations in person to the Sheikh of Muhammerah at Ahwaz in April last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) D. L. R. LORIMER, Captain.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 527.

Consul McDouall to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Gentlemen,

February 10, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 2, dated the 6th January, regarding the Shellili shed, I have the honour to inform you that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Legation to the effect that they sent a communication to the Persian Government at the end of December stating that the ownership of the ground on which the shed is being erected is unquestionable, that approval of contract by Persian Government is unnecessary, and requesting that Lynch be not interfered with in the exercise of their rights. They further instruct me to telegraph should you be interfered with.

On this I would advise your proceeding with the building without delay, and advising me at once if any objection is raised.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. McDOWALL.

#### Inclosure 3 in No. 527.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Consul Lorimer.

Sir,

Bussorah, January 4, 1909.

WITH reference to our interview of the 28th ultimo regarding the arrangements made by us with Sheikh Murtaza and Seyyid Muhamed Tabatabayee for the leasing of a store to be erected by us on their behalf at the landing-place known as the Cham at Shellilieh, the ownership of which property is now being disputed by the Mouin-ut-Tujjar, I have the honour to submit to you, for your consideration, particulars of the case and our views of the documents submitted to His Majesty's Legation at Tehran by the Mouin-ut-Tujjar in support of his claim.

1. Before the formation of the Persian Transport Company we had made unsuccessful efforts to obtain permission to lease a store to be erected at the Cham at Shellilieh, and in the year 1898 the Sirdar Akram, then Governor-General of Arabistan, agreed to build a store for us on this land, but owing to certain restrictions regarding the river frontage unacceptable to us, the negotiations fell through.

Again in 1904 fresh negotiations were opened by Sir Arthur Hardinge on behalf of the Persian Transport Company with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, which culminated in a draft Agreement being drawn up for the same purpose, but the objectionable restrictions were inserted, with the result that nothing was done. Since then negotiations between the owners of the land—Seyyid Mohamed Tabatabayee, son of Haji Seyyid Abdullah Tabatabayee, deceased, and his cousin, Sheikh Murtaza, and ourselves—terminated in an Agreement to erect and leave to us a store on their property the Cham at Shellilieh. The Mouin-ut-Tujjar now disputes the title of Seyyid Mohamed and Sheikh Murtaza to the ownership of the land.

2. Seyed Mohammed Tabatabayee and his two brothers Agha Mostapha and Seyed Hashem inherited the property known as Shellilieh which includes the Cham, or boat-landing place, from their father Haji Seyed Abdullah Tabatabayee, brother-in-law to the late Sheikh Mohammed Ali, Chief Mujtahed at Shushter, Seyed Mohammed taking one moiety and his two brothers one moiety in equal shares.

3. In the year 1305 the Nizam-es-Sultanah, then Governor-General of Arabistan, owing to some differences with Sheikh Mohammed Ali, Chief Mujtahed at Shushter, and father-in-law\* to Seyed Abdullah, seized the property and gave it to the Imam Jumei.

Against this action Sheikh Mohammed Ali successfully appealed to Naser-i-din-Shah who issued a Firman in the year 1307 (document No. 1) reinstating Seyed Mohammed Tabatabayee and his two brothers in the ownership of the land.

This Firman is dated Jemad-ul-Akbar 1307, and it states that the property of Shellilieh and its dependencies belonged to Seyed Abdullah Tabatabayee for many years, and confirms the ownership as vested in his heirs.

Seyed Mohammed and his brothers jointly enjoyed undisturbed possession of the property until the year 1314 when they mutually agreed to divide it among themselves, and executed a deed in the same year (document No. 2). This deed defines the boundaries of the division and shows a portion of the Cham to belong to Seyed Mohammed.

4. From these documents, and from the evidence gathered in negotiating with the Persian Government officials for the leasing of a store at the Cham, we maintain that the right to lease rests either with the Persian Government or with the recognized owners in possession, viz.: the heirs-at-law of Seyed Abdullah Tabatabayee.

In our negotiations with the Government officials no question of the proprietorship of the land was raised, and until we concluded arrangements with Seyed Mohammed and Sheikh Murtaza their title to the ownership of the land was never disputed by the Mouin-ut-Tujjar.

5. The Mouin-ut-Tujjar has produced two documents in support of his claim. They are—

(a.) A deed transferring two-thirds of the Shellilieh lands, said to belong to a number of Kalantari Seyids, to a certain Seyid Muhamed Javad, on condition that he erected a store for public benefit, dated 1310, subsequently transferred from Seyid

\* ? Brother-in-law.



Muhammed Javad to Haji Muhammed Hassan Alum, the Mouin-ut-Tujjar agent at Shushter, in the year 1319 (document No. 3).

(b.) A deed executed by the same Kalantari Seyids transferring the same property to Haji Muhammed Hassan Alum as agent of the Mouin-ut-Tujjar, dated 1319 (document No. 4). Deeds (A) and (B) are based on a title-deed, said to be many years old, which was found by the Kalantari Seyids and handed to the Mouin-ut-Tujjar, who also purchased from Seyid Muhammed Javad deed (A) for 1,000 krans some years ago.

The building constructed by Seyid Muhammed Javad in accordance with the terms of deed (A) having been destroyed by an inundation, it was no longer of use to him.

By means of this document the Mouin-ut-Tujjar obtained permission from the Persian Government to build a store on the Cham, but he did not commence to build at once; moreover, he left Seyid Muhammed Tabatabayee and his brothers in undisturbed possession of the property until the year 1905. In that year the Sardar Mukarram was Governor-General of Arabistan, and, owing to some quarrel between him and the Shushter people, he drove the family of the late Sheikh Muhammed Ali, of which Seyid Muhammed Tabatabayee and Sheikh Murtaza were members, out of Shushter. The Mouin-ut-Tujjar seized the opportunity to build the store and obtained the support of the Sardar Mukarram.

On the dismissal of Sardar Mukarram, the family of Sheikh Muhammed Ali returned to Shushter, and Seyid Abdullah's heirs immediately claimed their right to the land on which the store had been built.

In order to overcome this claim, the Mouin-ut-Tujjar, through his agent, Haji Muhammed Hassan Alum, purchased from Agha Seyid Mustapha and Seyid Hashem, brothers to Seyid Muhammed, for the sum of 3,000 krans, their portion of the Shellilieh lands, under a deed dated 1325 (document No. 5).

This deed clearly states that Seyid Mustapha and Hashem are the sons of the late Seyid Abdullah Tabatabayee, and defines the boundaries of the portion of the Cham acquired.

This deed has not been produced by the Mouin-ut-Tujjar in support of his claim.

We submit that—

1. The deed which the Kalantari Seyids base their title to the property has been superseded by the Firman issued by Naser-i-din-Shah in the year 1307, or it is a deed not relating to the Shellilieh property; consequently it affords no support to Mouin-ut-Tujjar's claim.

2. If the deed gives a good title the Mouin-ut-Tujjar would have no reason to purchase the shares of the property from Seyid Muhammed's brothers, as it would already have been in his possession as the rightful owner.

3. If Seyid Muhammed's brothers are the rightful heirs of a portion of the property, it establishes the fact that Seyid Muhammed is also an heir to a portion of the property; moreover, it confirms the agreement made between all the brothers in 1314 dividing the land.

4. The division of the property sold to the Mouin-ut-Tujjar by the deed executed in 1325, and the fact that the portion belonging to Seyid Muhammed Tabatabayee is not part of the land referred to in the deed sold to the Mouin-ut-Tujjar (document No. 3) is confirmed by a telegram sent to the Mouin-ut-Tujjar through Mr. Churchill, of the British Legation at Tehran, in June 1905 by the Kalantari Seyids (document No. 6).

Should it be necessary to obtain further local evidence to enable you to arrive at an equitable judgment in this case, we shall do our best to afford all the assistance in our power to obtain it; we foresee that any such evidence, however carefully sifted, would be biased in favour of the Mouin-ut-Tujjar, whose relative position in connection with a dispute to be decided locally is all-powerful.

The history of our efforts to obtain a suitable building at Shellilieh for our business conclusively proves that as long as we dealt with the Persian authorities no question of the ownership of the land was raised, but as soon as we commenced negotiations with the recognized owners the Mouin-ut-Tujjar took steps to formulate a claim to the portion of the land to be leased to us.

We can therefore only believe that the claim he sets up is an illegitimate one solely directed against us.

While having no desire to embarrass the Mouin-ut-Tujjar in his business, we venture to hope that the strong support extended to us by His Majesty's Legation when first we disclaimed the title to the property leased to us as being in the rightful

possession of Seyid Muhammed and Sheikh Murtaza, will be continued in resisting what we consider a fraudulent attempt to impede our efforts in developing an enterprise useful to the Persian public and to the interests of British trade.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. W. PARRY,  
Manager for Lynch Brothers.

Inclosure 4 in No. 527.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers' Case.

Document No. 1.

(Translation.)

By the name of the Almighty and the beloved place of the Blessed Seal.

WHEREAS, the benevolent and kind heart of His Imperial Majesty is always disposed towards the most respected and eminent Alims and Seyeds, therefore, the proprietorship of the village of Shellieli situated in the Mayanab of Shushter, which for many years belonged to the late Haji Seyid Abdullah Tabatabayee, had been graciously granted last year to Agha Seyid Mohammed, the eldest son of the above-named deceased Haji Seyid-Abdullah, but is this year of Oodeel in pursuance of an application from his Eminence Agha Sheikh Muhammed Ali Mujtehid and the said Agha Seyid Muhammed, and with a view to protect the right of all the heirs of the late Seyid, who are grandsons of the late Haji Sheikh Jaffar Shushteri Mujtehid, may God forgive his sins and bless his ashes, an order has been graciously issued that the said village of Shellieli with its dependencies should remain absolute property of all the sons of the above-named deceased, viz. :—

Agha Seyid Muhammed, half of the property.

Agha Seyid Hashem, and Agha Seyid Mustafa, jointly half of the property.

To pay the Government the revenue of the said village every year, and considering this property with all its dependencies as their own freehold property they can do with all what a proprietor would do, such as to sell and buy, to transfer, make over, and give it as gift, &c., and to exert their best effort and do all what is necessary for the prosperity of the village, and all the present and future Governors of Shushter have to consider same as the property of the above-named gentlemen for ever and allow them to enjoy the benefit of same, and all the high Government officials and clerks have to keep this property out of the High General Register and consider same as our property, to show which this Firman has been granted under the brilliant seal and registered in the month of Jemad-ul-Akher 1370 (1307).

This copy is compared with the original.

(Signed) ABDUL HUSSEIN.

(Seal.)

To collect the sum of 73 tomans and 8,000 dinars being revenue of the village of Shellieli situated in the Mayanab of Shushter which by a Firman was given over last year to his Honour Agha Seyid Mohammed, son of the late Haji Seyid Abdullah and by the present Firman has been, this year given to all the three sons of the deceased in accordance with an application submitted by his Eminence Agha Sheikh Mohammed Ali.

Document No. 2.

(Translation.)

This is to state that as the Shellilieh field, inclusive of Gala (fort) and its oelongings, being owned in partnership by Agha Seyid Mohammed, the eldest son of Haji Seyid Abdullah Tabatabai, and his two brothers, Haji Seyid Hashem and Agha Seyid Mostapha, who intended to divide the said lands and belongings into individual ownership amongst themselves, the division was arranged and distinguished in presence of people of good experience, according to the following terms:—

That the upper portion, viz., the Gala and cornfields, be owned by Haji Seyid



Hashem and his brother, Seyed Mostafa, with the exception of the portion of the Cham where the steamer enters, the limit of the said portions are as follows:—

On the west to the Gala of the late Haji Abdul Monem Alum.

On the south-west to the Chahardonge stream and cliffs adjoining to the Cham of the late Haji Seyed Mohammed Amin.

On the east to the Abd Ali highway, which is included in this portion, and which has not been a common road in olden times, and below which the portion of the land in front is the dividing point.

The limits of the portion of the land owned by Agha Seyed Mohammed are as under:—

On the south-west to the Chardonge stream.

On the east to the Garche cliffs in front of the Ishgene Gol Ram Hormozi, which extends to the river.

On the west to the Abd Ali highway.

After measurement and distinction of each individual portion, the three brothers, the first of whom, viz.:—

Seyed Mohammed legally transferred all his rights and claims to the whole of the upper portion of the land, inclusive of Gala and cornfield, together with all its belongings and appurtenances fixed by legal and civil law, without any exception, even the land where his own building lies (on condition that as long as the building stands, Haji Seyed Hashem and Haji Seyed Mostafa shall have no claim to the land of the said building) with two thatched-roofed rooms which he has purchased earlier, and the wall erected there together with the total cost and expenses of same, and the expenses of the well situated in the Cham, to his two brothers, Haji Seyed Hashem and Agha Seyed Mostafa, by payments of 106 krans and 10 loaves of sugar according to the Shushter weight, which has been received, in explanation of which, should Agha Seyed Mohammed make any claim henceforward to what he has transferred to them commonly, or particularly, this Agreement will show that he has transferred the whole of the above-mentioned portion, inclusive of all its belongings without exception, to Haji Seyed Hashem and Agha Seyed Mostafa. Haji Seyed Hashem and Agha Seyed Mostafa also have legally transferred all their rights and claims to all the lower portion of the land to their brother Agha Seyed Mohammed by grant of 9 loaves of sugar according to Shushter weight, which has been received, according to which all the lower portion of the land entirely is owned by Agha Seyed Mohammed, which is excluded from partnership, and which Haji Seyed Hashem and Haji Seyed Mostafa have no right whatever to claim. This is to explain that the Abd Ali highway begins from Chardonge stream and ends at the River Abi-Gargar, and all the land beyond the aforesaid highway is included in the portion belonging to the Agha Seyed Mohammed, or in other words, all the land below Abd Ali highway, which begins and ends in the Cham where steamer anchors, is included in his portion. This Agreement was concluded on the 17th Jemadi Aval, 1314. Limitations of Cham and Abd Ali road, as the Abd Ali road was subject to mutual quarrel, it was arranged that the passage between the two portions and the dividing point of the Cham where the steamer anchors should be the cliffs in the said Cham, and that the highway be included in the portion belonging to Agha Seyed Mohammed, extending also to the cliffs.

(A. Seyed Mohamed's seal.)

(A. Seyed Hashem's seal.)

(A. Seyed Mostafa's seal.)

Testified that all the writings in the body and margin of this Agreement is correct,

(Signed) ABDULLAH MOHD. ALI.

Testified also by Mohamed Ali Ibrahim.

(Signed) MOHAMED HUSSEIN ISMAIL.

### Muin-ut-Tujjar's Case.

#### Document No. 3.

(Translation.)

In the whole of Cham lands (two portions) 450 maunds of grain can be cultivated, 200 maunds in one and 250 maunds in another, so that 108 krans (reckoned as shares) equal to 10 tumans and 8 krans has been divided between the three deceases, viz., Seid Abdul Fateh Khan, Agha Mohammed Sadegh, and Agha Mohammed Rashid, as a third each, the portion belonging to the deceased Agha Mohammed Reshid had been transferred to the deceased Haji Agha Seyed Mohammed, and the portions belonging to Seid Abdul Fateh Khan, and Agha Mohammed Sadegh have been divided amongst their heirs as under:—

	Portion.
	Krans.
Haji Seyed Mohamed .. .. .	36
Seid Abdul Fateh Khan and Agha Mohamed Sadegh .. .. .	72-108
Assadullah Khan .. .. .	4
Mohammed Nebi .. .. .	7-666
Agha Ali Reza Khan's heirs .. .. .	4
Agha Abdul Latif .. .. .	3
Agha Bezorg, son of Agha Mohammed .. .. .	834
Sultan Hussein Khan (deceased) .. .. .	3
Agha Abdul Hassan Khan and Haji Saltareh Khanum .. .. .	3
Agha Mohammed Ali and Fatema Sultan .. .. .	7-917
Agha Ali, son of Agha Sultan (deceased) .. .. .	7-500
Heirs of Agha Ali, son of Agha Yalib .. .. .	13-041
Heirs of Agha Ali, son of Agha Yalib .. .. .	13-042
Heirs of Seid Abdul Fateh Khan, son of the late Seid Mohammed Bagher Khan, who are not included amongst heirs .. .. .	5

This is to state that as the respectful Agha Seid Mohammed Javad, the son of the deceased Haji Seid Abdul Salam, known as Haji Seid Agha, had always in mind to do public benevolence, he has nowadays intended to make some public improvements, viz., construction of caravanserais, buildings, cultivation of trees and crops in the land of steamers, Cham, near Shelieli, which is one of the Mianab districts, and which is wharfage of the steamers, and the full and legal two-thirds of the said lands being in possession of the heirs of the two deceased, viz., Abul Fateh Khan and Agha Mohammed Sadegh, who have some in their possession, since, most of the said heirs, whose individual portions, together with their respectful names, are being put down on the top of this document, have due to their high-minded generosity transferred full two-thirds of their portion of the whole of their hereditary possessions to the said Seyed Mohammed Javad through transfer of half-maund (sh) of white sugar, on condition that Agha Seid Mohammed Javad have full power to construct, according to his own wish, any kind of caravanserais or other buildings for protection and safety of people's property, and cultivate any kind of trees, gardens, or crops. It is hereby understood that from this date, viz., 14th Rabi-Aval, 1310, to four full years, the transferees have no right to claim their portion of the income and profit accruing from the caravanserais, buildings, and cultivation of the said land. It is further agreed to that Agha Seid Mohammed Javad has no right at all to claim any expenses he may incur during these four years on the constructions of caravanserais and cultivation of these lands from the above-mentioned transferees. After the expiration of the four years stated all the income and crops of the two-third of the whole land, buildings, gardens, and cultivation therein will be divided between the owner and the transferees, according to their respective and defined shares, viz., two-thirds for Agha Mohammed Javad, and one-third for the heirs herein mentioned. So also after the expiration of the afore-mentioned four years all the expenses incurred on the construction of buildings, lands, gardens, and cultivation of the said lands are to be divided between and paid by the three owners and transferees each according to his portion, viz., two-thirds by Agha Seid Mohammed Javad and one-third by other two heirs.

All the above statements and conditions have been approved of, by all the parties concerned, and this document is professedly drawn up in Arabic and Persian.

For further explanations it is hereby confirmed that the two-thirds of the said land, in one piece of which 200 Shushter maunds, and in another 250 maunds of grain can be cultivated, making a total of 450 maunds for the whole lot, is being owned in partnership by the parties enumerated in this document.

This was drawn up on the 14th Rabi Aval, 1310.



## Witnesses' seals—

ASSUDULLAH KHAN.  
 MOHAMMED HASSAN, son of  
 Nemaullah.  
 HASSAN, son of Ali.  
 SHAH MOHAMMED.  
 MOHAMMED BAGHER.  
 MOHAMMED AMIN.  
 MOHAMMED ALI, son of Mo-  
 hammed Bagher.  
 SAID MOOSA.  
 KHANUM BOZORG.  
 FARAJULLAH.  
 A. MOHAMMED ALI.

SEID NEMUTULLAH.  
 MOHAMMED ZAMAN.  
 KHADIJE.  
 ABDUL KERIM.  
 MOHAMMED ALI.  
 MOHAMMED AMIN, son of Ali  
 MOHAMMED.  
 A. AHMED.  
 MOHAMMED BAGHER, son of Mohammed  
 Reza.  
 SEID ALI MOHAMMED.  
 MOHAMMED AMIN.

It is hereby explained that I have in this occasion transferred this very steamer's Cham of Shelilieh, according to particulars given within this very document, on behalf of myself and my sons, to Haji Mouin-ut-Tujjar, through transfer of one miscal of boiled sugar, received from Haji Mohammed Hassan Alam, as his agent through whom arrangements for the said transfer have been concluded.

Dated the 15th Shaval, 1319.

(Sealed) MOHAMMED BAGHER MOOSA.

I testify that all arrangements concluded in this Agreement within and in the margin are correct.

(Sealed) MOHAMMED.

Kalantaris will surely bind themselves to the provisions of the Agreement regarding their share of two-thirds.

(Sealed) (Signed) JAFFR.

This is true copy of the original as compared with the Foreign Office  
 (Sealed) MOFTAH-US-SULTAN.

## Document No. 4.

## (Translation.)

This is to state that the two pieces of land, known as Cham of Shelilieh, situated along the river called Karun, flowing along the eastern side of the town of Shushter, the western portion of which two pieces of land are above water towards the town, where 250 maunds of grain can be cultivated, the eastern portion being used now as wharfage for steamers, wherein 200 Shushter maunds of grain can be cultivated, the full and legal two-thirds of the whole of those two portions of land, together with all their belongings and appurtenances, without exception, are considered as legal estate in possession of and unquarrellingly pertaining to, the respectful Kalantari Seyed, whose names and female names are fully mentioned, and who have exercised full legal power of their possessions, on the said two-thirds. In the document wherein individual shares of the two-thirds are enumerated, which is signed and agreed to by every one of the owners, in order to facilitate the division of the shares, the shares are considered and reckoned as krans, having excluded the remaining one-third of land which is out of their possession. For the sake of explanation it will be stated that the shares are called by krans in this important deed also.

The heirs of Assadullah Khan Kalantar, the son of the late Seid Ahmad Khan:—

*Males.*—Seid Mohammed Shah Khan, Agha Hussein, Agha Mohammed Kazem Khan, Agha Mohammed Ali, Agha Mohammed Javan.

*Females.*—Fatomi Khanum, Fateh Jahan Khanum, whose portion of the whole two pieces of land is equal to 4 krans, which is divided amongst heirs in halves.

The heirs of the deceased Agha Mohammed Nebi, son of the deceased Agha Seid Farajullah Khan:—

*Males.*—Seid Tultf Ali, Seid Mehdi.

*Females.*—Khatunjan Khanum, Kulsoom Khanum, both adults, whose hereditary position is equal to 7,666 krans.

And of the said owners was the deceased Agha Ali, son of the late Agha Sultan, whose only heir is Abdul Wahab, whose share is 7,500 krans.

Another of the owners was the deceased Abdul Fath Khan, son of the late Seid Mohammed Bagher Khan, who jointly owned 5 krans of the two pieces of land belonging to his heirs as follows:—

*Males.*—Seid Abdul Hussein Khan, Agha Seid Mostafa, and Agha Seid Mohammed Mehdi.

*Females.*—Sara Begum and Sarvi Khanum.

Another of the owners was the deceased Agha Mohammed Ali, son of the deceased Seid Mohammed Bagher Khan, whose shares is 7,970 krans and whose heirs are three daughters.

Another of the owners was the deceased Abdul Latif, son of the late Seid Ahmad Khan, whose share is 6 krans and whose heirs are Sara Khanum and Saterah Khanum.

Now gave evidence Agha Mohammed Kazim Khan the son of the deceased and before-mentioned Asudullah Khan, on behalf of himself, and as agent for his brothers and sisters herein referred to, and also as legal agent on behalf of the heirs of the late Agha Mohammed Nebi, also on behalf of Agha Abdul Wahab, the son of the late Agha Ali Agha Sultan, Agha Seid Abdul Hussein Khan on behalf of himself and as agent for his brothers and sisters, also Agha Mustafa, the son of the deceased Abdul Fath Khan, on behalf of the three daughters of Agha Mohammed Ali, and legally transferred to Agha Mohammed Hassan, deem the whole of their portion and those for whom they were acting as agents as stated, through transfer of 320 krans being equal to 320 krans, which was received in Mejlis inaugurated for this transfer were made on receipt of above amount.

Another of the owners was the deceased Agha Reza Ali Khan, son of the deceased Seid Ahmad Khan who owns 4 krans and whose heirs are two sons, Seid Hussein Ali who legally transferred his portion, viz., 2 krans, in the same Mejlis, through 20 krans cash, which he received after legal confessions for the said transfer were made; and the said Agha Khan Baba, whose heir Agha Mohammed Reza, possessing 2 krans, this Agha Mohammed Reza owns his mother's portion also, being the daughter of the deceased Agha, son of Agha Talib, and whose share being 13'040 krans, therefore Agha Mohammed Reza own 15'04 krans in all.

Another of the owners was the deceased Agha Seid Nematullah, known as Agha Bozorg, the son of the deceased Agha Mohamed Khan, whose share is 0'834 krans, i.e., about  $\frac{3}{4}$  krans and some cents, and whose heir is one son, Agha Hussein, and two daughters, Fatouie Khanum and Zeinab Begum, and the other was the deceased Agha Ali, the son of the deceased Agha Talib, possessing 13'041 krans, whose heirs are one son, Agha Hassan, and one daughter, Fatouie Khanum, who has according to the present deed, written and sealed by Mulla Jaffar, Sharaff-ed-Din, being sealed and testified by many known persons, transferred her portion and her brother, Agha Hassan.

Now accordingly gave evidence Agha Mohammed Reza, and Agha Hussein, son of the deceased Agha Seid Bozorg, and transferred their portions in this way. Agha Mohammed Reza transferred his portion, inherited by him from his father and mother, being equal to 15'040 krans, to Haji Mohammed Hassan Alam, through 155 krans received by Agha Mohammed Reza, and necessary confessions for the said transfer were made; and Agha Hussein, son of the deceased Seid Bozorg, and transferred on his behalf, and on behalf of his two sisters, their portions of the aforesaid purchaser, through 10 krans received by him, after making necessary confessions for the said transfer.

Another of the owners was the deceased Agha Sultan Hussein Khan, the son of the deceased Agha Nasrullah, whose heir is Agha Mohammed Zaman, and whose portion from the said lands is 3 krans; and the other was the deceased Agha Abdul Hassan, the son of Agha Nasrullah, and his sister, the deceased Hajieh Sater Khanum, whose two portions are equal to 3 krans. . it is to be stated that the portion

belonging to the deceased Agha Abdul Hassan is transferred to his sister herein mentioned; therefore all the 3 krans belonging to him have been legally transferred to his heirs, Haji Agha Seid Mohammed, Agha Seid Nematullah, and Haji Agha Seid Hussein, and one of their sisters.

Therefore gave evidence Agha Seid Abdul Hussein Khan, on behalf of Agha Mohammed Zaman, and Haji Agha Seid Mohammed on his behalf, and on behalf of his brother and sister, and legally transferred the amount of 6 krans out of the two-thirds of the two pieces of land mentioned above to Haji Mohammed Hassan Alam for 60 krans, which was received after necessary confessions for the said transfer were made; consequently, from what is stated in this document from beginning to end, full legal two-thirds of the two pieces of land herein referred to have been entirely excluded from the ownership of original owners, and given possession to Haji Mohammed Hassan Alam, who has full authority to exercise ownership powers over the land in question and deal with the same as he likes.

This was drawn up and concluded on the 25th Shaval, 1319. I, the Undersigned, Mohammed Hassan Alam, have concluded this Agreement on behalf of Haji Mouin Tujjar.

(Sealed) HAJI MOHAMMED HASSAN ALAM.

Witnesses' seals—

ABDUL HUSSEIN.	MOHAMMED KAZIM.
MOHAMMED HUSSEIN.	ASSADULLAH.
MOHAMMED KAZIM.	JAVAD.
AGHA KHAN.]	SEID MOHAMMED.
REZA.	MOHAMMED KAZIM.
ABDUL FATH.	MOHAMMED NEBI
MOHAMMED, son of Assadullah.	SEID MOHAMMED REZA.

This was drawn up with my knowledge.  
(Sealed) AZAM-EL-SULTANEH.

This is a true copy of the original in the Foreign Office.  
(Sealed) MEFTAH-ES-SULTANEH.

*Messrs. Lynch Brothers' Case.*

Document No. 5.

(Translation.)

This is to state that gave evidence, Agha Seid Hashem and Agha Seid Mostapha, the sons of the late Haji Seid Abdullah Tahtabai, and legally transferred, according to the separate deed showing individual shares held by them, one portion of Shellilieh lands, having been inherited by them from their father, being place of Haji Mouin Tujjar's stores and bounded as follows:—

*South.*—Beginning of Haji Seid Mohammed's portion at a distance of 6 zars, extending to the other side of store wall.

*North.*—Mooring post of Shushan.

*East.*—From wall of Haji Mouin Tujjar's store to the river bank.

*West.*—To distance of 15 zars from wall of Haji Mouin Tujjar's store, together with full and legal half of one cultivated piece of the said Cham lands adjoining same, including all its belongings with appurtenances, without exception, to Haji Agha Mohammed Hassan Alam for the sum of 300 tomans, being equal to 3,000 silver krans, one miscal coin, being received, thus settling all and any claims, by transfer of one Shushter maund of sugar and 10 current krans, both of which were received on consent of both parties.

Accordingly, necessary legal confessions for the transfer, also for cancelling any possible claims, were made between, according to religious law. It would therefore be inadmissible hereafter for the transferers, their agents, or heirs to make any possible claims about the money paid or the thing exchanged for against the buyer, who is furnished with full authority to exercise his rightful claim over same, according to his wish, this transaction and transfer having been concluded in the most accurate and amicable way, and the property purchased is entirely excluded from ownership of

the said transferers, being full possession to the buyer who considers it his own property.

This was drawn up on the 25th Jamadi-ul-Aval, 1325.

Witnesses' seals showing that the copy is according to the original.

MUHAMMED FAHER.	KHUDA KARAM.
ABU TALIB.	MOHAMMED KAZIM.
MOHAMMED HOSSAIN.	MOHAMMED TAHER.
NASRULLAH.	MOHAMMED HASSAN.
MOHAMMED TAHER.	MAHMOOD.
HOSSAIN.	MOHAMMED.
ABDUL HOSSAIN.	

This is a true copy of the original, and this transaction was concluded in my presence, being perfectly correct.

(Signed) BESHARAT-UL-MAMALIK.

*Shushter Telegraph Office.*

Document No. 6.

*Sadat Calantari to Moin-ut-Tojjar.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Shushter, June 15, 1908.*

The title-deed you have received from us does not include the Cham of Haji Said Mohammed. The land which he has leased to Messrs. Lynch is a part of Shellilieh and his own property. Please appoint an agent so that the land sold to you by us may be defined.

Inclosure 5 in No. 527.

*Consul McDouall to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.*

Gentlemen,

*Mohammerah, October 4, 1907.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 23rd September regarding land at Shellilieh, I have the honour to inform you that I have duly registered a copy of the deed of agreement and here wish to return the document.

In my opinion, the document is perfectly legal and could not be successfully contested by either party, unless a properly executed deed of subsequent date were produced stating that this one was cancelled.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. McDOUALL.

Inclosure 6 in No. 527.

*Deed of Agreement between Seyeds, Mohammed, Hashem, and Mostafa, regarding Division of Ground at Shellilieh.*

EXHIBITED by Messrs. Lynch Brothers the 26th day of September, 1907, and returned to them this 4th day of October, 1907, after retaining a true and faithful copy in the archives of the Consulate at Muhammerah.

(Signed) W. McDOUALL.



[12117]

No. 528.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 46.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 8, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 134 of the 6th instant, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bushire, inclosing a Memorandum in which His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah reports a conversation held with Sheikh Khazzal on the subject of the option for a Karun Irrigation Concession recently given to M. de Sturler by the Persian Government.

The arguments of the Sheikh as therein reported, coupled with the information which Mr. Akers, who had recently visited Mohammerah, was able to give me in regard to the Sheikh's deep anxiety for the protection of his own interests, and his practical power to check the execution of any irrigation scheme which ran counter to these interests, caused me to regard in a more favourable light the suggestion, from which I was at first instinctively averse, at all events until the situation had further developed itself, that he should on his own behalf telegraph to the Persian Government the claims of his interests to consideration in connection with irrigation projects.

I also transmit a copy of the draft Concession which, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me, M. de Sturler has been seeking to obtain. In communicating this document to me Saad-ed-Dowleh said that he had not yet given the terms of the proposed contract his consideration, as he thought that the formation of a Syndicate was an indispensable preliminary to any negotiations for the conversion of the option into a Concession.

I am forwarding a copy of the draft Concession to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, who, as I understand from Mr. Akers, is about to proceed to Mohammerah, where he will have the advantage of submitting it to Sir W. Willcocks, who is going thither to study the Karun waters as affecting the irrigation work which he is now executing for the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 528.

*Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 16. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, February 6, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 54, dated the 2nd February, 1909, regarding the Karun Irrigation Scheme, I have the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a Memorandum which I have received from Mr. McDouall, His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah, recording the substance of a conversation he had with Sheikh Khazzal (the Sardar Arfa) on the subject of the optional Concession granted to the late Netherland Minister.

I have, &c.  
(In the absence of the Consul-General),  
(Signed) A. P. TREVOR, Captain,  
First Assistant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 528.

*Memorandum of Conversation between Consul McDouall and Sardar Arfa regarding Ahwaz Irrigation, January 27, 1909.*

(Confidential.)

I GAVE the Sardar Arfa the information contained in Legation telegrams to Assistant Resident, Bushire, and asked for his views.

He recalled that Sir A. Hardinge advised him that any opposition to an irrigation scheme should be made by him in the name of the tribesmen, and unless the Concession were in his hands the Arabs would undoubtedly prevent it being carried

out. He could inform the Persian Government of this, either direct or through the Legation, but would like to know our views, and would like instructions ("dastur el amal") from the Legation as to his action, as was done in the case of the establishment of the customs. I pointed out that at present things were not far enough advanced; it was only an option and the Legation had reserved the right to object. As to his views on the subject, he thought it would be better that the Ahwaz barrage scheme should not be carried out, but if not now it would be some day. There were other less costly schemes. If the loan discussed with Major Cox on his last visit could be arranged he would try to obtain through Nizam-es-Sultaneh (Sardar Mukarrem), who claims it, the right to Nahr Hashem, and restore the Kerkha or at least the Shawur irrigation. The Nahr Hashem dam only broke some seventy-five years ago, and if rebuilt the old canals could easily be repaired by the tribesmen. If the Ahwaz barrage had to be made, the country belongs to him and his tribesmen, and the latter would certainly object, and if foreigners or Persians tried to make it, would prevent them. If he obtained the Concession he could only work it if assisted by British capital, and in that case he could gradually persuade the tribesmen to acquiesce by promising them irrigated land on easy terms or other concessions, and persuading them that it was in the tribal interest to have the works carried out, which would take time. In no case could he compel them by force to agree—that would upset the whole tribal organization, and reduce the country to the lawless state of other parts, which up to now had been avoided, and would seriously affect other British enterprises on the Karun or its neighbourhood.

I impressed on him the necessity of keeping us fully informed on the subject and of his views. He said that he quite agreed to that, but placed himself in the hands of the Legation, and looked to them to keep him informed and to instruct him what to do.

On the 29th, on reading above to Sardar Arfa, he wished to add that if he himself had the capital to make the Ahwaz dam he would not require a Concession, as it is his or his tribesmen's own land, but to satisfy foreign capital it would be necessary. He later sent Haji Rais Tujar, who said that the Sardar Arfa had heard nothing whatever from the Persian Government on this subject since the present Shah's accession. As now, they have given the option of a Concession without telling him they may later give the Concession without his knowledge. Therefore he thinks it advisable to telegraph to the Nizam-es-Sultaneh, who is with the Shah, that the Arabs are disturbed by a talk of Concessions to foreigners in Ahwaz neighbourhood, and if such were given they would not agree to it; if Government gives such Concession they would throw over ("sarfi nazar az") 50,000 Arabs. He would like to know at once if the Legation approves of his sending such a telegram. The Government would probably deny that they had any intention of giving a Concession which would be a sort of bond ("sanad") in his hands for future use.

(Signed) W. McDOUALL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 528.

*Convention between the Netherland Legation at Tehran and Persian Government.*

LA Légation Royale des Pays-Bas à Téhéran et le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse sont tombés d'accord sur ce qui suit :—

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse s'engage envers la Légation Royale des Pays-Bas à Téhéran de donner une Concession, ayant le contenu de l'annexe, à chaque Société présentée au Gouvernement Impérial par la Légation Royale des Pays-Bas.

## ARTICLE 2.

La présente Convention sera valable pour une durée de deux années à partir de la date de la signature.

Fait en triple à Téhéran, le .



## Inclosure 4 in No. 528.

*Draft Concession.*

LE Gouvernement Impérial de Perse donne à la Société Hollandaise Agricole d'Ahwaz la Concession pour une durée de quatre-vingt-dix-neuf années du droit exclusif d'exploiter une surface de terrain de 500,000 hectares située aux alentours d'Ahwaz et du Fleuve Karoun.

2. La Société, dont le siège sera établi en Hollande, sera une Société en actions. Le Directeur-Général de la Société et le Président-Commissaire du Conseil d'Administration ainsi que le Directeur Technique à Ahwaz seront de nationalité hollandaise.

Les membres du Conseil d'Administration ne peuvent pas être plus qu'un tiers de la même nationalité.

3. La Société est libre de faire sur ces terrains toutes sortes de constructions et de travaux, y compris des canaux, des digues, des ports, des routes, &c., qui seront nécessaires pour l'irrigation et pour l'agriculture, et indispensables pour l'exploitation et la réussite de l'entreprise.

4. La Société est autorisée de prendre l'eau d'irrigation des rivières pour l'irrigation, mais tout cela doit être fait de façon à ne pas affecter la navigation sur le Bas-Karoun, depuis Ahwaz jusqu'à Mohammerah.

5. Les terrains seront irrigués par la Société en lots ne dépassant pas 6,000 hectares chacun.

6. La Société est autorisée à vendre, au nom du Gouvernement Impérial, ces terrains irrigués par lots, et à des conditions à stipuler par la Société. Des prix de vente de ces terrains la Société payera au Gouvernement Impérial la somme de 100 fr. par hectare et 10 pour cent du surplus de chaque prix de vente par hectare.

7. La Société aura le droit d'installer sur ces terrains un service de police, qui sera reconnu par les autorités persanes.

8. Les machines, bateaux, et le matériel appartenant à la Société et destiné pour les travaux et l'exploitation d'Ahwaz, ainsi que les effets appartenant au personnel de la Société, seront exempts des droits d'entrée en Perse.

9. La Société aura la préférence pour tout autre travail ou toute autre nouvelle entreprise agricole dans les environs de la Concession et des deux rives du Fleuve Karoun. La Société devra s'exprimer, le cas échéant, endéans six mois après la date de l'offre du Gouvernement Impérial.

10. La Société a le droit exclusif de faire des explorations et des exploitations minières sur le terrain donné en Concession ainsi que sur les terrains au-dedans de 10 kilom. de la Concession.

11. La Société sera considérée par le Gouvernement Impérial comme "créancier privilégié," le cas échéant, et elle jouira des droits qui s'ensuivent de cette considération.

12. Quand la production du blé sur les terrains de la Concession dépasse 3,500 kharwars par année, la prohibition de l'exportation du blé (improprement connu sous le nom d' "embargo") sera levée.

13. Tout différend entre le Gouvernement Impérial et la Société sera arrangé à l'amiable par arbitrage, les procès étant absolument exclus.

A cet effet le Gouvernement Impérial et la Société nomment chacun un Arbitre, qui procéderont immédiatement, de commun accord, au choix d'un Surarbitre, qui tranchera le différend en dernier ressort.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et la Société s'engagent à accepter le jugement final du Surarbitre.

Ce Surarbitre sera choisi parmi les Ministres des Puissances européennes Représentées à Téhéran.

Fait à Téhéran en triple, ce

[Inclosure 5 in No. 528.]

*Draft Contract between Persian Government and M. D. L. Graat van Roggen.*

LE Gouvernement Impérial de Perse, représenté par \_\_\_\_\_, d'une part, et le sieur D. L. Graat van Roggen, Ingénieur, d'autre part, sont convenus et ont stipulé comme suit :—

1. Le Soussigné d'autre part s'engage au service du Gouvernement Impérial de Perse comme Ingénieur et Conseiller Technique pour l'Europe pour la durée de trois années à partir de la date de la signature du droit d'option de la Concession d'Ahwaz par Sa Majesté le Schah.

2. Le Soussigné d'autre part reste à la disposition du Gouvernement Impérial de Perse pour le cas où le Gouvernement donnera en Concession l'entreprise d'Ahwaz, pour faire tout le nécessaire pour la réussite de cette entreprise.

3. Le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse s'oblige à payer au Soussigné d'autre part des gages annuels, s'élevant à 10,000 fr., payables en quatre trimestres, chaque fois 2,500 fr. le premier jour du trimestre.

4. Ces gages seront remis par le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse au Représentant du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas accrédité à Téhéran, ou bien, en cas d'absence, au Ministre de Russie à Téhéran.

5. A moins que les parties contractantes se préviennent mutuellement au moins trois mois d'avance, il est entendu que le présent contrat sera considéré renouvelé chaque fois pour la durée d'une année, sans notice spéciale.

Fait à Téhéran, ce

Le Soussigné d'une part,

Le Soussigné d'autre part,

[12118]

No. 529.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 47.)

Sir,

*Tehran, March 8, 1909.*

WITH reference to Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 37 of the 20th January last, I have the honour to report that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires approached me on the subject of the protection desired by the Zil-es-Sultan's servants, mentioned in His Highness' letter to Sir F. Bertie of the 16th January.

In accordance with M. Sabline's request I instructed His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan to extend his good offices to the persons in question, and the Russian Consul-General received similar instructions.

In view of your despatch No. 42 of the 27th January to Sir F. Bertie, I have now instructed Mr. Grahame by telegraph to be careful to make his good offices of as non-committal a nature as possible.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[12203]

No. 530.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 208.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, March 30, 1909.*

BUSHIRE customs receipts.

I have received the following telegram, No. 71/263, dated yesterday, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire :—

" Referring to your telegram No. 68 of the 27th instant, I received late last night the first definite response from Seyyid Murteza, which was communicated to me by an intermediary to whom it had been sent in the form of a formal letter.

" The Seyyid begins by stating that to preserve the undoubted interests of His Majesty's Government and the British nation is one of the first duties of the Nationalists. He goes on to say that he proposes, in order to reassure the Residency and satisfy them in the question of the customs receipts, as a regular arrangement, that the Nationalist party should retain for daily expenses in connection with the maintenance of the force of riflemen a sum of 500 tomans a-day, and that the balance should be placed with some trustworthy Persian merchant to be selected by both parties and should remain in trust with him for three months. During that period the Nationalist party should defer giving their final reply. In the meantime they would ascertain their duty from the



other centres of the Nationalist movement or His Majesty's Government should produce documents in proof of their claim.

"I venture to make the following observations on the preceding paragraph:—

"1. The terms which we have been trying to obtain are that the balance of the receipts should be paid into the Imperial Bank of Persia to our account by the Nationalists after subtraction of 250 tomans a-day for expenses.

"2. In his above-mentioned letter Seyyid Murteza states that his answer has been drawn up in consultation with the Nationalist local Assembly, of which he poses as President. As a matter of fact he has hitherto kept the customs receipts himself and has been unable to form any local Assembly. Receipts amounted on the 26th, 27th, and 28th instant to 2,900, 400, and 500 tomans respectively.

"The following is the present position: Seyyid Murteza is a fanatical half-educated Mullah. His control of the situation is merely due to the fact that he can at any moment call to Bushire from the hinterland, of which he is a native, a horde of Tangistani riflemen as he did on the present occasion. The number actually here is about 1,000, but others are coming in daily. The Persians, whether Nationalists or others, have no faith in the personal integrity or *bona fides* of the Seyyid, and it may be assumed that merchants will, so long as he keeps his control of the situation, import and clear as little merchandise as possible, consequently receipts will be very low. The petty depredations of the Tangistani riflemen keep the native population of Bushire in perpetual fear, and they very generally express the opinion that nothing can restore tranquillity short of some kind of intervention on our part. In view of the desire of His Majesty's Government to avoid action of this nature as long as possible, I am replying, pending further instructions from you, to the Seyyid, whose personal attitude is outwardly cordial to His Majesty's Residency, that I note with pleasure his protestations of friendship, but that I cannot consider that British interests are in any way safeguarded by his offer, and that I shall treat his proposals as a basis for further friendly but serious negotiations between us.

"Until I receive further instructions from you I will try to persuade the Seyyid to reduce the amount of the receipts retained by him daily and to obtain his consent to some suitable temporary arrangement by which the balance may be placed in safe custody; also to get him to reduce the number of riflemen, and to secure the association with himself of some reliable persons for the transaction of current local affairs.

"He keeps a strict surveillance over the late Governor and Karguzar and has placed strong guards over their houses. I have done what I could on their behalf.

"The newsagents of the Russian Consulate and Residency report that the stubborn attitude of the Seyyid in regard to the question of the customs is to be attributed to the German Consulate. There is no specific evidence for this, though of course it is conceivable."

[12204]

No. 531.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 209.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 30, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

I have received the following telegram No. 72/264, dated yesterday, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"Referring to my immediately preceding telegram, His Majesty's ship 'Redbreast' is here. There is no special urgency, so far as British subjects are concerned, which would prompt me at present to ask for further force. The complement of bluejackets of the 'Redbreast' is, however, extremely small, and the foreign Consuls and their subjects are getting rather nervous. His Majesty's Government having, as I understand, assumed responsibility for the protection of foreign subjects, I think that a cruiser with a complement of 200 to 300 white men should be sent here. I make this suggestion with a view to precluding an application from the foreign Representatives to their Governments for protection, which I presume His Majesty's Government would wish to avoid."

[12205]

No. 532.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 210.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 30, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

I have sent the following telegram No. 71 to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"It should be impressed on the Seyyid that His Majesty's Government attach very great importance to the regular payment into the Imperial Bank of a monthly instalment (I leave to your discretion the amount in excess of 30,000 tomans) on account of the interest due on British loans which are secured on the Bushire customs revenue. You should also warn him that I may have to recommend to His Majesty's Government measures to secure the payment of these instalments.

"It surprises me that the Seyyid is not satisfied with your word as a proof of our rights.

"I approve your reply to the Seyyid, as also the course which you propose in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 263."

[12206]

No. 533.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 30, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

Telegrams Nos. 263 and 264 from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.

It appears that Seyyid Murteza does not realize the importance which His Majesty's Government attaches to the monthly instalments from the Bushire customs being paid regularly.

He would doubtless be brought to reason by the arrival of a cruiser, as suggested by Major Cox, and this would at the same time quiet the apprehensions of the foreign Consuls by assuming the protection of all foreigners in the event of disturbances.

I have visited M. Sabline and explained to him the situation at Bushire.

[12207]

No. 534.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 212.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 30, 1909.

RIOTS at Kermanshah.

Riots, chiefly directed against the Jews, have taken place at Kermanshah. Several Jews have been killed. The house of a British subject was pillaged by troops. I am making a strong complaint to the Persian Government against the local authorities, and am demanding compensation for the damage to British property.

Captain Haworth seems to have done all in his power to calm the situation.

[12212]

No. 535.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 213.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 30, 1909.

COSSACK Brigade.

I am informed by my Russian colleague that the Russian officers employed with the Cossack Brigade in Tehran have been removed from the Russian service. They are, however, asking for permission to go back to Russia and re-enter their regiments.

The Russian officers are the only sure element here which tend to the maintenance of order in the event of disturbances arising, and their departure from Tehran at this moment is not unattended with danger.

In view of the observations which I made on this subject in my telegrams Nos. 383,

[1629]

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392, 394, and 452 of 1908, I understood your telegram No. 196 to Sir A. Nicolson as merely suggesting a threat which there was no intention of putting into execution; and I did not feel that any expression of opinion from me was called for, as the suggestion seemed unobjectionable.

I presume from a reperusal of the correspondence relative to this question that this step has been taken by the Russian Government on their own initiative, and not in deference to His Majesty's Government's representations.

[12213]

No. 536.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)*

(No. 214.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 30, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

His Majesty's Consul-General telegraphs that the situation at Tabreez is going from bad to worse. Several persons have been starved to death.

The military party are determined to continue the struggle, though a section of the Nationalists are ready to treat for peace. Satar Khan says that the population must leave the town when the general stock of food is exhausted. He says that a reserve is being kept for the fighting men.

The fate of foreign subjects in such an event is evidently causing Mr. Wratislaw some apprehension.

[11765]

No. 537.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 117.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 30, 1909.

I APPROVE the action which you have taken, as reported in your telegrams Nos. 200, 202, and 205 of the 28th instant.

[12287]

No. 538.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)*

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 31, 1909.

NATIONALISTS and the Bushire customs receipts.

Referring to my telegram No. 210 of yesterday, I have sent the following telegram No. 75 to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"I am informed by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that the Nationalists have respected the Russian lien on the customs not only at Tabreez, but also at Mashad-i-Sar and Astrabad, and have not touched the customs receipts at these places.

"Following is very confidential: I am hoping to have a hint to the Seyyid to be more reasonable conveyed to him from the proper quarter here.

"It would be better, in view of the above, to postpone for the present giving the warning which I indicated in my telegram No. 71. The action of the Nationalists in regard to the northern customs on which the Russians have a lien should carry weight as an argument with Seyyid Murteza."

[12213]

No. 539.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 436.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 31, 1909.

PLEASE ask the Russian Government to convey a warning to the Shah similar to that indicated in my telegram No. 118 of to-day's date to Sir G. Barclay repeated to you.

[12213]

No. 540.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 31, 1909.

IN view of the serious state of affairs at Tabreez, reported in your telegram No. 214 of the 30th instant, the Shah should be warned that His Majesty's Government will hold him responsible for any harm done to His Majesty's Consulate or to British lives and property.

A request is being made to the Russian Government to send similar instructions to their Representative at Tehran.

[11759]

No. 541.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 31, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reporting on the recent interview of the Resident in the Persian Gulf with the Sheikh of Mohammerah.\*

Sir E. Grey proposes, with Viscount Morley's concurrence, to approve Sir G. Barclay's action in informing Major Cox that the action contemplated by the Sheikh in regard to the disposal of the customs receipts is unobjectionable, but to await a further communication from Sir G. Barclay before taking any other action in the matter.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

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\* No. 514.